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Abstract 
 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism is a work in normative political 
philosophy. In particular, it is a work on liberal approaches to 
cultural diversity. The work assesses some of the benefits and 
limitations of liberal multiculturalism (broadly conceived) and 
develops a more individuated, yet culturally sensitive, approach to 
cultural diversity. 
The two main parts of the work discuss the normative 
justifications and rationales for differentiated rights within 
liberalism (Part I) and the more practical problems of applying 
these rights in practice (Part II). 
The first three chapters (Part I) analyse the so-called autonomy-, 
toleration- and equality-based approaches to cultural diversity as 
presented by Will Kymlicka, Chandran Kukathas and Brian Barry. 
This part argues that the autonomy-, toleration- and equality-based 
approaches provide frameworks within which the liberal responses 
to cultural diversity should reside, but fail to give any definitive 
guidance into how the liberal state should react to cultural diversity 
in particular circumstances. These approaches leave a substantive 
scope of variation to the cultural policies of the liberal state, 
including the possibility, albeit not a requirement, to grant 
differentiated rights. 
The three latter chapters (Part II) develop a more individuated, 
yet culturally sensitive, approach to cultural diversity by 
concentrating on the further issues of allocating differentiated 
rights. The first chapter (Ch. 4) highlights the difficulties of 
defining one’s membership in a cultural group and argues that, in 
order to track their targets, the individually exercised differentiated 
rights should be allocated in accordance with need or self-
identification. Chapter 5 develops the individual-centred approach 
further by concentrating on the issues of the right of exit, and the 
liberal state’s responses to those who have decided to leave the 
contours of their group without rejecting their identity as a member. 
The final chapter (Ch. 6) focuses on the legal-theoretical debate on 
allowing cultural defence in criminal courts and gives an 
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application of the individuated approach in the criminal justice 
system. 
The main claims of the work are that the liberal multiculturalists 
have been successful in clarifying the grounds upon which the 
liberal responses to cultural diversity should reside and in showing 
that the culturally differentiated rights (variously construed) are not 
necessarily incompatible with liberalism. The liberal multicultural 
theories do not, however, give any definitive guidance on how the 
liberal state should respond to cultural diversity, nor do they always 
take sufficiently into account the variations within (and without) 
cultural groups. The work rejects the common assumption of 
differentiated rights as specifically group-differentiated rights, and 
argues for a more individuated approach that, nevertheless, takes 
people’s cultural commitments and their group identities seriously. 
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Introduction 
 
Cultural diversity – the existence of several cultural and religious 
groups within one society – is an inalienable element of western 
liberal democracies. The fact of cultural diversity, however, is not 
entirely unproblematic, as different groups, and their members, may 
also hold different norms, values and world views that are 
sometimes incompatible with the general norms of society. The 
incompatibility of different norms, as well as particular cultural or 
religious practices, raises questions about how the state should 
respond to cultural diversity, and how – and if – these differences 
should be accommodated.  
From the perspective of liberal political theory and philosophy, 
the questions of cultural accommodation are various. Why should 
the liberal state be concerned about people’s cultural differences, or 
culturally induced disadvantages? How should the liberal state 
respond to these differences? Upon what grounds should the state 
base its cultural policies? Can these policies, including a variety of 
minority or culturally differentiated rights, even be justified within 
the liberal framework? And if they can, to whom should they be 
granted? 
In this work, I address some, although by no means all of these 
normative questions relating to cultural diversity. The title of this 
work, Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism, refers to my aim to 
expose some of the theoretical as well as practical limitations of 
some of the major liberal approaches to cultural diversity,1 although 
this work should not be read as simply a critique of liberal 
multiculturalism. On the contrary, one of the main claims of this 
work is that the debates on multiculturalism, and especially on 
liberal multiculturalism, have been extremely important in 
clarifying the grounds upon which the liberal responses to cultural 
diversity must reside, and in explicating the reasons for the liberal 
state to be concerned about cultural disadvantages. They have also 
been extremely important in showing that culturally differentiated 
                                                 
1 These approaches include the autonomy-based, diversity-based and 
equality-based approaches to cultural diversity, to be discussed in Part I 
(Ch. 1, 2 and 3). 
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rights (variously construed) are not, as has often been thought, 
incompatible with liberalism, but that there is scope for the liberal 
state to aim at rectifying cultural disadvantages by culturally 
differentiated rights. 
Having said that, I also argue that the theoretical debates on 
liberal multiculturalism have not been able to give any conclusive 
guidance to how the liberal state should respond to cultural 
diversity, but that the complexity of issues relevant for any 
particular cases render the liberal multicultural theories somewhat 
silent with respect to the appropriate means of responding to 
cultural diversity. This, of course, is not a very novel idea, as the 
gap between political theories and political practice is well known 
as well as widely discussed. The approach developed in this work, 
however, provides some new means for narrowing this gap. It 
points out some of the issues often ignored within liberal 
multicultural theory that are, nevertheless, essential for the concrete 
application of these theories in practice.  
First and foremost, this work is a defence of a more individuated 
approach to cultural diversity and, especially, a more individuated 
approach to the allocation of culturally differentiated rights. As an 
individuated approach it is, however, still an approach that takes 
people’s cultural belonging and their group identity seriously, 
although it denies the common view of differentiated rights as 
specifically group-differentiated rights. During the course of this 
work, I look at issues of cultural membership, cultural identity and 
cultural motivation,2 and argue that a more individuated approach, 
consistent both with the basic tenets of liberalism as well as 
multiculturalism, is needed in order for the liberal multicultural 
theory to be applicable in practice, as well as in order for the 
multicultural policies to perform the tasks they are set to perform. 
This study is divided into two main sections (Part I and Part II), 
and a background section on liberalism, multiculturalism, and 
liberal multiculturalism. The main substance of this work lies in 
                                                 
2 The issues relating to cultural membership, identity and motivation are 
discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
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Parts I and II, although it is clear that the arguments developed in 
these parts are situated as well as based on the theoretical 
frameworks outlined previously. 
In the Background, I outline the framework within which this 
work operates, including an exposition of those basic values and 
principles that, I believe, any liberal theory of multiculturalism 
must be committed to. The two first sections of this background, 
What is liberalism? and What is multiculturalism?, also bring forth 
several conceptual clarifications, both with respect to the key values 
of liberalism as well as to the key concepts of multiculturalism. The 
main arguments, as well as the motivation of this work, are outlined 
in the final section, Liberal multiculturalism and its limits, in which 
I also situate my work within the theoretical debates on 
multiculturalism. 
The first main part of this book, Part I: Justifying minority 
rights: the grand theories and their constraints, concentrates 
mainly on the questions of consistency and on the difficulties that 
the general frameworking of debates within liberal political theory 
has brought for the so-called grand theories of multiculturalism to 
be applicable in practice. The first chapter, Kymlicka’s liberal 
multiculturalism, concentrates on the equality based arguments for 
multiculturalism, as put forth especially by Will Kymlicka, and 
looks at the scope within which these arguments can be used to give 
rationale for the liberal state being concerned about and to try to 
rectify, people’s cultural disadvantages. Whereas this chapter builds 
a strong case for the liberal state to take cultural disadvantages 
seriously, it also cautions against too straight forward an application 
of minority rights as the appropriate means for rectifying these 
disadvantages. Chapter two, Autonomy vs. toleration, looks at the 
now famous debate between autonomy- and diversity liberalism 
and assesses the extent to which the liberal commitment to the 
value of individual autonomy must operate as one of the side 
constraints for the justifiability of allowing cultural groups to 
conduct their internal affairs. This chapter argues that even those 
rejecting the role of the liberal state in protecting or promoting 
individual autonomy must be committed to some minimal 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
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protection of the conditions for individual autonomy, although they 
do not need to commit themselves to the role of the liberal state in 
promoting individual autonomy. Chapter three, Liberal 
egalitarianism and equality of opportunity, turns to a more specific 
discussion on equality of opportunity and the so-called liberal 
egalitarian critique of the rule and exemption approach. By looking 
at different conceptualisations of equality of opportunity as well as 
different normative issues incorporated in cultural exemptions, this 
chapter argues for a default position for the liberal state to try to 
rectify those disadvantages that result from the incompatibility of 
particular cultural practices and general rules and norms of society. 
This default position, however, constitutes nothing as strong as a 
requirement for the liberal state to grant cultural exemptions in 
specific cases, although it does explicate the rationale through 
which these exemptions may be justified. 
The second part, Part II: Liberal multiculturalism and minority 
rights in practice, builds up a more individuated, yet culturally 
sensitive approach to allocating differentiated rights and assesses 
some of the implications of this approach to the cultural policies of 
the liberal state. Chapter four, Liberal multiculturalism, group 
membership, and allocation of differentiated rights, looks at the 
theoretical difficulties and discrepancies of defining group 
membership and argues for a more individuated, yet culturally 
sensitive, approach for allocating differentiated rights in practice. 
This chapter argues that, in order to track their targets, individually 
exercised differentiated rights should not be allocated on the basis 
of group membership, but rather on the basis of individual needs 
and self-identifications. Chapter five, Exit, identity, and 
membership, assesses some of the implications of this individuated 
approach to the debates on the right of exit, including one’s 
understanding of exit and the role of the liberal state in 
guaranteeing right of exit to everyone. By focusing on the identity 
forming functions of belonging, this chapter suggests that the 
liberal state should continue recognizing people as members of 
cultural or religious groups even after they have exited the contours 
of their group without renouncing their identity as a member of that 
Introduction 
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group. Chapter six, Liberal individualism and cultural defence, 
transfers the more theoretical discussions of the previous chapters 
into the context of criminal courts, considering the usage of cultural 
defence in those courts. By looking at the ways in which actions (in 
these cases, crimes) can be motivated by culture, this chapter points 
towards a more sophisticated, individual centred approach for 
assessing people’s cultural motivations, in order for the criminal 
courts to treat all members of minority cultural groups fairly and 
equally. Together these chapters question the common assumptions 
of differentiated rights as specifically group-differentiated rights 
and argue for a liberal, individuated approach to cultural diversity 
that, nevertheless, takes people’s cultural commitments and their 
group identities seriously. 
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Background 
 
Liberalism, multiculturalism, and  
liberal multiculturalism 
 
Liberal multicultural theories (broadly conceived) stand in a very 
specific relation to both liberalism as well as multicultural policies. 
From the 1990’s onwards, many of the debates on multiculturalism 
have been conducted within the framework of liberalism and the 
questions of cultural accommodation have been approached from 
the perspective of the liberal state. The key questions of liberal 
multiculturalists have involved questions about the justifiability of 
minority rights within liberalism, although many have also argued 
for specific kinds of policies for the liberal state to respond to 
people’s cultural differences.  
In this background section, I shed some light on the framework 
within which this work is situated, by looking at some of the 
commonalities, as well as differences, between different theories of 
liberal multiculturalism. I begin (section 1) by looking at those 
basic values and principles that, I believe, any liberal theory of 
multiculturalism must be based on, before turning into the key 
questions and controversies of multiculturalism and cultural 
accommodation (section 2). In the final section (Liberal 
multiculturalism and its limits), I return to the basic framework of 
debates between liberalism, liberal multiculturalism and 
multicultural policies and, by way of doing so, also outline the basic 
motivation and arguments of this work.  
 
1. What is liberalism? 
Liberalism, as a school of thought, constitutes no unified viewpoint 
or theory, but rather a cluster of different types of theories as well 
as competing viewpoints placed under the rubric of the liberal 
tradition.3 As my focus, in this work, is on liberal political theory 
                                                 
3 The liberal tradition, of course, may not be any easier to define than 
liberalism itself, although the historical roots of liberalism can be traced 
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and, more specifically, on liberal multiculturalism, I wish to focus 
on those commitments that, I believe, any contemporary liberal 
theory of multiculturalism should be committed to. Any political 
theory, after all, needs to be committed to something in order to be 
called a liberal theory. In this section, I thus aim to identify those 
basic values and principles central to any contemporary liberal 
theory of multiculturalism, although I also show some legitimate 
variation in how these values and principles can be understood. 
 
1.1. Liberal individualism 
Although the notion of liberal individualism and, especially, the 
notion of the individuated self has attracted vast amounts of 
criticism,4 there is no denying that, at the very heart of liberal 
political theory lies some commitment to the individual and the 
moral primacy of the individual. According to liberalism, what 
matters, in the end, is the individual: how her life goes, her well-
being. There may, of course, be substantive disagreements on how 
to judge, or whether it is even possible to judge, individual well-
being or what this well-being entails, but these disagreements do 
not take away the central idea, incorporated within any liberal 
political theory, that it is the individual that ultimately counts. For 
liberal political theory, it is the individual that is of utmost 
importance, and this should also be reflected in the political 
organisation of society. 
It should be emphasized, however, that the ethical individualism 
of liberal political theory is, precisely, ethical individualism, and 
does not need to entail any particular metaphysical or ontological 
commitments about the nature of society or about the nature of the 
self. Liberal political theory does not need to (although it surely 
                                                                                                     
back to thinkers such as Locke, Kant and Mill. For historical overview, see 
e.g. Gray 1986. 
4 See esp. communitarian critiques of liberal individualism in: MacIntyre 
1981; Sandel 1982; Taylor 1989, Walzer 1983; for debate and overview, 
Gutmann 1986; Buchanan 1989; Mulhall and Swift 1992, Kymlicka 2002, 
ch. 6. 
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can) be committed to an atomistic view of society.5 It does not need 
to view society simply as an aggregation of its parts (individual 
members), but is compatible with the view according to which 
societies, and smaller groups within societies, are viewed as 
incorporating something more than their individual members (for 
example, shared values, social bonds, common interests, that cannot 
be accounted for with reference to individuals alone). 
Consequently, liberal political theory is compatible with the view 
according to which the interests of society, and of the smaller 
groups within society, may not be reducible to the interests of their 
individual members, but can, at times, even conflict with the 
interests of their individual members. All that the ethical 
individualism of liberal political theory is necessarily committed to 
is that in assessing the organisation of society, or the needs, 
interests or value of society (or smaller groups within society), the 
moral primacy of the individual should prevail. The interests of 
cultural or religious groups, for example, should be assessed in the 
light of how these interests affect individuals, and the value of 
religious or cultural groups (liberalism can, indeed, attach value to 
these groups) must be derived from the value that these groups have 
for individuals. Whereas liberal political theory does, in the ethical 
or normative sense, put the individual first, it does not need to be 
committed to the view according to which other things – groups, 
cultures, religions – could not also matter. Quite clearly, they do – 
but only because they matter to the individuals and to their well-
being. 
The ethical individualism of liberal political theory does not, 
also, need to entail the view of an individual as an unencumbered 
                                                 
5 The atomistic views of society are often connected to classical thinkers 
such as Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, although certain types of social atomism 
can also be found in the work of more recent liberal and/or libertarian 
thinkers, such as Hayek, Rand and Nozick. For Taylor’s classical attack on 
liberal atomism, see: Taylor 1985, ch. 7; for debate, see e.g. Kymlicka 
1989, ch. 5; 2002, ch. 6; Smith 2002, ch. 6; Den Uyl and Rasmussen 2006. 
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and unembedded self.6 Liberal political theory needs not, and – as I 
argue during the course of this work – should not ignore the social 
embeddedness of individuals and the often tremendous influence 
that an individual’s belonging to a particular group may have for 
their identity and well-being. It needs not ignore the social ties of 
individuals, nor does it need to insist that the very core of the 
individual – the true individual self – could somehow be abstracted 
from its social ties or surroundings. What it does, however, need to 
be committed to is that the value of these ties and social 
surroundings needs to be assessed from the standpoint of an 
individual: from how they make individual lives go. As will 
become clear during the course of this work, there may be several 
interpretations to the idea of the individual standpoint, but these 
differences do not take away the basic liberal commitment to the 
moral primacy of the individual. For liberal political theory, 
including liberal multiculturalism, it is, first and foremost, the 
individual that matters, and the social, political and/or economic 
organisation of society should also take this into account. 
 
1.2. Individual liberty, autonomy and equality 
Liberty 
Liberalism, unsurprisingly, is an ideology that attaches value to 
liberty, and to individual liberty more specifically. According to 
liberalism, people should, as a default, be allowed to live their lives 
in whatever manner they wish to, and any interventions into this 
liberty need justification. What liberals do not necessarily agree 
upon, however, is what this liberty means, when it can be infringed 
upon, or how, in any interpretation of the term, it is to be secured.7 
                                                 
6 The terms being coined by Michael Sandel (1982). For liberal responses, 
see e.g. Rawls 1986; 1996; Kymlicka 1989, ch. 4. 
7The classical distinction, given by Isaiah Berlin (1969), between negative 
liberty (incorporating freedom from interference) and positive liberty 
(incorporating also the ability to act) is, in recent political philosophy, 
often supplemented with a third, republican, conception of freedom 
(incorporating freedom from domination, or susceptibility to interference) 
Pettit 1997; 2001; Skinner 2002. Whereas the distinctions between these 
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The contemporary liberal political theorists do, nevertheless, tend to 
agree that people may have very different views on what they find 
valuable and what they consider to be good life and that, to a large 
extent,8 people should be free to pursue their different conceptions 
of the good. In order to guarantee this freedom to everyone 
(liberalism is, in this sense, universalist), the liberal political 
theorists often come to promote some set of basic rights (such as 
freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of expression 
etc.)9 as well as a specific role for the state in guaranteeing these 
basic rights to everyone.10 Although liberal political theorists may 
disagree on the conception of liberty, on the institutional 
mechanisms needed for securing this liberty, as well as on the 
justifiable interferences in individual liberty, what they do agree 
upon is that, as a default, people should be free to live their lives in 
accordance with their own conceptions of the good, and that any 
(state) interference on this liberty needs justification. 
                                                                                                     
three conceptions of liberty do play a part in discussions on liberal 
multiculturalism (most notably, in debates on the right of exit – discussed 
in Ch. 2 and 5), most of the controversies within liberal multiculturalism 
do not need to hang on these differences. Whereas the three main theorists 
discussed in this work, Kymlicka, Kukathas and Barry (Ch. 1, 2 and 3) 
would, most likely, subscribe to slightly different conceptions of 
individual liberty, their main differences do not (at least directly) stem 
from their different conceptions of freedom, but rather from their 
emphases and treatment of other liberal values, such as autonomy and 
equality. 
8 One of the classical formulations of the limits to individual freedom can 
be found in Mill’s famous harm principle. According to Mill, “The sole 
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can rightfully be 
exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, whether physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant.” Mill 1986 [1859], ch. 1, para 9. 
9 There is, no doubt, substantive disagreement on what exactly these basic 
rights are, and liberal theorists have also been notoriously reluctant to 
formulate any conclusive lists of such rights. 
10 I will discuss the role of the liberal state in more detail  in section 1.3. 
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Autonomy 
In the footsteps of Humboldt and Mill, many liberal theorists have 
included individual autonomy as one of the basic values of 
liberalism, and the protection of individual autonomy as one of the 
tasks of the liberal state. Individual autonomy, broadly construed, 
involves the idea of a person living her life from within, of being 
(in part) the author of her own life.11 For many, this entails the idea 
of the individual deciding for herself what is valuable in life, and 
for living her life in accordance with that decision.12  
This idea of individual autonomy, and the role of the liberal state 
in protecting autonomy, has, however, become contested, not least 
among liberal theorists of multiculturalism.13 Not everyone, after 
all, would seem to attach such value to individual autonomy, and 
the freedom to live one’s life in accordance with one’s own 
conception of the good would seem to include also the freedom to 
reject the value of individual autonomy and one’s ability to decide 
for oneself what is valuable in life. The liberal state, aiming to 
protect or even promote individual autonomy, would thus seem to 
be infringing on the freedom of those wanting to reject the value of 
                                                 
11 As Joseph Raz puts it: “The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal 
autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous 
person is a (part) author of his own life. The ideal of personal autonomy is 
the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, 
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives.” (Raz 
1986, 369.)  On a more recent formulation: “Autonomy is an ideal of 
people deciding for themselves what is a valuable life, and living their 
lives in accordance with that decision.” (Colburn 2010, 19.) For alternative 
conceptions, including hierarchy of motives –theories, see Frankfurt 1971; 
Dworkin, G. 1988; for relational conceptions of autonomy, see: 
MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000. 
12 For different views on what this “decision” may involve, ranging from 
well-informed, critical self-reflection to hypothetical affirmation, see e.g. 
Meyers 1989; Friedman 1986; 2003, ch.1; Dworkin, G. 1988; Christman 
1987; 1991. 
13 One such rejection, that of Chandran Kukathas’s, will be discussed in 
more detail in Ch. 2. 
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individual autonomy and wanting to conform to other ideals than 
the ideal of autonomous life. 
In the face of this controversy, a few remarks on the role of 
individual autonomy in liberal political theory may already be in 
order.  
Firstly, with respect to the critique mentioned above, there is no 
reason to presume that a person who rejects the value of individual 
autonomy could not still be considered as living an autonomous 
life. The leading of an autonomous life does not require the person 
to value individual autonomy, although it does require the person to 
decide (in some relevant sense of the term) what is valuable, and to 
be able to live her life accordingly. Secondly, there is no reason to 
think why a life of, say, total submission could not still be a life 
lead from within, as long as the decision (again, in some relevant 
sense of the term) to value submission and to adhere to a life of 
submission, is the person’s own.14 These two considerations do not, 
of course, say anything yet about those cases in which people have 
not decided (in some relevant sense of the term) to adhere to a life 
of submission as a decision of their own, but they do point towards 
the idea that the above mentioned critique may only work against 
some, more substantive conceptions of autonomy.  
Moreover – and most importantly – the disagreements on 
individual autonomy within liberal political theory may not be so 
much disagreements on the status of individual autonomy as a 
liberal value, but disagreements on the role that the liberal state 
should take with respect to individual autonomy. Although it 
certainly remains contested whether the liberal state should be in 
the business of promoting individual autonomy, in this work (esp. 
Ch. 2), I show that even those suspicious of the role of the liberal 
state in promoting individual autonomy may need to subscribe to a 
view that certain minimal conditions for individual autonomy must 
                                                 
14 The proponents of some more substantive conceptions of autonomy may 
reject this, arguing that, in order to be autonomous, the agent’s decisions 
need also be of the right kind. On substantive theories and debate on 
content neutrality, see Benson 1994. 
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be protected, although they do not necessarily need to subscribe to a 
view where the aim of the state policies should be the promotion of 
individual autonomy and autonomous life. 
 
Equality 
Apart from the questions of individual freedom and autonomy, 
within recent decades, much of liberal political theory has 
concentrated on the issues of social justice, and the just organisation 
of liberal institutions.15 For many contemporary liberals, social 
justice – and the incorporated notion of equality16 – operates at the 
very centre of liberal political theory. In its most minimal 
interpretation, liberal equality entails equal moral standing of, and 
concern for, each individual, although, to an increasing extent, it 
has also come to be seen as incorporating the ideal of equal 
distribution of resources or basic goods in society.17 It also 
incorporates the ideal of the liberal state treating all of its members 
with equal concern and respect, although there is, no doubt, 
substantive disagreement on what this equal concern and respect 
amounts to, and to whom it should be extended.18 
                                                 
15 John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) may be described as one of the 
turning points of political philosophy, and it is also a work in relation to 
which much of contemporary analytical work on issues of social justice is 
conducted. 
16 For debate on the relation between justice and equality, see e.g. Cohen 
2008; Arneson 2008. 
17 It should be noted that, for example, Rawls’s theory may not be viewed 
as strictly egalitarian, as his famous difference principle aims rather at 
justifying inequalities than providing for an equal distribution of social and 
economic goods. Nevertheless, taking Rawls’s first principle as well as the 
second part of his second principle (fair equality of opportunity), and 
taking the strong presumption in favour of equality present in the 
difference principle, it is clear that, for Rawls, equality operates as one of 
the fundamental liberal values and is also incorporated in his two 
principles of justice. 
18 Most notably, approaches, broadly labelled under the term “politics of 
recognition”, question the traditional liberal approaches of granting 
individuals certain basic rights as being sufficient for treating them with 
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Liberal egalitarians do, of course, differ on a variety of issues, 
including the currency (equality of what?), scope (equality among 
whom?) and the justificatory basis for equality (equality, why?). 
They do, also, differ on their views on the kinds of equality relevant 
for an egalitarian theory of justice, as well as on the institutional 
frameworks required for the pursuing of equality.19 Whereas the 
views of liberal political theorists do vary, to a substantive degree, 
on a variety of issues relating to equality, they do, nevertheless, 
share a commitment to at least some (minimal) notion of equality. 
For any liberal political theory, including liberal multiculturalism, 
the fundamental commitment to the equal moral worth of 
individuals is untradeable, and the requirement for the liberal state 
to treat (at least) all its members with equal concern seems non-
negotiable. What it means for the liberal state to treat all its 
members with equal concern, and what the role of the liberal state 
should be in a liberal society are, however, highly contested issues, 
of which I will say more in the following subsection (1.3.). 
 
Conflicts of values 
Whereas I believe that any liberal political theory, including liberal 
multiculturalism, must be committed to the basic liberal values of 
individual liberty, autonomy and equality, there may, nevertheless, 
be substantive disagreements on how these values are interpreted, 
and how these interpretations bear upon the wider normative 
questions about the organisation of liberal institutions or liberal 
society. The disagreements among liberal political theorists are not 
only restricted to disagreements about the specific interpretations or 
                                                                                                     
equal respect and concern. (e.g. Taylor 1994; Young  1990; 2000; Fraser 
and Honneth 2003) Many theorists of global justice, on the other hand, 
have questioned the traditional presumptions of the scope of the liberal 
principles of justice, claiming that the egalitarian principles of justice 
(variously construed) should also apply across the globe and not merely 
within some predetermined societies (normally, nation states). (e.g. Pogge 
1989; 2002; Beitz 1979; 2005; Moellendorf 2002; Tan 2004; Caney 2005) 
19 For an excellent overview on contemporary debates on equality, see: 
Holtug and Lippert-Rasmussen 2007. 
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applications of any particular liberal value, but include 
disagreements about the ordering or negotiation of these values. 
The basic liberal values of individual freedom, autonomy and 
equality may, at times, pull in different directions and liberals do, to 
a substantive degree, differ over their views on how to negotiate 
these conflicts.20 For example, certain interpretations of individual 
liberty (say, in the economic sphere) clearly violate certain notions 
of equality, and the trade-offs between different values, within 
liberal political theory, are more of a norm than an exception. Nor 
are these basic values necessarily the only considerations that cause 
disagreement, but other considerations (for example, social stability 
or security) may also play an important part – often, as legitimating 
certain restrictions on individual freedom, autonomy or equality. As 
will be noted time and again in the course of this work, the world is 
a very complex place, and those considerations relevant in one set 
of circumstances may be very different from the considerations 
relevant in another. When applied to concrete political practice, the 
basic liberal values, or the resorting to some basic liberal principles, 
may simply not be enough, as the issues, encountered in the real 
world, are very different from the issues encountered at the level of 
political theory. This is not to say that the theoretical discussions – 
be they on liberalism, multiculturalism or liberal multiculturalism – 
would not be of any importance in debates on concrete political 
practices. It is merely to say that political theories (be they liberal or 
non-liberal) may leave considerable scope for variation in 
legitimate political practices and that the search for theoretical 
normative guidance may not produce the kinds of results wanted, as 
the issues of the real world may not fit neatly to the theoretical 
frameworks of political theorists.21 
                                                 
20 For an on-going debate on the (in)compatibility of equality and liberty, 
see e.g. Dworkin 2002; Narveson and Sterba 2010; articles in May, Sistare 
and Schonsheck 1997. 
21 These remarks about the difficulties of applying political theories or 
theoretical principles into concrete political practice are, of course, not 
new, and it would be foolish to claim that the political theorists (including 
liberal political theorists) would not be aware of such difficulties 
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To make things clear, I do not advocate a view according to 
which political (liberal or non-liberal) theory could not give any 
normative guidance to concrete political practice. I do believe that 
the concrete political responses (be they multicultural policies or 
other ways of responding to cultural diversity), should take the 
basic liberal commitments to the moral primacy of the individual 
and to the basic liberal values of individual liberty, autonomy and 
equality seriously. These basic commitments provide the 
framework within which, not only liberal theory, but also the liberal 
state and society, should operate, as well as considerations that, in 
concrete political practice, cannot be ignored. Whereas it may be an 
open question, how to negotiate between these competing values, 
and what kinds of considerations may justify limitations on 
individual freedom, autonomy and equality, these values, 
nevertheless, must occupy a central place in the negotiations, along 
with the other relevant considerations (that may well vary 
depending on the context and the issue at hand). 
 
1.3. Liberal state and state neutrality 
The basic liberal commitments to the moral primacy of the 
individual and to (at least some notions of) individual freedom, 
autonomy and equality, may not, as already indicated, say much 
about how the liberal state should respond to cultural diversity or to 
other issues in society. Nor do they (directly) say much about how 
the liberal society should be organized, how its institutions should 
operate, or what the role of the state should be in society. Indeed, 
                                                                                                     
themselves. I do, however, believe this point to be worth restating as many 
liberal multiculturalists do, in fact, aim at building frameworks that would 
give normative guidance – sometimes, very specific normative guidance – 
to concrete political practices. Whereas I do, in the course of this work, 
argue that liberal multiculturalists largely fail in this task, this is not to say 
that their efforts would have been completely in vain. Rather, as I discuss 
later in this background (3.1.), the primary target of liberal 
multiculturalists may not have been so much in the directing of actual 
cultural policies, but rather in the modification, or (perhaps more 
accurately) clarification of the liberal theory itself.  
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liberal political theorists disagree, to a considerable extent, on the 
basic structure of society, partially due to their disagreements on the 
nature and the status of the basic liberal values. Having said that, 
liberals do tend to agree on two things. Firstly, they agree that 
people differ, that there may be more than one acceptable way of 
living, and more than one acceptable way of thinking about what is 
valuable in life. Provided that liberals are also committed to 
protecting individual liberty and people’s freedom to pursue their 
own conceptions of the good, they also agree that the basic 
structure of society should be organized in ways that allows, to a 
great degree, people to live their lives in accordance to their own 
conceptions of the good. For many (although not all)22 liberals, this 
has led to a view according to which the liberal state should stay 
neutral with respect to people’s conceptions of the good. 
The notion of state neutrality is itself a very complex one, and 
has been debated extensively among liberal political theorists (and 
their critics).23 Whereas I do not even attempt to build a coherent 
picture of all the debates and issues involved, a few remarks 
relevant for my purposes should be made. Firstly, as I discuss in 
more detail in the upcoming chapters, many have come to question 
the idea of whether the state could ever be neutral with respect to 
people’s different conceptions of the good. The state institutions – 
national languages, public holidays, school curriculums – are 
always reflective of some particular set of values and ways of life 
and, by upholding these institutions, the liberal state necessarily 
supports certain conceptions of the good at the expense of others.24 
This, it may be argued, puts the whole idea of state neutrality into 
                                                 
22 The perfectionist liberals, such as Joseph Raz, reject the ideal of state 
neutrality, claiming that “it is the goal of all political action to enable 
individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good and to discourage evil 
or empty ones” (Raz 1986, 133). 
23 For some defences of state neutrality see: Dworkin 1978;  Ackerman 
1980; Rawls 1996; Gaus 2003; For debate, see e.g. Wall and Klosko 2003. 
24 This is, roughly, the beginning of Will Kymlicka’s equality based 
argument for multiculturalism, discussed in Ch. 1. 
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doubt as, for a functional society, the state cannot but support some 
conceptions of the good over others.25 
Secondly, the liberal proponents of state neutrality may disagree 
on what exactly the requirement of state neutrality amounts to. 
Even if the state institutions and public policies reflected, say, 
Western Christian values and ways of life, this does not necessarily 
constitute a violation of state neutrality. The key distinction here is 
the distinction between neutrality of justification and neutrality of 
effect, and the liberal institutions and state policies, although not 
neutral in effect, may still be neutral in their justification. As will be 
discussed later on in this work (esp. Ch. 3), there is substantive 
disagreement on whether policies that are, apparently, neutral in 
their justification can, nevertheless, be considered as 
discriminatory, should their effects be systematically 
disadvantageous to particular groups of people. The underlying 
liberal standpoint is perhaps better described in terms of the state 
being required to treat all its citizens equally (rather than in terms of 
state neutrality), although, as already indicated, there may be 
substantive disagreements on what this equal treatment amounts to. 
Nevertheless, I believe that for any contemporary liberal political 
theory, including liberal multiculturalism, some commitment to the 
role of the state, not as an explicit advocate or promoter of any 
particular conception of the good, should be maintained.26 The 
liberal commitments to individual freedom, autonomy and equality 
do somewhat restrict the role of the liberal state and the operations 
of liberal institutions. The liberal state, rather than aiming to uphold 
                                                 
25 As will be seen, liberals differ on their responses to this observation. 
According to some (e.g.  Kymlicka), the state should give similar kind of 
support (for example, in the form of minority rights) to those ways of life 
that are not, currently, supported by the state institutions. According to 
others (e.g. Kukathas and Barry), there may not be a case for such 
alternative support, as the bias of liberal institutions is simply unavoidable, 
and the giving of alternative support may either create biases of different 
kind (Kukathas), or be theoretically unsound (Barry). 
26 This view, I believe, is also consistent with pluralist perfectionist views, 
such as Raz’s. 
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a society in which only some particular ways of life can be pursued, 
should rather aim at upholding a framework that enables people to 
pursue their different conceptions of the good, and the state 
policies, although not always neutral in effect (nor justification), 
should aim at treating individuals with equal concern and respect. 
 
2. What is multiculturalism? 
Having outlined some of the very basic commitments that, I 
believe, any liberal political theory must be based on, I now turn to 
look at some of the key debates and distinctions on issues on 
multiculturalism. I begin (2.1.) by looking at the various ways in 
which the term multiculturalism has been used in political theory, 
and – by doing so – also clarify some of the terminology used in 
this work. I then (2.2.) look at different conceptualisations of 
culture as well as the value of culture, and outline the specifically 
liberal commitments to an individualist and, primarily, instrumental 
value of culture. Finally (2.3.), I look at some of the approaches that 
the liberal state may adopt in responding to cultural diversity, and 
further specify the scope of the arguments that will be advanced in 
the following chapters. 
 
2.1. Three conceptions of multiculturalism 
Descriptive multiculturalism 
The term “multiculturalism” has, in political theory as well as in 
public discussions, been used in a variety of slightly different, 
partially overlapping, and certainly confusing, ways. As a 
descriptive term, multiculturalism refers to a state of affairs present 
in contemporary societies: that of the existence of different cultures 
and cultural groups within one society.  As a descriptive term, 
multiculturalism incorporates no claims about the desirability or the 
value of this state of affairs, nor does it include any normative 
claims about how this state of affairs should be responded to. 
Descriptive multiculturalism, or – as I call it – cultural diversity,27 
                                                 
27 In order to distinguish descriptive multiculturalism from what shall later 
be called “normative multiculturalism”, several alternative expressions 
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is simply an acknowledgement of the existence of different cultures 
and cultural groups in society, not an ideological or political stand 
or an attempt to respond to this diversity. 
 
Normative multiculturalism 
The state of cultural diversity may prompt several normative 
questions about how this diversity should be responded to. 
Multiculturalism, as a normative term, incorporates certain value 
judgements about the state of cultural diversity, but it also 
incorporates a vast variety of views and different theories about the 
appropriate responses to this diversity. Following Joseph Raz, 
normative multiculturalism is saying yes to the state of cultural 
diversity.28 That is, it is affirming cultural diversity as an acceptable 
state of affairs that, at the very least, should not be deliberately 
attempted to get rid of.  
Multicultural theorists do, of course, disagree on what this 
“saying yes” to cultural diversity amounts to. Some cherish the 
value of cultural diversity, and view cultural diversity in itself as 
worthy of protection.29 For others, it is not cultural diversity itself 
that should be protected, but people’s ability to live their lives in 
accordance with their culture, should they so wish.30 For others still, 
the affirmation of cultural diversity comes in a very minimal form, 
as an acknowledgement of cultural diversity as an acceptable state 
of affairs, but does not lead to claims of cherishing or protecting 
this diversity, or even people’s abilities to live their lives in 
                                                                                                     
have been suggested, including “circumstances of multiculturalism” (Kelly 
2002), “fact of pluralism” (Raz 1994; 1998), “multicultural” (Loobuyck 
2005) and “cultural pluralism” (also used as a normative term, cf. 
Kymlicka 2001). The term adopted here (“cultural diversity”) stands as 
one commonly used suggestion that, I believe, represents well the kind of 
diversity at stake, including diversity within as well as between different 
cultures and cultural groups. 
28 Raz 1994, 158. 
29 E.g. Parekh 2000; see also: Taylor 1994; Galston 1995. 
30 See esp. Kymlicka 1989; 1995. 
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accordance with their culture.31 For these theorists, one’s cultural 
background creates no legitimate claims against the state or society, 
although it certainly operates as the locus of  discussions, broadly 
labelled under the term “normative multiculturalism”. 
In this work, I use the term normative multiculturalism as an 
umbrella term, incorporating a variety of theories that (1) affirm 
cultural diversity as an acceptable state of affairs, and (2) 
concentrate on the normative issues arising from the coexistence of 
different cultures and cultural groups within society.32 
 
Cultural policies 
Thirdly, multiculturalism is also often used to describe those 
policies that aim at accommodating different cultural groups and 
their members within western liberal societies.33 The vast variety of 
cultural policies (ranging from the rights of self-determination to 
                                                 
31 E.g. Barry 2001; Kukathas 2003. 
32 It should be noted that, in this usage of the term, normative multicultural 
theories also incorporate many theories that have not been commonly 
labelled as multicultural. For example, Brian Barry’s polemic attack on 
some classical forms of multiculturalism and Susan Okin’s feminist 
critique are, according to this interpretation, multicultural theories 
themselves. Whereas I acknowledge that there are differences between 
those “classical multiculturalists” that concentrate primarily on the ways 
of rectifying disadvantages faced by cultural minorities and their 
justification (such as Kymlicka and Taylor), and those “unwilling 
multiculturalists” who point out the dangers of doing so too swiftly or 
uncritically (such as Barry, Kukathas and Okin), I also believe these 
theories fall on a continuum. This makes it sensible to talk of normative 
multiculturalism as an umbrella term, incorporating a vast variety of 
theories and differing viewpoints that, nevertheless, concentrate on those 
issues that arise from the coexistence and co-living of different cultural 
groups and their members within the same society. 
33 For the most part, the debates on multiculturalism have been conducted 
in the context of western liberal democracies, and this work is no 
exception to this focus. For some attempts to expand from the 
predominantly western perspective, see: Kymlicka and Opalski 2001; 
Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004; for discussions on multiculturalism in 
global contexts, see e.g. Kymlicka 2007a; Parekh 2008. 
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the cultural sensitizing of official documents or educational 
curriculums) are one of the subject matters of normative 
multiculturalism, and many multicultural theorists also advocate 
some systems of minority rights, or policies based on the 
acknowledgement of cultural diversity, and the acceptability of this 
diversity, within liberal society. Although it may thus be difficult to 
fully differentiate normative multiculturalism from the actual 
cultural policies (a more thorough account of which will be given in 
3.2.), I believe this distinction to be worth making as the debates on 
multiculturalism often tend to confuse the actual multicultural 
policies with their justification. Whereas one of the primary aims of 
normative multiculturalism and multicultural theories is to find 
those general principles upon which the state’s responses to cultural 
diversity should be based, these general principles, as I argue in 
more detail in the upcoming chapters, do not necessarily give any 
definitive guidance on what kinds of policies the state should adopt 
in any particular circumstances. Whereas the bases and principles 
of different normative theories of multiculturalism may be, and also 
have been, used to argue for a variety of multicultural policies 
(including culturally differentiated or minority rights), I will show 
that the scope of these arguments is far more restricted than many 
normative multiculturalists would hope for. They provide only 
general frameworks within which the liberal state’s responses to 
cultural diversity should reside, rather than give clear guidance into 
whether the liberal state should, or should not, adopt any particular 
multicultural policies in practice. 
 
2.2. Multiculturalism and culture 
The differentiation between descriptive multiculturalism (cultural 
diversity), normative multiculturalism (theoretical bases for 
responding to this diversity) and cultural policies (state responses) 
may not, as yet, say much about the actual subject matter of 
multiculturalism, that of culture and the accommodation of people’s 
cultural differences. To recall, multicultural theorists affirm the 
state of cultural diversity as an acceptable state of affairs within 
society, and they also look for ways and bases upon which the co-
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living of different cultural groups and their members should be 
organized. The terms culture, cultural group and cultural 
membership, however, are far from self-explanatory, and 
multicultural theorists do, to a substantive extent, differ on their 
views on what they conceive culture, or any of the related terms, to 
mean. Not surprisingly, these different views of culture as well as 
the value of culture also have an effect on the broader normative 
questions of cultural accommodation, and it is thus important to see 
how culture, and the value of culture, can be understood. 
 
From homogeneous cultural contents to fluid cultural memberships 
For contemporary multicultural theorists, culture is often conceived 
as a broad framework of norms, values, beliefs and practices that 
structures and regulates the lives of those within that culture.34  As a 
broad framework of norms, values, beliefs and practices, culture 
can be seen as having a profound effect on its members: on their 
senses of themselves, on their ways of living and on their views of 
the world. What the theorists of culture and multiculturalism 
disagree upon, is the extent to which one’s culture or one’s 
religion35 can be seen as structuring and regulating the lives or 
                                                 
34 For example, Bhikhu Parekh describes culture as “a historically created 
system of meaning and significance or, what comes to the same thing, a 
system of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings 
understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives. “ 
(Parekh 2000, 143) On a distinction (as well as possible inter-linkages) 
between so-called high culture and culture as a system of norms, see 
Wallerstein 1990. For an excellent analysis on different conceptions of 
culture (including semiotic, normative and societal conceptions), see: 
Festenstein 2005. 
35 In this work, I treat religion as one of the instances of culture, having 
largely the same structure as culture. For the most part, the arguments put 
forth are thus extended to both cultural as well as religious differences and 
many of the examples used are precisely examples from religion. Despite 
this broad application, I also acknowledge that at times (especially with 
respect to the rationale of the liberal state to accommodate particular 
minority practices) it may make a difference whether the issue at hand is 
conceived as cultural or religious. In these cases, I will make explicit 
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identities of individuals, and how the cultural policies should take 
these effects into account. 
Based on the views of the classical anthropologists, who saw 
cultures as coherent, holistic packages,36 the ideals of cultural 
homogeneity and the pervasiveness or comprehensiveness of 
culture has been surprisingly difficult to surpass.37 Cultures can be 
seen as pervasive, either in the sense in which they are the only, or 
at least the primary, regulators of people’s lives (singular culture – 
SC), but they can also be viewed as pervasive in the sense in which 
they regulate a broad array of people’s lives, ranging from their 
choices of occupation to their personal affairs, such as marriage and 
family (broad culture – BC). Distinguished from the two previous 
senses of pervasiveness (SC & BC), cultures can also be seen as 
pervasive in the sense in which they are seen as determining 
people’s behaviour, or some aspects of their behaviour, by 
providing very strict rules on some, or all, aspects of people’s lives 
(determining culture – DC).  
Cultural homogeneity, although much criticised, can also be 
seen as incorporating at least three different elements: those of the 
homogeneity in cultural content (that is, homogeneity in the 
interpretations of what the cultural norms, values, beliefs and 
practices contain – Hcontent), homogeneity in scope (that is, 
homogeneity in the views of which norms, values, beliefs and 
practices are conceived as cultural – Hscope), and homogeneity in 
membership (that is, homogeneity in the views of who are 
                                                                                                     
reference as to whether I am talking of culture or religion, as well as why 
this distinction, in any particular case, is important. 
36 For classical anthropological views on culture, see e.g. Tylor 1973 
[1871]; for later, interpretive accounts, see:  Geertz 1973. 
37 Numerous critiques of contemporary multicultural theories have, indeed, 
focused on the ways in which multicultural theories, either explicitly or 
implicitly, view cultures as homogeneous, comprehensive wholes thus also 
essentializing cultures or certain elements of culture. On charges of 
essentialism within multiculturalism (including cultural essentialism in 
terms of pervasiveness and homogeneity), see: Mason 2007; Phillips 2010, 
ch. 5. 
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conceived to be members of a particular culture - Hmembership). In 
its most rigid formulation, culture is seen as the sole regulatory 
framework of a person’s life (SC) that determines everything that 
that person does (BC+DC), allowing no contestation in the 
interpretations of those norms and practices that are conceived as 
cultural (Hcontent; Hscope), nor in the views of whether one does, 
or does not, come under the rigid regulatory framework this culture 
(Hmembership). 
In brief, no multicultural theorist, or – to be fair – even the 
classical anthropologists, would accept this rigid formulation of 
culture, although the different elements of pervasiveness and 
homogeneity do, to various extents, feature also in the discussions 
of the multicultural theorists. Cultures have been seen to 
“encompass many, varied, and important aspects of life, a culture 
that defines or marks a variety of forms or styles of life, types of 
activity, occupation, pursuit and relationship”38. Whereas the exact 
scope of cultural regulation39 as well as the extent to which culture 
operates as the only system of regulation40 can be variously 
                                                 
38 Raz and Margalit, 1994. 
39 As Amy Gutmann has succinctly put it: “Culture […] is comprehensive, 
but no single characteristic – such as a common language, dress, holidays, 
or territorial concentration – is absolutely necessary for an actual culture to 
be considered as such. Theorists of culture assume a rough approximation 
rather than a perfect match of the actual to the ideal type: a culture 
constitutes and constrains the identities (and therefore lives) of its 
members by providing them with common language, history, institutions 
of socialization, range of occupations, lifestyles, distinctive literary and 
artistic traditions, architectural styles, music, dress, ceremonies and 
holidays, and customs that are shared by an intergenerational community 
that occupies a distinct territory. Actual cultures encompass the lives of 
their members in many of these ways but not necessarily all.” Gutmann 
2003, 40. 
40 For example, Jeremy Waldron has argued for a view according to which 
cultures can no longer be viewed as the sole regulatory frameworks of 
people’s lives, but, in circumstances of cultural diversity, people draw 
from and navigate between many cultures. (Waldron 1992.) For different 
emphases on cultural interaction and change, see: Benhabib 2002; 
Scheffler 2007; Levy 2009. 
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interpreted (including variations between different cultures and 
cultural groups), some have come to argue that the broadness of 
cultural regulation, conjoined with a view of the value of culture (to 
be discussed shortly), has also prompted a case for accommodating 
(at least some) cultural groups, and their distinctive cultural 
structures, within the framework of the larger liberal society.41 
Not all debates within multiculturalism, however, focus on the 
questions of how to accommodate these broad systems or 
frameworks of norms, values etc. as a whole. Rather, they 
concentrate on the questions of how to respond to some particular 
cultural norms or practices (such as customs of marriage or 
relationship, religious or cultural obligations, customary or religious 
rituals etc.), and how to ensure that these responses do not unduly 
prioritize certain interpretations of culture, or discriminate against 
certain members of cultural groups. The underlying difficulty being 
that multicultural theorists, along with other contemporary theorists 
of culture, tend to deny the other aspects of the rigid formulation 
(SC & DC), viewing cultures as relatively broad (although not 
comprehensive) frameworks within which people operate, rather 
than as systems that would determine what the members of a 
particular culture think or how they behave.42 Consequently, 
multicultural theorists also deny the idea that cultures would be 
homogeneous, as different people may – and they also do – have 
very different interpretations of what they conceive their cultural 
norms, values, beliefs or practices to contain. The 
acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of cultural norms, values, 
                                                 
41 This is roughly the view of Kymlicka to whom cultures are primarily 
viewed in terms of “societal cultures” (to be discussed in more detail in 
Ch. 1) For alternative BC views of culture, see e.g. Shachar 2001 (“nomoi 
communities”); Walzer 1983 (“communities of character”); Raz and 
Margalit 1994. 
42 For discussion on how the idea of culture as determining people’s 
behaviour and the connected conceptions of (non)agency have operated in 
discussions on multiculturalism, see Phillips 2007, ch. 4. I will discuss 
questions relating to cultural motivation, including cultural compulsion, in 
Ch. 6. 
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beliefs and practices has proved especially problematic with respect 
to the various cultural policies that, as I argue in more detail in 
chapters 1, 4 and 5, tend to prioritize certain cultural contents over 
others. Moreover, the notions of cultural heterogeneity – both in the 
sense of heterogeneity of scope and heterogeneity of membership – 
create even further difficulties for normative multiculturalists, as it 
may no longer be clear whether some particular norms or practices 
should even be considered as cultural, or to whom these practices 
should be attached to. 
Instead of viewing cultures in terms of particular cultural 
contents, some multicultural theorists have attempted to reformulate 
the term culture in ways that would not be so prone to the 
accusations of cultural homogeneity, or to the underlying notions of 
cultural determination or cultural singularity.43 Most notably, Will 
Kymlicka has attempted to distinguish between cultural contents (or 
the character of a cultural community), and culture as a context of 
choice (or membership in a cultural community), claiming that it is 
only the latter (cultural context or membership) that should be the 
proper concern of liberal theorists, as well as the liberal state.44 The 
context of choice view would seem to take better into account 
cultural heterogeneity (Hcontent & Hscope), and the viewing of 
culture in terms of cultural membership rather than in terms of 
some particular cultural character would seem to better 
accommodate the generally accepted ideas of cultural fluidity, 
change and heterogeneity of cultural values, norms, beliefs and 
practices.  
Whereas I will return to Kymlicka’s characterisations of culture, 
and the difficulties incorporated in these characterisations in more 
detail in chapters 1 and 2, what can already be seen is the 
importance of explicating clearly, what precisely one is referring to 
when one debates the various issues of cultural accommodation. 
Although it may make sense to talk of culture, and cultural 
                                                 
43See also Scott 2003, who points out to the tendency of the theorists to 
define culture in ways that fit their normative theories. 
44 Esp. Kymlicka 1989; 1995. 
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accommodation, as a short hand for a wide variety of issues within 
normative multiculturalism, one cannot talk of specific issues (such 
as the state’s response to particular cultural practices, specific 
cultural groups, types of cultural disadvantages etc.) without 
explicating what the term culture, in these contexts, is set to refer 
to. As will be seen during the course of this work, the normative 
conclusions of multicultural theorists depend, to an extent, also on 
their interpretations of culture and on the extent to which they view 
cultures as singular, broad, determining or homogeneous (although 
none of them would subscribe to the rigid formulation given 
above). It also makes a difference whether one views culture in 
terms of a set of norms, values, beliefs and practices, or in terms of 
cultural membership and belonging that may, or may not, 
incorporate certain levels of adherence to those norms and practices 
conceived as cultural.  
In this work, I use the terms culture and cultural accommodation 
as umbrella terms, incorporating a wide variety of views both with 
respect to the nature of culture as well as with respect to the ways in 
which different cultures and/or different cultural groups should be 
accommodated. The key distinctions, to which I try my best to refer 
to and which I will explicate in more detail in context, however, are 
as follows. Firstly, I use the term cultural context to refer to that 
broad (although not necessarily comprehensive) framework within 
which people conduct their lives. This cultural context can be seen 
to incorporate things such as values and beliefs, norms as well as 
practices, although these values, norms, beliefs or practices 
(cultural contents) are not necessarily specific, but fluid and 
contestable. Secondly, I talk of specific cultural practices when 
referring to particular cases (such as religious dress codes, rituals of 
marriage, initiation ceremonies) although this reference 
incorporates no claims about these practices, or specific 
interpretations of these practices, as being fixed. On the contrary, 
there can be substantive disagreements on what the practices of any 
particular cultural group contain (Hcontent) as well as whether 
these practices can be conceived as cultural (Hscope).  
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Thirdly, when talking of cultural groups, I refer to those people 
who can, in yet undefined terms, be seen to come under the 
regulatory framework of some cultural context. Fourthly, I talk of 
cultural membership in terms of those people who, in yet undefined 
terms, can be seen to be members of a cultural group. As will be 
discussed especially in Ch. 4 and 5, the relations between the two 
first categories (cultural context and specific cultural practices) and 
the two latter (cultural groups and cultural membership) are very 
complex, and the possible discrepancies both within as well as 
between these categories will also have a profound effect on the 
questions of cultural accommodation and, especially, on the 
questions of allocating culturally differentiated rights in practice. 
Whereas I do, thus, join the common canon of viewing cultural 
contents as heterogeneous, fluid and contested, I also point to some 
of the difficulties that the complexity of cultural membership (and 
the related notions of cultural belonging and cultural identity) bring 
to the normative debates on multiculturalism. Whereas I do point to 
some of the additional problems that the acknowledgement of the 
heterogeneity of cultural memberships creates, I also point to some 
of the ways in which a more thorough analysis of membership may 
help reformulate the liberal multicultural positions, and how the 
recognition of cultural heterogeneity, in all levels (Hcontent, 
Hscope, Hmembership), may be used for the identification of the 
proper objects of cultural accommodation, as well as for a better 
application of cultural policies in practice. 
 
Instrumental/non-instrumental, individualist/non-individualist value 
of culture 
As already indicated, there may be as many ways of understanding 
culture as there are theorists of multiculturalism. The theorists’ 
views on the singularity, broadness, determination as well as 
homogeneity of cultures differ, as do their emphases on either the 
contents (values, norms, beliefs and practices) or memberships 
(groups and their members) as the proper objects of cultural 
accommodation. Regardless of these variations, one of the 
questions that any multicultural theorist needs to answer is why 
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culture (in any sense of the term) matters: why and in what senses is 
culture valuable. 
The different views on the value of culture (variously construed) 
can be understood by looking at two axes according to which one’s 
views on the value of culture are seen to differ: those of 
instrumental/non-instrumental, and individualist/non-individualist.45 
According to the individualists, cultures are valuable only and in so 
far as they contribute to the well-being of their individual members. 
Cultures do not possess any moral standing of their own, but the 
value of culture (variously construed) is reducible, without a 
remainder, to the value that it has for contributing to the lives of 
individuals. According to the non-individualists or collectivists, on 
the contrary, the value of culture cannot be accounted for purely 
with reference to individuals, but the collective nature of culture 
also has an effect on the value of culture, seen as irreducible to the 
value it has for individuals.46  
Whereas the collectivists are surely right in pointing to the 
collective nature of culture – cultures are surely group phenomena, 
and certain cultural goods, such as languages, cannot be enjoyed 
without at least some other individuals too enjoying such goods – it 
does not, however, necessarily follow that the value of culture 
could not be accounted for by reference to the role that it plays in 
the lives of individuals.47 Further, even if the collectivists are right 
in arguing that the value of culture cannot be reduced to its value in 
relation to individuals, the implications of this for liberal political 
theory are far from clear. As will be seen during the course of this 
work, the collective nature of culture does produce some difficulties 
for liberal multicultural theory in so far as those aspects of culture, 
                                                 
45 For similar analyses on the value of culture, see Festenstein 2005, 38-
43; Johnson 2000; Mason 2000, ch. 2. 
46 As Charles Taylor has argued, cultures should be conceived of as 
irreducibly social goods. For Taylor, cultures are both produced as well as 
consumed collectively, and due to the collective nature of culture, the 
value of culture cannot be reduced to the value it has for the individual 
members of that culture. Taylor 1994; 1995. 
47 Griffin 1986; Moore and Crisp 1996. 
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contributing to the well-being of individuals, are produced 
collectively, although it does not need to affect the basic liberal 
commitment to the moral primacy of the individual. Even if the 
value of culture could not be (fully) accounted for in terms of 
individuals, for liberal multiculturalists, this would be of secondary 
importance. After all, what ultimately matters, according to liberals, 
is the individual, and it is thus from the standpoint of the individual 
that the value of culture, and the possible accommodative measures, 
should be assessed. 
The second axis, that of the instrumental and non-instrumental 
conceptions of the value of culture, is not in a straight forward 
relationship to the individualist/non-individualist-distinction, 
although there is some tendency for the individualists to view the 
value of culture in instrumentalist terms, whereas the collectivists 
tend to be more open also to some non-instrumentalist 
conceptions.48 In order to elaborate on this distinction, it may be 
worth bringing in yet another category of value, that of intrinsic 
value. According to Joseph Raz, there are three ways in which 
things – such as cultures or cultural memberships – could be 
conceived of as intrinsically valuable. For Raz, things can be 
intrinsically valuable, firstly, because they are valuable in 
themselves, irrespective of what else exists. Secondly, things can be 
intrinsically valuable because they are constituent of that which is 
intrinsically valuable in the first sense (and, according to Raz, them 
being constitutive parts of the valuable thing in itself brings value 
that is not something already inherent in the thing in itself). And 
thirdly, things can be intrinsically valuable in virtue of them being 
ultimate goods or values – that is, justificatory and explanatory of 
the value of the things valuable in themselves (in which the value of 
                                                 
48 For example, Will Kymlicka’s conception may, at first sight, be read as 
an individualist-instrumental conception, emphasizing the value of culture 
only and in so far as it provides for the well-being of individuals. On the 
contrary, Charles Taylor’s conception of culture as a locus of good falls 
more properly under the axes of collectivist-non-instrumentality. (Esp. 
Taylor 1995, 136-139.) 
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the ultimate good or value does not need to refer to anything else in 
order for its value to be explained).49 
If we apply Raz’s second notion of intrinsic value to the 
questions of culture and cultural accommodation, something 
interesting emerges. In Kymlicka’s view, for instance, cultures (that 
is, cultural memberships) are conceived of as preconditions for 
individual freedom and autonomy and, being such, necessary 
conditions for individuals’ well-being. Being necessary conditions 
for individual freedom, autonomy and well-being, cultures or 
cultural memberships can also be considered as constitutive 
elements of this well-being, as nothing else can logically provide 
for the well-being thus constituted.50 Being constitutive elements of 
that which is intrinsically valuable (individual freedom, autonomy 
and well-being), Kymlicka’s account can thus be interpreted as 
individualist-non-instrumentalist. If cultures or cultural 
memberships can be conceived of as constitutive elements for 
individual freedom, autonomy and well-being, then cultures or 
cultural memberships are not valued in virtue of them being 
instrumentally valuable but for being necessary, constitutive parts 
of that which is intrinsically valuable. If no other condition than 
culture or cultural membership can provide for the flourishing of 
individual freedom and autonomy, then – following Raz’s second 
notion of intrinsic value – cultures or cultural memberships must 
also be conceived as intrinsically and, at least in this sense, non-
instrumentally valuable.  
Whereas I will return to the questions of the value of culture, 
including the questions of what, precisely, can be viewed as 
valuable in cultures later on in this work, a few preliminary remarks 
on the possible consequences of one’s conception of the value of 
culture for liberal political theory are in order.  
As already indicated, for liberals, what matters first and 
foremost is how individual lives go. Keeping this in mind, what 
liberals are interested in, and what should also play upon their 
                                                 
49 Raz 1986, 200. 
50 See also: Festenstein 2005, 41. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
34 
 
views on cultural accommodation, are the ways in which culture, or 
some aspects of culture, provide for the well-being of individuals. 
This, it would at first seem, connects the liberal standpoint strongly 
with the individualist-instrumentalist conception of the value of 
culture. This, however, would be an oversimplification, as the 
questions about the value of culture are, at least to an extent, 
independent of, and prior to, the questions relating to cultural 
accommodation. Whereas liberals are, first and foremost, interested 
in how individual lives go, there is no reason why liberals could not 
also be committed to (some) individualist-non-instrumental 
conception of the value of culture – that is, for example, to the view 
of cultures as constitutive elements of individual well-being. Should 
cultures, as in the case of Kymlicka, be viewed as constitutive 
elements of individual well-being, they would also, necessarily, be 
viewed as valuable from the perspective of the individual, 
contributing (in the constitutive sense) to their well-being. For 
theorists such as Kymlicka, the questions about whether cultures (or 
cultural memberships) provide for the well-being of individuals 
have already been answered, and the views on the accommodation 
of different cultures (or cultural memberships) are set to reflect this 
view.51 The viewing of cultures (variously construed) as 
constitutive elements of individual well-being, however, does not 
necessarily lead to the view according to which all cultures, or all 
elements of culture, should also be seen as constitutive in the same 
sense, and the liberal multicultural theory may, in fact, be better off 
taking a more cautious approach to the value of culture, assessing 
on a case to case basis whether, and to what extent, cultures 
(variously construed) provide for the well-being of individuals and 
for different individuals differently. 
 
                                                 
51 It should be noted that Kymlicka, as well as other multicultural theorists, 
also build arguments for why cultures can be conceived of as constitutive 
for individual well-being, although these arguments, I should add, are 
analytically separate from the arguments for cultural accommodation. 
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2.3. Multiculturalism and cultural policies  
So far, I have laid out some background and clarified some 
terminology with respect to the notions of liberalism, 
multiculturalism, culture and value of culture. None of this, 
however, has said anything directly about the kinds of responses, or 
the kinds of policies, that the liberal theorists of multiculturalism 
may promote, or the grounds upon which these policies are argued 
for. As I indicated in section 2.1., it may at times be difficult to 
distinguish normative multiculturalism from the actual cultural 
policies, and this section, no doubt, also faces this difficulty. The 
actual cultural policies (of which I will give a more thorough 
analysis shortly) cannot, however, be discussed without the 
framework within which they are argued for, and it is thus 
important to first outline some of the major arguments that have 
been given for the liberal state to engage in cultural accommodation 
(whatever the actual means for this accommodation may be). As I 
try to indicate, and as I will argue in more detail in the subsequent 
chapters, these arguments do not, however, lead directly to any 
particular cultural policies, although they do provide some reasons 
for why the liberal state should take cultural considerations into 
account and why the policy approaches, so fiercely debated among 
liberal multicultural theorists, have been developed. 
 
Importance and equality arguments 
The two most prominent groups of arguments with respect to the 
need of the liberal state to accommodate different cultures and/or 
cultural groups may be described as arguments from equality and 
arguments from importance.52 According to the equality argument, 
                                                 
52 The arguments from importance are also sometimes referred to as 
arguments from difference, playing certain heed to those theories that have 
come to be known as “politics of identity” or “politics of difference” (see 
e.g. Connolly 1991; Young 1990; 2000; for overview, see: Kenny 2004). 
As my intention is not to participate in these discussions (although some 
elements of these discussions will be used during the course of this book), 
and as I also attempt to steer clear from making too close connection 
between the arguments for cultural accommodation and the actual policies 
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members of minority cultural groups are in a disadvantaged 
position to that of the majority, and the aim of cultural 
accommodation is to rectify this inequality. At the most general 
level, the members of minority cultures are disadvantaged in terms 
of having no automatic access to their own cultural structure, 
having to live their lives in a society organized in accordance with 
the rules and norms of the culture of the majority. On another level, 
the members of minority cultures can also be seen as disadvantaged 
in cases where their specific cultural norms and practices collide 
with the norms and practices of the majority, denying them either 
equal access to public goods (such as education or employment), or 
denying them the freedom to participate in their particular cultural 
practices or to engage in particular cultural rituals.53 In order to 
rectify these disadvantages, it is often argued that the state should 
adopt certain systems of minority rights, aiming to lift the members 
of minority groups to the same line with the majority. 
The arguments from equality do not, however, work without 
some support for why the cultural inequalities, faced by minority 
members, should be proper concerns of the liberal state. This 
support, as will be seen in more detail in the course of this work, 
comes from two sources. First, it has been argued that cultural 
inequalities are proper concerns of the liberal state due to the non-
chosen nature of culture and cultural membership. One’s belonging 
to a particular cultural group is normally not a choice of one’s own, 
but can rather be viewed in parallel to other non-chosen 
circumstances, the disadvantages (or benefits) of which one should 
not be held responsible for.54 Second, and often in combination with 
the luck-egalitarian position above, cultures (variously construed) 
                                                                                                     
of doing so, I stick to the expression of “arguments from importance”. One 
particular form of these arguments, as well as the extent to which this 
argument needs to be utilized also by the proponents of the equality 
arguments, is discussed in Ch. 1. 
53 The different kinds of equality arguments are assessed in more detail in 
Ch. 1 and  3. 
54 This, so-called luck-egalitarian argument, and the scope of this 
argument within discussions on multiculturalism, is assessed in Ch. 1. 
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can also be seen as such important elements of their members’ lives 
that it would not be reasonable, as a default, to expect people to 
abandon these elements. Rather, the liberal state should look for 
ways in which people could adhere to, or identify with, their own 
cultures without this resulting in the kinds of disadvantages 
mentioned above. In order for the equality argument to work, some 
notion of the value of culture thus needs to be subscribed to (at the 
very least, the proponents of the equality argument need to 
acknowledge that people may have reasonable interests in adhering 
to or identifying with their cultures), although the reasons for the 
liberal state to aim at accommodating people’s cultural differences 
are not based on the value of culture as such, but on the 
disadvantages that the members of minority cultures face. 
The argument from importance, on the contrary, takes the value 
of culture as the pivotal point, claiming that people’s cultural 
differences should be accommodated, not because they put 
members of minority cultures in a disadvantaged position to that of 
the majority (although, in many cases, this may also be true), but 
because they are important, perhaps even inalienable, elements of 
their members’ lives. Although the arguments from equality and 
arguments from importance are often run together, it is important to 
note that the scope of these arguments is very different, as they 
incorporate very different views on the proper aims of cultural 
accommodation as well as on the proper objects of this 
accommodation. Whereas for the proponents of the equality 
argument, the proper aim of cultural accommodation is the 
rectifying of those disadvantages that members of minority cultures 
(by virtue of their culture) face, for the proponents of the 
importance argument, the aim of cultural accommodation is to 
enable people to continue adhering to their cultures or those aspects 
of their culture they are deeply associated with.55 This difference 
                                                 
55 Not surprisingly, the importance argument is often supported by claims 
about the majority’s tendencies to swamp other cultures, and the aim of 
cultural accommodation is to counter this constant threat of annihilation 
and to preserve the viability of minority cultures. (See e.g. Taylor 1994; 
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also bears upon the views on what precisely the state should aim to 
accommodate, and can also affect the views on the appropriate 
means of accommodation. Whereas the proponents of the equality 
argument tend to concentrate on those aspects of culture (e.g. 
specific cultural practices, norms, memberships) the disadvantage 
of which can be clearly measured (e.g. lack of opportunities, 
underrepresentation, discrimination), the promoters of the 
importance argument often extend their views further, viewing also 
those aspects of culture as worthy of attention that do not 
necessarily create a disadvantage, or a clearly measurable 
disadvantage, for their members (e.g. cultural identities, symbols, 
values and beliefs).56 As will become clear during the course of this 
work, neither of these arguments (or their combination), however, 
extends as far as dictating the appropriate means upon which 
people’s cultural differences should be accommodated, but leaves 
substantive scope for variation in those policies that the liberal state 
may adopt. 
 
Cultural policies and the exposition of minority rights 
Multicultural policies may be distinguished from other policies 
responding to the state of cultural diversity by looking at either the 
aim or the content of these policies. Regarding the general aim of 
multicultural policies, multiculturalism can be placed somewhere 
between the assimilationist and segregationist approaches to 
managing cultural diversity. The assimilationist approaches, widely 
                                                                                                     
Margalit & Halbertal 1994; Reaume 2000.) It should, however, be noted 
that the importance –argument presented here does not entirely coincide 
with the view according to which cultures should be preserved, as it is 
possible to argue for cultural preservation even in cases where culture (or 
some aspects of culture) were not considered as essential for its members’ 
well-being. For example, certain accounts of the value of cultural diversity 
(as opposed to the value of culture) may fall within this category. 
56 The lack of recognition of people’s cultural identities, symbols, values 
or beliefs can also be viewed in terms of cultural disadvantages, and I will 
utilize this observation especially in chapters 4 and 5. 
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argued for until the early nineties57 aim at constructing a single, 
unified culture within the state, either by assimilating minority 
cultures into the ways of the majority, or by the so-called “melting-
pot” approach, merging cultures into one.58 The segregationist 
approaches, such as that of apartheid South-Africa, aim at keeping 
different cultures and cultural groups separated with minimum 
contact and interaction. Different to these two approaches stands 
multiculturalism, aiming not to eliminate or segregate cultural 
diversity, but to create conditions in which different cultural groups 
and their members can live together, harmoniously within the same 
society. 
It may be argued that, at the level of the general aims of 
multicultural policies, it is very difficult to maintain the distinction 
made earlier between normative multiculturalism and actual 
multicultural policies. Any policies, promoted by normative 
multiculturalists, would be multicultural policies, as the aim of 
these policies incorporates the very basic commitments of 
normative multiculturalism – those of the acknowledgement of the 
existence and acceptability of cultural diversity within society, and 
the need to find common rules for the peaceful co-living of 
different cultural groups and their members within society. Whereas 
this may be true with respect to the general rationale behind those 
policies promoted by the normative multiculturalists, I use the term 
multicultural policies in a slightly different and more specific 
manner, incorporating only those policies that are, in some relevant 
sense, culturally differentiated. That is, they are sensitive and 
reflective of people’s cultural differences, taking these differences 
as legitimate reasons for altering the status quo or, in some cases, 
                                                 
57 E.g. Glazer 1997 
58 The assimilationist approaches may thus be seen as having much in 
common with some forms of nationalism that emphasize the importance of 
national unity and unified national identity. Not all forms of nationalism, 
however, are assimilationist with respect to managing cultural diversity, as 
the existence, or even promotion, of cultural diversity can be seen as 
compatible with the preservation of united national identity. See e.g. 
Miller 1995; 2000; Kymlicka and Banting 2006. 
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taking these differences as legitimating differentiated treatment of 
different people by virtue of their culture.59 These kinds of policies, 
in the literature on multiculturalism, have been referred to in a 
variety of ways – as cultural- or multicultural policies, minority-, 
differentiated-, group-differentiated-, cultural-, collective-, 
corporate-, group-, or membership rights – although none of these 
terms is totally subsuming of or identical to the others. 
The minority- or differentiated rights60 incorporate a vast variety 
of rights, distinguished from one another both with respect to the 
structure as well as the content of such rights. As a preliminary 
                                                 
59 A distinction between cultural policies and multicultural policies may 
help to explain this usage of the terms. In my usages, cultural policies 
refer to any of those policies that the normative theorists of 
multiculturalism have come to advocate in response to managing cultural 
diversity within society. The state’s response of benign neglect, promoted 
by Chandran Kukathas, or the difference-blind approach of Brian Barry 
thus fall (in their application) within the realm of cultural policies, simply 
by virtue of being policies, advocated as appropriate responses to the state 
of cultural diversity. The affirmation of a general rule or the rejection of a 
minority right, in this usage of the term, are conceived as cultural policies 
just as much as are the alteration of the rule, or the granting of an 
exemption. The term multicultural policies, however, is reserved only to 
the latter kinds of policies, as in these cases, the taking into account of 
people’s cultural differences has resulted into an active alteration of the 
status quo and, in the last example, into a granting of a differentiated right 
(e.g. exemption). 
60 In this work, I use the terms minority rights and differentiated rights 
interchangeably, although the scope of these rights is not, strictly 
speaking, identical. Whereas minority rights (perhaps the most commonly 
used term for multicultural policies in the above sense) are rights accorded 
to minority cultural groups or their members (and not others), 
differentiated rights could also be conceived as incorporating any rights 
the according of which was not universal (or based on citizenship), such as 
rights accorded to majority cultural groups or their members, rights of 
children, LGBT –rights etc. Within discussions on multiculturalism, 
however, differentiated rights can be seen as referring precisely to those 
rights that involve minority cultural groups and their members, and I will 
thus use these terms interchangeably. The group-aspect of these rights will 
be questioned in Part II. 
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distinction, minority rights can be divided into membership rights 
and group rights proper depending on whom the right in question is 
accorded to and by whom it is exercised.61 The membership rights, 
such as the exemptions of turban wearing Sikhs from motor cycle 
helmet laws (UK) or dress codes of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, are rights that are accorded to as well as exercised by 
individuals (members of a particular group), irrespective of the 
actions of the other right-holders or of the group as a whole. Group 
rights proper, on the other hand, are rights accorded to and 
exercised by the group as a collective, although the benefits of such 
rights may still be viewed in terms of the benefits the exercising of 
such right has for the individuals.62 Various forms of rights of self-
government for ethnic, cultural or national minorities, for example, 
are rights that are accorded to the group as a whole, and it is also 
the group as a collective (rather than its individual members) that is 
seen as exercising such right. Not all minority rights do, of course, 
fit neatly to the division between membership rights and group 
rights proper,63 although this distinction is important, as the 
                                                 
61 For some classical distinctions within literature on multiculturalism, see 
Kymlicka 1995, ch. 2 and 3; Parekh 2000: 213-219; Barry 2001, ch. 4. 
62 It should be noted that there is substantive disagreement on whether the 
benefits of group rights proper can be accounted for with respect to the 
benefits for the individuals. One illuminating discussion on the kinds of 
interests that group rights proper are set to serve is given by Peter Jones, 
who makes a differentiation between so-called collective rights and 
corporate rights. Whereas the collective rights are dependent on the 
exercising of such rights by a group of individuals jointly, the interests 
they are set to serve can nevertheless be traced back to the serving of the 
interests of particular individuals. Corporate rights, on the contrary, can be 
seen as serving the interests of the group itself, independent of the interests 
of its individual members. (Jones, 1999) For a similar distinction between 
derivative and sui generis rights, see Parekh 2000, 213-219.  
63 For example, certain types of positive advantages, such as quotas or 
other forms of positive discrimination, may be viewed as group rights in 
the sense in which they are accorded to the group as a whole, but 
membership rights in the sense in which they are taken advantage of by 
individuals. These rights differ from individually exercised membership 
rights in so far as taking advantage of such a right may be inherently 
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normative issues incorporated in any particular type of right depend 
heavily on the questions of who is seen to be the proper exerciser 
and/or beneficiary of such right. 
The normative issues relevant for the assessment of any 
particular minority right are not, of course, defined simply by the 
structure of such rights as either membership or group rights, but 
involve variety of other considerations. For example, the nature of 
the group in question (e.g. cultural, religious, national, indigenous) 
may have an effect on whether the group (or its members) are 
entitled to differentiated treatment by the state. Different kinds of 
rights may also be seen as aiming to rectify different kinds of 
disadvantages (e.g. equality of opportunity, autonomy, 
recognition/self-respect), and the minority rights also vary with 
respect to the specific issue they are referring to (e.g. language, 
land, religion, representation). In the assessment of any particular 
minority right, it must also be kept in mind, what kinds of relations 
within society the right in question has an effect upon, some rights 
affecting mainly the relations between the state and the minority 
groups, others having a profound effect on the relations between the 
group and its own members.64 In order to highlight the 
heterogeneity of normative issues relevant for different kinds of 
minority rights, Jacob Levy gives an illuminating categorisation of 
minority or cultural rights, with each category incorporating slightly 
different normative considerations relevant for the assessments of 
such rights in practice: 
 
 
                                                                                                     
dependent on the actions of other right holders, as the reference point of 
the right is the group as a whole rather than its individual members. For 
further discussion, see Barry 2001, ch. 4.1.  
64 Aylet Schachar has categorised the relations, relevant for any 
discussions on multiculturalism and minority rights into six types, those of 
(1) individual vs. individual, (2) individual vs. state, (3) identity group vs. 
identity group, (4) identity group vs. state, (5) non-member vs. identity 
group, and (6) individual group member vs. identity group. Shachar, 2001, 
27. 
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Figure 1: Jacob T. Levy’s classification of cultural rights 
 
CATEGORY EXAMPLES 
Exemptions from laws which 
penalize or burden cultural 
practices 
Sikhs / motorcycle helmet laws, 
Indians / peyote, hunting laws 
Assistance to do those things the 
majority can do unassisted 
Multilingual ballots, affirmative 
action, funding ethnic associations 
Self-government for ethnic, 
cultural or “national” minorities 
Secession (Slovenia), federal unit 
(Catalonia), other polity (Puerto 
Rico) 
External rules restricting non-
members’ liberty to protect 
members’ culture 
Quebec / restrictions on English 
language, Indians / restrictions on 
local whites voting 
Internal rules for members’ 
conduct enforced by ostracism, 
ex-communication 
Mennonite shunning, disowning 
children who marry outside the 
group 
Recognition/enforcement of 
traditional legal code by the 
dominant legal system 
Aboriginal land rights, traditional or 
group-specific family law 
Representation of minorities in 
government bodies, guaranteed 
or facilitated 
Maori voting roll for Parliament, 
U.S. black-majority Congressional 
districts 
Symbolic claims to acknowledge 
the worth, status, or existence of 
various groups 
Disputes over name of polity, 
national holidays, teaching of history 
  Jacob Levy (1997): “Classifying Cultural Rights”, p. 25. 
 
Regardless of whether Levy’s classification is exhaustive, or 
whether some other classification could better be used to explain 
the variety of normative issues relevant for different types of 
minority rights65, Levy’s categorisation brings nicely forth the 
                                                 
65 For other classifications, some of which will be returned to later on in 
this work, see: Kymlicka 1995, ch. 2 and 3; Barry 2001, ch. 4; Jones 1999; 
Miller 2002a; see also: articles in Sistare, May and Francis 2001. 
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heterogeneity of minority rights and their normative justification. 
For example, whereas the rights of self-government, external and 
internal rules as well as the recognition / enforcement of legal codes 
are often portrayed as rights that protect the cultural autonomy of 
the group in question, the exemptions, assistance, representation as 
well as symbolic claims may better be described as rights that aim 
to promote the civic equality and inclusion of minority members 
within society.66 The rights of self-government, external and 
internal rules can also be seen as affecting slightly different 
relations within society: the rights of self-government addressing 
(mainly) the state vs. group or group vs. group –relations, the 
external rules addressing the issues of group vs. non-members or 
members vs. non-members, and the internal rules involving the 
difficult questions of the relation between the group and its own 
members. Nor are the considerations relevant for an assessment of 
any particular right within any particular category necessarily the 
same, but may involve very different normative considerations, 
only assessable at the level of the particular right in question, and in 
the context within which this right is argued for. 
For example, the exemption rights, characterized by Levy as 
“individually exercised negative liberties granted to members of a 
religious or cultural group whose practices are such that a generally 
and ostensibly neutral law would be a distinctive burden on 
them”,67 incorporate various examples. As already mentioned, the 
turban wearing Sikhs in the UK have been exempted from motor 
cycle helmet laws, as have the Canadian Sikhs from certain aspects 
of the dress code of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The 
religious use of peyote by the American Indians has been exempted 
from the laws on narcotics and hallucinogens, and the Jews and 
Muslims may be exempted from humane slaughter laws in order to 
acquire meat that has been killed in accordance with their religious 
                                                 
66 All of these rights (some more than others), may also be described in 
terms of promoting the self-esteem of minority groups or their members. 
See also: May, Moodod and Squires 2004, 4. 
67 Levy 1997, 25. 
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requirements. In the United States, the old order Amish have 
(successfully) pursued a right not to send their children to school 
after a certain age, and in several places, the right to wear (or not to 
wear) a veil by Muslim females has caused extensive discussions, 
resulting both in the rigorous upholding of the rules (as in the 
French case of laïcité), as well as in exemptions from, for example, 
supermarket working uniforms (Norway). 
Although there is clearly something similar in all of these cases 
(in order for them to be discussed under the heading of 
exemptions), the normative considerations, in each case, are slightly 
different. Although the right of the Amish not to send their children 
to school after a certain age can, in a certain sense, be viewed as an 
individually exercised negative liberty, it is substantially different 
from the other examples, as the one most affected by the exemption 
(child) is a different person from those to whom this right is granted 
(parents). In this sense, the right of the Amish pays some, albeit not 
very much, resemblance to the exemptions from humane slaughter 
laws or even the claims of the Sikhs or Roma to carry ceremonial 
daggers or knifes in public, as in these cases, those most affected 
(or potentially affected) by the exemption are others than the right 
holder herself. An altogether different case, however, is represented 
by the French case of laïcité and the contested right of Muslim girls 
to wear a veil in public schools. In Levy’s formulation, the claims 
of the Muslim girls cannot be viewed as claims for exemption, 
because the principle of laïcité, far from being generally and 
ostensibly neutral, is directed precisely against the wearing of such 
religious symbols in the first place. At the level of what the law or 
the requirement is for, the exemptions on humane slaughter laws 
and the exemptions from laws on narcotics and hallucinogens pay 
some resemblance to the case of the French laïcité, as the aim of the 
law is, in these cases, to prevent precisely the practice (or some 
element of that practice) that one is seeking an exemption from. 
Moreover, it is clear that the “distinctive burden” referred to by 
Levy can be of several forms, as the burdens created by the 
requirements of a work place or educational institution are burdens 
relating to the basic (public) opportunities of individuals (such as 
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education and employment), whereas the burdens created, for 
example, by humane slaughter laws or by motor cycle helmet 
regulations are burdens relating mainly to the pursuit of people’s 
interests in private (such as the eating of religiously slaughtered 
meat or riding a motor bike).68 
Whereas it is thus clear that any categorization, however 
specified, will incorporate a vast variety of cases, the assessment of 
which can only be done in context, it is, nevertheless, important to 
look for some commonalities, as well as general principles, through 
which these cases can be assessed. Although I do not claim that 
liberal political theory could provide any definitive guidance into 
how the liberal state should respond to cultural diversity in any 
particular case – in fact, that is one of the main claims of this work 
– I do, however, believe that political theorists and philosophers can 
provide some general frameworks within which the assessment of 
these cases can begin.  
In this work, the distinctions between the individually exercised 
membership rights and collectively exercised group rights, as well 
as the distinctions between the kinds of relations that any particular 
right comes to regulate, play an important part, as these two axes, I 
believe, are particularly important for assessing the kinds of 
normative considerations that different kinds of differentiated rights 
incorporate. At the same time, the concentration on these two axes 
makes my discussions on cultural accommodation manageable 
                                                 
68 Rather than taking exemptions as a singular category, one can thus 
distinguish at least between: (1) those exemptions that affect solely or 
mainly the person to whom the exemption is granted and those that’s main 
effect is on others, (2) those exemptions that are sought from a law that is 
incidentally in conflict with the cultural practice in question and those 
that’s aim is the prevention of the practice or some aspect of the practice, 
and (3) those exemptions that aim at giving people equal opportunities to 
participate in public life (such as employment and education) and those 
that influence people’s private conduct. Levy’s own categorization 
concentrates on the rationale of the law that the exemption is sought from, 
differentiating between laws that are aimed at the protection of children, 
rules that seek to protect outsiders or the environment, and moralistic or 
paternalistic rules that regulate the behaviour of adults. (Levy 1997, 28) 
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without being reduced to an overtly simplified discussion on 
minority rights as a whole. Whereas I will defend the view 
according to which minority rights (variously construed) are 
compatible with liberalism, I will also show how the basic liberal 
commitments to the moral primacy of the individual, individual 
liberty, autonomy and equality create certain constraints both for 
the justifiability as well as for the applicability of these rights in 
practice. The exposition of these constraints, however, cannot be 
done without understanding the context within which the debates on 
liberal multiculturalism have been conducted, and the final section 
of this background chapter aims to shed some light on these 
contexts, as well as on the kinds of limitations of liberal 
multiculturalism that this book is primarily concerned with. 
 
3. Liberal multiculturalism and its limits 
The basic liberal commitments to the moral primacy of the 
individual, individual liberty, autonomy and equality, create certain 
constraints to any liberal theory of multiculturalism. These 
constraints may be interpreted in a variety of ways, depending on 
the kinds of policies (minority rights) that one is talking about, on 
one’s understanding of culture and the value of culture, as well as 
on one’s interpretations of the basic commitments of liberalism. 
Clearly, there are several liberal theories of multiculturalism (or 
liberal multiculturalism, broadly construed), and to give an 
uncontested answer to the question of what is liberal 
multiculturalism would, no doubt, be as difficult as giving an 
uncontested answer to the question of what is liberalism. Liberal 
multicultural theories have, however, been formed in certain 
contexts – both theoretical as well as political – and to understand 
some of the key debates and some of the difficulties in these 
debates one must keep these contexts in mind. 
In this section, I start with some of the historical background of 
these discussions and also identify the framework(s) within which 
these discussions have taken place. In the first section (3.1.), I 
outline a threefold structure of debates on liberal multiculturalism, 
and point towards some of the difficulties of negotiating between 
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these three levels of discussion. I then turn (sections 3.2. and 3.3.)  
to look at the kinds of limitations of liberal multiculturalism that I 
wish to point out to my reader, and that will also form the main 
substance of the remaining chapters of this work. These sections 
will also give a preliminary account of my own approach, that is, a 
more individuated yet culturally sensitive approach to cultural 
diversity, the details of which will need to be filled in the chapters 
to follow.  
 
3.1. Liberalism, liberal multiculturalism, and cultural policies 
In the early stages of debates, the theoretical discussions on 
multiculturalism were strongly connected to the liberalism-
communitarianism debate.69 Drawing from the communitarian 
critique of the antecedently fixed, disembedded and disembodied 
self, the early discussants on multiculturalism reflected extensively 
upon the questions on the social embeddedness and communality of 
individuals, and the implications that one’s views on the 
(ir)reducibility of cultural groups to their individual members had 
on the justifiability of group or collective rights. As a default, most 
of the discussions of the 70’s and 80’s focused on the questions of 
collective rights (with minority groups as potential right-holders), 
with the more individual oriented thinkers normally rejecting such 
rights, and the more collective or communitarian thinkers arguing 
for the need of such rights in the face of the acknowledgement of 
the communality and cultural embeddedness of individuals.70  
Whereas the questions about the nature of cultural groups, the 
social or cultural embeddedness of individuals and the justifiability 
of collectively exercised group rights still play important roles in 
the debates on normative multiculturalism, from the late eighties 
                                                 
69 For an excellent overview of the liberalism-communitarianism –debate, 
see: Mulhall and Swift 1992. For a similar contextualisation of the early 
debates on multiculturalism within the framework of liberalism-
communitarianism debate, see: Kymlicka 2007b. 
70 For communitarian oriented accounts, see e.g. Van Dyke 1975; 1977, 
Johnston 1989; McDonald 1991; Addis 1992; for more individual centred 
accounts, e.g. Narveson 1991; Hartney 1991. 
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onwards, there has been a notable shift in (as well as an upsurge of) 
debates on multiculturalism. No longer do the theorists of 
normative multiculturalism view cultural policies simply in terms 
of collective rights (group rights proper), nor does one’s stand on 
the liberal-communitarian axis necessarily define one’s stand on 
multicultural policies (variously construed). Rather, there have been 
several notable attempts to create a specifically liberal approach to 
multiculturalism, and many of the discussions on multiculturalism 
are nowadays constructed within the framework of liberalism 
(present work included).71 
In his ground breaking work Liberalism, Community and 
Culture (1989), Will Kymlicka set the task of answering the 
question of whether the cultural claims of minority groups or their 
members could be reconciled with liberalism. As will be discussed 
in more detail especially in Ch. 1 and 2, Kymlicka’s arguments 
were not always clear and addressed several different issues (the 
exposition of which was often wanting), but the general aim of 
Kymlicka’s work was, nevertheless, obvious. That is, the 
reconciliation of cultural claims and multicultural policies (minority 
rights) with liberalism. As is well known, Kymlicka’s answers to 
the question of the compatibility of cultural claims and liberalism 
were rather robust. According to Kymlicka, culture (or cultural 
membership) was, within the traditional liberal frameworks such as 
Rawls’s and Dworkin’s, one of the primary goods that the liberal 
state ought to protect, and the minority rights (variously construed) 
were not only compatible with liberalism, but in fact required by 
the liberal principles of justice.72 
                                                 
71 Perhaps the most prominent, self-confessedly liberal approaches to 
multiculturalism that will also be discussed in this work include those of 
Will Kymlicka (esp. 1989; 1995; 2001), Chandran Kukathas (esp. 2003) 
and Brian Barry (esp. 2001). For alternative liberal approaches, see: Raz 
1994; 1998; Tamir 1993; Spinner-Halev 1994, 2000, Carens 2000. Many 
feminist approaches to multiculturalism can also be seen as located 
broadly within the liberal framework, e.g. Okin 1999; 2005; Benhabib 
2002; 2004; Shachar 2001; Song 2007; Phillips 2007; 2010. 
72 Kymlicka 1989, esp. ch. 8 and 9. 
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The influence of Kymlicka’s work73 for later discussions on 
multiculturalism cannot be overestimated. Not only have people 
used Kymlicka’s framework to argue for a variety of minority 
rights in different contexts, but the alternative liberal theories of 
multiculturalism have also posited themselves in relation, and in 
opposition, to Kymlicka’s. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
problematically, the initial questions of Kymlicka – those of the 
reconciliation of cultural claims and multicultural policies with 
liberalism – were widely adopted. Much of the subsequent 
theoretical discussion on multiculturalism has operated precisely at 
the level of trying to justify (or reject) the taking into account of 
cultural claims at the level of liberal policies and the possibly, 
although by no means necessarily, resulting differentiated rights. 
Many liberal multiculturalists, again in the footsteps of Kymlicka, 
also wish their normative theories to be applicable in practise, 
giving guidance to the ways in which the liberal state should 
respond to cultural diversity. The following figure illustrates this 
threefold structure of debate on liberal multiculturalism, including 
the basic questions of Liberalism (Theory 1), questions of Liberal 
Multiculturalism (Theory 2 / Application 1), actual state responses 
(Application 2), and their relations to one another: 
 
Figure 2: Three-fold structure of debates on liberal 
multiculturalism74 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Esp. Kymlicka 1989; 1995. 
74 It may be contested whether the two parts of “Theory” in the structure 
(Liberalism and Liberal Multiculturalism) are, in fact, distinct or whether 
liberal multiculturalism should rather be seen as an extension of liberalism 
(for an argument against the distinctiveness of liberal multicultural theory, 
see Barry 2001;  Colburn 2010). Whereas I believe that liberal 
multiculturalism does, and rightly so, fall within the broader framework of 
liberalism, for explanatory purposes, these two levels of discussion are 
kept separated. 
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Not surprisingly, given Kymlicka’s initial framing of the debate, 
most theoretical discussions on liberal multiculturalism have been 
operating precisely within and between the frameworks of Theory 1 
(liberalism) and Theory 2 / Application 1 (liberal multiculturalism). 
The key questions, located in this area (relation 1), however, may 
be very different questions to those of the actual responses of the 
liberal state (application 2) and the relations within which these 
responses should stand to liberal multicultural theories (relation 2), 
the basic tenets of liberalism (relation 3), or the initial questions 
themselves (relation 4). As already indicated, the two questions that 
Kymlicka set out to answer were questions about the role of cultural 
claims (A) and differentiated rights (B) within liberalism. These 
two questions, however, are very different and the answer to one 
need not determine the answer to the other. The first question, 
properly understood, is a question about the rationale that the liberal 
state may have for including culture (variously construed) among 
those considerations that need to be taken into account in state 
policies. As I will argue, liberal multiculturalists have been 
successful in showing that there are, indeed, good reasons for the 
liberal state to take cultural considerations into account, and that the 
cultural disadvantages, faced by minority members, should also be 
proper concerns of the liberal state. 
The second question of the justifiability of culturally 
differentiated rights within liberalism is, however, a very different 
question to that of the rationale for the liberal state to take cultural 
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considerations into account. Surely, in order to argue for the 
compatibility of culturally differentiated rights and liberalism, one 
also needs to give an affirmative answer to the question of whether 
cultural considerations should be taken into account by the liberal 
state, but an affirmative answer to this question (A) need not entail 
affirmative answer to the latter (B). It is perfectly possible for one 
to agree that the liberal state should take cultural considerations into 
account in public policies, yet reject the claim that culturally 
differentiated rights (or some of them) would be consistent with the 
basic principles of liberalism. In this work, I argue that liberal 
multiculturalists have been successful in showing that culturally 
differentiated rights are not, inherently, in conflict with the basic 
liberal commitments to individual freedom, autonomy and equality, 
although I also argue that this compatibility of culturally 
differentiated rights with liberalism leads not to the view, promoted 
by Kymlicka, that such rights would also be required by the liberal 
principles of justice. 
Why this is so, should already be apparent from the initial 
framing of the debates and from the fact that neither of the initial 
questions (A or B) are addressing the question of how the liberal 
state should respond to cultural diversity, but rather questions 
located within the theoretical framework of liberalism itself. When 
thinking about the actual state responses, several other 
considerations need to be borne in mind. Even if there were no 
inherent inconsistency with, for example, collectively exercised 
group rights for certain levels of self-determination (for example, 
an aboriginal group’s right for territorial autonomy, or the right of a 
religious group to enforce its own family jurisdiction) with 
liberalism, this does not, as yet, lead to the view according to which 
the liberal state should also respond to cultural claims by granting 
such rights. As has been noted especially by many feminists, these 
rights may potentially be used against individuals, and the adequate 
response of the liberal state may well depend on whether these 
rights are also conjoined with other measures, protecting the basic 
Background 
53 
 
rights of individuals.75 Nor is it always the case that differentiated 
rights (variously construed) would be the only, let alone the best, 
responses to cultural diversity, especially in cases where the 
disadvantage that the particular right is aiming to rectify can also be 
rectified by other means.76  
Moreover, as will be argued in the forthcoming chapters, the 
questions about the actual granting of differentiated rights (whether 
individually exercised membership rights or group rights proper) 
involve not only questions about the rationale and justifiability of 
such rights, but also questions about the allocation of such rights. 
That is, questions about who, and on what grounds, should be 
eligible for such rights (individually exercised membership rights), 
or who, and on what grounds, should fall within the scope of the 
right in question (collectively exercised group rights proper). These 
questions about the allocation of differentiated rights have, to a 
large extent, been ignored by the liberal theorists of 
multiculturalism, and one of the main contributions of this work is 
to bring these issues into a better focus. As will be argued, 
especially in Part II of this book, the common assumptions about 
the differentiated rights as being specifically group-differentiated 
rights may not stand up to closer scrutiny, as there may not be any 
uncontested way of defining where the borders of the group stand, 
or who should be considered as a member of any particular group. 
                                                 
75 One of the minimal safe-guards, that of the right of exit, and its possible 
inadequacies will be discussed in chapters 2 and 5. 
76 In Ch. 3 I discuss the so-called rule and exemption –approach that has 
often been argued for in cases where the cultural or religious practices of a 
minority collide with the general rules and norms of a majority, thus 
creating disadvantage to those engaging in such practices. Whereas I will 
defend the rationale behind the rule and exemption –approach, my 
intention is not to say that this approach should, as a default, be used to 
rectify such disadvantages. Nor do I, however, suggest that an alternative 
approach, such as the changing of the general rule, should always be 
adopted, but that within the liberal multicultural framework, there is a 
substantive amount of scope for the liberal state to respond to such cases 
in a variety of ways (incl. differentiated rights), and that the reasons for- as 
well as against- any particular policy need to be assessed in context. 
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In the issues of allocation, it will be argued, the basic liberal 
commitments to the moral primacy of the individual and to 
individual freedom and autonomy should be brought back to the 
forefront, creating a more individuated, yet culturally sensitive 
approach to allocating differentiated rights in practice. 
 
3.2. Limits of consistency 
The predominantly individuated, yet culturally sensitive, approach 
developed in this book builds upon two distinct, although partially 
related, arguments about the kinds of constraints that contemporary 
debates on liberal multiculturalism are seen to suffer. Especially 
Part I (Ch. 1, 2 and 3) concentrates on the kinds of difficulties that 
the so-called grand theories of multiculturalism are faced with due 
to them prioritising a particular liberal value, and due to them 
attempting to create comprehensive liberal multicultural theories 
based on their chosen value. These theories, as will be seen, are not 
only attempts to answer the initial questions about the compatibility 
of cultural claims or differentiated rights with liberalism, but also 
attempts to give normative guidance to the kinds of responses that 
the liberal state, faced with issues of cultural diversity, should 
adopt. 
In broad outlines, the liberal approaches to multiculturalism can 
be divided into autonomy-based, toleration-based and equality-
based approaches to accommodating people’s cultural differences 
within a liberal society.77 The distinctions between these three 
categories are not, however, always clear cut, and the arguments 
from autonomy, toleration (derived from freedom of association) 
and equality have also been used in conjunction with one another, 
                                                 
77 The most prominent autonomy-based account is that of Will 
Kymlicka’s, although Kymlicka’s account can also be seen as an equality-
based approach to cultural diversity (a rather different equality-based 
approach by Brian Barry will be discussed in Ch. 3). The toleration-based 
accounts of Chandran Kukathas and William Galston will be discussed in 
Ch. 2. 
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depending on the normative issues at hand.78 The usage of different 
kinds of arguments for (or against) multicultural policies should 
not, of course, come as a surprise, as the normative issues relevant 
with respect to any particular policy may differ, and the rationale 
for the liberal state to take cultural considerations into account 
should not be based on the prioritisation of any one particular 
liberal value, but on a combination of these.79 Not all grand 
theorists of multiculturalism recognize this, and one of the aims of 
Part I is to show some of the theoretical difficulties that an overt 
emphasis on a particular liberal value brings to the undoubtedly 
complex and diverse discussions on multiculturalism.  
The difficulties, encountered by the grand theorists of 
multiculturalism, stem partially from the already mentioned 
                                                 
78 For example, Will Kymlicka uses both arguments from autonomy and 
arguments from equality in building his case, both for the rationale for the 
liberal state to be concerned about cultural disadvantages as well as for 
differentiated rights. (These arguments will be discussed in Ch. 1 and 2) 
Perhaps more surprisingly, Chandran Kukathas’s toleration based 
argument also incorporates elements from the autonomy approach, or so I 
try to argue in Ch. 2. 
79 As already indicated (1.2.) different liberal values may pull in different 
directions, and some balancing act between the key values of individual 
freedom, autonomy and equality must be made. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean that any of these values could, in all cases, trump the 
others, but, depending on the issue at hand, the balancing act may well 
turn out differently. Regardless of whether one comes to prioritise one or 
another liberal value at the centre of any particular cases (for example, 
whether one comes to prioritize individual autonomy over toleration in 
one’s assessment of particular rights of illiberal groups, or whether one’s 
main focus is on questions of equality in discussions on cultural 
exemptions), this needs not entail that the centrality and primacy of that 
particular value would extend to all cases of cultural accommodation. Nor 
does one’s emphasis on, say, freedom of association make the claims 
based on individual autonomy or equality fully redundant, as these are 
considerations that any liberal theory needs to take seriously. Whereas it 
may be an open question how to negotiate between the (possibly) 
conflicting values of individual freedom, autonomy and equality in 
particular cases, these values, nevertheless, must occupy a central place in 
the negotiations, and cannot be fully ignored. 
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structure of debates, including the different levels of debate 
outlined above (3.1., Figure 2.) As already suggested, most of the 
discussions on liberal multiculturalism have been conducted within 
the theoretical framework of liberalism, aiming to address two 
questions that, although interlinked, are nevertheless analytically 
separate: that of the rationale for the liberal state to take cultural 
considerations into account (A), and that of the compatibility of 
differentiated rights with the basic tenets of liberalism (B). Besides 
these questions, however, liberal multiculturalists have also tried to 
tie their theories into concrete political practice, aiming to give 
guidance to the ways in which liberal states should respond to 
cultural diversity (C). Unfortunately, as will be seen during the 
course of this work, there has been a tendency to conflate these 
three questions, and to presume an inherent linkage between the 
answers to the questions of rationale (A), compatibility (B), and 
actual policies (C). The linkages between these three questions, 
however, are far from straight forward and, as I will show, the 
scope of the arguments, given by the grand theorists of liberal 
multiculturalism, do not extend to the final questions about the 
actual policies that the liberal state should adopt. Whereas I argue 
that the autonomy-based, toleration-based and equality-based 
approaches have provided slightly different frameworks from which 
to address the questions of rationale (A) and compatibility (B), I 
also show that the grand theories remain, and also should remain, 
relatively silent about the final questions concerning the adoption 
(or rejection) of differentiated rights in practice. Whereas I argue (at 
times in opposition to the theorists themselves) that the autonomy, 
toleration and equality based approaches all give good reasons to 
answer in the affirmative to questions A and B, I also argue that 
they fail to give any definitive guidance on how the liberal state 
should respond to cultural diversity in practice (C). Rather, the 
grand theories of multiculturalism leave substantive scope for 
variation in the legitimate state responses to cultural diversity, 
including the possibility (although not a requirement) for a variety 
of differentiated rights to be applied. 
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3.3. Limits of application 
Provided that the grand theories of liberal multiculturalism leave 
open the possibility (albeit not a requirement) to apply culturally 
differentiated rights in practice, but fail to give any definitive 
guidance into this application, the question remains: according to 
which principles should culturally differentiated rights (variously 
construed) be applied? Following Joseph Carens and his emphasis 
on taking into account the concrete circumstances and specificities 
of different cases in constructing the principles of multicultural 
accommodation, I too believe that many of the questions relating to 
the concrete application of minority rights (or any minority right in 
particular) can only be solved in specific contexts.80 This, I believe, 
should already be clear from the plurality of differentiated rights 
and the heterogeneity of the normative considerations relevant for 
each type of right (see also 2.3. above). Rather than concentrating 
on specific types of rights – be they defined by the content of such 
rights (e.g. language, land, religion), the holders of such rights 
(individuals, groups), the form of such rights (e.g. exemptions, 
assistance, self-determination), or by the specific circumstances of a 
specific political community – in this work, my focus is on one of 
the often ignored aspects of application, that of the allocation of 
different kinds of culturally differentiated rights in practice. This 
question of allocation, it should be emphasized, is a very specific 
sub-category of the questions of application, addressing issues of 
scope rather than issues commonly conceived as relevant to the 
initial granting of such rights in practice.  
                                                 
80 See: Carens 2000; 2004. It should be noted that the contextual approach, 
adopted by Carens may not be anything particularly new to political 
philosophy (for discussions, see e.g. Kukathas 2004), and the grand 
theorists of multiculturalism discussed in Part I all utilize several concrete 
examples in constructing and assessing their theories. Carens’s work is, 
however, a particularly systematic attempt to narrow the gap between 
abstract political theory and concrete political practice and, as such, 
deserves proper acknowledgement. 
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The difference between these two questions of application 
(questions of scope and questions of granting such rights) may be 
outlined as follows: on the one hand, it may be asked, in which 
circumstances, and according to which principles, should the liberal 
state grant differentiated rights (or any particular differentiated 
right) to cultural groups or their members. Whereas the liberal 
principles of individual freedom, autonomy and equality do not, as 
such, overrule minority rights as legitimate ways for the liberal state 
to respond to cultural diversity, in certain circumstances there may 
be good reasons not to implement such rights in practice. For 
example, the answer to the question of whether to grant an 
exemption to a particular group or group members in order to 
alleviate the burdens that their specific cultural or religious 
practices are seen to cause may depend on several factors, such as 
the centrality of the practice itself, the legitimacy and the purpose 
of the rule from which the exemption is sought from, the area of 
conduct that the rule is governing, etc. – all considerations that can 
only be properly assessed in context.81 On the other hand, however, 
it may also be asked, to whom, and according to which principles, 
should the right in question be granted (individually exercised 
membership rights), or who should come under the influence of 
such rights (collectively exercised group rights proper). These 
questions of allocation are not, as such, questions about whether a 
particular right should, or should not, be implemented, but 
questions about the relevant scope of these rights. 
An objection could be raised that this question of allocation 
makes no sense unless combined with some principles that guide 
the actual granting of differentiated rights in the first place (that is, 
the principles defining those instances in which the liberal state 
should adopt some particular culturally differentiated rights to be 
implemented). To an extent, this is true, as the appropriate ways of 
allocating differentiated rights may well depend on those 
circumstances in which these rights are granted, and the principles 
                                                 
81 Some of these issues, relevant for the rule and exemption approach, will 
be discussed in Ch. 3. 
Background 
59 
 
for granting such rights may well depend on the proper scope of 
such rights. Whereas I will also discuss some of the issues relating 
to the relation between the justifiability of granting a particular 
minority right and its application, for the most part, my intention is 
simply to look for those guidelines that, from the liberal standpoint, 
should guide the actual allocation, or the scope of differentiated 
rights in practice. Whereas the constructing of such guidelines may 
well end up being partial, rather general, and certainly need to be 
more specified in specific contexts, I also believe that there is a 
pressing need to construct such guidelines in order for liberal 
multicultural theory to be more applicable in practice. This need is 
especially acute as many western liberal democracies have, in 
effect, adopted some systems of minority rights (regardless of 
whether they should or should not have done so), and the effects of 
such rights are very real, affecting the lives of both those coming 
under the direct influence of such rights (the right bearers) as well 
as others. 
The main argument, put forward especially in Part II of this 
book (Ch. 4, 5 and 6) is that, in questions of allocation, the basic 
liberal commitment to the primacy of the individual should be put 
back to the forefront. As already mentioned, culturally 
differentiated rights have, traditionally, been considered as group-
differentiated rights, either in the sense in which the right is granted 
to a particular cultural or religious group as a collective, or in the 
sense in which the right is granted to an individual by virtue of her 
membership in this group. The allocation of differentiated rights 
along group boundaries or on the basis of group memberships, 
however, is far more problematic than would at first seem. As will 
be discussed especially in Ch. 4, there is no uncontested way of 
defining where the borders of any particular group should lie, or 
who should be considered as a member. In the face of this 
indeterminacy, I argue, the liberal state should adopt a more 
individuated approach to allocating culturally differentiated rights, 
not on the basis of one’s group membership, but on the basis of 
individual needs and individual self-identifications. 
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The questions of what the individual needs or individual self-
identifications precisely refer to, and how they are to be assessed, 
are of course difficult questions, and cannot be answered without 
some reference to the actual rationales of the differentiated rights 
and the justificatory framework within which these rights are 
argued for. The liberal frameworks discussed in Part I thus provide 
important starting points for a specifically liberal approach to 
allocating differentiated rights, by showing how culture (variously 
construed) can create certain kinds of disadvantages,82 and how 
differentiated rights (variously construed) can operate as rectifying 
these disadvantages. These rationales, combined with the specific 
contents of differentiated rights83 should, however, be in line with 
those to whom the right in question is allocated, and, more often 
than not, those falling within the proper scope of any particular 
right transcend the commonly ascribed group boundaries and group 
memberships. As will be argued during the course of this work, the 
discrepancies both in one’s views on the contents of culture as well 
as in one’s views of cultural membership, cast some serious doubt 
on whether culturally differentiated rights, granted on the basis of 
group membership, really manage to adequately track those whose 
disadvantages the rights are aiming to rectify. A more individuated 
approach, on the contrary, would seem to have the benefit of better 
tracking the proper beneficiaries of such rights, denying the 
inherent linkage between the kind of disadvantage that the right in 
question is aiming to rectify and one’s commonly ascribed 
membership in a particular cultural or religious group. 
The specifics of this individuated, yet culturally sensitive 
approach to allocating different types of differentiated rights need 
                                                 
82 These disadvantages may be of several kinds. For example, people may 
be disadvantaged by the lack of access to a familiar cultural context, by the 
incompatibility of particular cultural practices and general rules of society, 
but they may also be disadvantaged by the lack of recognition, or 
affirmation of their cultural identities. The questions of state recognition, 
as related to group memberships, will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 5. 
83 The necessity of differentiated rights as promoting certain cultural 
contents will be discussed especially in Ch. 1, 4 and 5. 
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to, of course, be discussed in more detail, and Part II of this book is 
dedicated to doing this. Whereas this part by no means gives a 
comprehensive account of the ways in which the individuated 
approach alters the traditional ways of allocating differentiated 
rights in a variety of circumstances, it does, nevertheless, point out 
to some important implications that a more individuated approach 
to cultural diversity would have at the level of actual multicultural 
policies. This focus on the issues of allocation and the implications 
of the individuated approach to actual multicultural policies, I 
believe, is not only important in order for the variety of 
differentiated rights to better track their targets, but also for liberal 
multicultural theory. Whereas the liberal multiculturalists have been 
extremely concerned with the questions of justifying different types 
of differentiated rights, and have attempted (even if unsuccessfully) 
to guide the kinds of policies that the liberal states should adopt, 
they have seemed to largely ignore the fact that the final 
justification of any particular policy depends also on the scope of 
this policy – that is, on the questions of who, precisely, comes 
under the policy in question. As will be argued in this work, a 
distinctively liberal approach to cultural diversity needs to take this 
question of scope seriously, not only in order to be a good liberal 
theory, but also in order to be better applicable in practice. 
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PART I 
 
Justifying Minority Rights:  
the grand theories and their constraints 
 
Broadly construed, liberal multicultural theories can be divided into 
autonomy-based, toleration-based and equality-based approaches to 
cultural diversity. The autonomy-based approaches emphasize 
individual autonomy as one of the key values of liberalism, and also 
argue for the need of the liberal state to protect and/or promote 
individual autonomy through state policies and public institutions. 
Autonomy-based arguments have been used in support of both 
collectively as well as individually exercised differentiated rights, 
but they have also been used to indicate certain limitations to these 
rights: the right of a cultural or religious group to conduct its 
internal affairs, for example, cannot be used to suppress individual 
autonomy, but is conditional upon a framework within which 
individuals are both free as well as capable of leading autonomous 
lives, including being free and capable of rejecting the rules and 
norms imposed on them by their own cultural or religious groups. 
The toleration-based approaches tend to reject the centrality of 
individual autonomy within liberalism and the role of the liberal 
state in protecting and/or promoting individual autonomy. The 
toleration-based approaches highlight the freedom of individuals to 
associate (and to disassociate) in whatever ways they wish, 
including ways that suppress individual autonomy, and argue for a 
requirement of the different cultural or religious groups to tolerate – 
that is, to not interfere with – the affairs of another. The toleration-
based arguments can be used both in support of as well as against a 
variety of differentiated rights, although most prominently, the 
toleration-based approaches have been associated with the rigid 
rejection of both the liberal state’s role in promoting individual 
autonomy as well as its role in accommodating minority cultural 
groups with the help of differentiated rights. 
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The equality-based approaches, unsurprisingly, start from the 
presupposition that the liberal state should treat all of its members 
with equal concern and respect. The equal treatment of different 
people may, however, sometimes mean differentiated treatment, 
and the equality based arguments have been used to argue for a 
need to grant cultural groups and their members differentiated 
rights on the basis of considerations of equality. The equality-based 
arguments may, however, also be used in opposition to 
differentiated rights, for example in cases where a differentiated 
right is seen to disadvantage certain members of groups (for 
example, when a group’s right to govern its internal affairs is used 
to discriminate against some of its own members), or in cases 
where the differentiated right would undermine the rationale for a 
universal rule (for example, in cases where an exemption is sought 
from rules that, for good reasons, are upheld for everyone). 
Clearly, the autonomy-based, toleration-based and equality-
based arguments can be used to different effects and, as will 
become clear later on, the distinctions between these three 
approaches are far from clear cut. On the contrary, most theorists of 
multiculturalism utilize autonomy, toleration and equality 
arguments conjointly, and one’s emphasis on one type of argument 
rather than another may well depend on the specific issue at hand. 
The autonomy-, toleration- and equality-based approaches do, 
however, provide slightly different grounds upon which to begin 
assessing the difficult issues of liberal multiculturalism, including 
the rationale for the liberal state to take cultural considerations into 
account (A), the compatibility of differentiated rights with 
liberalism (B), and the state policies of cultural accommodation (C). 
In this part, I look at the so-called grand theories of 
multiculturalism (broadly labelled under the autonomy, toleration 
and equality –approaches)84 and assess the ways in which these 
                                                 
84 The so-called grand theories include those of Will Kymlicka (Ch. 1 & 
2), Chandran Kukathas (Ch. 2) and Brian Barry (Ch. 3). I call these 
theories “grand theories”, as each of the authors aim at building fairly 
comprehensive accounts of how to justify (or not justify) culturally 
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grand theories are capable (or incapable) of answering the questions 
of rationale (A), compatibility (B) and state policies (C). In the 
course of doing so, I build a strong case, based on the basic liberal 
commitments to individual freedom, autonomy and equality, for the 
liberal state to be concerned about people’s cultural disadvantages 
and to aim at rectifying these disadvantages, possibly – albeit not 
necessarily – with the help of different kinds of minority rights.  
The kinds of cultural disadvantages, faced by minority groups 
and their members are of various kinds, and one of the purposes of 
this part is to shed some light on the kinds of cultural disadvantages 
that can be conceived of as proper concerns of the liberal state. This 
part also assesses the scope of the arguments put forth both in 
defence, as well as in opposition to, differentiated rights, showing 
how the arguments for rationale (A) have often been conflated with 
the arguments for state policies (C). For the benefit of the second 
part of this work (Part II: Liberal multiculturalism and minority 
rights in practice) this part identifies some of the internal 
inconsistencies in the works of the so-called grand theorists, that are 
partially due to their overt emphasis on a particular liberal value (be 
it autonomy, freedom of association or equality), partially due to 
the conflating of the three questions of rationale (A), compatibility 
(B) and state policies (C). Whereas I argue (sometimes contrary to 
the theorists themselves) that the grand theories of liberal 
multiculturalism do provide strong cases for the liberal state to be 
concerned about and to try to rectify people’s cultural 
disadvantages, I also show that they remain relatively silent about 
those specific policies that the liberal state should adopt, leaving 
considerable scope in the legitimate variation of the ways in which 
                                                                                                     
differentiated rights within liberalism and how the liberal state should 
respond to cultural diversity. Each of these positions have also prompted 
extensive discussions in their own right (some of which will also be 
commented upon in due course). To an extent, this part can also be read as 
a historical overview of the debates on liberal multiculturalism, starting 
from the classical debates on “minority rights” (as a bulk), proceeding to 
the more recent, specified and critical approaches to accommodating 
people’s cultural differences in liberal societies. 
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the liberal state can respond to cultural diversity in practice. 
Contrary to providing conclusive guidance to the liberal state in 
issues on cultural diversity, I argue that the grand theories of 
multiculturalism should rather be viewed as providing frameworks 
within which different cases – no doubt to be assessed in context – 
can be discussed. 
As the discussions on liberal multiculturalism cannot ignore the 
tremendous influence of Will Kymlicka’s ground breaking work, I, 
too, begin by assessing some of the benefits and weaknesses of 
Kymlicka’s account. In the first chapter, Kymlicka’s liberal 
multiculturalism, I focus especially on Kymlicka’s luck-egalitarian 
defence of minority rights before (in Ch. 2) turning to his autonomy 
based commitments and to the so-called diversity-liberal critique of 
autonomy liberalism. In chapter 3, Liberal egalitarianism and 
equality of opportunity, I return to the egalitarian standpoint (now 
specified in the context of individually exercised membership 
rights) to complement my argument for the different kinds of 
rationales that the grand theories of liberal multiculturalism provide 
for the liberal state to be concerned about and to try to rectify 
cultural disadvantages, without, however, providing conclusive 
guidance on the kinds of policies that the liberal state should adopt. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism 
 
Kymlicka’s argument for minority rights85 within the liberal 
framework incorporates several elements. Firstly, Kymlicka is 
committed to the view according to which the liberal state should 
stay neutral with respect to people’s conceptions of the good. That 
is, the liberal state should not base its policies on an assessment of 
the value of people’s ways of living, but allow, as far as possible, 
people to decide for themselves what they see valuable in life and 
to pursue whatever conceptions of the good they may have. 
Secondly, Kymlicka is committed to the value of individual 
autonomy, and the role of the state in catering for autonomy. 
According to Kymlicka, people can, and they also do, sometimes 
revise or even reject their current conceptions of the good, and the 
liberal state should provide for conditions in which people are able 
to do so. Thirdly, Kymlicka holds that the liberal state should be 
committed to treating people equally, and that this requires the state 
to rectify those inequalities that people are not themselves 
responsible for. That is, the liberal state should rectify those 
inequalities that result, not from the choices that people make, but 
from their unchosen circumstances. 
                                                 
85 The term “minority rights”, in Kymlicka’s work, is used as a short hand 
for a variety of culturally or religiously based group-differentiated rights. 
Minority or group-differentiated rights incorporate both the individually 
exercised freedoms of group members (membership rights), as well as 
rights exercised by a collective (group rights proper). They may also 
include measures that work for the benefit of a minority, but that are not, 
as such, exercised by the group or its members (e.g. symbolic recognition). 
What is distinctive about minority rights, in Kymlicka’s framework, is that 
they are, in some relevant sense, group-differentiated: they go beyond the 
common rights of citizenship by treating people differently due to their 
different cultural or religious backgrounds. See e.g. Kymlicka 1989, 138-
140; 1995, ch. 2; 2001, 42; for further distinctions, see Background 2.3. 
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Kymlicka’s commitments to 1) neutrality of the state, 2) value of 
individual autonomy and 3) luck-egalitarianism, however, say 
nothing, as yet, about cultural groups or the need of the liberal state 
to respond to cultural diversity by granting minority rights to these 
groups or their members. Thus, Kymlicka complements his account 
with two further commitments. Fourthly, Kymlicka views cultures 
as contexts of choice. That is, he views cultures as frameworks 
within which people can access a variety of options provided by 
culture and make meaningful choices among them. Fifthly, 
Kymlicka sees one’s cultural membership as unchosen. That is, he 
sees one’s cultural membership as the kind of circumstance that, 
should this membership create disadvantage, the liberal state should 
aim to rectify this disadvantage. With these five commitments in 
place, Kymlicka constructs his liberal argument for minority rights. 
As Kymlicka’s argument incorporates several moves between 
these five elements, it is worth looking in more detail, how his 
argument is constructed and what kinds of (extra) background 
commitments Kymlicka builds into his account. As Kymlicka’s 
argument is predominantly a liberal egalitarian argument for 
minority rights, my starting point is in Kymlicka’s concerns on 
equality and the ways in which his other commitments build into 
his egalitarian framework. (I will return to Kymlicka’s views on 
individual autonomy in more detail in ch 2) In this chapter, I argue 
that the egalitarian framework, promoted by Kymlicka, is both 
capable of explaining the kinds of inequalities faced by minority 
members as well as of giving reasons for why the liberal state 
should be concerned about and try to rectify these inequalities. It is 
not, however, capable of providing any conclusive case for the need 
of minority rights, but is rather suggestive of extreme caution with 
respect to the application of different types of minority rights in 
practice. This, I argue, has to do with the nature of minority rights 
as always promoting certain conceptions and contents of culture, as 
well as with certain problems of these rights to perform the tasks 
they are set to perform. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first part, Equality for 
minority members, I outline Kymlicka’s luck-egalitarian position 
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and identify three distinct arguments that Kymlicka uses for 
positing the base line of equality at the point in which people can 
live their lives in their own cultural contexts (1.1.). I then (1.2.) 
assess the scope of these arguments with respect to the kinds of 
disadvantages identifiable within Kymlicka’s framework, and with 
respect to the rationales for the liberal state to be concerned about 
these disadvantages. In the second part, Minority rights and the 
limitations of Kymllicka’s framework, I turn to some of the 
difficulties of applying the luck-egalitarian framework at the level 
of state policies. In section 2.1. I give a brief typology of minority 
rights before turning into two main difficulties inherent in 
Kymlicka’s account. Section 2.2. focuses on the problematic 
relationship between minority rights and cultural contents, section 
2.3. on the ways in which minority rights can (or cannot) be seen as 
protecting people’s memberships. Both of these difficulties, I argue, 
suggest a far more cautious approach to the application of minority 
rights in practice without nullifying the rationales that the liberal 
state has for being concerned about and aiming to rectify people’s 
cultural disadvantages. 
 
1. Equality for minority members 
Kymlicka’s equality based argument for the liberal state to grant 
differentiated rights to minority groups or their members takes 
approximately the following form. As the liberal state (indeed any 
state) is necessarily organized in accordance with particular cultural 
norms and practices,86 this puts members of other cultures in a 
disadvantaged position to that of the majority. Whereas the 
members of the dominant culture – the majority – have an 
automatic access to their own culture and are able to live in 
accordance with their own cultural norms and practices, the 
members of the minority are not. To the contrary, the minority 
members are faced with a stark choice of either abandoning their 
                                                 
86 For example, official languages, public holidays, national symbols, 
education curriculums are always reflective of certain culture(s), normally 
the culture of the majority. e.g. Kymlicka 1995, 108; 2001, 80. 
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own cultural framework or spending vast amounts of resources to 
maintain it – something that the majority is getting for free. 
According to Kymlicka, this disadvantage is the kind of 
disadvantage that the liberal state should be concerned about, thus 
creating a case for minority rights within the liberal framework. 
Kymlicka’s argument for the state to be concerned about and to 
try to rectify the disadvantage faced by the minority members is 
strongly based on a Dworkinian model of equality of resources.87 
According to Dworkin, people should be held responsible for their 
choices, but they should not suffer (or gain) from their unchosen 
circumstances, including their inborn disabilities, low talents, or 
misfortunes caused by bad brute luck. In order to eliminate the 
inequalities that people could not be held responsible for, Dworkin 
developed a model according to which to distribute resources that 
people could then use to their own liking. The Dworkinian model 
(based on hypothetical auction and the envy test) incorporated two 
elements. Firstly, the equal distribution of the initial resources of 
individuals (which they are (bearing the consequences) free to use 
as well or as badly as they see fit), and secondly, the continuous 
compensation of those who, to no fault of their own, cannot make 
the best (or as good as others) of the initial resources given.88 
Whereas Kymlicka’s account is a pronouncedly ‘resourcist’ account 
of equality, based on the Dworkinian conception of equality of 
resources, there are certain modifications that Kymlicka introduces 
to the Dworkinian model. According to Kymlicka, it is not that the 
members of minority cultures would be disadvantaged due to them 
having fewer initial resources (although this might also be the case), 
or because they are not able to make as good a use of their 
resources (although this might, too, be the case),89 but they are 
                                                 
87 Dworkin 1981b. 
88 Dworkin 1981b; for alternative views on the currency of egalitarian 
justice, see: Dworkin 1981a; Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Sen 1980; 
Nussbaum 1988; for critiques of the luck-egalitarian position, see e.g. 
Anderson 1999; Wolff 1998; Scheffler 2003. 
89 Kymlicka does point towards the idea that the members of minority 
cultures cannot necessarily pursue their chosen ways of life as 
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disadvantaged due to them lacking the familiar cultural context in 
which these resources could be utilized. Whereas people should, 
pace Kymlicka and Dworkin, be held responsible for and pay the 
price of their own choices, they should not be held responsible for 
lacking the actual context in which these choices (to be responsible 
for) could be made. For Kymlicka, unlike Dworkin, it is not only 
the equality of resources that matters, but also the context within 
which these resources can be utilized.90 
Although Kymlicka’s further claim (not of inequality of initial 
resources in the Dworkinian sense, but of inequality of being able 
to utilize one’s resources in one’s own cultural context) would seem 
to go beyond the Dworkinian conception of equality of resources,91 
Kymlicka, nevertheless, attempts to back this further claim up 
within the framework of the Dworkinian model. According to 
Kymlicka, the existence of just one prominent cultural framework 
(that of the majority) creates a situation in which the members of 
minority cultures will have to use vast amounts of their resources 
for the maintenance of their own cultural framework. Even if they 
were able to do this (that is, preserve their own cultural framework 
by directing part of their bundle of resources into this maintenance), 
this would cut down the amount of resources that they have 
available for leading their lives – thus putting them in a 
disadvantaged position to that of the majority (who still have their 
whole bundle of resources to be utilized). This, according to 
Kymlicka, is the point at which the equality of resources should be 
                                                                                                     
“efficiently” as the members of the majority, should they be forced to do 
so in an alien cultural framework. See e.g. Kymlicka 1989, 176. 
90 Kymlicka 1989, 188-189. 
91 Kymlicka is careful to note that, in accordance with the Dworkinian 
model, the members of minority cultures might well be happy with their 
bundle of resources, and not envy the resources of the majority as such 
(thus fulfilling the Dworkinian envy test). Even if this was the case, 
however, the members of minority cultures may still be envious of the 
majority, albeit not qua their bundle of resources, but because of the fact 
that the majority can utilize their resources in their own cultural context. 
Kymlicka 1989,188. 
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measured, thus putting the baseline of equality not at the point in 
which people have equal resources to start with, but at the point in 
which people have these resources and their own cultural 
framework within which to use them.  
 
1.1. Culture as a context of choice 
In order to place the base line of equality to the point in which 
people are already able to live their lives within their own cultural 
framework, Kymlicka needs to show why having one’s own 
cultural framework would be something that people cannot be 
expected to abandon or pay the price for. Part of the support for this 
claim comes from Kymlicka’s treatment of cultural membership as 
one of the primary goods, part from his assumptions about the 
involuntary nature of cultural membership. These lines of support 
can best be examined in the light of Kymlicka’s conception of 
culture as a context of choice, and the elements incorporated in this 
conception. I identify three distinct, although interrelated, 
arguments within the context of choice –view that, together, form 
the support needed for placing the base line of equality to the point 
of being able to live one’s life in one’s own cultural framework. 
Later on (in part 1.2.) I use these arguments to show that, although 
supportive of Kymlicka’s new base line, these arguments also pose 
certain restrictions on the ways in which the rationales for the 
liberal state to rectify different kinds of disadvantages can be 
conceived of. 
 
The prerequisite for choice –argument  
In order to show why people should not be required to abandon, or 
pay the price for their own cultural framework, Kymlicka looks at 
the role of cultural membership in the constitution of a good life. 
According to Kymlicka, cultural membership can be conceived as 
one of the primary goods – something that all rational persons can 
be expected to want,92 and that the state should (based on 
                                                 
92 Kymlicka 1989, 166; 1995, 86; for Rawls’s original account of primary 
goods, upon which Kymlicka builds, see Rawls 1971, 62; 92. 
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requirements of justice) attempt to guarantee. Drawing from a 
specifically liberal framework, Kymlicka emphasizes the role of 
individual freedom and the importance of the individual’s 
capabilities to view, assess and make choices about one’s life. 
Contrary to the traditional liberal theories, however, Kymlicka 
argues that one’s freedom of choice is both enabled as well as 
restricted by one’s cultural framework. Culture, as a context of 
choice, is a prerequisite for individual freedom and autonomy as “it 
is only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that 
people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available 
to them, and intelligently examine their value.”93  
This view of culture as prerequisite for individual choice is 
essentially related to Kymlicka’s understanding of culture as a 
specifically societal culture.94 By societal culture Kymlicka refers 
to a framework that “provides its members with meaningful ways 
of life across a full range of human activities, including social, 
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, 
encompassing both public and private spheres.”95 Societal culture is 
encompassing both in the sense of it being regulative of people’s 
lives in a wide area of activity, as well as in the sense of it being 
institutionally embedded, for example in the school, court and 
financial systems of society.96 Despite its encompassive nature, 
however, Kymlicka argues that societal cultures do not determine 
the ways in which people should live their lives but, rather, provide 
the context within which people can make their lives meaningful. 
The societal cultures thus have two important functions. Firstly, 
they provide options that people can, should they so wish, take 
                                                 
93 Kymlicka 1989, 165. 
94 Esp. Kymlicka 1995, ch. 5. For different conceptions of culture used in 
debates on multiculturalism, including societal, normative, constructivist / 
semiotic, see: Festenstein 2005, 13-26. 
95 Kymlicka 1995, 76. 
96 Similar accounts of culture as encompassing in the sense of it being 
regulatory of a wide variety of human behaviour have been given for 
example by Margalit & Raz 1994 (emcompassive cultures) and Shachar  
2001 (nomoi communities). 
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advantage of. And secondly, they also provide the framework – the 
cultural narratives97 – through which people can mediate and make 
value judgments about these options. Notably, for Kymlicka, it is 
only through one’s membership in a societal culture that one gains 
access to the options provided by culture, as well as learns to make 
intelligible choices among them. Thus, for Kymlicka, one’s cultural 
membership comes to be seen as a prerequisite for individual 
freedom of choice and, consequently, as one of the primary goods 
that the liberal state should attempt to guarantee. 
Kymlicka’s argument for cultural membership as one of the 
primary goods does not, however, justify as yet the move for 
positing the base line of equality at the point in which people are 
already able to use their resources within their own cultural context. 
All Kymlicka has been able to demonstrate so far, is that some 
cultural context is needed, in order for the individuals to become 
aware of their options and to make intelligible choices among these 
options. But the requirement of some cultural context for individual 
freedom of choice is still far from the requirement of having some 
particular cultural context – the requirement of having one’s own 
cultural context being, in fact, something of a misnomer, as culture 
is hardly something that people cannot not have.98 Recognizing this, 
Kymlicka has to bring in a further argument for why it would be 
precisely one’s own (born into) cultural context that, as one of the 
primary goods, should be guarded by the liberal state. 
 
The importance –argument  
In order to argue for the status of one’s own (born into) cultural 
context as one of the primary goods guaranteed by the liberal state, 
Kymlicka turns to look at the identity-forming functions of cultural 
                                                 
97 Kymlicka 1995, 83. 
98 As Kwame Anthony Appiah has aptly noted: “the problem with grand 
claims for the necessity of culture is that we can’t readily imagine an 
alternative. It’s like form: you can’t not have it.” Appiah 2005, 124. See 
also: Tomasi 1995, 588-589.  
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membership.99 Drawing from empirical evidence, Kymlicka argues 
that one’s born into culture plays an extremely important role in the 
development of that person’s identity. The view of oneself is, at 
least partially, constituted by one’s cultural membership, and one’s 
self-respect can be inherently tied up with this membership. Being 
such a constitutive element of one’s identity and self-respect, 
people (at least generally) also wish to maintain and protect this 
membership, and the cultural context to which they belong.100 
Further, it is not only that people would (generally) have a strong 
wish to maintain their cultural membership, but that the 
consequences of losing this membership and the cultural context 
that one belongs to, can be catastrophic. By linking one’s cultural 
membership with one’s identity and self-respect, Kymlicka argues 
that it is not reasonable to expect people to abandon their 
membership and the cultural context to which they belong to, but to 
preserve this context, due to the importance that that this context 
(that is, one’s own born into cultural context) has for the identity 
and self-respect of its members.101 
What should be noted, however, is that the claims about the 
identity forming functions of one’s own cultural membership and 
the magnitude of the harm that the loss of this membership may 
produce are independent of the argument for the need of having 
one’s own cultural context due to it catering for one’s abilities to 
view, assess and make choices about one’s life (the prerequisite for 
choice –argument). Whereas one can, undoubtedly, make choices 
                                                 
99 Esp. Kymlicka 1989, 175-176; 192-193; 1995, 89-90; for alternative 
views on the role of culture and/or cultural membership for the 
constitution of people’s identities, see e.g. Margalit & Halbertal 1994; 
Young 1990; Taylor 1989; 1994; Raz 1998; I will return to the identity-
forming functions of cultural membership in more detail in chapters 4 and 
5. 
100 Kymlicka 1989, 175-176; see also: 1995, ch. 5, esp. 89-90. 
101 Thus, for Kymlicka, “respecting people’s own cultural membership and 
facilitating their transition to another culture are not equally legitimate 
options.” Kymlicka 1989, 176. 
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within an alien cultural context,102 it may not be reasonable to 
expect one to abandon one’s own (born into) cultural context, due 
to the importance of one’s cultural membership to one’s identity 
and self-respect. The reasons for one not to be expected to abandon 
one’s own (born into) cultural context thus come from the 
importance –argument, whereas the prerequisite for choice –
argument simply establishes the role of cultural contexts for 
individual freedom and autonomy. 103 As will be seen, there is 
                                                 
102 At times, Kymlicka does seem to lean towards the view according to 
which the range of options from which individuals can choose their 
courses of life could only be provided by the particular cultural context to 
which the individual happens to be born to (see e.g. Kymlicka 1989, ch 8 
& 9 for Kymlicka’s discussions on the dangers of rapid changes within 
cultures, and of the losing of one’s own cultural context). This view, 
however, is rejected both by Kymlicka (1995, 84-85) as well as by the 
majority of other theorists on multiculturalism. In contemporary 
circumstances of cultural diversity, it is hardly sustainable to argue that 
people could not live in other cultural contexts, and make meaningful 
choices within these contexts. The options provided by the majority 
culture are surely options that are open also to the members of the 
minority (although, as I discuss in chapter 3, this can, in certain occasions, 
be debated), and the choices either to take advantage or not to take 
advantage of these options surely indicate the capability of the minority 
members to make value judgments about these options. As many have 
argued, it is a gross misunderstanding to think of cultures as completely 
isolated, holistic entities that would have nothing in common, and between 
which people could not negotiate. (For a cosmopolitan market-place view 
of cultures, see Waldron 1992; against so-called billiard-ball conception of 
cultures, see Tully 1995, ch. 1.) Although living in a different cultural 
context may, at times, be difficult for those who are not accustomed to the 
norms and practices of that context, it is surely too strong a claim to insist 
that the meaningful options among which individuals are able to make 
meaningful choices could be provided only by one’s own (born into) 
culture. 
103 Rainer Forst makes a similar observation emphasizing that it is culture 
as a context of identity (rather than choice) that provides an argument for 
one’s need to live in one’s own cultural context rather than in the context 
of the majority. Forst 1997; for Kymlicka’s attempted response based on 
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certain tension between these two arguments, the prerequisite for 
choice –argument somewhat constraining the kinds of cultural 
contexts Kymlicka views as worthy of protection, whereas the 
importance –argument makes no such restrictions.104 
 
The involuntariness  –argument 
The importance argument, connected to the other supporting strand 
of Kymlicka’s model – that of the assumption of the involuntariness 
of one’s cultural membership (the involuntariness argument) – 
supposedly brings forth the support needed for positing the base 
line of equality at the point in which people are already able to 
utilize their resources in their own cultural context. As cultural 
membership is something that (at least in most cases) is not chosen 
by the members themselves, and as this membership is (at least in 
many cases) something of a tremendous importance for the 
members themselves, it is not reasonable to expect people to 
abandon this context, nor is it fair that the resources given to the 
members of minority cultures would have to be used (solely or 
extensively) for the preservation of that context. Being more of an 
unchosen circumstance rather than a choice (to be responsible for), 
members of minority cultures should not be disadvantaged by their 
efforts to live within their own cultural context – something which 
it is not reasonable to expect them to abandon, and which they did 
not choose to belong to.105 
                                                                                                     
the interdependency of the considerations based on choice and identity, 
see: Kymlicka 2001, 55. 
104 I will return to this tension in more detail in Ch. 2. 
105 Despite obvious dissimilarities, Kymlicka’s treatment of cultural 
membership can be conceived as on a par with some of the factors 
discussed by Dworkin, such as physical or mental disabilities, the 
disadvantages of which people should not be required to pay for. This 
parallel, it should be emphasized, needs not presume that one’s cultural 
membership (like one’s physical or mental disability) would be a 
disadvantage in itself, but simply that, in a society, organized in 
accordance with the cultural norms of the majority (or, in accordance with 
the needs of the able bodied or minded), one’s membership in a minority 
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1.2. The scope of Kymlicka’s arguments 
Although Kymlicka’s prerequisite for choice, importance and 
involuntariness arguments, taken together, would thus seem to 
provide the support needed for positing the base line of equality at 
the point in which people are, already, able to live their lives in 
their own cultural contexts, it is also important to keep these 
arguments separate, in order to establish what kinds of inequalities 
Kymlicka’s model is able to incorporate and what kinds of reasons 
there may be for the liberal state to try to alleviate these 
inequalities.  Before turning into assessing the kinds of minority 
rights that Kymlicka’s model may justify, I wish to elaborate on the 
scope of these arguments, as the cultural disadvantages faced by 
minority members are of various kinds. Importantly, one needs to 
distinguish between the kinds of disadvantages that Kymlicka’s 
model is able to identify from the reasons that the liberal state may 
have for trying to rectify these disadvantages. Further (as discussed 
in the latter part of this chapter), these two aspects of Kymlicka’s 
account need to be separated from the kinds of minority rights that 
may be used to alleviate these disadvantages. 
 
Two types of disadvantage 
Following, roughly, Kymlicka’s own distinction between the 
inequalities faced by ‘national minorities’ and ‘ethnic groups’,106 
there are two major types of disadvantages that can be identified 
                                                                                                     
cultural group may result in disadvantages that one should not end up 
paying the price for. 
106 Kymlicka 1995, 10-11. Kymlicka’s typology of minority groups is, to 
be fair, much more complex, incorporating national minorities, indigenous 
peoples, immigrants and religious groups (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995; 2001) 
as well as some “hard cases and grey areas” (Kymlicka 1995, 24-25) that 
do not fit neatly into the fourfold distinction above. For critical remarks on 
Kymlicka’s typology, see e.g. Young, 1997; Mason 2000, ch. 3; 
Carens1997; 2000, ch. 3. For the sake of clarity, I discuss only the two 
major types of disadvantages that correspond, roughly, to Kymlicka’s 
distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups. 
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within Kymlicka’s modified, resourcist account of equality. On the 
one hand, those minority members striving to lead their lives in 
their own cultural contexts are disadvantaged by not having an 
automatic access to their own cultural context and by having to 
spend large amounts of their resources on maintaining this context. 
As the western liberal societies are already organized in accordance 
with certain cultural norms (reflected, for example, in public 
holidays, school curriculums, and official languages), the members 
of the majority get their cultural context for free whereas the 
members of the minority do not. On the other hand, the 
disadvantages resulting from the need to spend extra resources, due 
to one’s membership in a minority culture are not only encountered 
by those who are striving to keep their own cultural contexts (such 
as those aboriginal people who wish to maintain their traditional 
ways of living, or those religious minorities who wish to separate 
themselves from the modern life), but also by those who, due to 
adhering to some particular cultural practices, have difficulties in 
taking part in the public life of society (organized in accordance 
with the cultural norms of the majority). Even if the members of a 
minority would not aim at maintaining their cultural context as a 
whole, it may well be that the adaptation of some of their cultural 
customs (such as dress codes, religious holidays, languages) to the 
cultural context of the majority will require a substantial amount of 
time and effort that is not required of the majority (whose dress 
codes, religious holidays, and languages coincide with the general 
norms and practices of the society). A minority member who is, 
say, not capable of speaking the official language, will (unless 
assisted) need to use a substantial amount of her resources in order 
to, say, be able to communicate in governmental offices, thus 
leaving her less resources for her other endeavors. 
 
Reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about these 
disadvantages 
At the level of explanation, Kymlicka’s modified, resourcist 
account of equality would thus seem to be able to account for both 
the disadvantages encountered by those striving to live their lives 
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within their own cultural context, as well as of those who, due to 
adhering to some particular cultural practices, have difficulties in 
participating in the workings of the society. These two types of 
disadvantages are, however, very different with respect to the 
reasons that the liberal state has for being concerned about them 
and for trying to alleviate those disadvantages.  
As already indicated, Kymlicka puts forward three distinct 
arguments for why the liberal state should be concerned about and 
try to alleviate the disadvantages caused by one’s cultural 
membership (the prerequisite for choice, importance and 
involuntariness –arguments).107 However, the prerequisite for 
choice –argument gives no independent support for the state to be 
concerned about the disadvantages caused by the lack of one’s own 
cultural context, but merely establishes the role of cultural context 
for individual freedom and autonomy. The prerequisite for choice –
argument is important for showing that the claims based on culture 
are not necessarily incompatible with the liberal values of 
individual freedom and autonomy, although the rationale for the 
state being concerned about the disadvantages caused by the lack of 
one’s own cultural context must come from other sources – those of 
the importance and involuntariness arguments. As one’s own 
cultural context can be conceived of as being of a potentially 
tremendous importance for the bearer of that culture, and as people 
have not normally chosen to belong to one culture or another, it 
may not be reasonable to expect one to abandon such a context, nor 
to pay the price of being able to maintain it. The importance and 
involuntariness –arguments, taken together, thus provide a rationale 
for the state to be concerned about and try to rectify those 
disadvantages that result from not being able to live within one’s 
                                                 
107 Kymlicka also discusses two further arguments, those of the argument 
from historical agreements and the argument from the value of cultural 
diversity, but acknowledges that these two arguments should only be seen 
as complementing the concerns based on equality. See: Kymlicka 1995, 
ch. 6. 
Kymlicka’s Liberal Multiculturalism 
81 
 
own cultural context (provided that this context is, indeed, 
compatible with individual freedom and autonomy).108 
With respect to the second kind of disadvantages (that is, the 
disadvantages relating to particular cultural customs or practices), it 
may not, however, be possible to use the same kind of rationale 
conjoining the importance and involuntariness –arguments. As 
established by the prerequisite for choice –argument, Kymlicka 
views cultural contexts as frameworks within which people make 
choices and the cultural practices (that may, no doubt, result in 
disadvantages when in conflict with the general norms and rules of 
society) must, in accordance with the context of choice –view, be 
conceived precisely as choices made by the members of the 
particular cultural or religious minority. As Kymlicka argues, it is 
perfectly right and proper for the character of a culture to change as 
a result of the choices of its members109 – this context of choice 
(cultural community or structure) being strongly distinguished from 
any particular cultural norms or practices (character of that 
community)110. Moreover, Kymlicka argues that it is not only that 
the prevalent practices of any particular cultural community can 
change in time, but that the individual members of cultural groups 
should, at any given time, “be free to choose what they see to be 
most valuable from the options provided”.111 The particular cultural 
practices, such as the Muslim women’s usage of the veil or the 
American Indian’s usage of peyote, must, in line with the context of 
choice -view, be conceived as choices, not as unchosen 
circumstances the disadvantages of which the individuals should 
not be held responsible for. But, if this is the case, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to see why those disadvantaged by their 
adherence to some particular cultural practice should not also be 
                                                 
108 I will come back to this constraint in Kymlicka’s account in Ch. 2, 
when I discuss the critique of Kymlicka from the so-called ‘diversity 
liberals’. 
109 Kymlicka 1995, 104-105. 
110 Kymlicka 1989, 166-167. 
111 Kymlicka 1989, 198. 
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held responsible for the disadvantage created – if, indeed, their 
adherence to this practice is (or at least should be) a choice that they 
have made from the options provided by their culture. 
Perhaps Kymlicka could argue that, as the context within which 
the choice to wear a veil or to use peyote has been made is not 
chosen by the people themselves, they should not be held 
responsible for making such choices, enabled by their own, 
unchosen cultural context. If the Muslim religion or the American 
Indian culture embraces these options as viable, perhaps even 
desired options for their members, and if these options nevertheless 
conflict with the general rules and norms of the society, people 
should not be held responsible for the disadvantages of these 
choices, as the general structure of society clearly supports only 
options provided by the majority culture and not others. Even if 
those adhering to minority cultural practices can (in accordance 
with the context of choice -view) be conceived of as having chosen 
this adherence (and should thus, strictly speaking, be held 
responsible for the resulting disadvantage), it may still be that, due 
to the institutional bias of society, they should not be held 
responsible for making such choices because of the unchosen nature 
of their cultural context (that embraces these options as viable 
options for their members). As Kymlicka argues, the liberal society, 
necessarily organized in accordance with some of the norms and 
practices of the majority fails to treat people equally by being 
(necessarily) supportive of some cultural norms and practices, but 
not others.112 Even if the adherents of the minority cultural practices 
could be seen as having chosen these practices, the disadvantage 
caused by this choice may still be a proper concern of the liberal 
state, due to the institutional bias of the society. 113  
                                                 
112 Esp. Kymlicka 1995, 113-115. 
113As Anne Phillips has forcefully argued, it may well be that, due to the 
institutional bias of society, it may not always be reasonable to apply the 
chance/choice –distinction to identify those disadvantages that people 
should not be held responsible for. Phillips 2007, 111-112. 
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However, whereas it may thus be possible to argue that some of 
the disadvantages caused by the incompatibility of one’s cultural 
practices and the general rules and norms of the society are, indeed, 
proper concerns for the liberal state, it is worth noting that not all 
cases of cultural disadvantage fall into this category. Most notably, 
Kymlicka’s framework fails to incorporate cases where the 
disadvantage is faced by voluntary immigrants114 who, according to 
Kymlicka, have chosen to leave their own cultural contexts and 
have thus also forfeited their right to live their lives in their own 
cultural context.115 Although Kymlicka tries to emphasize that the 
choice of the immigrants would only cancel out their claims to live 
their lives within their own cultural contexts – and not their claims 
to preserve some of their particular cultural practices within the 
framework of their new context – it is difficult to see how 
Kymlicka could defend his argument. If the immigrants have, 
indeed, chosen to leave their own cultural contexts, and if they have 
also chosen to enter a context which does not cater for their specific 
cultural practices, why would this choice cancel out only their 
claims to their own cultural contexts, but not their claims to 
preserve some of their specific cultural practices? By choosing to 
leave their own cultural context, and by choosing to enter a context 
within which their practices do not fit, the immigrants would seem 
to have forfeited also their right to preserve their conflicting 
cultural practices, even in cases where the disadvantage they were 
faced with (due to continuing to adhere to these practices) could be 
traced to the institutional bias of society.  
 
The importance –argument and specific cultural practices 
Kymlicka’s involuntariness –argument, when joined with his 
prerequisite for choice –argument, would thus seem to fail in giving 
                                                 
114 Similar criticism about the applicability of Kymlicka’s theoretical 
framework to the case of immigrants has been put forth for example by 
Carens 1997; 2000, 56-59; Quong, 2006. 
115 Kymlicka 1995, 95-100; 113-115. 
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conclusive116 support to the claim that the state should be concerned 
about and try to alleviate those disadvantages resulting from the 
incompatibility of the general norms and practices of the society 
and the particular cultural practices of the minority. Being so, it is 
left for the importance –argument to do the work required and, with 
certain modifications, I believe that the importance argument can 
do at least some of this work. This rationale, provided by the 
importance –argument is, however, very different from the rationale 
that Kymlicka gives for the liberal state to be concerned about and 
try to alleviate the disadvantages caused by the lack of one’s own 
cultural context and, as will be seen, also rationale that requires 
certain modifications to Kymlicka’s original framework. 
Recall that, according to the importance –argument, one’s 
cultural membership could be seen as of such importance for a 
person’s identity and self-respect that it would not be reasonable to 
expect a person to abandon this membership, or the cultural context 
to which they belonged to. The importance -argument alone could 
not, however, provide anything as strong as a requirement for the 
liberal state to safeguard people’s own cultural contexts, but was 
supplemented with two other arguments: those of the 
involuntariness –argument (establishing why the minority members 
should also not be expected to pay for the maintenance of their own 
cultural context) and the prerequisite for choice –argument 
(establishing that the maintenance of such context is compatible 
with the liberal values of individual freedom and autonomy). 
However, as I tried to argue, there was a certain tension between 
the involuntariness and prerequisite for choice –arguments, 
disabling the same kind of rationale for the liberal state to be 
concerned about and to try to rectify those disadvantages that 
resulted from the incompatibility of particular cultural practices and 
the general rules and norms of the society.  
                                                 
116 That is, it would seem to fail at least in cases of voluntary immigrants 
who have not only forfeited their right to live in their own cultural 
contexts, but also their right to preserve some of their specific cultural 
customs and practices within their new context. 
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It is, however, possible to extend the scope of the importance –
argument in a way that provides support for Kymlicka’s claims that 
the minority members (including voluntary immigrants) should, as 
a default, be able to continue to adhere to some of their specific 
cultural practices. According to the modified importance –
argument, it is not only one’s cultural membership or cultural 
context that provides for the identity and self-respect of its 
members, but also the particular cultural practices that the minority 
members are engaged in. People do not only conceive themselves 
as members of cultural groups (such as Muslim, American Indian, 
Inuit or French) and view this membership as one of the defining 
features of their identity, but they also attach meanings – contents – 
to these identities and act in ways they conceive the proper 
Muslims, American Indians, Inuits or French to behave.117 It is thus 
not only that people would find their being a Muslim or American 
Indian or Inuit or French as something of crucial importance for 
their identity and self-respect, but they may also find the 
engagement in particular cultural practices (such as being dressed in 
a certain way, earning one’s living in a particular way, or 
communicating in a particular language) as something of 
tremendous importance for their identity and self-respect.118 Being 
                                                 
117 The different kinds of expectations to “the proper modes of behaviour” 
of a particular X (Muslim, Aboriginal etc.) and their normative 
implications will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 4. For the time being, 
it suffices to say that people who conceive themselves as X often also have 
certain views on how they, as an X, should behave. These views need not 
have anything to do with any objective criterion for how it is proper or 
improper for and X to behave, but are simply views of the person 
themselves, how they, as an X, should behave.  
118 Margalit and Halbertal (1994) make a similar point in their critique of 
Kymlicka’s views on the value of culture to its members. According to 
them, Kymlicka’s account fails to capture something important about the 
ways in which people – the culture bearers themselves – value their 
cultures. According to Margalit and Halbertal, people do not necessarily 
value the structure or membership in a cultural community as such, but 
they value precisely those cultural contents that they happen or choose to 
possess. (Margalit and Halbertal 1994) 
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such an important element of one’s identity, it may not be 
reasonable to expect people, as a default, to abandon such practices, 
due to the magnitude of the harm that abandoning such practices 
may cause to the identity and self-respect of the practitioner. 
Independent of the involuntariness and prerequisite for choice -
arguments, it would thus seem that there would already be good 
reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about the disadvantages 
caused by minority members’ particular cultural practices, due to 
the importance of these practices to their practitioners, and the 
unreasonableness of expecting, as a default, people to abandon such 
practices. 
It should, however, be emphasized, that the modified importance 
argument is only able to provide rationale for the state to be 
concerned about the disadvantages caused by people’s adherence to 
particular cultural practices, but is not, on its own, able to establish 
anything as strong as a requirement for the state to also rectify 
these disadvantages. Within Kymlicka’s framework, the 
requirement for the liberal state to rectify cultural inequalities is 
still based, primarily, on the involuntariness –argument and, as I 
have tried to argue, one’s adherence to particular cultural practices 
cannot be conceived as involuntary. The modified importance –
argument can, however, be used to argue why the disadvantages 
resulting from one’s participation in particular cultural practices can 
be considered as proper concerns of the liberal state and why the 
state should not simply disregard the claims of those minority 
members who find themselves in a disadvantaged position due to 
their cultural commitments.119 Whether the state should then 
propose measures, and what kinds of measures, to alleviate this 
disadvantage would then depend on several other considerations, 
                                                 
119 The argument advanced here can perhaps better be interpreted as an 
argument against the view according to which the liberal state should 
bracket cultural claims from the realm of public policies, although it is not 
an argument for a requirement of the liberal state to also rectify those 
disadvantages that one’s adherence to particular cultural practices may 
cause. 
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including the nature of the practice in question, the costs of the 
measures implemented, as well as the type and magnitude of the 
disadvantage120 – all of which, no doubt, would need to be assessed 
in context. Although the modified importance argument would thus 
seem to provide rationale for the liberal state to take cultural 
considerations into account, it does not provide any definitive 
guidance into how to respond to these considerations.121 
 
2. Minority rights and the limitations of Kymlicka’s framework   
So far, I have concentrated on Kymlicka’s theoretical framework 
that tries to both, explain the kinds of disadvantages faced by 
minority members, as well as give reasons for why the liberal state 
should be concerned about and try to rectify these disadvantages. I 
argued that, at the level of description, Kymlicka’s framework is 
capable of taking into account both the kinds of disadvantages 
faced by minorities due to them lacking their own cultural context, 
as well as the kinds of disadvantages caused by the incompatibility 
of the general norms and practices of society and the specific 
cultural practices of the minority. I did, however, argue that 
Kymlicka’s view of culture as a context of choice, and the three 
distinct (although interrelated) arguments incorporated in this view, 
gave very different rationales for the liberal state to be concerned 
about and to try to rectify these disadvantages. Whereas the 
prerequisite for choice, importance and involuntariness –arguments 
                                                 
120 Whether of the minority in question, its individual members, other 
minorities, or the so-called majority. 
121 To clarify, I do not think that the combination of the prerequisite for 
choice, importance and involuntariness –arguments provide any definitive 
guidance into how the liberal state should respond to the inequalities 
caused by one’s lack of one’s own cultural context either. The 
combination of these three arguments, in Kymlicka’s framework, does, 
however, provide slightly stronger case for the liberal state to aim at 
rectifying these disadvantages than the modified importance argument. 
Whether Kymlicka is right in placing such emphasis on the 
involuntariness-argument is, of course, another matter, the treatment of 
which will have to wait for later. 
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could provide a case for the liberal state to try to guarantee (some) 
people’s own contexts of choice, the rationale for the state to be 
concerned about the disadvantages caused by one’s specific cultural 
practices was much weaker, based only on a modified importance 
argument – something that Kymlicka does not explicitly subscribe 
to himself, but on which his claims about the right of minority 
members to preserve some of their cultural practices must, 
nevertheless, be based upon.122 
During this discussion, I have not, quite purposefully, said much 
about the measures that Kymlicka proposes for rectifying these 
disadvantages – that is, minority rights. This has been due to the 
importance of distinguishing between the reasons that the state has 
for being concerned about the disadvantages in question and the 
kinds of responses that may be adopted in order to rectify these 
disadvantages. Even if there were good reasons for the liberal state 
to be concerned about and try to alleviate the disadvantages faced 
by minority members (as, within Kymlicka’s framework, there 
clearly are), these reasons do not, as yet, provide any definitive 
guidance into how the state should respond to these disadvantages. 
Rather, the possible responses need to be assessed in their own 
right, taking into account both, the rationale given, as well as any 
other considerations that may affect the justifiability of the policy in 
question. Even if there were good reasons for the state to be 
concerned about and try to rectify the disadvantages faced by 
                                                 
122In cases of immigrants and other ethnic groups, Kymlicka does, in fact, 
bring forth a modified context of choice –argument claiming that, although 
not entitled to their own cultural contexts, the immigrants should be 
provided with access to the cultural context of the majority. This, 
Kymlicka continues, may require two-way integration, including the 
accommodation of minorities’ specific cultural practices into the 
framework of the majority. (Kymlicka 1995, 14; 96-97) It should, 
however, be noted that such accommodation is not a prerequisite for the 
minorities’ access to the context of the majority, but is based on the 
importance-argument discussed above. For an analysis of such an 
accommodation as potentially operating also for the enrichment of 
majority’s context of choice, see Goodin 2006. 
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minority members, there might also be other good reasons for 
adopting (or refraining from adopting) particular kinds of policies 
in response to these disadvantages.123 What I wish to do next, 
therefore, is to assess, whether the policies proposed by Kymlicka 
are consistent with his own theoretical framework, and whether 
there may also be good reasons (within Kymlicka’s own account) 
not to adopt the kinds of policies Kymlicka promotes. 
 
2.1. Typology of minority rights 
Kymlicka’s typology of minority or group-differentiated rights124 
incorporates three relatively broad categories, those of self-
government rights, polyethnic or accommodation rights125 and 
special representation rights.126 These three categories are 
distinguished from each other, partially, by the different aims of the 
rights within each category, but also by the kinds of minority 
groups that Kymlicka sees as eligible for these rights. 
The rights of self-government, according to Kymlicka, are 
accorded to a cultural group by virtue of it being a distinct “nation” 
or “people” – a historical community, occupying a certain territory, 
with distinct language and/or culture.127 Indigenous people, such as 
the Maori or Sami people, and national minorities, such as the 
                                                 
123 Kymlicka, too, acknowledges this is passing, claiming that in certain 
cases granting minority rights may come at  “too high a price in terms of 
other liberal goals” or be  “unnecessary or too costly” (Kymlicka 1995, 
106). He does, however, maintain that, “certain group-differentiated rights 
are required by the principles of liberal justice” (ibid.), although, as I try to 
show, such requirement may be misplaced, even in Kymlicka’s own 
terms. 
124 Kymlicka uses these terms interchangeably. 
125 In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka uses the term polyethnic rights, 
reflecting the kinds of groups potentially eligible for such rights. In 
response to criticism (e.g. Carens 1997), Kymlicka changes the term used 
to accommodation rights, as this term emphasizes the actual aim of these 
rights to accommodate some of the specific cultural practices of minorities 
into the larger framework of the majority. Kymlicka  1997; 2001, 51. 
126 Kymlicka 1995, esp. ch. 2. 
127 Kymlicka 1995, 11; 18; 27-30. 
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Quebecois or Welsh, would be potential claimants for rights of self-
government. These groups, according to Kymlicka, are groups that 
are in possession of the kind of societal culture that Kymlicka is 
concerned with, and they are also potentially capable of 
maintaining this culture. Further, they are the kinds of groups that 
have not forfeited their right to their own cultural context (by 
choosing to leave and enter another), but who have rather been, 
either forcefully or by some historical agreement, incorporated into 
the societal culture of the majority. 
The aim of the rights of self-government is to enable these 
people to enjoy and maintain their own societal cultures, with their 
own cultural norms and practices, including their own institutions 
organized in accordance with these norms and practices. The rights 
of self-government vary from full secession to partial autonomy,128 
and can involve measures that restrict the rights of non-members to 
the benefit of the minority (such as restrictions on occupying land 
in minority territories, or language laws, like the restrictions on 
immigrants’ access to English services in Quebec).129 Importantly, 
for my purposes, Kymlicka maintains that the rights of self-
government do not pose any duty for the people in question to 
maintain the traditional or prevailing norms or practices of their 
culture (or even a duty to maintain themselves as distinct cultural 
communities),130 but merely enable these people to be in control of 
their own destiny by being able to decide for themselves how they 
wish their communities to be run.131  
                                                 
128 As will become clear later on, most of the rights of self-government 
are, in fact, partial, also incorporating particular views on the conceptions 
and contents of culture. For a useful distinction between two types of 
minority claims: autonomist (recognition from the state) and secessionist 
(recognition as a state), see Valadez 2007. 
129 Kymlicka calls these external protectors, Kymlicka 1995, esp. 35-44. 
130 Kymlicka 1995, 100; 113. 
131 Kymlicka 1989, 166-167; 1995, 104-105. As will be discussed in more 
detail in Ch. 2, there are some substantive limits on the minorities’ right to 
govern their internal affairs given by the prerequisite for choice –
argument. 
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Polyethnic or accommodation rights, on the contrary, aim at 
accommodating people’s cultural backgrounds within the 
institutional framework of the larger society. According to 
Kymlicka, immigrant groups (with their distinct ethnic, religious, 
linguistic and/or cultural backgrounds), religious groups (such as 
the Amish) and territorially dispersed non-immigrant groups (such 
as the Roma) should have a right to maintain some of their 
culturally distinct ways of living within the institutional framework 
of the larger society. These groups, Kymlicka argues, may not be 
eligible for the rights of self-government as they have either 
forfeited their right to their own cultural context by leaving and 
entering another (voluntary immigrants), or they may be too 
territorially dispersed to be able to maintain their own societal 
cultures (Roma). The multicultural policies with respect to these 
groups may include policies against discrimination (such as anti-
racism policies),132 funding for private associations (such as 
religious associations or art-centres) as well as exemptions from 
general laws or norms (such as Sunday-closing regulations or 
professional dress-codes). The general aim of these rights is, unlike 
the rights of self-government, not to enable members of these 
groups to enjoy a societal culture of their own, but to allow them to 
express their distinct cultural identities without being disadvantaged 
from this expression within the institutional framework organized 
in accordance with different cultural norms and practices.133 Like in 
the case of the rights of self-government, Kymlicka argues that the 
accommodation rights should not create a duty for minority 
members to maintain any of their particular cultural practices, 
although (and I will come back to this in more detail in the 
                                                 
132 For Kymlicka, the anti-racism policies operate on a different level to 
other polyethnic rights as they are not, strictly speaking, group-
differentiated citizenship-rights but rather aim at the effective exercise of 
the common rights of citizenship. (Kymlicka 1995, 30-31) It should, 
however, be kept in mind that many of the group-differentiated rights 
promoted by Kymlicka (such as exemptions and assistance rights) can also 
be conceived as ensuring the equal rights and opportunities of citizenship. 
133 Kymlicka 1995, 30-31. 
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following subsection) he also argues that both the rights of self-
government as well as the accommodation rights should not be 
considered as temporary but, rather, as permanent arrangements 
through which the minority members can preserve some of their 
cultural heritage.134 
With respect to the third category of group-differentiated rights 
– that of rights for special representation – the main aim of these 
rights is to reduce the under-representation of oppressed groups 
(such as groups eligible for the two above rights, but also of 
women, gays or the poor) in public positions of power. Contrary to 
the two previous categories that aim at maintaining the minority 
members’ abilities to preserve (some of) their cultural heritage 
(without being disadvantaged for doing so), the rights for special 
representation do not, necessarily, have this as their target. Rather, 
the special representation rights can be seen as ways of tackling the 
kinds of structural disadvantages that prevent some groups from 
being fairly represented in public bodies,135 although in some cases 
the special representation rights can also be seen as corollaries for 
the rights of self-government, ensuring that those groups, eligible 
for the rights of self-government also have a say in determining the 
rules of such self-government.136  
 
                                                 
134 Kymlicka 1995, 31. 
135 Kymlicka compares this form of special representation to affirmative 
action policies that can be seen as temporary measures to tackle 
oppression or systematic disadvantages. (Kymlicka 1995, 32) These 
measures, once the oppression has ceased and systematic disadvantages 
rectified, may be seen as losing their rationale and are no longer needed. 
As an example, quotas for women, ethnic minorities or other 
underrepresented groups in certain professions can beseen as temporary 
measures, the need for which becomes extinct once the desired proportion 
of women, ethnic minorities etc. has been reached and is also going to 
remain at the desired level without such quotas. For alternative arguments 
for affirmative action, including backward-looking arguments, see Boxill 
and Boxill 2003. 
136 Kymlicka 1995, 31-33. 
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2.2. The rationale for concern vs. the rationale for minority 
rights 
Kymlicka’s account of minority rights has attracted much criticism, 
both with respect to the kinds of groups that Kymlicka views as 
eligible for each type of right, as well as with respect to the force of 
Kymlicka’s arguments to create an obligation for the liberal state to 
grant such rights in practice.137 These critiques, although addressing 
important issues relevant to both the justifiability as well as the 
applicability of minority rights in practice, have, however, largely 
side lined the question of whether the original rationales given for 
the liberal state to be concerned about cultural disadvantages, can 
even be extended to an argument for minority rights, or their 
application in practice. As argued in the previous section, there is a 
case, within Kymlicka’s framework, for the liberal state to be 
                                                 
137 For example, it has been argued that Kymlicka’s typology is based on a 
rather simplistic account of the kinds of groups that Kymlicka thinks to be 
eligible for each type of minority right. This typology is largely based on 
his distinction between national minorities and voluntary immigrants, and 
may thus not be able to take into account the vast variety of minority 
groups, some of which may fall between, or beyond, these two (e.g. 
Young 1997, Kukathas 1997a; Mason 2000,  ch. 3). It has also been 
claimed that Kymlicka’s account confuses the actual justification of 
minority rights with the limitations that there may be for applying such 
rights in practice. According to Kymlicka, those groups eligible for the 
rights of self-determination, for example, are only those national (or 
indigenous) minorities that are, already, sufficiently territorially 
concentrated and strong enough to be able to maintain their own societal 
cultures. But the fact that a national (or indigenous) minority is weak or 
territorially dispersed should not be relevant in assessing whether it is, 
indeed, justified in claiming rights of self-determination, only whether it 
is, in practice, capable of successfully executing such right. (Carens 1997) 
Further, many have argued that, regardless of whether Kymlicka’s 
typology is correct or useful, his normative claims about these rights as 
being required by justice are too strong. According to these critics, 
Kymlicka does not manage to build a convincing case for any of these 
rights as being required – only, at the most, as being allowed, based on 
other considerations than requirements of justice. (e.g. Barry 2001; 
Kukathas 2003) 
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concerned about and to try to rectify disadvantages faced by 
minority groups and their members, but this case, it should be 
emphasized, is directed precisely at giving rationales for the state’s 
concerns, not necessarily to giving rationales for any particular 
types of policies. The kinds of policies adopted by the liberal state 
would, of course, need to be consistent with the original rationales 
and, as I now will argue, there are certain difficulties in the 
minority rights for living up to this task. 
 
Minority rights as promoting certain conceptions and contents of 
culture 
According to Kymlicka, the disadvantages faced by minority 
members should be a proper concern of the liberal state due to, 
either, the importance and involuntariness of one’s own cultural 
framework as context of choice, or – along the lines of the modified 
importance argument – due to the importance of one’s particular 
cultural commitments (norms and practices) for the identity and 
self-respect of that person. Constrained by the prerequisite for 
choice -argument, however, Kymlicka emphasizes that, in order to 
alleviate these disadvantages, the state should only create 
circumstances in which people are able to preserve their own 
cultural contexts or their particular cultural practices, but it should 
not aim at-, nor in effect come to promote-, any particular cultural 
contents or create any obligation for minority members to do so. 
This is important, as Kymlicka is committed to the value of 
individual autonomy and the importance of being able to revise 
one’s conceptions of the good, should one so want to. Keeping this 
in mind, Kymlicka argues that minority rights should not promote 
any particular conception or character of culture, but rather, enable 
people to express their cultural identities – their cultural 
memberships – in ways they themselves see fit.138 
It is, however, questionable, whether the minority rights – 
especially the rights of self-government and polyethnic or 
                                                 
138 Kymlicka 1995, 113. 
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accommodation rights139  – succeed in fulfilling any of the 
requirements in Kymlicka’s framework: that is, of not promoting 
any particular contents or character of culture, of enabling people to 
express their membership in ways they themselves see fit, or of 
protecting people’s cultural memberships as primary goods.140 
With respect to the rights of self-government, Kymlicka stresses 
that the rights of minority groups to decide about their own affairs 
do not dictate what the contents of these decisions should be.141 
Rather, the rights of self-government only give people the right to 
decide for themselves which norms, values, beliefs or practices they 
wish their community to work upon. Whether the people in 
question wish to promote certain cultural norms and practices, and 
organise their institutions in accordance with these norms and 
practices, is a question following the right of self-government, not 
whether such right would, in itself, promote any particular contents 
of culture.  
If we look at the rights of self-government, and the aims of such 
rights, more closely, it does, however, become apparent that these 
rights do, in fact, promote certain conceptions of culture, as well as 
                                                 
139 In this work, I will not discuss the issues of special representation in 
any great detail.  This is due to the specific character of such rights as not 
(at least directly) aiming at accommodating people’s cultural memberships 
and the specificity of normative questions relevant for such rights. The 
issues of special representation have also been discussed extensively 
within more general debates on democratic theory. For some classical 
accounts of special representation of marginalized groups, see Phillips 
1995; Young 1990; 2000; see also: Williams 1996; articles in Benhabib 
1996. 
140 For the crucial role of the state in deciding which groups are 
accommodated and how, see e.g. Shachar 2001, 37-40. 
141 Notably, the prerequisite for choice –argument provides certain 
limitations to these decisions, although Kymlicka is reluctant to admit that 
even a failure to conform to these limitations would give a right to others 
(including the liberal state) to intervene or dictate the decisions of the 
group (Kymlicka 1992, 144-145; 1995, 164-170). I will return to the 
issues on non-intervention in more detail in Ch. 2, 1.2. 
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– albeit indirectly – certain contents of culture.142 Considering that 
the aim of the rights of self-government is to enable certain groups 
of people to live within their own cultural contexts, including the 
institutional framework organized in accordance with the prevailing 
norms and practices of that culture, this already incorporates a 
conception of culture according to which culture is viewed, not only 
as an informal system of norms and practices, but also as a basis for 
institutional organisation. This conception of culture as societal 
culture is, no doubt, one of the building blocks of Kymlicka’s 
theory, but it does create some difficulties for Kymlicka’s claims 
about minority rights as not advancing any particular contents of 
culture. Recall that, according to Kymlicka, any institutional 
framework (incorporating a wide variety of educational, social, 
financial etc. systems) cannot but advance some cultural contents at 
the expense of others (as manifested, for example, in official 
languages, public holidays etc.). If the aim of the rights of self-
government is to enable certain groups to live within their own 
societal cultures (including these institutional frameworks), it 
becomes apparent that these rights also promote certain cultural 
contents, albeit indirectly. If the aim of the right of self-government 
is to give certain groups a right to decide how their communities 
should be run (including those institutions that, necessarily, 
advance certain cultural contents over others), then this right also 
indirectly advances those cultural contents that these institutions 
end up advancing. 
Not all rights of self-government are, however, rights of full 
secession or national self-determination, but rather, rights that grant 
the group relative autonomy in matters particularly important to the 
group in question. The rights of self-government granted to, for 
example the Sami people in Lapland or to the Welsh people in 
Wales, may not be rights to govern all of their social and 
                                                 
142 The distinction between conceptions and contents of culture coincides 
roughly with the distinction given in Background 2.2. between (the 
homogeneity of) scope (Hscope) and (homogeneity of) contents 
(Hcontents). 
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institutional affairs, but perhaps only affairs regarding, say, their 
traditional sources of livelihood or language policies. Conceived in 
this manner, the rights of self-government (as rights to govern 
certain, but not all, of the group’s affairs) promotes an even more 
specified conception of culture, as well as – albeit indirectly – 
certain contents of culture. Granting the Welsh people in Wales a 
right to decide about their own language policies advances a 
conception according to which language is an integral ingredient of 
one’s culture and identity, and may also advance a conception of 
the Welsh language as being an integral and inalienable element of 
Welsh culture. Although the right of the Welsh people to decide 
about their own language policies does not, in itself, promote Welsh 
language as an essential element of Welsh culture (the Welsh may, 
in fact, come to reject all policies aimed at promoting the Welsh 
language), this right, nevertheless, promotes a certain conception of 
culture (where language is seen as an essential element of this 
particular culture) and, indirectly, it also promotes those 
conceptions of cultural content that the Welsh – having decided 
their language policies – come to promote.  
Further, given that, according to Kymlicka, the aim of the rights 
of self-government is to enable national or indigenous groups to 
live within their own cultural contexts, it is clear that most of the 
rights of self-government (such as the rights to decide about one’s 
language policies, land claims, or family law) fall well short of this 
task.143 Rather than being able to live their lives in their own 
societal cultures (incorporating a wide variety of social institutions 
organized in accordance with the wide variety of cultural norms and 
practices), these groups can only make decisions about those 
                                                 
143 In his discussions on separatism and the possible responses to 
separatism (including federalism), Kymlicka does recognize the often 
partial nature of the rights of self-government. (Kymlicka 1995, 181-186; 
2001, esp. ch. 5). He does not, however, seem to acknowledge the 
inconsistency of this partiality and his claims for the right of national 
minorities to preserve their own cultural contexts. 
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matters that are already conceived of as important, even essential 
elements of their culture.144 
With respect to polyethnic or accommodation rights, the 
promotion of certain cultural contents is even more straightforward. 
As Matthew Festenstein has noted, cultural policies are not 
produced in a vacuum, but are always specified in certain 
contexts.145 Whereas the anti-discrimination policies and funding 
for private associations can perhaps still be seen as only indirectly 
promoting certain cultural contents,146 an assessment of legal 
exemptions provides us with a different story.  
As an example, let us take a well-documented and much 
discussed case of the exemption of the Sikh men from wearing 
safety helmets on construction sites.147 Although this exemption 
does not, as such, oblige the Sikh men to wear a turban instead of a 
safety helmet (and thus allows for different interpretations within 
                                                 
144 I should emphasize that my intention is not to claim that, for example, 
language policies would not have an effect on a variety of social 
institutions with an overall impact on the ways in which the society in 
question is organized. To the contrary, I do think that a group’s right to 
decide about its own language policies will have a tremendous influence 
on many of the ways in which the society is run, although it will (on its 
own) also fail to allow the group in question to live fully in their own 
cultural contexts. Further, the language rights also have an impact on the 
ways in which the culture in question is conceived of as primarily a matter 
of language and, debatably, also a matter of a particular language. 
145 Festenstein 2005, 81-82. 
146 For example, banning discrimination on the basis of religion, skin 
colour, dress etc. may promote a conception of culture in which, for 
example, certain dress codes can be seen as important elements of a 
particular culture or religion, although it will still leave open the question 
of the actual contents of these dress codes. Similarly, funding a particular 
cultural arts centre only advances a conception of certain arts as inherent 
elements of this culture, but leaves open the question of which arts this 
particular centre wishes to promote. 
147 UK Employment Act (1989); another exemption, The Motor-Cycle 
Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act (1976) gives Sikhs the right to 
wear a turban instead of a crash helmet when riding a motor bike. I will 
return to the possible rationales behind these exemptions in Ch. 3. 
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Sikh culture), the policy nevertheless explicitly acknowledges the 
importance of wearing a turban for Sikh culture and identity. 
Further, it can be argued that such exemption not only 
acknowledges but also promotes the conception according to which 
wearing a turban is an important, even essential ingredient of Sikh 
culture and identity. Sikh men are allowed to wear turbans instead 
of safety helmets precisely because it is recognized that the wearing 
of the turban is an important element of their identity, and the 
minority right – in this case, an exemption – is aiming to cater for 
this fact. 
It should, however, be borne in mind that the acknowledgement 
of the wearing of the turban as an important element of Sikh culture 
and identity, and the granting of a right that allows Sikh men to 
wear the turban instead of the safety helmet does not, as such, 
create anything as strong as an obligation for Sikh men to wear the 
turban. Sikh men are still perfectly free not to wear the turban, even 
in the face of the public recognition of this practice as an important 
element of Sikh culture. In this sense, the legal exemptions would 
seem to succeed in not creating a duty on minority members to 
preserve some particular cultural contents, although, as I now will 
argue, there are some important considerations that, nevertheless, 
cast some doubt on Kymlicka’s claims about minority rights as 
simply enabling people to preserve their particular cultural contexts 
or specific cultural practices, if they so wish. 
 
Problem of permanency 
As a preliminary point, Kymlicka argues that both the rights of self-
government as well as accommodation rights should not be 
considered as temporary measures directed to alleviating the 
disadvantages faced by minority members, but rather as permanent 
measures through which the minority members are able to preserve 
their own cultural contexts or some of their cultural practices. The 
rights in question should not, according to Kymlicka, be considered 
as temporary, as they do not aim to eliminate, but rather to protect 
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people’s cultural differences.148 The purpose of giving territorial 
autonomy to aboriginal people is not that, in due time, the 
aboriginal people could be incorporated back to the main stream 
political system, and the purpose of granting exemptions to Sikhs 
from wearing safety hats in construction sites is not to pave way to 
the gradual abolishing of the wearing of turbans on construction 
sites. Rather, these rights aim to cater for the possibility of 
aboriginal people being in charge of their own land in the future, 
and for Sikhs to continue wearing turbans, even when working on 
construction sites. 
However, given the already established link between minority 
rights and certain conceptions and contents of culture, and the 
already mentioned constraints of the prerequisite for choice –
argument, it is difficult to see how Kymlicka could support the idea 
of different kinds of minority rights as permanent. If the rights in 
question do, as I have tried to show, promote certain conceptions as 
well as contents of culture, and if these rights do (as in the case of 
exemptions) acknowledge certain cultural practices as inherent, 
important elements of that culture, then the idea of the permanency 
of that right would also seem to incorporate a presumption about 
the continuing importance of that practice in the future. But if, as 
Kymlicka argues, people are perfectly free to change their views 
about what they view important and worth preserving in their 
culture, then they should also be free to decide that those practices 
(such as the wearing of the turban) might not, some time in the 
future, be considered as inherent, essential elements of their culture. 
Once the importance of a particular practice within a culture 
disappears, however, so disappears the rationale for granting (or 
maintaining) the exemption that aims to accommodate this practice. 
                                                 
148 Kymlicka 1995, 31. It is noteworthy that Kymlicka uses the expression 
of “protecting cultural differences” as a shorthand for the protection of 
people’s abilities to preserve their particular cultural commitments, if they 
so wish. By doing this, Kymlicka does, already, seem to acknowledge that 
the rights he is proposing are not neutral with respect to cultural contents, 
but do, in fact, promote some cultural contents – that is, those contents that 
are distinctive to the group in question.  
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Kymlicka could respond by saying that the idea of minority rights 
as permanent is only to ensure that the minority members can, if 
they so desire, continue to observe those cultural norms or practices 
that these rights aim to accommodate. That is, the rights in question 
should not, as a default, be considered as temporary, although it is 
possible that, at some point in time in the future, the rationale for 
granting (or maintaining) any particular right may have also 
disappeared (due to the changing views of minority members). In 
these instances, the minority right in question will end up being 
temporary, although we should not, as a default, expect this to 
happen. The presumption of the permanency of any particular right 
could be understood in terms of these rights as not being inherently 
temporary (or permanent), but simply in terms of these rights as 
retaining their rationale, as long as otherwise indicated. 
 
Problem of status quo 
Whereas Kymlicka’s claims about the permanency of minority 
rights could, therefore, be seen as incorporating both the 
possibilities of minority members not adhering to those practices 
that the right in question is trying to accommodate, as well as 
(although debatably) changing their views about the centrality of 
these practices in their culture, it is important to keep in mind that 
these possibilities, once the minority right in question has been 
established, may come at a substantive cost. That is, it may well be 
that, due to the inherent linkage of minority rights with some 
conceptions and contents of culture, it may be far more difficult for 
the minority members to do either of these things. That is, the 
minority rights may make it substantively harder for the minority 
members not to adhere to the particular cultural contents that the 
right in question aims to accommodate, as well as to decide against 
the centrality of these contents in the future. 
Firstly, with respect to the accommodation rights, such as 
exemptions, it is clear that granting an exemption for minority 
members to do X (wear a turban) in circumstances C (construction 
sites), promotes a view according to which X is seen as an 
important element of the minority members’ culture. Although the 
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exemption itself does not create anything as strong as an obligation 
for the minority members to do X, it does, nevertheless, give X a 
special status by recognizing it as (one of) the “proper” practices of 
that culture. Consequently, the legal recognition of X as (one of the) 
proper practices of that culture may, in fact, contribute to the 
maintenance of that practice, as well as making it much harder for 
those who do not agree with the practice not to adhere to it. This is 
especially so in cases where the exemption is granted in order to 
accommodate practices that, according to some minority members, 
are seen as being required by their culture.149 Rather than simply 
enabling the members of minority cultures to X – if they so wish – 
the minority right in question may thus end up restricting the 
opportunities of minority members not to X, due to the special 
status that X now enjoys as one of the proper practices of that 
culture.150 
With respect to the rights of self-government, such as the right 
of the cultural group to decide about its own language policies, land 
distribution or family law, it is equally unclear whether these rights 
                                                 
149 The debates on the French case of laïcité and the ’head scarf –affair’ 
may help demonstrate this point. One of the main arguments against the 
allowing of head scarves in public schools is that allowing them would 
create undue pressure on the Muslim girls to wear the veil in order to be 
considered good Muslims (see e.g. the findings of the Stasi Report/ 
O’Brien 2005; for debate, see: Laborde 2005; 2008; Bowen 2007, 112-
127; McGoldrick 2006, 83-89). Although the French case of laïcité is a 
very special case of cultural accommodation (or lack of; see also 
Background 2.3.), there is no reason to presume that other forms of 
exemptions, legitimizing particular cultural practices as proper practices of 
some culture or religion, could not, also, create pressures for the minority 
members to adhere to those practices that the right in question is aiming to 
accommodate. 
150 It should be noted that this is not an inherent effect of minority rights, 
such as exemptions, but rather a byproduct, the coming into existence of 
which may well depend on several issues, including the nature 
(authoritativeness) of the group in question. The worry expressed here is, 
however, very genuine, especially in cases where the rights are granted to 
those illiberal groups that tend not to tolerate dissent or differing views 
among their members. 
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do, in fact, manage to give the minority groups a right to decide 
about their own affairs (in those matters that the right proscribes), 
without creating at least strong incentives for the group to also 
preserve certain cultural contents. As already argued, it is clear that 
the granting of a right to a cultural group to decide, for example, 
about its own language policies promotes the view according to 
which language is an important and inherent element of that culture 
and thus gives a special status to language as one of the defining 
features of that culture. However, the rationale behind giving a 
group a right to decide about its language policies lies not simply in 
the importance of language (any language) for the culture in 
question, but also in the fact that the particular language(s) of the 
group are not the same as the official language(s) of the majority, 
and that the members of the minority do not thus enjoy the same 
kind of access to their own language (and services provided in this 
language) as the majority. If the group’s language was the same as 
the official language of the majority, there would be no need to 
grant the group a right to decide about its own language policies as 
the minority members’ access to their own language would already 
be guaranteed. But, if the rationale for the group to decide its own 
language policies comes from the fact that the minority members do 
not have access to their own language (due to it being different 
from the official language), then the rationale for such right would 
also cease to exist should the group decide to run down its 
traditional languages and not support people’s access to these 
languages (or services provided in these languages). In order to 
retain its right to decide about its own affairs (something that the 
group members may, nevertheless, wish to retain), the group thus 
needs to preserve at least some of its cultural distinctiveness, often 
by preserving precisely those cultural contents that have created the 
need for the rights in the first place.151  
                                                 
151 See also: Kukathas 1997a, 416. Matthew Festenstein makes an even 
stronger claim, arguing that the rationale of having secure access to one’s 
own cultural context creates a duty, not only on the minority group itself 
but also on the state, to preserve precisely those traditional ways of living 
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All in all, it would seem that both the rights of self-government 
as well as (at least some) accommodation rights fail to escape the 
accusation that these rights promote certain conceptions-, as well as 
(either directly or indirectly) certain contents- of culture. Although 
neither create anything as strong as an obligation for the minority 
members to preserve or to adhere to any particular cultural contents, 
it would nevertheless seem that, in effect, both of these rights give 
support for maintaining the prevailing cultural contents by 
explicitly recognizing these contents as proper elements of the 
culture in question. The members of cultural groups are, no doubt, 
still free to choose not to adhere to their traditional ways of living 
and to alter their views about the contents of their culture, but this is 
made substantially more difficult by the legitimation of certain 
cultural practices as proper elements of the culture in question. 
 
2.3. Minority rights and cultural membership 
Instead of promoting certain conceptions and contents of culture, 
Kymlicka argues that minority rights should protect people’s 
cultural memberships, and their possibilities to express their 
memberships in ways they themselves see fit. The difficulty of 
distinguishing minority rights from specific cultural contents was 
already mentioned, although it was also noted that these rights 
                                                                                                     
that the group is currently accustomed to (Festenstein 2005, 77-79). I do 
not think that this is the case, as one’s access to one’s own cultural context 
does not mean that the options provided by one’s culture should stay 
precisely the same. I do, however, agree with Festenstein that the rationale 
of having secure access to one’s own cultural context may somewhat limit 
the speed with which the cultural group can make changes to its traditional 
ways of being (partially due to Kymlicka’s claims about rapid changes as 
causes of loss and disorientation). The argument I have advanced here, 
however, is somewhat different from that of Festenstein’s in so far as my 
intention has not been to argue that the rationale behind a differentiated 
right would create an obligation for the group members to use this right in 
a particular way, but that, once the right has been granted, it might create 
strong incentives for the group members to preserve those very 
circumstances that have provided the rationale for the right in the first 
place. 
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created nothing as strong as an obligation for the minority members 
to preserve these particular cultural contents. Being thus, the 
difficulty of minority rights as promoting certain contents of culture 
could perhaps be accepted, should the minority rights in question 
nevertheless manage to perform the task they were set to perform – 
that is, to protect people’s memberships in minority cultural 
groups.152 Unfortunately, as I try to show, the minority rights hardly 
managdo not manage to live up to this task either, or, if they do, 
only to an extent that falls short of the liberal individualist 
commitments prescribed to by Kymlicka. 
 
Terminological issues: contents, structures and memberships 
Kymlicka views one’s cultural membership as one of the primary 
goods that the liberal state should attempt to guarantee. This view 
of cultural membership as one of the primary goods comes from 
two sources. Firstly, one’s membership provides one access to 
opportunities among which to make meaningful choices. And 
secondly, one’s membership also operates as one of the integral 
elements in the constitution of people’s identities.153 People do not 
only see themselves as individual human beings, but they also see 
themselves as members of cultural groups – as Inuits, Muslims, 
Sikhs or Roma. Given these two important functions of cultural 
membership, the liberal state is seen to have good reasons for 
applying different types of minority rights in practice – should these 
                                                 
152According to this line of argument, the promotion of certain conceptions 
as well as contents of culture could, perhaps, be viewed in terms of 
unavoidable by-products, necessary for the protection of people’s 
memberships. Provided that minority rights were the only means of 
protecting people’s memberships and provided that they did also perform 
this task, the idea of an unavoidable, and acceptable, by-product may be 
sound. As will be shown, however, neither of these presumptions are 
correct, thus rendering the thought of an unavoidable (and acceptable) by-
product suspect. I will return to Kymlicka’s own analysis of unavoidable 
by-products with respect to internal restrictions and external protections in 
Ch. 2, 1.1. 
153 Kymlicka 1989, ch. 8; 192-193; 1995: 84-93. 
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rights, indeed, protect people’s memberships in minority cultural 
groups.  
In order to understand why I think minority rights may, 
nevertheless, fail to protect people’s cultural memberships (or either 
of the two functions attached to this membership), it is worth 
looking at a distinction between what Kymlicka labels as cultural 
structure and cultural membership. Although this distinction is 
clearly present in Kymlicka’s work, there are also certain 
implications to this distinction that, I believe, are largely ignored by 
Kymlicka. 
In order to understand the distinction between cultural structure 
and cultural membership, one must start from a slightly different 
distinction: that of cultural structure and cultural contents. In 
Liberalism, Community and Culture, Kymlicka attempts to open up 
this distinction as follows:  
 
In one common usage, culture refers to the character of a historical 
community. On this view, changes in the norms, values, and their 
attendant institutions in one’s community (e.g. membership in 
churches, political parties, etc.) would amount to loss of one’s culture. 
However, I use culture in a very different sense, to refer to the cultural 
community, or cultural structure, itself. On this view, the cultural 
community continues to exist even when its members are free to 
modify the character of the culture, should they find its traditional 
ways of life no longer worth while.154 
 
It should be noted, right from the outset, that Kymlicka uses the 
terms cultural community and cultural structure interchangeably. 
Cultural community refers not only to an aggregate of individuals, 
but also to the social or institutional framework that bonds these 
individuals together. The cultural community, conceived of in terms 
of cultural structure, incorporates some cultural contents (most 
notably, those social norms and institutions that bond the people of 
                                                 
154 Kymlicka 1989, 166-167, emphasis in the original. 
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this community together), although these contents are changeable, 
and are also open to a variety of interpretations.155 
Given Kymlicka’s illuminating distinction between cultural 
contents and cultural structure (or community), it is somewhat 
strange that Kymlicka, nevertheless, fails to make (or at least make 
good use of) another distinction – that of cultural structure and 
cultural membership. When discussing the value of cultural 
structures, Kymlicka argues that cultural structures do not possess 
any moral status of their own, but are only valuable in so far as they 
provide their members meaningful options and secure structures to 
identify with.156 There is no rationale for protecting cultural 
structures qua them being cultural structures, but only qua what 
these structures do to their members. The differentiation between 
cultural structures and their individual members is thus clearly 
present in Kymlicka’s work (otherwise, it would not make sense to 
talk of the value of cultural structures per se versus its value for 
individual members), but the utilization of this distinction, as will 
be seen, is far from satisfactory. For Kymlicka, the status of one’s 
cultural membership as a primary good leads to the view according 
to which the existence of cultural structures should be protected by 
the liberal state,157 but this inference, I believe, does not pay enough 
                                                 
155 There are certain ‘constants’ that Kymlicka attaches to cultural 
communities, such as shared language and history (Kymlicka 1989, 168), 
although these ‘constants’ should not be thought of as incorporating any 
thick conceptions of what, for example, this shared history of a particular 
cultural group may contain. For the problemacy of defining cultural 
communities in terms of shared history, see e.g. Appiah 2005, 136-137. 
156 Kymlicka 1989, 165-166; for Kymlicka’s views on the moral status of 
groups, 241-242. 
157 In his discussions on Lord Devlin’s remarks about homosexuality in 
England, Kymlicka makes this conflation most pronouncedly, shifting 
from the primary good of cultural membership to the primary good of 
cultural structure: “Thus liberalism requires that we can identify, protect, 
and promote cultural membership, as a primary good, without accepting 
Devlin’s claim that this requires protecting the character of a given 
cultural community. It is the existence of a cultural community viewed as 
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attention to the distinction between cultural structures and cultural 
memberships and the implications that this distinction may have for 
liberal political theory.  
 
Two senses of protecting membership 
The  distinction between cultural structures and cultural 
memberships can be illustrated by looking at the ways in which 
minority rights, promoted by Kymlicka, can be viewed as 
protecting cultural structures but not, necessarily, any particular 
individual’s cultural memberships.  
Take, firstly, the rights of self-government that give a group a 
right to decide about its own affairs (in most cases, about some 
particular affairs, such as language policies, land distribution or 
family affairs). Granting a group a right to self-government may, 
indeed, protect the cultural structure of the group by enabling the 
group to maintain those bonds – social and institutional frameworks 
– that tie the group members together, and also provide these 
members their contexts of choice and bases of identification. But 
the rights of self-government remain silent about how the members 
of the group eligible for this right should be identified. In many 
cases, the rights of self-government are, in fact, precisely rights that 
enable the group, not only to decide about how their communities 
are run, but also to decide who they accept as members of their 
group.158 Keeping this in mind, the rights of self-government fail to 
protect the membership of any individual to the structure in 
question, as the group may, in fact, come to restrict some people’s 
                                                                                                     
a context of choice that is a primary good, and a legitimate concern of 
liberals.” Kymlicka 1989, 169. 
158 Kymlicka’s discussion on the membership rules of Pueblo Indians puts 
this point forth most clearly. Although Kymlicka admits that the sexually 
discriminatory membership rules of the Pueblo Indians are something that 
the liberals are right to criticise, he nevertheless maintains that the group 
in question should be allowed to apply its own rules of membership 
without external intervention from the liberal state. (Kymlicka 1995, 165-
170) The difficulties of allowing group members to decide their own rules 
of membership will be returned to in more detail in Ch. 4 and Ch. 5. 
Kymlicka’s Liberal Multiculturalism 
109 
 
access (people’s membership) to this structure. Without 
membership, these people, undoubtedly, lack access to the 
opportunities provided by their culture, and may also find it very 
difficult to identify with the group in question due to lack of 
recognition as a group member.159 Whereas the rights of self-
government can be seen as protecting the cultural structure itself 
and, by way of protecting this structure, creating conditions in 
which cultural membership (in the abstract) can be enjoyed, they 
nevertheless fail to protect the membership of any individual and, 
consequentially, of any individual’s access to opportunities and 
bases of identification.160 
Many of the accommodation rights (such as exemptions from 
the general rules or laws of society) would not, either, seem to 
protect any individuals’ memberships, or these individuals’ access 
to opportunities or bases of identification. Whereas the 
accommodation rights differ from the rights of self-government in 
so far as they are not even aiming to provide people secure access 
to their own cultural structure, these rights can, nevertheless, be 
seen as providing the two functions of cultural membership. The 
                                                 
159 The issues of recognition-beased identities will be discussed in Ch. 5. 
160 Perhaps Kymlicka could respond by claiming that giving a right to a 
particular group (or members of this group) already entails a conception of 
who are the members of that group, thus following Kymlicka’s views of 
certain identities as given (Kymlicka 1995, 184). However, as I will argue 
in Ch. 4, denoting membership in a cultural group is far from being a 
simple and straightforward task. Further, even if Kymlicka was able to 
establish that the protection of cultural structures was necessary for the 
protection of some particular people’s cultural memberships (that is, those 
people’s memberships who are already seen as members), the problem 
remains. If one’s cultural membership is valuable – and, in accordance 
with Kymlicka’s claims, should be protected – due to the value that this 
membership has as a provider for that person’s identity and opportunities, 
it would seem that the primary concern of the liberal state should not be 
the protection of cultural structures, but rather, the protection of the 
individuals’ memberships – something that the rights of self-determination 
would seem to fail at protecting.  
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exemption of Sikh men from wearing hard hat provides the male 
members of Sikh culture an opportunity to express their 
membership by wearing a turban. This may also operate as one of 
the important features through which they identify themselves as 
Sikh men. In accordance with Kymlicka’s view of accommodation 
rights as easing the access of minority members to the cultural 
context of the majority (without having to abandon all of their 
cultural heritage), this exemption also provides opportunities for 
Sikhs to conjoin some of their cultural practices with the cultural 
framework of the majority.161 The question of who, and on what 
grounds, is identified as a Sikh man to whom this exemption is 
granted, however, does not feature in Kymlicka’s (or many other 
theorists) discussions on minority rights. At the most, these 
exemptions can thus be seen as protecting the way in which some 
people may come to express their cultural membership, but they do 
not protect the membership of any individual, or the bases upon 
which any particular individual comes to enjoy the opportunities 
arising from the exemption, or the possibilities of expressing one’s 
identity by the practice that the exemption accommodates. The 
accommodation rights, such as exemptions from general rules or 
laws of the society, too, say nothing about the criterion according to 
which those people eligible for the exemption should be identified, 
thus failing to protect the membership of any particular individual, 
but only membership in the very abstract and perhaps also very 
uninteresting sense. 
It should be noted, that Kymlicka does not make a clear 
distinction between the protection of cultural membership in the 
abstract (that is, the protection of cultural structure that creates 
conditions in which cultural membership can be enjoyed) and the 
protection of any individuals’ membership in this structure. The 
failure to do so, however, I believe, constitutes one of the crucial 
inadequacies in Kymlicka’s work and in his attempt to build a 
genuinely liberal, individual centered approach to cultural diversity. 
                                                 
161 This view of accommodation rights as providing for the opportunity to 
conjoin X and Y will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 3. 
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Taken that, for Kymlicka, cultural structures and cultural 
memberships are valuable only by virtue of them being valuable for 
their individual members (by providing for their opportunities and 
their identities), it is somewhat strange that Kymlicka should 
restrict his theory to the protection of cultural structures (that 
provide the conditions in which membership (in the abstract) can be 
enjoyed), without also aiming to protect the membership of those to 
whom these structures are, in fact, valuable. 
It may be argued in response that the fact that minority rights 
fail to protect any particular individual’s membership makes no 
difference to the case for the need of these rights, as without such 
rights perhaps no-one would be able to enjoy such membership, or 
the benefits of such membership. Although there may be some truth 
in this response, I do not think that this response fully addresses the 
problem I have tried to indicate here. Whereas it may well be the 
case that (at least some) minority rights do protect those structures 
within which some people can enjoy their cultural memberships,162 
I do not think that Kymlicka’s (or many other theorists’) treatment 
of minority rights as protecting cultural structures take sufficiently 
into account the individualist commitments of liberalism, and the 
fact that it is not only cultural memberships in the abstract that 
should be the proper concern of the liberal state, but the cultural 
memberships of those individuals to whom these memberships 
really matter. Without answering the questions of who should come 
under the minority right in question (rights of self-government) or 
to whom certain rights should be accorded (accommodation rights), 
these rights, protecting the cultural structures and memberships in 
the abstract, only take us half way in protecting people’s 
memberships, failing to protect the memberships of those 
                                                 
162 This, of course, may be subject to empirical evidence, and does not, in 
any way, preclude the possibility that such structures could not be 
protected by other means than minority rights. 
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individuals to whom these structures are, indeed, valuable as 
contexts of choice and as bases of identification.163 
 
3. Conclusion on Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism 
In this chapter, I have concentrated on Will Kymlicka’s liberal 
multiculturalism as presented mainly in Liberalism, Community and 
Culture, and Multicultural Citizenship.164 Although Kymlicka’s 
work incorporates several elements (all of which could be discussed 
in their own right), I have tried to concentrate on his basic liberal 
egalitarian framework, and on his proposals (minority rights) for 
rectifying those inequalities that this framework comes to identify. I 
have argued that Kymlicka’s modified, resourcist account of 
equality manages to explain both the disadvantages caused by one’s 
lack of one’s own cultural context, as well as the disadvantages 
faced by those who, due to adhering to some particular cultural 
norms or practices, find it difficult to participate in the workings of 
the larger society. I did, however, point out that the rationales for 
the state to be concerned about and try to rectify these 
disadvantages were, in each case, different. A much stronger case, 
based on the prerequisite for choice, importance and involuntariness 
arguments, was made for rectifying the disadvantages caused by 
one’s lack of one’s own cultural context, whereas the 
                                                 
163 More thorough analyses of how to address these questions of cultural 
membership and the protection of any individual’s membership within the 
liberal framework needs to wait until Part II of this work. 
164 The choice to concentrate on these two earlier works of Kymlicka 
comes from the acknowledgement of these two works as outlining 
Kymlicka’s theoretical commitments most explicitly. Whereas in his later 
work, Kymlicka deepens and, no doubt, somewhat fine tunes his analysis 
on different cases of cultural inequality by tying his analysis more tightly 
to the concrete circumstances around the globe (esp. Kymlicka 2001; 
2007a), I do not think that his later work makes substantive modifications 
or additions into his basic theoretical framework. Rather, whereas 
Kymlicka’s later work certainly gains from being even more connected 
and sensitive to the multiplicity of cases of cultural inequality, it loses in 
being less connected with and rigorous about the theoretical problems 
incorporated in issues of cultural accommodation. 
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accommodation of people’s cultural differences within the context 
of the majority could, in many cases, only be based on the 
importance argument (and, as that, on the modified importance 
argument that Kymlicka never explicitly subscribes to himself). 
Whereas Kymlicka’s egalitarian framework does, therefore, 
manage to explain why the cultural inequalities faced by minority 
members should be proper concerns of the liberal state, his 
arguments for minority rights as appropriate responses to these 
inequalities are far from satisfying. Kymlicka argues that minority 
rights (both rights of self-government and accommodation rights) 
are not to advance any particular cultural contents, but to simply 
enable minority members to live in their own cultural contexts 
and/or express their cultural identities in ways they themselves see 
fit. It is, however, clear that neither of these categories of rights 
manage to stay entirely clear from promoting certain cultural 
contents by legitimizing certain cultural practices as proper 
elements of that culture. Although the minority rights do not, as 
such, create anything as strong as an obligation for the minority 
members to maintain any particular cultural contents, they do, 
nevertheless, promote certain conceptions as well as contents of 
culture, and may, in effect, also reinforce the preservation of certain 
cultural practices, and diminish the opportunities of the minority 
members to alter or reject these practices.  
The problem of minority rights as promoting certain conceptions 
as well as contents of culture could, however, perhaps be accepted 
if the minority rights in question did, nevertheless, perform the task 
they were tasked to perform: that is, to protect people’s cultural 
memberships. However, as argued in section 2.3., Kymlicka’s 
treatment of minority rights as protecting cultural structures 
(memberships in the abstract) rather than any individual 
memberships (in particular), only gets us half way to fulfilling this 
task. The framework, given by Kymlicka, never answers the 
questions of who should come under any particular right (rights of 
self-government) or who should be eligible for the rights of cultural 
accommodation, and – by not doing so – also casts some doubt on 
the idea of minority rights as protecting people’s memberships. 
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Answering these questions, however, is of utmost importance in 
order for minority rights to track their targets, and in Part II, I 
answer these questions in more detail. 
To make things clear, none of the above mentioned 
considerations (the different kinds of rationales for the state 
concern, the failure of minority rights to stay clear of promoting 
particular contents of culture, or the inadequacy of the membership-
model) are intended as providing support for an outright rejection 
of different kinds of minority rights within the liberal framework. 
Such rejection (if, indeed, possible) would need to assess the 
question of minority rights from a slightly different perspective, 
partially taken in the next two chapters of this work. What I hope to 
have shown, however, is that the problems outlined in this chapter, 
even if not providing any conclusive case against minority rights, 
are very real and should not be ignored lightly. At the very least, 
they should direct us towards a far more cautious approach to 
minority rights, both at the level of their justification as well as at 
the level of application. Whereas the general liberal egalitarian 
framework of Kymlicka, as I have shown, gives good reasons for 
the liberal state to be concerned about and to try to rectify cultural 
disadvantages, this framework may not be extended as far as 
dictating the kinds of policies that the liberal state should adhere to. 
Rather, the actual policies of cultural accommodation need to be 
assessed in context, taking into account both the theoretical 
difficulties outlined above, as well as other possible considerations 
that there may be for granting, or not granting, such rights in 
practice. 
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Chapter  2 
 
Autonomy vs. toleration 
 
In the previous chapter, I concentrated on Will Kymlicka’s equality 
based arguments for (1) the liberal state to be concerned about and 
try to rectify cultural disadvantages, and (2) for minority rights as 
adequate responses to these disadvantages. I argued that Kymlicka 
was able to build a strong case for the liberal state to be concerned 
about disadvantages faced by minority members, but that this case 
did not extend to an argument for the requirement of minority rights 
in practice. Most notably, I highlighted the difficulties ensuring that 
minority rights steer away from promoting certain conceptions and 
contents of culture, as well as their incapability of protecting 
individual cultural memberships. Neither of these difficulties, 
however, provided any conclusive case against minority rights, 
although they did point towards adopting a more cautious approach 
to such rights, as well as towards the need to rethink the issues of 
cultural membership and the questions of the allocation of these 
rights anew. 
During the course of these discussions, I made several 
references to the tensions between Kymlicka’s prerequisite for 
choice –argument, and the two other arguments from importance 
and involuntariness. The prerequisite for choice –argument, it was 
suggested, was important for showing the compatibility of cultural 
claims with liberalism, but it also stood in some tension with the 
importance and involuntariness arguments, by creating certain 
constraints on the kinds of cultures and cultural commitments that 
the liberal framework could incorporate. These constraints, inherent 
in Kymlicka’s theory, can be traced back to Kymlicka’s emphasis 
on individual autonomy as one of the key values of liberalism, and 
the role of the liberal state in protecting, or even promoting, the 
autonomy of its individual members. 
As the centrality of individual autonomy, and the role of the 
liberal state in protecting and/or promoting individual autonomy are 
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far from uncontested issues among liberal multiculturalists, in this 
chapter, I focus on the issues of individual autonomy and the kinds 
of constraints that individual autonomy, as one of the key liberal 
values, brings to the liberal responses to cultural diversity. Most 
notably, I look at the questions relating to the rights of minority 
groups to govern their internal affairs, and the kinds of constraints 
the liberal state may impose as preconditions for non-interference. 
Whereas my intention is not to argue for the more stringent 
approaches, incorporating the role of the liberal state in promoting 
individual autonomy and the requirement of the imposition of 
liberal norms (to the affairs of illiberal groups), I do argue that 
alternative approaches (often discussed under the term diversity-
liberalism) also require protection of certain preconditions for 
individual autonomy, as well as certain interferences of the liberal 
state to the affairs of illiberal groups. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin (section 1, Limits of 
autonomy liberalism) by looking at some of the autonomy-based 
constraints that Kymlicka gives to the legitimate ways of using 
minority rights, especially the rights of self-government.165 I argue 
(1.1.) that these constraints, inherent in Kymlicka’s account, 
provide much stronger guidelines to the kinds of groups eligible for 
the rights of self-government than Kymlicka would be willing to 
acknowledge, as well as grounds upon which the state’s 
interference to the affairs of illiberal groups can be justified. Given 
Kymlicka’s reluctance to legitimize such interference, I show (1.2.) 
how Kymlicka’s framework does, indeed, provide strong practical 
reasons for not interfering with the internal affairs of certain groups, 
                                                 
165 The connection between minority rights and individual autonomy is, I 
believe, most explicit in Kymlicka’s discussions on the self-government 
rights of national and indigenous minorities, although the discussions of 
this chapter can also be read as discussions of a more general problem, that 
of the right of (any) cultural or religious group to govern its own affairs 
without the interference of the state. The term “right of self-government” 
should, in this context, thus be understood broadly, as a right of a group to 
govern its internal affairs, regardless of whether this self-government 
incorporated full or even partial secession from the liberal state. 
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although it is not able to provide any principled justification for 
why these groups should be eligible for the rights of self-
government in the first place.  
After discussing the qualifications that Kymlicka’s emphasis on 
individual autonomy creates for his justificatory framework for 
minority rights (rights of self-government), I turn to discuss an 
alternative approach, that of Chandran Kukathas’s toleration-based 
account of multiculturalism (section 2, Diversity liberalism and the 
critique of autonomy). I argue that, whereas Kukathas is right to 
point out some of the limitations of Kymlicka’s autonomy-based 
account (most notably, the inability of this account to accommodate 
those ways of living that do not place high value on individual 
autonomy), his attack on individual autonomy as one of the guiding 
principles of liberalism is far from successful. By way of analysing 
the requirements of mutual toleration and non-interference in 
Kukathas’s own model, I show how his model of a free society also 
rests on a requirement to ensure certain (albeit very minimal) 
conditions for individual autonomy for all.   
The final section  of this chapter (section 3, Minority rights, 
diversity, and the state), returns to the question of minority rights 
and the (in)ability of the grand theories of multiculturalism to 
provide conclusive guidance to the liberal state with respect to these 
rights. This section analyses the arguments, given by Kukathas, for 
the rejection of minority rights as appropriate means for the liberal 
state to respond to cultural diversity and argues that Kukathas’s 
own theoretical framework leaves considerable scope for the liberal 
state to adopt a variety of minority rights in practice. All in all, this 
chapter, together with Ch 1, builds a case for rejecting the grand 
theorists’ attempts to create too simple and straight forward 
accounts of (either the requirement or rejection of) minority rights, 
by showing that there may not be any principled answer to whether 
the liberal state should adopt any particular system of minority 
rights in practice, but that, in most cases, there are good liberal 
reasons both for as well as against such rights. 
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1. Limits of autonomy liberalism 
One of the most controversial aspects of Kymlicka’s liberal 
multiculturalism lies in his strong commitment to individual 
autonomy as one of the guiding principles of liberalism, and his 
view of minority rights as catering for individual autonomy. To 
recall, Kymlicka views cultures as contexts of choice that provide 
people opportunities and enable them to make meaningful choices 
among these opportunities. The minority rights, such as rights of 
self-government, are needed in order to secure minority members’ 
access to their own contexts of choice, within which they can make 
meaningful choices among the options provided by their culture.166 
Kymlicka’s emphasis on the freedom of choice of the minority 
members does, however, create certain limitations both to the kinds 
of minority rights justifiable within Kymlicka’s liberal framework, 
as well as for the kinds of groups eligible for these rights. Some of 
these limitations, such as the illegitimacy of minority groups to 
suppress the freedom of choice of their own members, are clearly 
recognized and argued for by Kymlicka himself, although, as I will 
argue, the scope of these limitations167 extends much further than 
Kymlicka would be willing to acknowledge. Most notably, as I try 
to show, Kymlicka’s commitments to individual autonomy, and the 
requirement of the minority rights (rights of self-government) to 
protect or even promote individual autonomy lead to far more 
stringent requirements for the kinds of groups eligible for such 
rights than Kymlicka would be willing to accept. 
 
                                                 
166 The difficulties of viewing one’s own culture as prerequisite for 
individual choice were discussed in Ch. 1, 1.1. 
167 My focus is on Kymlicka’s discussion on intra-group relations. It 
should be noted that Kymlicka also argues for certain limitations on an 
inter-group level (see: Kymlicka 1995, 152-153), but I will not comment 
on these limitations in this discussion. 
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1.1. External protections and internal restrictions 
According to Kymlicka, the self-government, accommodation and 
special representation rights can all operate to two different effects. 
On the one hand, they can be used as external protections that 
shield the minority group from unwanted external influences by 
securing the conditions in which the minority members can 
preserve their own cultural contexts (if they so wish). The self-
government rights of the indigenous peoples, for example, allow 
these peoples relative control of their own territories, thus ensuring 
that, within their given territory, the minority in question is not 
outbid by the decisions of the majority. On the other hand, 
however, minority rights can also operate as internal restrictions 
that limit the opportunities of the minority members to question and 
revise their traditional ways of living. The same self-government 
rights of the indigenous peoples, for example, can be used to force 
minority members to adhere to the traditional customs of their 
community or to impose severe restrictions on the minority 
members freedom to leave their communities.168  
Kymlicka is careful to note that, within the liberal framework, 
only external protections can be justified, whereas internal 
restrictions should be rejected.169 This claim is based on Kymlicka’s 
emphasis on individual autonomy as one of the guiding values of 
liberalism, and his view of minority rights as catering for such 
autonomy.170 Whereas the external protections (providing the 
conditions in which the minority group can enjoy their own cultural 
context) cater for this task, the internal restrictions (limiting the 
opportunities of minority members) do not. What is not entirely 
clear, however, is, firstly, whether the distinction between external 
protectors and internal restrictions is sustainable, and, secondly, 
whether the minority rights, such as the rights of self-government, 
manage to live up to the task of catering for individual autonomy, 
and in what sense. 
                                                 
168 Kymlicka 1995, 35-44. 
169 Kymlicka 1995, 37; 41; 152-153. 
170 Kymlicka 1992, 142. 
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Dealing with the distinction 
As Kymlicka recognizes, the distinction between internal 
restrictions and external protections is not always easy to draw.171 
The same right of self-government, for example, can be used both, 
to protect the social and institutional framework that operates as the 
minority members’ context of choice, as well as to restrict the 
minority members’ opportunities to question and revise their 
traditional ways of living. Often, the internal restrictions (such as 
the restrictions on the usage of land, or the requirements to follow 
certain codes of conduct) are even argued for in terms of external 
protections aiming to minimize the outside influence within the 
group.  
On a theoretical level, the distinction between the external 
protections proper, and the internal restrictions argued for in terms 
of external protections is relatively clear: the external protections 
(proper) enable the minority members to preserve their traditional 
ways of living, if they so wish, whereas the internal restrictions 
force the minority members to do so, even if they would not 
voluntarily choose to do so.172 The strict enforcement of religious 
dress codes, for example, may be argued for in terms of trying to 
reduce the outside influence within the group (and may even be 
able to do this), but only by taking away the freedom of the 
members not to adhere to such requirement. By taking away the 
freedom of the members to change such tradition, such enforcement 
becomes unjustifiable, regardless of its role as reducing the outside 
influence and, consequently, of enhancing the opportunities of 
minority members to preserve their own cultural contexts.173 The 
                                                 
171 Kymlicka 1995, 42. 
172 Kymlicka 1995, 42, n. 11. 
173 It is, of course, debatable whether the reduction of outside influences in 
terms of, for example, banning certain types of clothing, enhances the 
opportunities of minority members to preserve their own cultural contexts. 
Given Kymlicka’s distinction between cultural contents and cultural 
structures, the answer would seem to be negative (see also Ch. 1, 2.3.). My 
point here, however, is not to argue for or against the possible impacts of 
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external restrictions, on the contrary, should have no such 
consequences, preserving the freedom of the minority members to 
interpret and practice their cultures also in ways that do not fit the 
traditional conceptions of what the culture in question contains.  
In the light of the discussions of the previous chapter, it is, 
however, debatable whether the theoretical distinction between 
external protections and internal restrictions can ever be maintained 
in practice.174 That is, whether it is ever the case that the external 
protections would not also create certain internal restrictions by 
taking away at least some of the options open to the minority 
members. As argued in the previous chapter (esp. 2.2.), the rights of 
self-government (indeed any minority rights) are never rights 
purely in the abstract, but incorporate certain contents through 
which the legitimate practices of the group are decided. The 
language laws of Quebec, for example, do, in effect, restrict the 
opportunities of the Quebecois to choose to use English in certain 
settings, and the land laws of the indigenous peoples do not only 
restrict the usage of land of outsiders, but of the indigenous peoples 
themselves. For Kymlicka, these internal restrictions, incorporated 
in the external protections, are viewed in terms of unavoidable by-
products.175 That is, as unfortunate, although acceptable, 
consequences of measures (external protections) that are, 
                                                                                                     
such measures, but simply to show that, even if such measures (e.g. bans 
on certain types of clothing) did enhance the opportunities of minority 
members to preserve their own cultural contexts, the taking away the 
freedom of the minority members to change these traditions would render 
such measures illegitimate. 
174 This, it should be noted, is an altogether different question from the 
problem of whether it is ever possible to know in advance to which effect 
any particular right will be used. (See also: Kymlicka 1995, 40) Whereas 
the predicting of the possible usage of any particular right (such as the 
rights of self-government) should, no doubt, be on the agenda of the liberal 
state granting such rights, the problem, highlighted here, is conceptual, 
incorporated in the nature of minority rights themselves (rather than in 
their particular usages). 
175 Kymlicka 1995, 44. 
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nevertheless, needed for the minority members to be able to 
preserve their own cultural context, should they so wish. 
The introduction of unavoidable, yet acceptable, internal 
restrictions into the discussions on justifiable minority rights creates 
a pressing need to draw a distinction between the unjustifiable 
internal restrictions proper (such as the strict enforcement of 
religious dress-codes) and restrictions that come as unavoidable 
(yet acceptable) by-products of external protections (such as certain 
restrictions on using particular languages in particular situations). 
One way of drawing such a distinction would be to look at the kinds 
of restrictions that the minority members are faced with and assess 
whether these restrictions limit the basic civil rights and liberties of 
the group members.176 To an extent, this is also the approach 
adopted by Kymlicka, for whom the rights of minority groups 
should not limit the basic rights and freedoms of the group 
members, such as the freedom of speech and expression, liberty of 
conscience, the right to physical integrity etc. Most notably, 
Kymlicka argues that minority rights should not restrict the 
minority members’ capabilities to assess and to also revise their 
traditional ways of living, but (on a much stronger note) provide for 
their autonomy – for their capabilities to choose and to pursue the 
kinds of lives they themselves see fit.177 
These two requirements (1. that minority rights should not 
prevent people from assessing (and possibly changing) their current 
ways of life, and 2. that they should also cater for or even enhance 
people’s capabilities for doing so) are, of course, very different, 
providing either weaker or stronger limitations to the kinds of 
minority rights justifiable within Kymlicka’s liberal framework. 
The first requirement (that of non-prevention) may, at the most, be 
                                                 
176 The key distinction between internal restrictions proper and 
unavoidable (yet acceptable) by-products does not thus lie in the way in 
which these restrictions have come into being (whether by their own or as 
by-products of external protectors), but rather on whether these restrictions 
can be justified within the liberal framework. 
177 Kymlicka 1995, 152-153; 1992, 142. 
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seen as a requirement for the minority rights to protect individual 
autonomy, whereas the latter (that of enhancement) provides a 
much stronger claim, not only of protection, but also of promotion 
of the autonomy of minority members.178 Depending on which one 
of these views one subscribes to, one will also have slightly 
different views of the kinds of groups that, within the liberal 
framework, can be seen as eligible for such rights – or so I try to 
argue. 
 
Protecting vs. promoting individual autonomy 
Take, first, the stronger claim that minority rights should promote 
individual autonomy – that is, to cater for or enhance people’s 
capabilities to assess and to pursue the kinds of lives they 
themselves see fit. In order to cater for individual autonomy, it 
seems, it is not enough that the minority right in question enables 
the members of the cultural group to preserve their own cultural 
context, but that this context is also of certain kind. At the very 
minimum, this context needs to incorporate a sufficiently complex 
set of options that the minority members can take advantage of, as 
well as a system of education that enables the members to make 
meaningful choices among these options.179 In order for the 
                                                 
178 Kymlicka’s own terminology incorporates expressions such as 
“promoting”, “enabling” and “protecting” individual autonomy (ibid.), and 
it is not always clear which position Kymlicka himself subscribes to. 
Whereas my distinction between the promotion and protection of 
individual autonomy reflects, partially, the ambiguities of Kymlicka’s own 
position, it does (as will become clearer later on) also capture something 
important about the kinds of responses that the liberal state may take in its 
responses to cultural diversity. 
179 It could even be argued that, for the promotion or enhancement of 
individual autonomy, it is not enough that the context in question provides 
sufficiently complex set of options for the members to choose from, but 
that this context should also provide “a better” set of options than the 
context of the majority (that is, the context should be such that will enable 
the minority members to practice their autonomy to fuller extent than in 
the context of the majority). Should the context of the minority, however, 
provide substantively lesser (or “worse”) opportunities for its members 
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minority members to make autonomous choices among the options 
provided by their culture, the culture needs to, already, be such that 
caters for individual autonomy, incorporating both, an environment 
within which the members’ capacities for autonomy can develop, as 
well as a sufficiently varied set of options for the minority members 
to choose from.180 But if, say, the options provided by the minority 
culture are very few and far between (as is often the case when the 
community in question continues to live in relative isolation in 
accordance with its age old traditions),181 it becomes questionable 
whether the options provided by these cultures can really be 
conceived of as varied enough for the members to have any 
meaningful choice with respect to how to lead their lives. The 
minority groups, eligible for the rights that enable them to preserve 
their own cultural contexts would thus seem to be restricted to 
groups that are, already, sufficiently pluralistic and heterogeneous – 
that is, to groups that are, already, liberal.182 
A liberal multicultural theory should not, however, be a theory 
that can only accommodate liberal cultural groups and liberal ways 
of life, and to answer this worry, many have come to argue for 
                                                                                                     
than the context of the majority (even if sufficiently complex), it would – 
from the perspective of promoting individual autonomy – be better not to 
grant rights of self-government for these groups, as the preservation of 
these contexts would fail to enhance individual autonomy. For my 
purposes, I use the term “promoting individual autonomy” not in this 
stronger sense, but in the sense in which the context in question must 
provide 1) sufficiently complex set of options to choose from, and 2) 
environment within which the capabilities of the minority members to 
reflect and to make informed  choices about these options can develop. 
180 As Joseph Raz has forcefully argued, a choice made in the face of lack 
of alternatives may not be counted as an autonomous choice, as autonomy 
involves the idea of having an adequate range of options to choose from. 
Raz 1986, ch. 14 & 15. See also: Christman 2001; 2005; Colburn 2010. 
181 Such as certain indigenous peoples in Latin America, or certain 
religious communities that have chosen to isolate themselves from the rest 
of society, including the Amish in USA. 
182 I will come back to the second (liberal) requirement of these groups not 
suppressing the basic rights and liberties of their members shortly. 
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much weaker requirements for the kinds of groups that, within the 
liberal framework, can be seen as eligible for minority rights, such 
as the right of self-government. According to these thinkers, those 
minority groups that provide only very limited sets of options for 
their members can still be seen as having the right to organize their 
internal affairs in ways they wish, as long as they provide their 
members information also of other ways of living (that is, of other 
ways than their “own”).183 Being provided such information, it is 
argued, the members would at least be aware of other opportunities 
and other ways of life (even if their own group could not provide 
them with these opportunities), and may also be able to leave their 
own cultural community for the wider variety of options and ways 
of life provided by the culture of the majority.184 
Whereas this weaker position (that is, not the requirement of the 
minority groups to provide sufficiently complex sets of options 
themselves, but the requirement of these groups to provide 
information about alternative options outside the group), would 
seem to have the benefit of incorporating somewhat wider variety 
of minority groups to be eligible for minority rights, this response, 
however, is not open to Kymlicka himself. Most notably, this 
response stands in stark contrast with Kymlicka’s original rationale 
for why people should be able to live in their own cultural contexts 
in the first place – that is, because these contexts, by definition, 
provide people meaningful options to choose from. Nor does this 
response seem to fit well with Kymlicka’s commitment to the 
primacy of one’s own cultural context and the view according to 
                                                 
183 Most prominently, William Galston has promoted a view according to 
which the group’s right to govern its internal affairs is dependent on the 
requirements of providing its members certain minimal knowledge about 
alternative ways of life. (Galston 1995; 2002; 2005) I will come back to 
Galston’s view and its implications to other diversity-liberal theories of 
multiculturalism in the second part of this chapter (esp. 2.2.). 
184 The requirement of providing information about alternative ways of life 
is also inherent in Kymlicka’s account (e.g. Kymlicka 1995, 81-82), 
although, as I will argue, this cannot operate as a sufficient requirement for 
the minority groups to be allowed to govern their internal affairs. 
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which it is not reasonable to expect people to leave their own 
cultural contexts. If the group to which the individual happens to 
belong to, however, only provides a very limited set of options for 
that individual to choose from, it is not enough that further options 
are available outside the community, as the taking of advantage of 
these options would require the individual to leave.185 Rather, the 
requirement of the minority rights to cater for, or to promote the 
autonomy of the group members would seem to create a 
requirement for the minority groups, not only to provide 
information about alternative ways of life outside their community, 
but also to incorporate these alternatives into their own cultural 
context, at least to a point in which the options provided by the 
culture in question would be complex enough for the minority 
members to make meaningful choices from.  
This requirement for a cultural group to provide its members a 
sufficiently varied set of options to choose from does not, however, 
say anything yet about when a particular set of options provided by 
any particular culture is, indeed, sufficient to be considered as 
catering for people’s autonomy. Quite obviously, the sets of options 
provided by different cultures vary, and it may be too strong a 
requirement to insist that the minority cultures would need to 
provide their members a maximally varied set of options or even a 
set of options that would be as diverse as the options provided by 
majority culture. In order to live autonomous lives, it is enough that 
the minority members have a relatively varied set of options to 
choose from, but this set needs not be as varied as, or identical with 
the set provided by the majority culture.186 On the contrary, what is 
                                                 
185 Recall that, for Kymlicka, “respecting people’s own cultural 
membership and facilitating their transition to another culture are not 
equally legitimate options” Kymlicka 1989, 176. 
186 This may also be a question of lacking common metrics for measuring 
the variety of options inherent in any particular culture. As David Miller 
has forcefully argued, in circumstances of cultural diversity, it may be 
difficult, even impossible, to find any uncontested metric for measuring 
whether the members of any particular group (in Miller’s case, nation) 
enjoy equal, or relatively equal opportunities. Miller 2005. 
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important, according to Kymlicka, is that the options provided by 
the minority culture are the kinds of options that the minority 
members find meaningful, not that they resonate (in scope or 
content) with the options of the majority.187 
Whereas I do believe that, for Kymlicka, the minority rights 
should perform precisely this stronger task of promoting individual 
autonomy,188 it is also clear that the constraints this requirement 
creates for those groups eligible for such rights are, not only 
extremely stringent, but also extremely difficult to measure or 
assess. Due to these difficulties (of measuring the kinds of options, 
meaningful to the minority members, as well as of establishing the 
threshold above which the set of options provided by the minority 
culture would be sufficiently complex), it may be worth looking at 
those requirements that the minority culture must, minimally, 
fulfill, in order for the group in question to be even considered for 
those rights that enable them to preserve their own cultural 
contexts, if they so wish. These requirements, I believe, are 
incorporated in Kymlicka’s weaker claim – that is, that the minority 
rights should not prevent people from assessing (criticizing or 
reaffirming) their current customs and ways of life. That is, the 
cultural group, to which the minority rights are granted, should not 
use these rights to force people to adhere to any particular cultural 
customs or practices, nor should it prevent people from acquiring 
information about alternative ways of life, although it does not need 
to be the kind of group that provides its members sufficiently varied 
                                                 
187 Provided that different cultures provide different cultural narratives 
through which to view one’s ways of life, it is clear that those options, 
conceived as meaningful for the minority can vary tremendously from the 
options conceived as meaningful for the majority. This does not, of course, 
take away the fact that, in order to make meaningful choices, some 
threshold of sufficiently complex set of options needs to be established – 
only that this set needs not be identical with the set of the majority. 
188 That is, of providing minority members freedom not only to choose 
their own courses of life, but also of providing 1) sufficiently complex set 
of options from which these choices can be made, as well as  2) supporting 
those capacities that are requires for autonomous choice. 
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sets of options to choose from, nor specific ways through which the 
members learn to make meaningful choices among their 
alternatives (however scarce or abundant they be).  
Whereas this weaker requirement – let us call it the requirement 
of protecting individual autonomy189 – would seem to be able to 
incorporate a much wider variety of groups190 eligible for minority 
rights (rights of self-determination), it is worth noting that, even 
with this weaker requirement, there are still certain, indispensable, 
requirements that those groups eligible for minority rights must 
fulfill. In Kymlicka’s framework – regardless of whether one views 
minority rights as promoting or merely protecting individual 
autonomy – the groups in question cannot restrict their members’ 
basic rights or freedoms to question their traditional ways of living, 
or their attempts to acquire information about alternative ways of 
life. Those groups, eligible for minority rights are, in Kymlicka’s 
framework, only those groups that are, already, operating in 
accordance with certain liberal principles, protecting the basic 
rights and freedoms of their members. The right of the group to 
govern its own affairs and to maintain its own cultural context 
(should it so wish) is, in Kymlicka’s own terms, justifiable only in 
cases where this context is of a certain kind – that is, a liberal 
cultural context of a liberal cultural group. 
 
1.2. Liberal rights and liberal imposition 
Kymlicka’s emphasis on individual autonomy and his consequent 
view of minority rights as subordinate to the basic rights and 
freedoms of individuals, has prompted a critique according to 
                                                 
189 This requirement of “protection” should be understood in a very 
minimal sense of “not preventing” people from questioning their current 
ways of life. 
190 For example, groups that are only able to offer very limited set of 
options to their members (such as isolated tribal communities or extremely 
poor nation states) can be conceived as eligible for the rights of self-
determination (broadly construed), as long as they do not prevent their 
members from questioning their traditional ways of living or of acquiring 
information from outside their own community. 
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which Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights is simply a form of 
cultural imperialism that justifies the imposition of liberal values on 
groups that would not, voluntarily, be willing to endorse such 
values.191 The idea being that, by prioritizing the basic rights and 
freedoms of individuals over the rights of the group to govern its 
own affairs, Kymlicka does not only reduce the kinds of groups, 
eligible for the right of self-determination, into groups that are 
already liberal, but also opens the door for interference, forcing the 
other, illiberal groups to change. 
Being reluctant to accept such implications, Kymlicka attempts 
to make a differentiation between two questions: (1) what sorts of 
minority claims are consistent with liberal principles? and (2) 
whether the liberals should impose their views on minorities which 
do not accept some or all of these liberal principles?192 According to 
Kymlicka, “the first is a question of identifying a defensible liberal 
theory of minority rights; the second is the question of imposing 
that liberal theory.”193 Moreover, Kymlicka explains that his task 
(especially in Multicultural Citizenship) has been the first rather 
than the second,194 and that, in order to answer the second (that of 
imposition), several further considerations would need to be taken 
into account.195 Further, Kymlicka argues that, in many cases, there 
are no legitimate grounds for imposing liberal principles upon 
                                                 
191 E.g. Kukathas, 1992; 2003, 181-189; Galston 1995; 2005; Gray 2000; 
see also: Mendus, 1989. 
192 Kymlicka 1995, 164. 
193 Kymlicka 1995, 164, emphasis in the original. 
194 In his later works, Kymlicka does, to an extent, attempt to answer the 
second question of imposition by discussing some of the difficulties as 
well as appropriate mechanisms for enforcing basic human rights within 
illiberal groups. See e.g. Kymlicka 2001, ch. 4; for Kymlicka’s account on 
the role of the international community in such processes, see Kymlicka  
2007a. 
195 In Kymlicka 1992, Kymlicka identifies at least three steps between the 
questions of liberal theory and the imposition of liberal principles in 
practice, each incorporating several considerations that would need to be 
answered to. Kymlicka 1992, 144. 
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illiberal groups.196 Most notably, one would need to answer the 
question of who, and on what grounds, would have the authority to 
impose liberal principles upon illiberal groups – a question that 
Kymlicka finds no clear answer to, as this imposition would require 
the relevant authority to infringe on the internal affairs of a self-
governing entity.197 
 
The self-governing status of illiberal groups 
Although I agree with Kymlicka that the answer(s) to the second 
question (imposition) are not determined by the answer(s) to the 
first (identification), I also think that Kymlicka’s response is 
somewhat ad hoc, and lies on an unjustified presupposition about 
the self-governing status of illiberal groups. In order to see this, one 
needs to look at the reasons for why certain groups should have a 
right to decide about their own affairs, and the kinds of groups that, 
in Kymlicka’s own terms, qualify for such right. 
To recall, Kymlicka claims that the rights of self-government are 
needed in order for the cultural groups in question to be able to 
maintain their own cultural contexts. The cultural contexts, 
however, are only important in so far as they cater for individual 
autonomy, and the importance of the ability to maintain one’s own 
cultural context can only be argued for in terms of individual 
                                                 
196 It should be noted that Kymlicka’s argument is conditional, only 
applying to national minorities (incl. indigenous peoples), rather than to 
immigrants. According to Kymlicka, it is justifiable to enforce liberal 
principles on immigrant groups, as the immigrants have normally left their 
own cultural contexts voluntarily and have also been aware of the liberal 
principles that they will be living under. (Kymlicka 1995, 170, see also: 
Ch. 1, 1.1.) Further, Kymlicka maintains that, even in the case of national 
(or indigenous) minorities, there is a limit to the kinds of illiberal practices 
that should not be interfered on. Kymlicka mentions the cases of gross and 
systematic violations of human rights (such as genocide and torture), 
although he does not build any systematic argument for why, precisely in 
these cases, intervention would be justified, whereas in others (such as 
denial of freedom of conscience or sexual discrimination) it would be not. 
Kymlicka 1995, 169-170; for criticism, see e.g. Kukathas 1997a, 418-420. 
197 Kymlicka 1995, 164-170. 
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autonomy. Keeping this in mind, however, there does not seem to 
be any reason why a cultural group that infringes the autonomy of 
its members should be self-governing in the first place, as the rights 
of self-government are argued for precisely in order to protect that 
context within which members’ autonomy can be enjoyed.198 As 
argued in the previous section (1.1.), it is built into Kymlicka’s 
framework that those groups, eligible for the rights of self-
government, only are groups that have already organized in 
accordance with certain liberal principles, and to infringe upon the 
internal affairs of a group that is not organized in accordance with 
these principles, is to infringe upon the affairs of a group that 
should not be self-governing in the first place. Whereas it may well 
be the case that no legitimate authority can easily be found to 
infringe upon the internal affairs of a self-governing group, 
Kymlicka’s own framework does not provide justification for the 
illiberal groups to be self-governing. Rather, the minority groups 
within the liberal state are, by definition, still under the jurisdiction 
of the state, thus giving the state authority to intervene in the 
illiberal practices of these groups.199 
                                                 
198 It may be objected that this interpretation downplays the role of the 
importance –argument (see also Ch. 1, 1.1.). To recall, Kymlicka 
supplements his prerequisite for choice –argument by saying that it is 
precisely one’s own cultural context and membership in one’s own cultural 
group that are important for people’s self-respect and for their identity, and 
that it is for this reason that the liberal state should be concerned about the 
disadvantages resulting from not being able to live in one’s own cultural 
context. However, as I argued in Ch. 1, it is important to distinguish 
between those reasons that the liberal state may have for being concerned 
about the disadvantages faced by minority members and the appropriate 
responses to these disadvantages. Whereas the importance argument gives 
reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about people’s own cultural 
contexts (even if these contexts were illiberal), it does not as yet provide 
justification for the cultural groups to be given rights of self-government. 
The rights of self-government, in Kymlicka’s framework, are conditional, 
requiring the group to respect the basic rights and freedoms of its 
members. 
199 See also: Mason 2000, 86-88. 
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Practical reasons for non-interference 
Having said that, it should be noted that, despite there being no 
liberal justification for the internal restrictions of illiberal groups, 
nor any principled grounds for why the liberal state could not 
interfere in the illiberal practices of illiberal groups within its 
jurisdiction, there may well be other reasons for the liberals and the 
liberal state to refrain from imposing liberal principles upon 
illiberal groups. The forceful imposition of liberal principles may, 
in fact, be counterproductive, and only weaken the situation of 
those whose rights the minority group is already suppressing.200 The 
minority group that has, already, been given substantive rights to 
govern its own affairs may not be willing to accept the authority of 
the impostor and respond by aggression or by making stricter its 
own illiberal rules. Even if successful, the imposition and the 
consequent adoption of liberal principles may only be superficial 
and not work in the long run. As Kymlicka observes, “liberal 
institutions can only really work if liberal beliefs have been 
internalized by the members of the self-governing community, be it 
an independent country or a national minority”,201 and the forceful 
imposition of liberal principles may well be more harmful (from the 
liberal perspective) than the refraining of intervention. 
None of these reasons, however, are reasons that would take 
away the right of the liberal state to interfere in the affairs of 
illiberal groups in its jurisdiction, or (on the other side of the coin) 
reasons that would justify the self-governing status of the illiberal 
groups in question. On the contrary, as far as I can see, in 
Kymlicka’s theory, there is no principled justification for the 
illiberal practices of the group, no principled basis for their right of 
                                                 
200 Andrew Mason identifies this as one of the circumstances in which the 
liberal state may have strong reasons not to interfere in the illiberal 
practices of a cultural group – that is, the circumstances in which the costs 
of the liberal imposition would fall mainly on the victims of the illiberal 
practices rather than on the perpetrators. Mason 2000, 84. 
201 Kymlicka 1995, 167. 
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self-determination, and no principled reason for the liberals to 
refrain from imposing liberal principles upon these groups. 
Whereas it may, for sure, be wise for the liberal state to refrain (in 
certain circumstances) from intervening in the illiberal practices of 
the group, the reasons for doing so are practical rather than reasons 
derived from Kymlicka’s theoretical framework itself.202 
 
2. Diversity liberalism and the critique of autonomy 
Kymlicka’s theoretical framework, and his views on minority rights 
as catering for individual autonomy, would thus seem to create 
rather robust conditions for those minority groups eligible for these 
rights. The groups eligible for minority rights (such as the rights of 
self-government) would, already, need to operate in accordance 
with certain liberal principles, and refrain from infringing upon 
their members’ capabilities to assess and to choose their own 
courses in life. As already indicated, Kymlicka was able to provide 
reasons for why the liberal state should not (always) intervene in 
the internal affairs of those groups that failed to live up to these 
requirements, although these reasons were practical, rather than 
reasons incorporated in Kymlicka’s theoretical framework itself. 
This mismatch (between Kymlicka’s theoretical framework and his 
practical recommendations) has prompted many to question the 
actual background commitments of Kymlicka’s theory that, quite 
obviously, do not lead to the conclusions that Kymlicka would want 
them to. Most notably, the so-called diversity liberals203, such as 
William Galston and Chandran Kukathas, have questioned 
                                                 
202 As Chandran Kukathas has noted, Kymlicka may have been able to 
provide an excuse for non-intervention, but no justification. Kukathas 
1997a, 418-420; 2003, 183-186. 
203 The term “diversity liberalism” comes from Galston (1995) who labels 
Kukathas’s (as well as his own) toleration-based accounts under such 
term. Whereas Kukathas and Galston do, to substantive extents, differ on 
their views on diversity and its value (Kukathas explicitly rejects diversity 
as valuable in itself (Kukathas 2003, 29; 32; 37; 69), and views it, at the 
most, as an indication of free society (ibid., 116), I stick to this commonly 
used term, as nothing, in my argument, needs to hang on the term itself. 
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Kymlicka’s commitment to individual autonomy as one of the 
guiding principles of liberalism, and attempted to formulate 
alternative theories of cultural accommodation. Most notably, both 
Galston and Kukathas have expressed their concern that 
Kymlicka’s autonomy-liberalism fails to acknowledge those ways 
of life that do not place high value on individual autonomy, and that 
the liberal state, committed to being neutral with respect to people’s 
conceptions of the good, should also allow for these kinds of lives 
to flourish204 – something that Kymlicka’s theoretical framework 
would not seem to accommodate.  
In this section, I look more closely into Chandran Kukathas’s 
alternative account of liberalism and his attack on individual 
autonomy as one of the key values of liberalism. I argue that the so-
called diversity-liberal attack on autonomy-liberalism goes only 
half way, and that even the most stringent diversity-liberal 
approaches to cultural diversity need to be committed to securing 
certain (albeit very minimal) conditions for individual autonomy for 
all. In the final section, Minority rights, diversity and the state, I 
return to the more general question of whether Kukathas manages 
to provide a genuine alternative to Kymlicka’s autonomy-liberal 
approach, and whether this approach manages to escape some of the 
pit falls identified in Kymlicka’s theory, namely those of failing to 
give any definitive guidance to the liberal state with respect to its 
responses to cultural diversity. 205 
                                                 
204 This “allowing of different kinds of flourishing” means not that the 
liberal state should be in the business of enhancing or promoting human 
flourishing. As Kukathas explicitly notes, the liberal state should not be 
directly interested in human flourishing, nor promote any particular type 
of flourishing, but simply to uphold a system within which people can live 
peacefully. Kukathas 2003, 249. 
205 To anticipate a little, I will argue that Kukathas’s account leaves 
substantive scope for the liberal state to adopt different kinds of minority 
rights in practice. To an extent, this is also recognized by Kukathas who 
views many of the issues of public policy as practical compromises rather 
than principled solutions (Kukathas 2003, 244). At the theoretical level, 
however, Kukathas maintains that minority rights should be rejected, 
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2.1. Chandran Kukathas’s account of a free society 
Chandran Kukathas rejects Kymlicka’s emphasis on individual 
autonomy, and the state’s role in catering for autonomy, on the 
basis that this would prevent those groups that reject the value of 
autonomy from living in accordance with their conscience. 
According to Kukathas, a free, liberal society is a society that 
allows people to live in accordance with their conscience, even if 
this means that some people’s autonomy, and their freedom to 
choose their own conceptions of the good, would be suppressed. 
For Kukathas, the free society is guided by the fundamental 
principle of freedom of association that allows people to associate 
with, as well as to disassociate from, those they wish or do not wish 
to associate with. This freedom of association (and disassociation) 
is to guarantee that people can live their lives in accordance with 
their conscience, without being forced to accept those values 
(including the value of individual autonomy) they would not 
voluntarily be willing to accept.206 
In order to highlight the differences in Kymlicka’s and 
Kukathas’s accounts, and in order to identify the scope of 
Kukathas’s criticism of Kymlicka, it may be helpful to begin by 
outlining some of the things these two thinkers have in common.  
Like Kymlicka’s, Kukathas’s theory is a liberal, individualist 
account of a good society. It is individualist in the sense that its 
starting point lies in the interests and well-being of individuals. 
According to Kukathas, groups or collectives have no independent 
value of their own, but they matter only in so far as they contribute 
to the well-being of individuals. This is not to say that a group’s 
character or its interests could always be reduced to the character or 
                                                                                                     
although, as I try to argue, this theoretical framework is far from 
convincing. 
206 Kukathas 1992a; 1997a; 2003: esp. ch. 3. Importantly, the liberty of 
conscience is not to be held as the fundamental value of a free society, as 
those wishing to reject the value of the liberty of conscience should also be 
free to do so, and free to associate with those they can associate with in 
accordance with their conscience. 
Part I Justifying Minority Rights 
136 
 
the interests of its members, but only that the group and its interests 
are valuable only by virtue of their effects on individual well-being. 
Nor is it therefore to say that the individual members of groups 
could not be (partially) constituted by their group membership – to 
the contrary, the view acknowledges the importance of group 
membership (and the possible adherence to shared norms and 
values) as inherent elements in the constitution of one’s identity.207 
Kukathas’s individualist commitments, and the value that Kukathas 
attaches to one’s culture, thus resonate with Kymlicka’s, who also 
emphasizes that culture, and one’s cultural membership, should be 
conceived as valuable only in so far as it caters for individuals’ 
well-being.208 
Like Kymlicka, Kukathas also acknowledges the diversity of 
moral, cultural and religious outlooks in contemporary societies. 
The nation states (that are often the default units of political 
organization)209 are far from being homogenous, and the views and 
values of different people within the nation can vary tremendously. 
Being committed to the idea that the state should stay neutral with 
respect to people’s conceptions of the good,210 both Kukathas and 
Kymlicka argue that the liberal state should not be in the business 
                                                 
207 Kukathas1992a, 112; 2003, 85-93. 
208 As will be noted later on, Kukathas and Kymlicka do, however, draw 
very different conclusions from how the instrumental value of culture 
should effect the kinds of policies, legitimate in a liberal state. 
209 Whereas both Kymlicka and Kukathas view nation states as the 
common units of social organization, they disagree on the role that the 
nation state should play in contemporary circumstances of cultural 
diversity. Whereas Kymlicka can well be described as a cultural 
nationalist (viewing societal cultures also largely as features of nations), 
Kukathas questions the primacy of nation states as locus of political 
authority, viewing states simply as transitory political settlements that 
should not be concerned with cultural issues. Kukathas 2003, 15. 
210 That is, the state should not base its policies in an assesment of 
people’s different conceptions of the good, although both Kukathas and 
Kymlicka also acknowledge that, by default, the state is bound to privilege 
certain ways of living by creating certain rules for the peaceful 
cohabitation of different groups. 
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of imposing any particular moral, cultural or religious outlooks on 
people, but allow, as far as possible, people to live the kinds of lives 
and to pursue the kinds of projects they themselves see 
worthwhile.211 
Despite these preliminary commitments (to the instrumental 
value of culture, existence of cultural diversity and state neutrality), 
Kymlicka and Kukathas come to argue for very different responses 
to cultural diversity. What they disagree upon is, fundamentally, 
what it means for people to be able to live the kinds of lives they 
themselves see fit, and what the role of the state should be in 
allowing for them to do so. Whereas Kymlicka holds that, in order 
to live the kind of life one finds meaningful requires one to also be 
able to assess, and to possibly change, one’s ways of living (and 
one’s views of a good life), for Kukathas, it is not necessary for a 
person to have this ability in order to live a perfectly meaningful 
life. In fact, Kukathas argues that, in some cases, this ability may 
even be detrimental to the individual in question, making her life go 
worse for her, as not all individuals have an interest in being able to 
revise or to change their ways of living (or thinking).212 What is 
important, according to Kukathas, is not that people are free to 
judge, reaffirm or reject their current ways of living or thinking, but 
that they acquiesce (for whatever reason) to the kinds of lives they 
are leading, and to the kinds of values, norms or practices that they 
are subscribing to.213 
Consequently, Kukathas argues that, rather than building a 
framework within which people’s freedom to choose their own 
conceptions of the good would be protected, the liberal society 
should be organized in accordance with the principle of mutual 
toleration that allows people to live as their conscience dictates. The 
two building blocks of a liberal society, freedom of association and 
                                                 
211 Kymlicka 1989; 1995; Kukathas 2003, esp. ch. 5. 
212 Kukathas 2003, 58-59. Kukathas’s view thus reflects the idea that it is 
impossible for a person’s life to go better for her against her own 
judgment. For discussion, see e.g. Dworkin, R. 1989; Dworkin, G., 2005. 
213 Kukathas 2003, 101. 
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mutual toleration cater, not for individual autonomy, but for 
freedom of conscience – even in cases where one’s conscience 
rejects the value of individual autonomy and one’s freedom to 
choose between alternative courses of life. Further, Kukathas 
argues that the role of the state, in a liberal society organized in 
accordance with the principles of freedom of association and 
mutual toleration, should be very minimal, operating only as an 
umpire that secures the peaceful coexistence of different cultural 
(religious, or other) groups. The liberal state, in Kukathas’s model, 
holds no right to infringe upon the groups’ internal affairs, but it 
also holds no obligation to cater for the groups’ interests (or 
existence) with any system of minority rights.214 
 
2.2. Freedom of association, exit and autonomy 
Two important clarifications need to be made about Kukathas’s 
account of a free society governed by the principles of freedom of 
association and mutual toleration. Firstly, it should be noted that the 
scope of the principle of mutual toleration is, in Kukathas’s 
framework, restricted by the principle of freedom of association. As 
the individuals of a free society should be free to associate with 
whomever they can associate with in accordance with their 
conscience, in order to guarantee this freedom to all individuals, the 
associations (and members of associations) must refrain from 
interfering with the internal matters of other associations. The 
principle of mutual toleration does not, however, operate as the 
guiding principle between all interactions of all individuals of the 
free society. Rather, mutual toleration can only be seen as holding 
at the level of interactions between associations (and between 
members of different associations). Although an association (say, a 
religious sect) can be tolerant towards the differing views of its own 
members, it is not obliged to be so. It is, however, obliged to 
tolerate the differing views and ways of lives of others (members of 
other associations), and not interfere with them. The freedom of 
                                                 
214 I will discuss Kukathas’s views on the role of the state as well as his 
account of minority rights in the upcoming section 3. 
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association, in Kukathas’s model, is to guarantee that people can 
associate with those they wish associate with in accordance with 
their conscience, and if one cannot associate with those of different 
(perhaps reprehensible) world views, one should not be obliged to 
do so. 215 
Secondly, although the freedom of association, conjoined with 
the requirement of mutual toleration, prevents outsiders (including 
the liberal state) from interfering with the internal affairs of cultural 
(or religious, or other) groups, the freedom of association is also 
intended to give certain (minimal) protection to the individual 
members of such groups. In Kukathas’s model, the groups (and 
their members) are perfectly free not to tolerate internal dissent and 
also to continue to engage in their (sometimes illiberal) practices,216 
but they are not free to force anyone to become, or to remain as, a 
member. The freedom of association, conjoined with the 
requirement of mutual toleration, gives groups substantive authority 
over their members, but this authority does not override any 
individual’s right to associate (or disassociate). On the contrary, this 
individuated freedom of association (and disassociation) entails 
                                                 
215 Kukathas 2003, ch. 3 & 4. It should also be noted that mutual 
toleration, in Kukathas’s view, is a very minimal form of toleration. 
Kukathas 2003, 23-24. Tolerating different values and world views of 
different associations (or members of these associations) does not entail 
any forms of respect (towards the associations or towards the differing 
views), nor does it require that the associations (or their members) would 
need to value the existence of this plurality. The different associations (and 
members of different associations) simply need to tolerate each other in 
the sense of “not objecting to coexist” (ibid., 210), and thus not also 
interfere with the internal matters of other associations. Kukathas 2003, 
esp. ch. 4. For alternative, more substantive accounts on toleration, see e.g. 
Galeotti 2002; see also: articles in Williams and Waldron 2008. 
216 Kukathas does claim that there are some limits to the kinds of illiberal 
practices that should be tolerated (most notably those of “cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment” Kukathas 1992a, 128; see also Kukathas 1997b; 
2001), although it is not entirely clear where and how to draw the line 
between tolerable and intolerable illiberal practices. See also: Mason 2000: 
74-77; Barry 2001, 141-146. 
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that, even if subject to the group’s authority, the individual 
members of groups have one fundamental right against their group 
– that is, the right of exit.217 Individuals should be free to leave their 
associations, and they should also be free to form new associations 
with those who they wish to associate with.  
In broad outline, Kukathas’s model of a free society thus builds 
upon four interlinking elements: that of (1) mutual toleration 
between (but not necessarily within) groups, (2) freedom of 
association (and disassociation) aimed to cater for (3) individual 
freedom of conscience, and (4) the right of exit derived from 
freedom of association (and disassociation) catering for the 
individual freedom of conscience. Given Kukathas’s emphasis on 
freedom of conscience and his rejection of individual autonomy as 
something that the liberal state should attempt to provide conditions 
for, it is worth looking at whether Kukathas’s model in fact 
manages to protect individual freedom of conscience without also 
incorporating some minimal conditions for individual autonomy 
into this model. 
 
Formal right of exit 
I believe that the problems of Kukathas’s model – that tries to 
secure freedom of conscience without also securing individual 
autonomy – lie in the first and fourth of the above mentioned 
elements (those of the requirement of mutual toleration and the 
right of exit) and the rather robust preconditions that these 
requirements provide for all members of the liberal society. To 
recall, in Kukathas’s model the individuated freedom of association 
also entails individuated right of exit – that is, the right of the 
individual to leave her group. According to Kukathas, this right of 
exit is fundamental and one that holds even if the group in question 
does not recognize it as such. The group cannot thus force the 
individual to stay in the group, but she should be free to leave 
should she no longer find the group worthy of her allegiance.218 
                                                 
217 Kukathas 1992a, 116; 2003: 96. 
218 Kukathas 1992a, 116-117; 2003, 96-97. 
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Kukathas’s account of the right of exit is a very formal one. 
According to Kukathas, the existence of the right of exit does not 
depend on one’s capabilities of taking advantage of such right, or 
even on one’s ability to comprehend (or be aware of) this option or 
the alternative courses of life that one could exit to. Rather, the 
right of exit prevails as long as the individual is, at least in 
principle, free to leave her group, should she ever become aware 
this option, or the alternative courses of life that she could lead.219 
For Kukathas, the only substantive requirements for the right of exit 
to be effective are, firstly, that the individual is not forced by others 
to remain in her group (for example, by being locked up or 
enslaved)220 and, secondly, that the wider society is also open for 
those who use this right to leave their communities.221 None of this, 
however, requires that the individual members of groups should 
also be autonomous – that is, capable of assessing (and possibly 
changing) their own conceptions of the good – or that the state (or 
the group itself) should protect or promote the individual members’ 
autonomy. 
Kukathas’s account of a formal right of exit has, of course, 
prompted extensive critique in its own right, especially from those 
who view the right of exit as meaningless if people have no realistic 
opportunities to use it. The critics argue that, in order for the right 
                                                 
219 As an example, Kukathas talks of Fatima, who lives in a small fishing 
village in Malaysia with no desire to live elsewhere or otherwise, and who 
might even be fully ignorant of the possibility of leaving or living 
differently, see Kukathas 2003, 113-114. For Kukathas’s restatement of 
the plain exit –principle, see Kukathas 2012. 
220 Kukathas thus claims that the right of exit must clearly have “some 
substantive bite” (Kukathas 1992a, 128-134.), although it is clear that 
some of the legitimate (in Kukathas’s view) practices of groups that wish 
to prevent their members from leaving (such as the threat of “shunning” or 
“banishing”) may have precisely the same effects as the illegitimate 
practices of for example enslavement. See: Kukathas 1992b, 677. 
221Kukathas 1992a, 133-134. Kukathas conceives this wider society as a 
liberal society, or “much more like a market society” (Kukathas 1992a, 
134), although he does not think this necessarily needs to be so. Kukathas 
1992b, 677. 
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of exit to be meaningful, the preconditions of the lack of physical 
coercion and the existence of a society to be exited to, would need 
to be supplemented by the person’s capacity to make use of exit. At 
the very minimum, this would entail that the group members should 
be aware of alternative ways of life, although many also argue that, 
in order for the right of exit to be realistic, the members should also 
possess certain capabilities of critical reflection, as well as not be 
overwhelmed by the high costs of exit.222 
For Kukathas, none of these conditions (1. knowledge of 
alternative ways of life, 2. capability to reflect upon these ways of 
life, or 3. reasonable costs of exit) should be taken as necessary 
conditions for a person to be free to leave, nor therefore as 
something that the liberal state should attempt to guarantee. For 
Kukathas, a person who is not aware of any alternative courses of 
life, has no capabilities of assessing these (or even her own) courses 
of life, and who may be discouraged (even disabled) by the high 
costs of exit would still be free to leave, as long as she was not 
(physically) forced to stay in her group, and the wider society was 
such that the person could exit to. Further, Kukathas argues that it is 
perfectly possible for this kind of person to live a meaningful life, 
and that the imposition of knowledge about alternative ways of 
living or the teaching of basic skills of critical thinking may even be 
detrimental to her well-being. The person, fully unaware of and 
unable to assess any alternatives, may still be considered as living 
her life in accordance with her conscience – something that she 
should, according to Kukathas, not be prevented from doing. 
Whereas it is, no doubt, debatable whether the 
acknowledgement of the worthiness of an unexamined life and the 
possibility of this kind of life being a life led under the dictates of 
conscience would lead to the view according to which it would 
                                                 
222 I will return to some of the preconditions of exit, and the exit debate in 
more general in Ch. 5. For alternative perspectives on the realistic right of 
exit, see e.g. Shachar 2000; 2001; Spinner-Halev 2000; 2005; Okin, 2002; 
Holtzleithner, 2012; For the costs of exit debate, see: Barry 2001; 
Borchers 2012. 
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never be justifiable to expose these people to some knowledge of 
alternative courses of life, or to teach them some basic skills of 
critical thinking, my interest, for the time being, lies not in this 
worry. Nor does it lie in the well rehearsed debate on whether a 
person can really be conceived as free to leave her community if 
she possesses no capabilities for exercising such freedom. Rather, 
what I attempt to show is that the two elements – the right of exit 
and the (soon to be discussed) requirement of mutual toleration – 
create much stronger requirements for all members of the society to 
fulfill and, by doing so, also undermine Kukathas’s formal account 
of the rights of exit by incorporating certain (minimal) conditions of 
autonomy into his theoretical framework. 
 
Mutual toleration 
In Kukathas’s model, in order to guarantee freedom of association 
(catering for the freedom of conscience) to all individuals, the free 
society would need to operate in accordance with the principle of 
mutual toleration. That is, the different associations would need to 
“not object to coexist”223 with other associations, and they would 
also need to refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of 
other associations. Although Kukathas emphasizes that these 
requirements operate primarily at the level of different associations 
rather than at the level of (all) individuals, it is difficult to see how 
the requirement of mutual toleration would work if it did not also 
operate as a guiding principle for interactions between different 
individuals of different associations. Although the individuals 
within any particular group are not required to tolerate the 
dissenting views of their fellow members (but, depending on their 
position in the group, they can either leave or excommunicate the 
dissenters), they are, nevertheless, required to tolerate and refrain 
from interfering with the affairs of others, who do not belong to the 
same cultural/religious/other group. 
Provided that the individual members of groups (as well as 
groups as collectives) are required not to interfere with the affairs of 
                                                 
223 Kukathas 2003, 210. 
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other groups or members of such groups, the question arises, what 
would be the conditions within which this toleration and non-
inteference would be secured. As Kukathas notes himself, it is very 
unlikely that different groups (or individual members of these 
groups) would, or even could, stay in complete isolation from one 
another224 – and even if they did, certain conditions would need to 
be met, in order to ensure that, should the different groups or their 
members come in contact with one another, the principle of mutual 
toleration and non-interference would be followed.225 
Contrary to Kukathas, who gives no clear answer to how the 
principles of mutual toleration and non-interference would be 
secured, Willian Galston attempts to address this point in his 
discussions on the preconditions that the liberal society, allowing 
for the fullest possible scope for diversity, should fulfill.226 Like 
Kukathas, Galston questions the view according to which the liberal 
state should be in the business of protecting (let alone promoting) 
individual autonomy, and also holds that only a strong system of 
toleration will ensure that different views and ways of life 
(including those ways of life that do not value individual autonomy) 
are able to flourish.227 Contrary to Kukathas, however, Galston 
                                                 
224 Kukathas 2003, 132-133. 
225 This, I believe, is fully consistent with Kukathas’s remarks on the role 
of the state to preserve order in which different people and different 
associations can coexist peacefully (Kukathas 2003, 147; 213). I will come 
back to the role of the liberal state in Kukathas’s account in more detail in 
section 3 (esp 3.3.). 
226 Galston 1995; 2002; 2005. 
227 It should be noted that, for Galston and Kukathas, the primary reasons 
for promoting toleration are somewhat different. Whereas Kukathas sees 
mutual toleration as necessary for the protection of individual freedom of 
conscience, for Galston, toleration is also necessary for the preservation of 
deep diversity . (An aim that Kukathas explicitly rejects, Kukathas 2003, 
29) This difference need not, however, affect the point that I am making 
here. What is important, for my purposes, is that both Galston and 
Kukathas view toleration as one of the guiding principles of a liberal 
society, and that they both also interpret toleration in fairly minimalist 
terms: as refraining from interference and not objecting to coexist 
Autonomy vs. Toleration 
145 
 
worries that toleration, in the sense of non-interference, could not 
be secured without at least minimal awareness of the existence and 
nature of ways of life other than those of one’s family and 
community.228 If individuals of cultural groups are kept in complete 
isolation and ignorance of other ways of life than their own, it may 
well be that, should they ever come across these alternative ways of 
life, their reaction would not be that of toleration, but that of 
hostility and (forceful) intervention. Consequently, Galston argues 
that the liberal state, committed to safeguarding deep diversity, 
should also incorporate a vigorous system of civic education that 
teaches toleration to all, including the teaching of some information 
about the existence and nature of different ways of life.229 
Whereas one does not need to go as far as Galston does in 
arguing for a vigorous system of civic education on behalf of the 
liberal state,230 I do believe that Galston’s concerns about how to 
ensure mutual toleration between different groups and members of 
these groups should be taken seriously. If, as Kukathas seems to 
hold in his discussions on the right of exit, it is perfectly all right for 
the minority groups to keep (some of) their members in complete 
ignorance about other ways of life, then there is nothing that would 
ensure that these members would be tolerant and not try to interfere 
with the affairs of others, should they ever come across these other 
ways of living. It is not, of course, that the civic education such as 
the teaching of toleration, would necessarily need to be provided by 
the state, but it does seem that the minority groups would need to 
comply with certain general guidelines, including the requirement 
that they provide their members some (minimal) knowledge about 
                                                                                                     
(Kukathas), and as refusing to use coercive power to impose one’s views 
on others (Galston, 1995, 528). 
228 Galston 1995, 529; 2002, 127. 
229 Galston 1995, 528-529; for further elaboration on Galston’s views on 
education, see e.g. Galston 2002, ch. 8. 
230 That is, one does not need to agree with Galston on the exact contents 
of such education (Galston’s views on civic education do, in fact, 
incorporate much more than the teaching of toleration), nor on the 
provider (liberal state) of such education. 
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different ways of life, as well as teach them to tolerate and not 
interfere with these ways of living. 
As Galston maintains, none of this needs to entail that the 
minority members should also be taught to question and to be 
critical about their own ways of living.231All that is required is that 
the minority members are given some knowledge about alternative 
ways of life and that they are also taught to respond to these 
alternatives appropriately.232 But, if this is the case, then it would 
seem that the principle of mutual toleration, and especially the 
ensuring of this toleration, would require that at least some (albeit 
very minimal) conditions for individual autonomy should also be 
protected. Firstly, it must be ensured that the minority members 
have some knowledge about alternative ways of living and, 
secondly, it must also be ensured that these alternatives are 
portrayed, not as something to be gotten rid of, but as viable 
options, at least for some (other) people. The minority members do 
not need to be taught to be critical of their own ways of living, but 
they do need to be shown that the other ways of living may also be 
worthwhile, thus also providing some tools for the minority 
members to mirror their own ways of life to the alternatives 
presented.233 
                                                 
231 Galston 1995, 529. 
232 That is, by refraining from forcefully interfering with these ways of 
life. 
233 It could be argued (as Galston does) that these conditions (the 
requirement of the minority members to have at least some (minimal) 
knowledge of alternative ways of life as well as the portraying of these 
ways of life as worthwhile for at least some (other) people) do not, as yet, 
constitute conditions for the protection, let alone promotion, of individual 
autonomy. The minority groups are still perfectly free to deny their 
members certain ways of life, and they can even prevent their members 
from acquiring information about alternative ways of life (Recall that, for 
securing mutual toleration, only some minimal information about 
alternative ways of life are needed, and the groups are perfectly free to 
block any further information from their members.) Nevertheless, these 
conditions are, as will be argued in more detail with respect to the 
conditions relating to the right of exit, far more substantive than, for 
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Taking Galston’s insight about the necessity of certain minimal 
information about alternative ways of life for the securing of mutual 
toleration on board, it would seem that Kukathas’s own framework 
– especially his commitment to the fundamental right of exit – 
provides even stronger requirements for the illiberal groups to 
comply with. That is, contrary to what Kukathas says, his 
commitment to the fundamental right of exit would, in fact, seem to 
require that the minority members must also be aware of the 
possibility of exit.234 This, however, needs to have nothing to do 
with the question of whether an individual is free to leave her 
community should she not even be aware of such possibility, but 
rather with the requirements that the right of exit, and the ensuring 
of the right of exit, creates for others. As Kukathas maintains that 
the individual members of groups should have one fundamental 
right – that of the right of exit – and that this right requires the 
group (as well as its individual members) not to force anyone to 
remain or to become a member, in order to ensure that the members 
do not attempt to forcefully prevent others from leaving, they 
should also have knowledge of the possibility of exit, and the 
appropriate response to it (non-intervention). Surely, this need not 
entail that the minority members should be given knowledge of the 
possibility of exit in the sense in which it was portrayed as a viable 
option for them, but they nevertheless need to be aware that, at 
times, their own group members may decide to leave their 
community and that, should this happen, they should not try to 
forcefully prevent them from doing so. 
Whereas it is clear that these requirements (of being aware of 
alternative ways of living and the possibility of exit, and of viewing 
these options as something one should not interfere with) are still 
                                                                                                     
example Kukathas, would be willing to acknowledge, thus also providing 
some (albeit not necessarily sufficient) preconditions for individual 
autonomy. For discussion on whether Galston’s liberal pluralist model as a 
whole  manages to steer away from autonomy-liberalism, see Crowder 
2007; 2009; Thunder 2009. 
234 In his discussions on Fatima, Kukathas explicitly denies this. Kukathas 
2003, 113-114. 
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far from the requirements given by the autonomy liberals, that the 
minority members should also be taught the basic skills of critical 
reflection, they are, nevertheless, substantially stronger than the 
conditions given by Kukathas in his discussions on the formal right 
of exit. Whereas it may well be that the formal right of exit itself 
does not require even these minimal conditions to be protected, it 
would seem that, in order to ensure peaceful coexistence of 
different groups and the non-violation of the right of exit, certain 
(albeit very minimal) conditions for individual autonomy must be 
secured. Kukathas’s attack on individual autonomy as one of the 
guiding principles of liberalism, and his insistence on the protection 
of freedom of conscience rather than autonomy, would thus seem to 
go only half way. Whereas Kukathas can still maintain that it is not 
the business of the state to try to protect (let alone promote) 
individual autonomy, it would seem that in order to ensure that 
people can live in accordance with their conscience (entailing the 
conditions within which the principle of mutual toleration and the 
right of exit prevail), will nevertheless require certain (minimal) 
conditions of autonomy to be protected. These are the awareness of 
alternative ways of life and the possibility of exit, and the viewing 
of these options as viable options at least for some (other) people. 
 
3. Minority rights, diversity and the state 
In the light of the original critique that Kymlicka’s autonomy 
liberalism creates too stringent requirements for those minority 
groups that the liberal state can justifiably accommodate, the 
toleration-based approach of Kukathas would seem superior – at 
least in the sense of it being able to incorporate a far wider variety 
of different ways of life legitimate within the liberal framework. 
Whereas I have shown that Kukathas’s own model may incorporate 
far stronger conditions for the minority groups to comply with than 
he would himself be willing to accept, these conditions are 
substantially weaker than those given by Kymlicka. In order for the 
minority groups to be allowed to manage their internal affairs 
without the interference of the liberal state, I have argued, they need 
to comply with the requirement of equipping their members with 
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knowledge of alternative ways of life, the possibility of exit, as well 
as the acceptability of these options (alternative ways of life and 
exit) at least for some (other) people. The groups do not, however, 
need to teach their members to question or to assess their own ways 
of living or view these alternatives as viable options for themselves. 
Nor do they – contrary to Kymlicka – need to provide their 
members with a sufficiently complex set of options that the 
minority members can choose to take advantage of. Rather, the 
groups can continue to live in accordance with their (sometimes) 
very restrictive rules, impose standards incompatible with the basic 
liberal values of individual freedom and equality, and expect their 
members to comply with the norms and values of the community. 
All this, as long as the basic requirements of equipping the 
members knowledge of alternative ways of life and exit, and of 
portraying these options as viable options, are fulfilled. 
Whereas the problems of Kymlicka’s account are manifested, 
most prominently, in the failure of his theoretical framework to 
support the vast variety of minority rights he comes to advocate, the 
toleration-based approach of Kukathas would not, at least at first 
sight, seem to encounter this problem. Rather, the minimal 
requirements of the diversity liberals could, in fact, give support to 
a far wider variety of minority rights, including the self-government 
rights of those groups who do not themselves subscribe to the 
liberal values of individual autonomy, freedom and equality. 
Interestingly, despite this prospect, Kukathas comes to advocate a 
very different approach to minority rights – that of their rejection – 
although, as I argue, the reasons for doing so are more practical 
than incorporated in the theoretical framework itself. 
As Kukathas’s arguments against minority rights take several 
different forms, it is worth outlining the main arguments that 
Kukathas uses, and the ways in which these arguments operate with 
respect to different kinds of minority rights. In this section, I will 
thus give a brief overview of the three main bundles of arguments 
given by Kukathas (the critique of groups, the critique of equality, 
and the role of the liberal state), and assess these arguments with 
respect to different types of minority rights. My purpose is to show 
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that, far from providing a conclusive case for rejecting the kinds of 
minority rights promoted by Kymlicka, Kukathas’s theoretical 
framework also leaves substantive scope for the liberal state to 
adopt such rights, depending on the actual circumstances and 
contexts within which these rights are debated. 
 
3.1. Critique of groups 
In his correspondence with Kymlicka,235, Kukathas questions the 
approach, adopted both by Kymlicka and Vernon van Dyke,236 that 
the liberal state should accommodate cultural minorities by giving 
them special cultural rights. By cultural rights, Kukathas refers 
primarily to those rights and forms of assistance that are accorded 
to cultural groups as collectives, such as the rights of self-
government and linguistic rights.237 Provided that Kukathas’s focus 
is primarily on the group rights proper (rather than on the rights of 
individual members of cultural groups),238 it is not surprising that 
one of the main critiques posed by Kukathas comes in the form of 
questioning the status of cultural groups as proper claimants of 
rights. 
According to Kukathas, the idea of cultural (or other) groups as 
proper claimants of rights fails to take sufficiently into account the 
fluidity, malleability and internal diversity of such groups. Rather 
than being fixed and unchanging entities, groups are fluid and 
changeable, not least in response to the institutional frameworks 
and public policies that are in place. Being historical and political 
formations (and continuing to be such), it makes no sense to argue 
for specific cultural rights of cultural groups, as it is precisely 
through these rights (and other institutional measures) in response 
                                                 
235 Kymlicka 1989; Kukathas 1992a; Kymlicka 1992; Kukathas 1992b 
236 Esp. Van Dyke 1977. 
237 For example, in terms of special support for minority language 
schooling. 
238 Kukathas does mention, in passing, affirmative action/preferential 
treatment policies (Kukathas 1992a, 114) although, as his focus is clearly 
on the cultural rights of cultural groups, I will, for the time being, 
concentrate on these. 
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to which the groups are shaped and formed.239 Further, although 
Kukathas does not deny that groups could have interests that are not 
reducible to the interests of individuals, he does not think it 
appropriate to justify group rights on the basis of group interests. 
The group interests, like the composition of the group, also change 
in response to historical, economic and political circumstances, and 
the granting of group rights would, in itself, have an effect on those 
interests that a group comes to have.240 Not only does the idea of 
group rights fail to acknowledge the instability of groups (both in 
their composition as well as their contents), but, Kukathas worries, 
these rights would have an illegitimate impact on the kinds of 
groups that are allowed to be formed or continue to exists, as well 
as on the kinds of interests, values and ways of life that are given 
scope to flourish. 
Whereas I fully agree with Kukathas that cultural groups (both 
their composition as well as their contents) are, to a large extent, 
formed by the historical, economic and political circumstances, and 
that the non-fixedness, malleability and internal diversity of groups 
should raise some concerns about group rights proper, I do not 
think that Kukathas’s account of groups is, on its own, enough to 
reject the kinds of cultural group rights that Kukathas attempts to 
reject. Firstly, there is no reason to think that the way in which 
groups have come into existence – whether by being part of some 
natural order or by being responses to the historical or political 
circumstances – should have an effect on how we think of groups 
and their status as rights-bearers. The fact that the existence of 
cultural groups is not independent of the surrounding circumstances 
should not, on its own, make us think that groups cannot have rights 
(just like the social embeddedness of individuals should not lead us 
to think that individuals cannot have rights). Secondly, the cultural 
rights, such as the rights of self-determination or language rights, 
                                                 
239 Kukathas 1992a, 110-113; see also Kukathas 1998, 692-693; 2003, 78-
80; 197-200. 
240 I will return to the question of the contestability of group interests in 
more detail in the upcoming section 3.2. 
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are not necessarily as insensitive to the indeterminacy and 
malleability of groups as Kukathas would seem to think. Whereas it 
is the case, as I will argue in more detail in Part II, that the 
proponents of minority rights have often ignored the problems of 
the indeterminacy of group composition (group membership), the 
cultural rights do not necessarily need to be insensitive of this fact. 
Thirdly, the acceptance of group rights, such as rights of self-
determination or language rights, does not necessarily need to entail 
a view of the group as a right bearing entity, but could be 
understood as being derivative of individual rights, without the 
need to grant any independent moral status to the group itself.241  
Whereas Kukathas’s view of cultural groups as historically, 
economically and politically formed entities is, no doubt, 
warranted, it does not, on its own, suffice to reject the kinds of 
cultural rights that Kukathas attempts to reject. At most, Kukathas’s 
analysis of groups and their interests points out to some of the 
difficulties that the proponents of group rights must address, 
although it does not, on its own, suffice to reject such rights. 
 
3.2. Critique of equality 
Provided that the fluidity and malleability of cultural groups (both 
their composition and their content) is not enough to warrant 
outright rejection of cultural group rights, some other support must 
be given. The main bundle of arguments, given by Kukathas, relates 
to the rationale that the supporters of minority rights (such as 
Kymlicka) have given for minority rights. To recall, Kymlicka 
argues that minority rights, such as rights of self-determination, 
language rights or land claims, are required, in order for the 
members of cultural minorities to be able to start from the same line 
with the members of the majority. That is, the minority rights (most 
prominently, the rights of national minorities) are argued for on 
egalitarian grounds, as attempts to rectify the unequal 
circumstances that the minority members face. 
                                                 
241 See also: Gould 2001, 46-50.  
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It should be noted, right from the outset, that Kukathas’s critique 
of the egalitarian rationale behind minority rights is not only a 
critique of these rights failing to rectify the kinds of inequalities 
they are set to rectify, but a more general critique against the search 
for equality in circumstances of cultural diversity. According to 
Kukathas,  
 
[d]iversity and equality are incompatible; and attempts to promote one 
can only be made at the expense of other. In these circumstances, we 
should abandon the ideal of equality as incapable of offering us an 
adequate understanding of the nature of the good society.242 
 
Whereas there is, no doubt, more to Kukathas’s arguments against 
the egalitarian rationale behind cultural accommodation (some of 
which I will return to in section 3.3.), what is important, for the 
time being, are the ways in which Kukathas attempts to reject 
minority rights based on the failure of these rights to deliver 
equality, or to do so without substantive and (in Kukathas’s view) 
unacceptable side costs. 
Kukathas’s critique of minority rights as failing to rectify the 
kinds of inequalities they are set to rectify relates, in part, to his 
analysis of cultural groups. The cultural groups, within liberal 
societies, are not only fluid and changeable, but they are also 
heterogeneous, both between (e.g. small/large, dominant/non-
dominant groups) as well as within (elites/masses, 
majorities/minorities, dominant groups/subgroups). The problems 
this creates for the egalitarian proponents of minority rights are at 
least threefold. Firstly, the minority rights, such as rights of self-
government or language rights, can only feasibly be given to a 
certain number of groups and, as Kukathas rightly points out, these 
rights are normally given to those groups that are sufficiently large 
and exert certain amount of political power within the liberal 
society. This, however, creates or (in most cases) reinforces the 
inequality between minority groups by enhancing the situation of 
                                                 
242 Kukathas 2003, 214-215. 
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those who are, already, sufficiently large and powerful at the 
expense of small and politically weak groups.243 Secondly, 
Kukathas argues that minority rights do not only enforce the 
inequality between groups, but are also likely to create inequalities 
within groups. Often, the minority rights are claimed and most 
extensively argued for by a small number of minority members 
(normally, the leaders or the elites), whose views about the 
interests, values or ways of life of the group do not necessarily 
coincide with the views of the other group members. The 
minorities, or the sub-groups within minority groups, do not all 
agree on which direction the group should be led, and the granting 
of minority rights, Kukathas claims, would unduly prioritise the 
views of the group leaders at the expense of the group’s sub-
groups.244 Thirdly, Kukathas argues that not all minorities, or their 
members, face the same kinds of inequalities with respect to the 
majority, and to try to rectify these inequalities by minority rights 
fails to recognize that, not only different groups, but also members 
within these groups, are differently disadvantaged.245 
To take these three arguments in turn, it becomes clear that 
Kukathas’s critique of minority rights on egalitarian grounds does 
not build a conclusive case against cultural rights, although it does, 
no doubt, point towards some important considerations that the 
egalitarian proponents of minority rights, and the liberal state in 
charge of distributing such rights, should take into account.  
                                                 
243 Kukathas 2003, 229-234. 
244 Kukathas 1992a, 113-114; 130-132; 2003, 87-89; 156-158. Kukathas 
goes as far as to claim that the granting of minority rights could create 
substantive inequalities and conflicts between subgroups, when the 
benefits of these rights (for example, the distribution of land or 
fishing/hunting rights) are unequally distributed between the subgroups of 
the community. Kukathas 2003, 234. These inequalities, it should be 
noted, can also be manifested at the level of decision making processes, 
when different people or sub-groups have different amounts of say on 
deciding how to organise the internal affairs of the group. 
245 Kukathas 1992a, 123. 
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Firstly, with respect to the claim that minority rights enforce 
inequality between different groups and, as Kukathas is also keen to 
point out, may also create conflict and resentment between 
groups,246 Kukathas seems to be in the right track. That is, he is in 
the right track in pointing out to some of the practical difficulties in 
applying minority rights in the concrete political arena. For 
example, it may not be possible (due to limited financial or other 
resources) for the state to grant support to all linguistic minorities 
for minority language schooling or for access to public services in 
their own language, but only to some – normally, those linguistic 
groups that are relatively large and/or exert certain amount of 
political power within the liberal society.247 But the fact that 
concrete political practices tend to favour those groups that are 
already large and politically powerful should not affect the rationale 
behind minority (linguistic) rights to start with.248 As is well known, 
Kukathas attempts to reject such rationale (to which I will come 
back to in the next subsection), but this rejection should have 
nothing to do with the tendency of the actual policies to favour 
some groups and not others. Provided, for the sake of an argument, 
that there was a case for granting minority linguistic rights to all 
linguistic groups (regardless of their size or political power), the 
granting of these rights to some and not others would surely create 
an embarrassment to the policies in question, but it would not take 
away the rationale behind the need for such policies in the first 
place. Whereas Kukathas worries that the unequal allocation of 
minority rights will only fortify inter-group inequality and cause 
resentment between different minorities, this worry, it would seem, 
                                                 
246 Kukathas 1997a, 148. 
247 Kukathas 2003, 239-240. 
248 See also Carens 1997 for a similar critique of Kymlicka’s position on 
the granting of the rights of self-determination only to those groups that 
are, already, sufficiently large and powerful to maintain their own societal 
culture. 
Part I Justifying Minority Rights 
156 
 
relates primarily to the application of minority rights in practice, not 
to their principled justification.249 
Secondly, whereas Kukathas is right to point out that not all 
minority members, or minority sub-groups, have the same views on 
the interests, values or ways of life of their group, it is somewhat 
unclear whether Kukathas is able to use this observation as 
extensively as he would like to. The primary worry, with respect to 
intra-group inequality, is that those minority members who argue 
most extensively for differentiated treatment or minority (group) 
rights are only a certain fraction of the group – the group leaders or 
the elite – whose visions of the group’s internal affairs may be very 
different from the views of the other group members or sub-groups. 
By granting minority rights to cultural groups, the state, in effect, 
gives priority to the views of those most dominate within the group, 
thus privileging the status quo and the (inevitable) inequalities 
within the group.250 
It should, at this stage, be recalled that earlier (Ch. 1, esp. 2.2.), I 
expressed some concerns about minority rights as advancing (either 
directly or indirectly) certain conceptions as well as contents of 
culture by giving formal recognition to certain group customs or 
practices as proper elements of that culture. Minority rights, it was 
argued, were never rights purely in the abstract, but always 
incorporated certain views about the nature as well as the contents 
of the culture in question. In the light of these discussions, 
Kukathas’s worries about minority rights as prioritizing the views 
of the elite / leaders of the group do not seem far fetched. Provided 
that it is often the leaders or the elites of the group who articulate 
their claims in the public arena, it is not surprising that minority 
rights, granted by the liberal state, often reflect the views of the 
group leaders. It is, however, debatable, whether Kukathas manages 
to use this point to the extent that he does, aiming to reject a vast 
                                                 
249 I will come back to the question of how not granting certain kinds of 
minority rights may also create inequality and resentment in section 3.3. 
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variety of minority rights – including the rights of self-
determination.251 
Recall that, for Kukathas, people should be free to associate with 
whomever they wish to associate with in accordance with their 
conscience. Consequently, Kukathas argues that people should also 
be free to repudiate authority and to leave, alone or together with 
others, to form new communities in which they can live as their 
conscience dictates. For Kukathas, it is essential that “each 
community enjoy certain amount of independence and integrity”252 
and that (should they so wish) they should also be left alone to live 
as they please.253 Despite these commitments (to individual freedom 
of conscience and group independence), Kukathas is sceptical, to 
say the least, of granting cultural groups rights of self-
determination. The reasons for this scepticism, however, stem from 
a misunderstanding of what the right of self-determination amounts 
to and the conflation of the right of self-determination with the 
group’s preserving its particular ways of living. As Kukathas points 
out, “it has to be recognized that there are considerable limits to the 
extent to which collective self-determination is possible. Once 
cultures come into contact with others and trade and other forms of 
social intercourse develop, it is very difficult for the community to 
preserve its ways.”254 The right of self-determination, however, 
equates not with the community preserving its own ways, but 
simply with the right of the community to decide, for itself, what 
these ways may be. As Kymlicka has forcefully argued (and I have 
to agree with Kymlicka here), the right of self-determination does 
not necessarily entail that the group would stay immune to the 
                                                 
251 Much of what is said here is based on Kukathas’s initial position, as 
outlined in Kukathas 1992a, and repeated (with minor modifications) in 
Kukathas 2003, esp. 103-106. Later, Kukathas somewhat weakens his 
position by accepting that there may be some cases in which legitimate 
claims for self-determination can be made (Kukathas 2003, 196-205), 
although the general scepticism remains intact. 
252 Kukathas 1992a, 127. 
253 Kukathas 1992a, 116. 
254 Kukathas 1992a, 130. 
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external influences (although it may, for sure, attempt to do so), but 
simply that the group is given a right to decide for itself which 
external influences it wishes to welcome and which not.255 Whereas 
there may be limits to the extent to which collective self-
determination is possible (that is, even with the right of self-
determination, the group may not be fully in control of its own 
affairs), there is no reason to equate the right of self-determination 
with the preservation of a particular way of life, or the group’s 
isolation from the rest of society. 
This conflation of the right of self-determination with the 
group’s preserving a particular way of living is reflected in 
Kukathas’s concerns about the minority rights (including the rights 
of self-determination) as prioritizing the views of the group leaders 
or group elites. According to Kukathas, “self-determination is 
problematic because there is considerable internal disagreement 
about the direction it should take”.256 But the question about the 
direction of self-determination – that is, about the contents of the 
decisions made – is, to an extent, independent of the question about 
who should make these decisions in the first place. If Kukathas 
wants to maintain that people should be free to associate with 
whomever they wish to associate with and that, consequently, these 
associations should enjoy certain measure of independence (to the 
extent of being left alone to live as they please), Kukathas’s 
position would, in fact, seem to require that the liberal state grant 
rights of self-determination to the groups in question. Even if the 
views of the members, with respect to the contents of the decisions 
made, would differ, the freedom of association would require that 
these decisions can, indeed, be made by those willing to associate 
with one another, rather than by the larger liberal society or by 
those not recognizing the terms of association. Kukathas’s whole 
framework – including freedom of association and group 
independence – would thus be a framework precisely for the rights 
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of self-determination, understood as the right of the group to decide 
about its own affairs. 
A more promising avenue (that, to be fair, Kukathas also 
recognizes) would be to question whether the views of the group 
leaders or the elite about the need for self-determination itself 
would coincide with the views of the other group members.257 That 
is, whether all members of the group do, in fact, wish to associate in 
terms of a self-governing community or, to put it in other words, 
whether all those coming under the rule of the self-determining 
community are willing to accept the authority of this community.258 
The underlying worry, it seems, would be that by giving a group 
rights of self-determination, some members would be subject to the 
rule they do not wish to be subject to, simply by virtue of being 
members of the group to which the right of self-determination has 
been granted. 
However, whereas I believe that this worry (about some people 
being subject to the rule they do not consent to) is a genuine one, I 
fail to see how it would be any more pressing in relation to groups 
that enjoy rights of self-determination than in relation to Kukathas’s 
own model that gives groups relative independence derived from 
the individuated freedom of association. In order to distinguish the 
two cases, Kukathas needs to subscribe to yet another 
misconception about the right of self-determination – that is, to the 
view that this right would be insensitive, not only to the 
heterogeneity of different views about the cultural contents of the 
group (which it certainly need not be), but also to the non-fixity and 
malleability of group boundaries in terms of group membership. As 
Part II of this book is dedicated, in large part, to analysing the 
problems of group membership, and the defining of politically 
relevant group membership, for the time being, I will leave aside 
these problems and simply note the misconception of viewing the 
right of self-determination as necessarily insensitive to the fluidity 
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of such membership. As many group theorists have argued, the 
existence of a group does not need to entail fixity in its constituent 
parts, but the group may continue to exist even when all of its 
members have changed.259 Consequently, even if a group as a 
collective is given a right to decide about its own affairs (that is, 
given a right to self-determination), this does not need to entail that 
those people, coming under the authority of the self-determining 
community, would need to remain the same, but the group’s 
membership can undergo even drastic changes. This, I believe, 
should have been noted by Kukathas himself, who spends a 
substantial amount of time emphasizing the fact that the 
composition of a group can, and does, change in response to the 
economic and political circumstances – including the circumstances 
of granting the group rights of self-determination. Whereas I will 
come back to giving a more thorough analysis of Kukathas’s 
rejection of the rights of self-determination (and a number of other 
group differentiated rights) in the next sub-section (3.3.), what I 
wish to have shown by now, is that the worries about this right as 
prioritizing the views of the group leaders or elite, or of unduly 
fixing the group boundaries are not sufficient for an outright 
rejection of such rights, as the rights of self-determination need not 
be insensitive to the differing views within the group, nor to the 
malleability of group membership.   
Finally, Kukathas argues that the egalitarian rationale behind 
minority rights is unfounded, as not all groups nor all of their 
members face the same inequalities, and that the cultural (group) 
rights fail to acknowledge this fact. Again, I agree with Kukathas in 
his analysis – not all cultural groups are the same, nor do all 
members of a particular cultural group face precisely the same 
disadvantages as others – but fail to see how this analysis could 
                                                 
259 Examples of such groups entail practically all nation states that have 
foregone such change in their membership simply by virtue of old 
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lead to an outright rejection of minority rights. With respect to the 
differences between minority groups, Kukathas worries that the 
granting of cultural (group) rights bundles cultural groups into the 
same mould, and fails to acknowledge that groups differ in both 
size as well as power, and that the state responses should be able to 
take these differences into account.260 This worry seems somewhat 
absurd, especially in the light of Kukathas’s earlier remarks about 
minority rights being (feasibly) granted only to those groups that 
are already considerably large and exercise sufficient political 
power, but it is also a worry that is clearly based on a far too 
simplistic view of cultural rights. Whereas the linguistic rights 
(linguistic assistance, linguistic self-determination etc.) attempt to 
rectify the inequalities faced by linguistic minorities, exemptions on 
religious grounds, for example, are a very different matter, aiming 
to alleviate those disadvantages that stem from the conflict between 
one’s religious norms and practices, and the (cultural) norms and 
practices of the wider society. Further, there is no reason why both 
linguistic as well as religious rights could not be formulated to be 
sensitive to the particular needs as well as the size of the groups in 
question: it would be absurd to grant a minute linguistic minority 
superfluous assistance to run their own educational institutions or to 
guarantee that all governmental offices provided service also in the 
minority language, whereas it may not be absurd to grant them 
support for some minority language tuition within the larger 
education system, or for interpretation services in governmental 
offices. Nor is there any principled reason to think that the minority 
rights, once being granted, should stay intact, not taking into 
account the changing needs or the changed composition or size of 
the minority group in question. As Kukathas notes with respect to 
the larger liberal society, there must be scope for redesigning the 
structure of the society in order to take into account the differences 
as well as the changing composition of this society,261 and I see no 
reason to think why minority rights (such as linguistic assistance or 
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religious exemptions) could not also change, along with the 
changing needs as well as the composition of the minority groups in 
question.262 
With respect to the inequalities faced by different members of 
cultural groups, Kukathas worries that the cultural (group) rights 
fail to acknowledge the internal heterogeneity within groups. 
According to Kukathas, not all members of a particular cultural 
group are similarly disadvantaged with respect to the members of 
majority, and some members of a minority may, in fact, be much 
better off than some members of the majority.263 Whereas this may 
be true – some members of minority cultures may be better off than 
some members of the majority, for example in financial terms, in 
terms of formal education or in terms of social competency – it is 
equally true that all members of a minority are in an unequal 
position to the members of majority in certain cultural terms – that 
is, in terms of not being able to live their lives and pursue their 
chosen conceptions of the good in a society that would be organized 
in accordance with the norms and practices of their own cultural 
community.264 Whereas this is not to say that all members of a 
                                                 
262 In the previous chapter (Ch. 1, esp. 2.2.), I did express some worries 
with respect to certain types of minority rights prioritizing certain cultural 
norms and practices, even to an extent of upholding the status quo and 
making it much more difficult for those, disagreeing with these norms and 
practices, to change them. Whereas this is a genuine worry, and one that 
should be taken into account in actual political decision making, I do not 
believe it to be a worry that could be used for an outright rejection of such 
rights. 
263 Kukathas 1992a, 123. In the same context, Kukathas attempts to give 
another argument against minority rights, claiming that it is not only 
cultural minorities that face disadvantages that are due to their non-chosen 
circumstances rather than their choices, but also the disabled, people from 
poor economic backgrounds etc. (ibid.) The acknowledgement that some 
other groups of people are also disadvantaged by their non-chosen 
circumstances, however, is hardly sufficient to reject the claims of cultural 
groups, but can equally well be interpreted as support for differentiated 
rights and assistance to them all. 
264 See also Kymlicka’s response to Kukathas in Kymlicka 1992. 
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minority would be equally disadvantaged by not being able to lead 
their lives in their own cultural contexts (some may, in fact, be very 
well accustomed to-, and even prefer to live in the so-called alien 
cultural context), they can, nevertheless, all be considered as being 
in an unequal position to that of the members of the majority, in 
terms of not being able to live in a society organized in accordance 
with the norms and practices of their own cultural community. 
Provided that minority rights (such as the rights of self-government, 
linguistic rights or religious exemptions) attempt to rectify this 
inequality (rather than the financial, educational, or other social 
inequalities), it would not seem to matter that, in these other 
respects, some minority members may well be better off than some 
members of the majority as it is not these inequalities that minority 
rights are set to rectify. 
 
3.3. Role of the state 
Whereas the concerns about different kinds of groups and group 
members, as well as the forms of inequality both between as well as 
within groups are – and should be – very much concerns for the 
proponents of minority rights, they are not, on their own, enough to 
build a convincing case for an outright rejection of such rights. 
Firstly, it is not an inherent feature of minority rights (whether 
cultural (group) rights or individually exercised differentiated 
rights) that they be insensitive to the heterogeneities within group, 
or to the fluidity of group composition.265 Although concrete 
political practices may, as currently practiced, treat groups as if 
they were fixed and unchanging entities (both in their boundaries as 
well as in their contents), it is not necessary that minority rights 
remain fixed to a particular group of people, or that they could not 
change along with the changes in group composition and content. 
Secondly, whereas minority rights do, as argued in Ch. 1, always 
advance (either directly or indirectly) certain conceptions as well as 
contents of culture, there is a difference in the extent to which 
different types of minority rights do so. Further, the mere 
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observation of the fact that minority rights may benefit some people 
more than others is far from sufficient grounds for rejecting such 
rights. As Kukathas notes himself, any state policies will have 
consequences – including the granting or denial of minority rights – 
and the fundamental question is whether (and on what grounds) to 
accept these consequences.266 
Rather than from his critique of groups or his critique of 
equality, the main basis for rejecting minority rights, in Kukathas’s 
account, would seem to come from his view of the state, and the 
role of the state in a liberal, free society. Most prominently, 
Kukathas argues that the liberal state should not be interested in 
anything except securing peace and order among different people 
and different groups within society. The liberal state should not be 
interested, nor should it base its policies on, people’s interests or 
attachments; it should express no group preferences; nor should it 
promote any particular individuals or individual interests. In the 
end, the liberal state should not even be interested, or base its 
policies on, how people’s lives go, as it occupies no independent 
standpoint from which this could be assessed.267 For Kukathas, the 
only concern of the liberal state should be “with upholding the 
framework of law within which individuals and groups can function 
peacefully.”268 Consequently, Kukathas argues that it is no business 
of the state to take a stand on how the society or different groups in 
society should be organized, but the state should restrict its 
operations to the minimum, operating only as an umpire, ensuring 
the peaceful coexistence of different groups within society.269 The 
liberal state, in Kukathas’s model, will not deny people the freedom 
to organise their affairs in whichever way they wish (provided they 
do not violate the requirements of mutual toleration and non-
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interference), but it also gives no support to any individuals or 
groups to pursue their ways of living. In the face of cultural 
diversity, Kukathas argues, the liberal state should do nothing – 
apart from securing the peace among different groups and 
individuals.270 
It is relatively easy to see how Kukathas constructs his argument 
for rejecting minority rights from his views on the interests of the 
state and the role of the state in a liberal society. As minority rights 
always advance (either directly or indirectly) certain conceptions as 
well as contents of culture, the granting of minority rights would 
mean that the liberal state was taking a stand on which cultural 
groups and which conceptions of their culture were to survive, 
flourish, or simply die out. This, however, would be unacceptable: 
“the state should not be in the business of trying to determine which 
cultures will prevail, which will die, and which will be 
transformed.”271 As a solution, Kukathas suggests, the liberal state 
should stay clear of the cultural market place, and let the market 
place decide which cultural groups, and which conceptions of their 
culture, are to prevail. 
The obvious problem with Kukathas’s solution is that the liberal 
state cannot stay clear of the cultural market place and avoid taking 
a stand on which cultural groups or which conceptions of culture 
are to prevail. Even in a minimalist state advocated by Kukathas272 
there will be common institutions (such as the court system dealing 
with the conflicts between different groups),273 and most 
contemporary liberal democracies (to which Kukathas clearly 
wishes his model to be applied) also incorporate public systems of 
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271 Kukathas 2003, 252 
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conception of the liberal state would include, although it is clear that any 
state, however limited or minimal, must include some institutions 
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education and various other state institutions that cannot operate 
without affirming some cultural contents and thus prioritizing some 
cultural group(s) instead of others. By doing nothing, the liberal 
state, in effect, supports those groups and those conceptions of 
culture that are incorporated in the state institutions and, by way of 
doing so, also takes a stand on which cultures and conceptions of 
culture are most likely to prevail. 
The response, given by Kukathas, is based on his view of state 
neutrality, and the bracketing of cultural claims from the sphere of 
public policies. According to Kukathas, by upholding institutions 
organized in accordance with the rules and norms of the majority, 
the state makes no deliberate decision to support one culture over 
other, whereas by granting minority rights the state would be 
making such a decision.274 The prevailing state institutions, the 
rules and norms of the society, are, in Kukathas’s view, justified 
because their rationale makes no reference to culture. On the other 
hand, the granting of minority rights is not, as the rationale for these 
rights would necessarily incorporate claims of culture and more 
specifically claims for cultural equality. However, provided that the 
state institutions and the rules and norms of society have some 
historical grounding – they have been adopted precisely because 
they fit the beliefs and ways of life of a particular cultural group – 
Kukathas’s claim that the state would not be making a deliberate 
decision to support one culture over others is cast in doubt. 
Provided that the current set of institutions, the rules and norms of 
the society, have been adopted precisely on cultural grounds and 
that, staying intact, they are systematically disadvantaging members 
of minority cultural groups, it becomes difficult to maintain that, by 
doing nothing, the liberal state would not also be making a 
deliberate decision to support one culture over others. Although 
Kukathas aims to bracket cultural claims from the sphere of public 
policies, the cultural embeddedness of state institutions and the 
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disadvantages that these institutions create for members of (other) 
cultural groups, make his claims rather dubious.275 
Moreover, even if Kukathas was able to argue that the upholding 
of current institutions, rules and norms of society, involved no 
deliberate decision on behalf of the liberal state to support one 
cultural group over others, and that the cultural claims could be 
bracketed from the sphere of public policies, this would not, in 
itself, be sufficient for an outright rejection of minority rights. The 
bracketing of cultural claims from the sphere of public policies 
would only deny the using of culture or cultural identity as rationale 
for such rights, although it would not take away the possibility of 
justifying such rights, and applying such rights in practice, as long 
as they were argued for in terms other than culture. It would not, in 
Kukathas’s framework, be justifiable to argue for, say, linguistic 
assistance on the grounds that the official language(s) of public 
institutions were systematically disadvantaging certain linguistic 
minority; it could, however, be justifiable to argue for such 
assistance on the grounds that the systematic disadvantaging of the 
minority could lead to serious social disruption and unbalance the 
peace and order of society. Kukathas is eager to emphasize the 
extents to which the granting of minority rights could cause 
resentment, even violence, between as well as within cultural 
groups, but he seems to ignore the potential upshots of upholding 
the status quo should this status quo systematically benefit the 
dominant group in society, and disadvantage others. 
The question of whether cultural claims can be bracketed from 
the sphere of public policies, and whether the denial of such claims 
also leads to an outright rejection of minority rights, however, 
seems to leave the main issue of whether cultural claims should be 
allowed in the sphere of public policies intact. As Kukathas argues 
that there should be room to modify the common organisation of 
the society (the state institutions, public holidays, working week 
etc.) should the composition of the society change and the majority 
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of the, say, previously dominantly Christian population become, for 
example, Muslim,276 it becomes difficult to see how Kukathas could 
sustain his claim that the rationale of state policies should not 
involve claims of culture. Provided that cultural claims were 
rejected, as a default, from the rationale of state policies, this would 
not only prevent cultural claims from being used in support of 
minority rights, but it would also prevent cultural claims from being 
used in an attempt to modify the general rules and norms of the 
society in the first place.277 The upshot would seem to be that 
Kukathas needs to allow cultural claims to operate as rationales for 
state policies as, otherwise, he would not have a case for modifying 
or changing the prevailing state institutions, the rules and norms of 
society, in the face of one cultural group becoming dominant 
instead of another. But, if this is the case, then why does Kukathas 
not allow cultural claims to be used in support of minority rights? 
The response goes back to the unattainability of cultural equality 
and the idea that achieving equality in one sense inevitably creates 
inequalities in another. In the face of an impossible task of 
achieving perfect equality, or of accommodating claims of all 
cultural groups (as well as their sub-groups), Kukathas surrenders 
and claims that “no resolution is possible in philosophical terms; 
and it would be better not to try”.278 But, as argued in the previous 
subsection, the fact that, in concrete political practice, it may not be 
possible to respond to all claims of culture, and that the granting of 
minority rights to some may, at times, be disadvantageous to others, 
is not sufficient grounds to not even try. The disadvantages faced 
by minority members are very real and, should the state be able to 
rectify- or at least ease some of these, it should at least try 
(provided that the disadvantages caused to others do not override 
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the benefits produced to some). Provided that Kukathas does, 
indeed, let cultural claims operate as rationales for state policies at 
the level of the general rules and norms of society, there is no 
particular reason for why this rationale could not also operate at the 
level of minorities as potential support for a variety of minority 
rights. This, of course, is not to say that the response of the liberal 
state to cultural diversity should, as a default, come in the form of 
granting different types of minority rights, but it is to say that the 
liberal state can, and also should, take cultural claims into 
consideration and that there is no reason why the disadvantages, 
resulting from the differing norms and practices of minorities and 
the general norms and practices of society, could not also be 
responded to by a variety of minority rights – should these rights be 
conceived of as the best alternatives available. 
 
4. Conclusion on autonomy vs. toleration 
In this chapter, I have concentrated on one of the much debated 
issues within liberal multiculturalism, that of the centrality of 
individual autonomy and the role of the liberal state in catering for 
autonomy. I started by assessing Will Kymlicka’s arguments for 
minority rights as catering (either protecting or promoting) 
individual autonomy, and argued that Kymlicka’s emphasis on 
individual autonomy as one of the guiding principles of liberalism 
created far stronger preconditions for those minority groups that 
could be seen as eligible for minority rights. I then turned to an 
alternative approach, that of Chandran Kukathas’s toleration based 
account and argued that, whereas Kukathas’s account was able to 
accommodate much wider variety of minority groups within liberal 
society, Kukathas’s framework (most notably, the requirements of 
mutual toleration and the right of exit) created much stronger 
conditions for all groups within the liberal society to conform to 
than Kukathas was willing to recognize. 
Whereas the toleration based account of Kukathas was able to 
incorporate a much wider variety of minority groups within the 
liberal society (although not quite as wide as Kukathas would 
claim), this approach was also defective from the perspective of 
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giving any definitive guidance on the ways in which the liberal state 
should respond to cultural diversity. Whereas Kukathas’s own, no 
doubt controversial, approach was to argue against minority rights 
by also arguing against the usage of culture as a rationale for state 
policies, I tried to show that, within Kukathas’s own framework, 
cultural claims could not be bracketed from the sphere of public 
policies. This, however, left open the possibility of the liberal state 
taking cultural considerations into account in public policies and in 
public decision making, as well as to responding to cultural claims 
by minority rights. Whereas Kukathas was able to point out to 
several practical problems of applying minority rights in practice, 
his theoretical framework failed to provide any outright rejection of 
such rights. Rather, as with the autonomy based account of 
Kymlicka, Kukathas’s toleration based account provided no 
definitive guidance into how the liberal state should response to 
cultural diversity, although it did (contrary to Kukathas’s claims) 
leave substantial scope for the liberal state to take cultural 
considerations into account, and to respond to the disadvantages 
faced by minority groups and/or their members possibly, although 
not necessarily, with the help of minority rights. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Liberal egalitarianism and equality of 
opportunity 
 
In the two previous chapters, I concentrated on some of the 
classical arguments for as well as against minority rights within the 
liberal framework. The arguments from equality, autonomy and 
toleration were discussed both in the light of the rationales for the 
liberal state to take cultural considerations into account, as well as 
in the light of the need or the rejection of different kinds of minority 
rights. Whereas these approaches provided slightly different 
platforms from which the issues of cultural accommodation could 
be approached, none of them, it was argued, provided any 
conclusive case for or against minority rights within the liberal 
framework. Rather, as I tried to argue, the discussed approaches left 
substantive scope for legitimate variation to the liberal approaches 
to cultural diversity, including the possibility, albeit not a 
requirement, for the liberal state to grant different kinds of minority 
rights in practice. 
One of the main criticisms, not only against these classical 
debates on multiculturalism, but also against my own argument 
based on these debates, would be that they fail to take sufficiently 
into account the complexity of issues involved in debates on 
multiculturalism and, especially, on minority rights. Minority or 
culturally differentiated rights are of various kinds and the 
normative issues relevant for each may be very different, depending 
on the kind of right in question as well as on the context within 
which this right is argued for.279 It may, therefore, not be sensible to 
talk of minority rights as a bulk, nor should it come as a surprise 
that the attempts to justify (or reject) these rights by a recourse to a 
simple guiding principle (be it equality, autonomy or toleration) are 
bound to encounter some serious difficulties. Due to the 
                                                 
279 See also Background, esp. 2.3. 
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heterogeneity of normative issues relevant for any particular 
minority right, the debates on the justifiability (or unjustifiability) 
of these rights should rather be done in context, as the justificatory 
framework of, for example, exemptions, rights of self-government, 
symbolic recognition, or special representation, are bound to be 
very different as well as more complex than the classical debates on 
multiculturalism would make it seem. 
Whereas it is far beyond the scope of this work to try to build a 
comprehensive account of the vast variety of minority rights or 
their (no doubt, equally varied) justifications, in this chapter, I wish 
to look at one, rather specific debate among liberal multiculturalists 
– that of the debate over the rule and exemption –approach, and the 
justificatory framework of equality of opportunity within which this 
debate has largely been conducted. This case of “rule and 
exemption” is chosen for two reasons. Firstly, I believe that the 
cultural exemptions granted for minority members, in the face of 
the incompatibility of certain norms and practices of the majority 
with those of the minority, constitute a relatively easily identifiable 
group of rights, although as will be seen not all exemptions should 
fall within precisely the same justificatory schema. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the liberal egalitarian critique of cultural 
exemptions can also be seen as an attempt to counter the arguments 
presented in Ch. 1 for the egalitarian rationale of the liberal state to 
be concerned about people’s cultural disadvantages – this rejection 
being based precisely on the same grounds of equality. 
Some of the concerns posed by the liberal egalitarian critics of 
minority rights will be revisited in more detail in Part II.280 Putting 
these concerns aside, in this chapter, I aim to show that the rejection 
of both, the egalitarian rationale for the state to be concerned about 
cultural disadvantages, as well as of differentiated treatment such as 
exemptions, may be too swift and theoretically unfounded. By 
looking at different conceptions of equality of opportunity and, 
                                                 
280 Most notably, I will return to the liberal egalitarians’ critique of 
allocating minority rights on the basis of one’s group membership, and 
develop my own account of the appropriate modes of allocation. 
Liberal Egalitarianism and Equality of Opportunity 
173 
 
especially, the proper object of opportunity, I argue that, contrary to 
the critics, there are strong equality-based reasons for the liberal 
state to be concerned about cultural disadvantages, and that a 
default position of trying to rectify these disadvantages should be 
adopted. This default position, however, constitutes nothing as 
strong as a requirement for the liberal state to grant cultural 
exemptions in all cases, although it does explicate the rationale 
through which these exemptions may be justified. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section 
Multiculturalism and equality of opportunity I outline the 
framework within which the discussions on cultural exemptions 
have taken place, starting from some of the rationales that the 
liberal state may have for being concerned, not only with equality 
of resources, but also with equality of opportunity. I also look at 
some of the ways in which the incompatibility of the norms and 
practices of the majority and those of a minority may affect the 
minority members’ opportunities to function as full members of 
society, and the ways in which certain rules, albeit seemingly 
neutral, may nevertheless be considered as disadvantageous to 
certain groups of people. In section 2 Opportunities, opportunity 
sets and equality of opportunity to X, I concentrate on some of the 
definitional debates within discussions on equality of opportunity, 
and further qualify the scope of the argument given in this chapter. 
In the final section The proper object of opportunity, I defend a 
properly construed conception of equality of opportunity – that is, 
an opportunity to combine one’s cultural commitments with one’s 
aspirations in public life – and argue that, should one’s adherence to 
a particular cultural practice prevent one from fulfilling some 
criteria for a particular job or educational institution, there are 
strong egalitarian reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about 
and to aim to rectify this inequality.  
This chapter concludes (3.2.) with some important qualifications 
to the extent to which my argument can be used in defence of the 
rule and exemption –approach, outlining some of the benefits as 
well as constraints of the joint conception of equality of opportunity 
in debates on multiculturalism and cultural exemptions. Whereas I 
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argue that the conception of equality of opportunity in terms of joint 
opportunities has the benefit of shifting the burden of proof from 
those disadvantaged to those who claim these disadvantages to be 
justified, I also show that this conception does not, in itself, provide 
any conclusive guidance to the ways in which the liberal state 
should respond to these disadvantages. Rather, in line with the 
arguments of the two previous chapters, this chapter argues for a 
strong rationale for the liberal state to be concerned about and to try 
to rectify those disadvantages that result from the incompatibility of 
the general rules and practices of the society and those of the 
minority, but cautions against too straight forward ab applicability 
of this rationale as a basis for any particular types of cultural 
policies. 
 
1. Multiculturalism and equality of opportunity 
In chapter 1, I built a strong case for the liberal state to be 
concerned about as well as to try to rectify those disadvantages that 
the members of minority cultural groups faced due to them living in 
an alien cultural context. The argument developed was based on 
Will Kymlicka’s resourcists account of equality and the modified 
importance argument showing why it was not reasonable, as a 
default, to expect people to abandon their own cultural contexts or 
particular cultural practices.281 The disadvantages, faced by 
minority members, were explained, primarily, in terms of the 
inequality of resources, covering a variety of cases where the 
minority members had to use substantive amounts of time and 
effort in order to preserve their own cultural contexts, or to continue 
adhering to their specific cultural traditions or practices. 
Whereas the resourcist account, combined with the modified 
importance-argument, was thus capable of both explaining a vast 
variety of cultural disadvantages as well as of providing rationale 
for the liberal state to be concerned about these disadvantages, this 
pronouncedly resourcist account may not be able to capture all 
types of (in)equalities that are, nevertheless, important from the 
                                                 
281 See Ch. 1, esp 1.2. 
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liberal point of view. As argued by many, it is not only that the state 
should be concerned about whether people have equal resources 
with which to pursue their chosen ways of life, but also whether (a) 
pursuing certain ways of life is possible for people, and (b) whether 
these ways of life are equally open to all. What the liberal state 
should be concerned about, is not only the inequalities resulting 
from people’s efforts to maintain their own cultural contexts / 
practices, but also with people’s opportunities in other spheres of 
life – that is, whether people have equal opportunities to achieve 
certain prospects in life, regardless of their cultural background. 
The emphasis put forth by the proponents of equality of opportunity 
is thus not so much on whether the members of minority cultures 
can begin from the same line with majority when choosing their 
courses of life, but whether – once their choices have been made – 
they also have equal prospects of success.282  
                                                 
282 This account of equality of opportunity has obvious similarities to 
Richard Arneson’s conception of equality of opportunity to welfare 
(Arneson, 1989; 1990). However, whereas Arneson argues that people 
should have equal opportunities to the welfare that they have – after 
rational reflection – come to aspire, the account discussed here is more 
limited in scope. Whereas Arneson’s account incorporates the possibility 
of people’s welfare being defined in very different ways, the account 
discussed here has a fixed point of reference, that is, the way of life X, or 
the prospect Y that people should have equal opportunities to achieve. 
Although it is, of course, an important question whether people should 
have equal opportunities to their welfare, I believe that it is an equally 
important question to consider whether people have equal opportunities to 
some objectively defined prospect of Y, should they find this prospect as 
important for their welfare. Furthermore, the equality of opportunity in this 
sense fits much better the concerns of multiculturalists for whom, apart 
from the subjectively experienced welfare of members of cultural groups, 
it is also of tremendous importance that the members of minority groups 
should also have equal opportunities to achieve those positions in society 
that are, generally speaking, perceived of some status. 
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Equality of opportunity is, of course, a notoriously difficult 
concept, the definition of which remains contested.283 In order to 
open up some of the ways in which equality of opportunity has 
been understood in multiculturalism, I start by giving a brief (and 
no doubt incomplete) account of the classical Rawlsian position, 
before turning to some of the implications that a properly construed 
conception of fair equality of opportunity may have for discussions 
on multiculturalism. 
 
1.1. The Rawlsian framework of fair equality of opportunity 
According to John Rawls, certain positions (such as public offices, 
jobs and educational careers) should be open to all, regardless of 
those characteristics of the applicants that can be conceived as 
arbitrary from a moral point of view.284  According to Rawls, social 
contingencies, such as one’s social class or status, should not affect 
one’s eligibility for the positions of advantage, but everyone – 
regardless of their social status – should be allowed to compete, as 
well as to have fair chances of success in attaining these positions. 
By one’s social status, Rawls refers primarily to one’s income class, 
although it is now fairly commonly accepted that things such as 
race, religion, gender or cultural background should also be 
conceived as contingent facts that should not influence one’s 
eligibility or one’s chances of success.  
This broad notion of fair equality of opportunity (that is, the 
construction incorporating race, religion, cultural background, etc.) 
has two important consequences. Firstly, if one’s social status 
                                                 
283 Williams 1973; Radcliffe-Richards 1997; for useful overview, see: 
Arneson 2002; Mason 2006; for an excellent attempt to give a formal 
definition and critique, see: Hansson 2004. 
284 Rawls 1971, 73. In his restatement, “Justice as Fairness” (2001), Rawls 
formulates the second principle of justice as follows: “Social and 
economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: a. They are to be 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; b. They are to be to the greatest benefit of the 
least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).”  Rawls 
2001, 42-43. 
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(including one’s gender, race, and cultural background) should not 
affect one’s eligibility or one’s chances of success, it is quite clear 
that the criteria used for fulfilling the positions of advantage should 
not be based on these characteristics. Setting certain social 
background, skin colour, or gender as a requirement for a job or an 
educational career is unjustifiable, as this takes away the 
opportunity of those with different social backgrounds, skin colours 
or genders to attain these positions. As has come to be commonly 
accepted, the criteria for fulfilling such positions should be based 
on the skills required, so that those equally equipped for 
successfully performing in such positions also have equal prospects 
of success in attaining these positions (careers open to talents).285 
This, irrespective of their social class, gender, skin colour, cultural 
background etc. 
Secondly, Rawls also maintains that it is not enough that those 
positions, open to all, are filled in accordance with criteria relevant 
for the successful performance in that position. One’s social status 
often affects the ways in which one is capable of developing one’s 
talents, and concentrating solely on the criteria for fulfilling certain 
positions of advantage ignores these effects. Thus, Rawls argues 
that the whole structure of society should be organized in a way that 
enables those with equal talents and ambitions to also develop these 
talents and to pursue, with equal prospects of success, their 
ambitions. For such a state of affairs to exist, Rawls proposes that 
the state should try to ensure equal chances of education through 
subsidized public schooling, police the economic activities and 
conduct of firms, and guarantee social minimum income (including 
effective health care etc.) for everyone.286 This, Rawls calls fair 
equality of opportunity – that is, formal equality of opportunity 
                                                 
285 It should be noted that the Rawlsian “careers open to talents” is, by no 
means, the only justifiable criterion from the perspective of equality of 
opportunity, but for example certain types of lotteries may well also be 
used for the allocation of positions of power. See e.g. Stone 2007; 
Saunders 2010. In this work, I will, however, subscribe to the more 
commonly accepted view of “careers open to talents”. 
286 Rawls 1971, 73; 275; 2001, 43-44. 
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defined in accordance with non-morally arbitrary criteria, conjoined 
with an institutional structure that enables those with equal talents 
and ambitions to fulfill these criteria. 
 
1.2. Fair equality of opportunity in multiculturalism 
It is not entirely clear what kinds of implications this (broad) 
conception of fair equality of opportunity should have on issues on 
multiculturalism, or on minority rights such as cultural exemptions. 
Quite obviously, the Rawlsian framework does not allow public 
offices, educational institutions or job opportunities to be filled on 
the basis of one’s cultural or religious background, nor does it allow 
the members of minority cultures to be excluded from such 
positions simply by virtue of them being from a particular cultural 
background. This implication, of course, is nothing new (or novel to 
Rawls), but it does pave the way to a more interesting (as well as 
much more complex) question about the actual criteria that is used 
for fulfilling those positions that should be equally open to all. That 
is, it brings out the further question of whether the criteria, 
supposedly relevant for the successful performance in a position, is, 
in fact, consistent with the principle of fair equality of opportunity, 
if this criteria, nevertheless, excludes members of certain minority 
groups from gaining such positions.287 
To recall, the Rawlsian conception of fair equality of 
opportunity states that certain positions (educational careers, jobs, 
public offices) should be open to all.288 Anyone, regardless of their 
gender, religion or cultural background, should be able to pursue 
his/her ambition of, for example, becoming a police officer, and to 
compete on equal terms with others who share the same ambition. 
Further, the Rawlsian conception of fair equality of opportunity 
                                                 
287 For debate, see also Barry, 2001; Festenstein 2005. 
288 In Rawls’s conception, this obviously refers to people within a 
particular society, that is, the citizens of the nation state. Rawls’s own 
view of equality of opportunity on the global level is very different (see 
esp. Rawls, 1999; for debate see Martin and Reidy 2006), although some 
work have been done to apply the Rawlsian framework of domestic justice 
also to the global sphere, e.g. Beitz 1979; Pogge 1989; 1994. 
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also states that the criteria used for deciding who wins the 
competition of becoming a police officer should be based on those 
qualities that are relevant for a successful performance as a police 
officer, not on the morally arbitrary characteristics of gender, 
religion, cultural background etc. If successful performance as a 
police officer requires, say, certain educational qualifications, the 
criteria for fulfilling the positions of a police officer should also be 
based on if one has attained these qualifications. Finally, and most 
importantly, fair equality of opportunity also states that the 
structure of the society should be organized in a way that everyone, 
regardless of their cultural background etc., have equal chances of 
becoming a police officer, the chance being only dependent on their 
natural talents and the amount of work they put into fulfilling the 
criteria for such position. This entails that the educational 
institutions, including the institutions for police training, should be 
accessible to all, but it may also entail that the criteria for being a 
police officer itself should not disadvantage people from different 
cultural backgrounds. 
It should, at this stage, be noted that, having criteria that is not 
based on the morally arbitrary characteristics of gender, religion, 
cultural background etc., is not necessarily the same thing as having 
criteria that does not put members of certain cultural groups in a 
disadvantaged position to that of the majority. For example, if one 
of the requirements of being a police officer is the acceptance of a 
strict code of appearance (including, say, a certain kind of uniform, 
short hair and cap), this does, in effect, make it much more difficult 
for those to become police officers who’s own cultural or religious 
commitments (such as the wearing of a veil or a turban) are in 
conflict with such requirements. Although the requirement is not, in 
itself, based on the morally arbitrary characteristics of one’s 
cultural or religious background,289 this requirement, nevertheless, 
has a very different impact on people from different cultural 
backgrounds, as for some, fulfilling this requirement means giving 
                                                 
289 That is, the requirement is not intended to prevent those with 
conflicting dress codes from joining the police force. 
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up a (potentially very important) aspect of their culture, whereas for 
others, no such sacrifices are required. As a consequence, it may be 
much more difficult for members of those cultural groups with 
conflicting dress codes to become police officers than others, thus 
also cutting down the amount of people who, from such 
backgrounds, manage to both fulfill these requirements as well as to 
become police officers. With respect to these consequences, two 
issues should be kept separated: 
 
Proportional underrepresentation 
Firstly, there is the issue of proportional underrepresentation of 
members of certain groups. Although this may be a concern in itself 
(it can be argued that public institutions, such as the police force, 
should have equal representation of all groups in society), this does 
not, in itself, entail that the requirements of becoming a police 
officer would be discriminatory against the members of some 
groups. As Brian Barry has pointed out, there may be several 
reasons for why members of certain groups do not even wish to aim 
at certain positions, irrespective of the criteria that is required for 
such positions.290 The proportional underrepresentation of some 
groups may, of course, be a result of discriminating criteria (and 
should thus also give good reasons for the state to investigate the 
used criteria in order to identify this (possible) discrimination), but 
the underrepresentation itself does not suffice to establish that the 
criteria used for fulfilling such positions would be discriminating 
against the members of some groups.291 
 
Differentiated impact of a rule 
Secondly, and more interestingly for the purposes of this chapter, 
there is the issue of whether the differentiated impact of criteria 
violates the principles of fair equality of opportunity, and whether 
such criteria can be considered as leading to unfair 
                                                 
290Barry 2001, 97-98; 117.  
291 See also: Barry 2001, 97-98. 
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discrimination.292 Again, it is Brian Barry who has taken the stand 
to the contrary, arguing that the differentiated impact of a rule (in 
this case, the criteria for becoming police officer) does not 
necessarily mean that the people who are burdened by the rule 
would also be discriminated against.293Whereas I think that Barry is 
right – a differentiated impact of a rule does not necessarily mean 
discrimination – I also believe that the argument Barry gives in 
support of this position is flawed, and that in many cases, rules that 
have a differentiated impact on members of cultural groups are, in 
fact, discriminating. 
To start with Barry’s own argument, Barry states that all rules 
treat different people differently, and the fact that a rule has a 
different impact on some people due to their religious or cultural 
commitments does not suffice to show that this rule would be unfair 
or discriminatory. As examples, Barry points towards laws that 
prevent rapists from raping or pedophiles from interfering with 
children – both clearly laws that have much harsher impact on those 
who would want to rape or molest than those who do not.294 
Needless to say, these laws are not considered as unfair or 
discriminatory, even if the impact of the law is clearly different for 
different people. 
The attempted analogy between the anti-rape laws and the 
criteria that put an extra burden on members of certain cultural 
groups in the employment market is, however, clearly flawed. In 
order to see this, one needs to look at the difference in the intention 
of the laws or rules in question. Whereas it is the intention of the 
anti-rape laws to put a burden on the would-be rapists (justified by 
the rights of those not wishing to be raped), it is not, and should not 
                                                 
292 For the sake of simplicity and shortness, I will from now refer to 
“discrimination” instead of “unfair discrimination” although it should be 
kept in mind that there may also be positive forms of discrimination that 
aim at fair or just outcomes or distribution, and that not all forms of 
discrimination are necessarily inherently unjust or unfair. Cf. Lippert-
Rasmussen 2006; 2007. 
293 Barry 2001, 34. 
294 Barry 2001, 34. 
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(in accordance with the principle of fair equality of opportunity) be 
the intention of the criteria of employment to put a burden on those 
members of cultural groups whose cultural practices (such as dress 
codes) are in conflict with the used criteria.295 Whereas the anti-rape 
laws are designed to prevent those wishing to rape from raping, the 
criteria for becoming a police officer is, and should be, designed in 
accordance with the requirement of everyone having an equal 
chance of becoming a police officer.296 Moreover, whereas one’s 
interest to rape can easily be conceived as an illegitimate interest 
(overridden by the interests of those not wishing to be raped), most 
cultural practices – including dress codes – are perfectly legitimate. 
Whereas rape is, inherently, a violation of another person’s rights, 
cultural dress codes are not.297 In order for Barry to build a 
convincing argument from analogy to show that the differentiated 
impact of a rule, due to one’s cultural commitments, would not be 
discriminatory, he should have at least picked other rules that were, 
in relevant senses, analogous to the cases at hand.. 
Showing the flaws in Barry’s argument does not, however, show 
that his conclusions would also be flawed. Nor does it answer the 
question of whether the principle of fair equality of opportunity is 
violated, should some criteria (such as the dress codes of the police 
officer) put an extra burden on those whose cultural commitments 
are in conflict with the criteria. Although I will elaborate on this 
issue more fully in the following section, what I wish to suggest, for 
the time being, is that it is at least an open question whether the 
                                                 
295 See also: Barclay 2005. 
296 This is not to say that the primary aim of the criteria would be to 
provide everyone equal chances of being a police officer. Rather, the dress 
code is designed to benefit the performance of both the police force as 
well as the individual officers. However, unlike the anti-rape laws that are 
designed to put a burden on certain people, the dress codes are not, and – 
in accordance with fair equality of opportunity – should not. 
297 It is, of course, a different issue whether the enforcement of a dress 
code (such as the wearing of a veil) violates the rights of, or causes harm 
to, those to whom it is enforced. An illegitimate enforcing of the code, 
however, does not make the code itself as inherently illegitimate. 
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differentiated impact of a rule or criteria (designed to fulfill the 
requirements of fair equality of opportunity) is (unjustifiably) 
discriminatory. 
A comparison between Barry’s example of anti-rape laws and 
the example of the professional dress codes of the police officer 
should help clarify this point. Whereas it is clear that in both cases, 
the universally applicable rule has a different impact on different 
people, what the multiculturalists would wish to maintain is that, in 
the first case, the differentiated impact is justified, whereas in the 
second, it is not. Although it is certainly true that in the first case, it 
is the intention of the anti-rape law to burden the would-be rapists, 
and that in the second case it is not, the intention of the rule does 
not, in itself, suffice to establish whether this burden would be 
justified. Having a law that is intentionally burdensome to some 
people does not make it justified, nor does the un-intentionality of 
the burden establish that it would be un-justified.298 There are, 
however, other differences in the two cases that may be helpful for 
the multiculturalists for explaining the difference between the two 
cases. 
Whereas in the case of rape, the question can be framed in terms 
of balancing the interests of the would-be rapist and his victim, in 
the case of professional and cultural dress codes no such obvious 
comparison can be found. In the case of rape, it can (fairly non-
controversially) be argued that the interests of the would-be rapists 
are overridden by the (more fundamental) interests of others to 
bodily integrity, thus justifying the differentiated impact of the law 
to would-be rapists and non-rapists.299 In the case of professional 
dress codes, however, it is not quite as clear, between what, let 
                                                 
298 As an example, most contemporary liberal thinkers would probably 
agree that the apartheid system of South Africa was hardly justified, 
although it was certainly intentional. 
299This is not to say that the only wrong of rape would be that it violates 
the basic rights or interests of the victim, although this certainly is one 
aspect of the wrongness of rape. For more thorough analyses of the 
wrongness of rape, including interest-base accounts, see Archard 2007; 
entries to Burgess-Jackson 1999. 
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alone how, the balance should be struck. On the one hand, there are 
the interests of those wishing to maintain their own cultural dress 
codes – something that, following the importance argument given 
in Ch. 1, it is not, as a default, reasonable to expect them to 
abandon. On the other hand, however, there are the benefits of a 
uniform dress code – something that (at least to an extent) can be 
considered as necessary for both the successful operation of the 
police force, as well as the successful performance of the individual 
police officers.300  
Whereas I will, in the final section of this chapter, come back to 
some of the different reasons (as well as the weight of these 
reasons) there may be for insisting on particular rules or criteria in 
various situations, for the time being, it suffices to note that, 
contrary to the case of rape, the balance of interests in many 
cultural cases may be far less straight forward than many 
multiculturalists, or their critics, would hope it to be. Once we take 
seriously the differentiated impact (burden) of the criteria, the 
(potentially very strong) consequences that following this criteria 
may have to one’s cultural commitments, and the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity, it becomes far more difficult to argue that 
those burdened by the criteria due to their cultural commitments 
should, as a default, be expected to either abandon their cultural 
commitments or their professional aspirations. If one’s cultural 
commitments are of such (potentially) tremendous importance that 
it is not (as a default) reasonable to expect people to abandon these 
commitments, it would seem odd to argue that any rule, imposing a 
burden due to these commitments, could be deemed justified 
without any further ado. This is not so say that, in some cases, the 
particular universal rules or criteria could not be deemed of such 
importance that the burdens created for minority members would be 
                                                 
300 For the time being, I will set aside the question of whether it is 
precisely that particular dress code that is necessary for the functioning of 
the police force, or whether some other uniform dress code would also 
suffice. 
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justified,301 or that, in all cases, those burdened by the rule or 
criteria should automatically be exempted.302 It is simply to point 
out that, in many cases, it is not at all obvious where, and between 
what, the balance should be struck.  
Although this observation may, at first, seem somewhat trivial 
and unimportant, I nevertheless believe it to be an important 
observation, showing that it is at least an open question, whether the 
reasons for having certain criteria are weighty enough to justify the 
differentiated impact of the criteria due to one’s cultural 
commitments. If one’s cultural commitments are of such 
(potentially) tremendous importance that it is not reasonable to 
expect people to abandon these commitments, it must also be that 
the reasons for having criteria that impose a burden due to these 
commitments, must be extremely weighty – in order to change the 
unreasonable expectations of abandoning one’s cultural 
commitments into reasonable ones. This idea of balancing the 
reasons between having generally applicable criteria and of not 
requiring (some) people to adhere to this criteria will be discussed 
in more detail in the last section of this chapter (esp. 3.2.). Before 
that, however, a more systematic analysis of what it means to have 
an opportunity, and when equality of opportunity prevails, is in 
order. 
 
2. Opportunities, opportunity sets, and equality of opportunity 
to X 
So far, I have focused on the possible rationales that the liberal state 
may have for being concerned about the disadvantages resulting 
from the incompatibility of general rules and norms of society and 
the specific cultural or religious practices of the minority. I argued 
                                                 
301 For example, bans on implementing grievous bodily harm, or rules 
necessary for the ensuring of public safety may be such. What these rules 
are exactly, and whether there can ever be exemptions to such rules are, of 
course, contested issues that can only be solved on a case to case basis. 
302 The rule and exemption –approach will be discussed in more detail in 
section 3. 
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that, within the framework of fair equality of opportunity, there 
were strong reasons for the liberal state to investigate the criteria 
used for fulfilling positions of advantage, should the members of 
minority cultures be a) underrepresented in these positions, or b) 
seen to encounter extra burdens by virtue of having to abandon their 
cultural commitments due to the criteria used to fill these positions. 
Whereas I did not argue that, in all such cases, the used criteria 
could be seen as (unfairly) discriminatory, I did, nevertheless, try to 
show that the extra burden of abandoning one’s cultural practices 
(conjoined with the not least obvious balancing of interests) gave 
strong reasons for the liberal state to at least investigate whether the 
burden in question was justified. 
In this section, I turn to look at some of the background debates 
on equality of opportunity within debates on multiculturalism, and 
clarify some of the terminology used in these debates. I begin by 
looking at Brian Barry’s two conceptions of equality of opportunity 
(general and narrow), including his presumptions of opportunities 
(options) as objective states of affairs (2.1.). I then move to look at 
the difficult questions relating to the costs of opportunities and the 
relevancy of different types of costs for equality of opportunity to 
prevail (2.2), and suggest that, from the perspective of those 
disadvantaged, the questions of the existence of costs and their 
(possible) justification should be kept separated. As will be seen in 
the final section of this chapter (3.The proper object of 
opportunity), the taking into account the perspective of the 
disadvantaged also affects the questions about the proper focus of 
discussions on equality of opportunity, shifting the locus of 
discussions from the relevant costs of opportunities to the proper 
object of opportunity, and the appropriate notion of having joint 
opportunities to X and Y. 
 
2.1. Brian Barry on equal opportunities 
In this polemic attack on multiculturalism, Brian Barry questions 
the view according to which one’s cultural commitments could be 
seen as restricting the opportunities of those adhering to these 
commitments. In constructing his argument, Barry gives two, rather 
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different, formulations of equality of opportunity. On the one hand, 
Barry argues that, in order for equality of opportunity to obtain, 
people must have roughly identical opportunity sets to choose from 
(equality of opportunity, general).303 For Barry, these opportunity 
sets are provided, first and foremost, by rules that are universally 
applicable, regardless of one’s cultural, religious or social 
background. It is not, Barry maintains, that those adhering to certain 
cultural practices would be denied equal opportunities, should these 
practices collide with the general rules, norms or laws of society 
(such as, for example, the general health and safety requirements, 
gender equality legislation, animal welfare legislation, or (with 
some qualifications) with the general dress requirements of a work 
place). If, say, a certain profession requires people to wear certain 
outfits, or work on designated hours on designated days, it is not a 
question of inequality of opportunity that some people cannot 
participate in these professions due to them observing their cultural 
or religious dress codes, designated praying times or religious 
holidays.304 The observants of the conflicting cultural or religious 
                                                 
303 What is meant by opportunity sets is the pool of options – including 
options of employment and education – that people can choose (with some 
prospects of success) to aspire to. By roughly identical opportunity sets, it 
is meant that one’s options of, say, employment or education, should not 
be restricted to, for example, a very limited number of jobs, but that 
everyone should have roughly the same pool of options (different jobs) 
that they can (with some prospects of success) aspire to. This view of 
roughly identical opportunity sets (that Barry ascribes to) takes from the 
resourcist account of equality the insight of emphasizing the equality of 
initial opportunity sets. Thus, choosing certain options may limit the pool 
of options available in later life, without violating the basic requirement of 
the state to guarantee people roughly identical opportunity sets to begin 
with. 
304 Barry qualifies his position by saying that these requirements (such as 
dress codes that prevent people with other, conflicting, dress codes from 
being chosen for the job) can be justified only if they are necessary for a 
successful performance in the job. (Barry 2001, 59-60; 2002, 216) I will 
return to this shortly. For the time being, it suffices to say that, in Barry’s 
general formulation of equality of opportunity, even if these requirements 
were not justified by their necessity for the performance in the job, people 
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practices are not devoid of the opportunity to participate in these 
professions, as they are perfectly free to choose whether they wish 
to hold on to their cultural commitments, or abandon these 
commitments in order to take advantage of the opportunity in 
question. What is important, Barry maintains, is that people have 
roughly identical opportunity sets to choose from (including the 
number of jobs, educational institutions or public offices), and it is 
no business of the state to interfere in which opportunities (and on 
what grounds) people wish to take advantage of.305 
Besides the general formulation of equality of opportunity (in 
terms of roughly identical opportunity sets), Barry also constructs 
another, narrower definition of equality of opportunity. This 
definition, according to Barry, should be primarily used in specific 
cases of employment or education, although, as I try to show, the 
scope of this conception is far more restricted than would at first 
seem. According to Barry, this narrower notion of equality of 
opportunity requires that “those who are equally well qualified to 
do a job have an equal chance of getting the job. If some people 
who are as well qualified as others are denied an equal chance of 
employment in some job, they can complain of (unfair) 
discrimination.”.306  As an upshot, Barry argues that any job that, 
for no good reason, denies people the right to adhere to their 
cultural commitments (such as certain dress codes or times of 
prayer) violates the requirements of equality of opportunity if the 
denial of such commitments cannot be shown as required for the 
successful performance of such job.307 However, should such 
restrictions be required for the successful performance of the job, 
                                                                                                     
would not be lacking an opportunity to work in such a job even if the 
adherence to the conflicting dress codes would prevent them from being 
chosen for the job. 
305 Barry 2001, esp. ch. 2.3. 
306 Barry 2001, 55; see also Barry 2002, 216-221. 
307 For example, Barry defends the right of the Muslim women to wear 
head scarves for example in office jobs or department stores where there 
are no non-trivial reasons to insist on banning such attire. Barry 2001, 57-
62; 2002, 216. 
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no issues of inequality of opportunity arise. Due to one’s cultural 
commitments, in these cases, one is simply not as qualified for the 
job in question, although one would still have the opportunity (in 
the general sense)  to qualify for the job, if one was willing to 
abandon one’s conflicting cultural practices.  
 
Objective and subjective conceptions of opportunity 
Barry’s broader notion of equality of opportunity – that of the 
equality of opportunity defined in terms of roughly identical 
opportunity sets to choose from – is based on two important 
assumptions. Firstly, it is based on the assumption of the objective 
nature of opportunity, and secondly, it is based on the interpretation 
of equality of opportunity as incorporating no further elements than 
the existence of the opportunity set in question. 
With respect to the nature of opportunity, Barry argues that an 
opportunity is an objective state of affairs.308 For an option X to be 
an opportunity that is open to me, it only needs to be an option that 
I can (bar my physical constraints) do. A turban wearing Sikh, for 
example, has an opportunity to wear a policeman’s hat (and thus 
work as a police officer), as he is not physically constrained from 
taking off his turban in order to do so.309  
As opposed to Barry’s view, Bhikhu Parekh has argued that 
opportunity is also subject-dependent. According to Parekh, it 
                                                 
308 Barry 2001: 37. 
309 Much of the literature on job opportunities and cultural dress codes 
have utilized two classic examples: the traditional head gear of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, and the wearing of safety helmets on 
construction sites. (see e.g. Parekh 2000, 243-245; Kymlicka 1995, 177; 
Phillips 2007, 113; Barry 2002, 216-217; Caney 2002, 87-88) The two 
cases are, quite obviously, different, and have also attracted different 
responses, due to one (the requirement of wearing the traditional hat of the 
Canadian Mountain Police) being a requirement based mainly on tradition, 
whereas the other (safety helmet) being a question of work place safety. 
Although I will return to the question of how the reasons for having 
particular criteria may, or may not, affect equality of opportunity later on 
in this section, my current discussion on the nature of opportunity itself 
needs not take into account the reasons for why certain criteria is in place. 
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makes no sense to say that one has an opportunity X unless one also 
has a cultural disposition to take advantage of X.310 In the case of 
the turban wearing Sikh, it may not be a feasible option for him to 
take off his turban (in order to wear the police hat), thus (provided 
that one of the requirements of being a police officer is the wearing 
of the hat) denying him the opportunity to work as a police officer. 
It should be emphasized that, so far, both Barry’s as well as 
Parekh’s accounts are only concerned with how to understand the 
concept of opportunity, or option, itself – not with how this concept 
relates to the wider notion of equality of opportunity (understood in 
terms of roughly identical opportunity sets). Although it is clear that 
Barry and Parekh come to argue for very different conclusions with 
respect to the wider notion of equality of opportunity, a closer 
analysis shows that this need not be so. In fact, one’s views of 
whether one has an opportunity X in any particular situation need 
not depend on the dichotomy of objective vs. subjective 
conceptions of opportunity.311 Rather, depending on how one 
interprets the subjectivity of opportunities in Parekh’s position, the 
objective and subjective conceptions of opportunity would seem to 
lead into either identical or completely different conclusions with 
respect to whether one has an opportunity X (for example, an 
opportunity to work as a police officer) and whether this 
opportunity is thus also included in the opportunity sets of the 
person in question. Moreover, as I try to show, it is only if one 
accepts the stronger (and, in my view, untenable) interpretation of 
the substantive conception of opportunity that the differences arise. 
 
Subjective opportunities and opportunity sets 
Criticizing Parekh’s position, Barry argues that Parekh’s subjective 
conception of opportunity blurs the distinction “between limits on 
the range of opportunities open to people and limits on the choices 
that they make from within a certain range of opportunities”.312 
                                                 
310 Parekh, 1997: 150-151; 2000: 241. 
311 This dichotomy has also been criticised in Mendus 2002; Miller 2002b. 
312 Barry 2001, 37. 
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Although my cultural commitments may impose certain limits to 
how I am supposed to choose to live my life, this does not take 
away the existence of the option that I still could (at least in 
principle, although perhaps not in practice) take advantage of, even 
if taking advantage of this option would mean abandoning some of 
the requirements of my culture. 
However, whereas Barry’s distinction between the limits on the 
range of opportunities and limits on the choices made within this 
range is, no doubt, an important distinction, it is not necessarily the 
distinction that Parekh fails to note. To be fair to Parekh, he does 
not argue that an option X would not (at least in principle) be open 
to those whose cultural commitments conflict with the requirements 
of taking advantage of X, but merely that this option should be 
considered as “mute” and “passive”, should one not be culturally 
dispositioned to take advantage of it.313 What Parekh would seem to 
be concerned about, is thus not only whether people “have an 
objective opportunity X” in the sense described by Barry (that is, an 
option that one could (bar one’s physical constraints) take 
advantage of), but whether people also “have the capacity to choose 
to take advantage of X”. That is, not only whether one has the 
option of becoming a police officer should one choose to adhere to 
its requirements, but whether one also has the capacity, or a cultural 
disposition, to make that choice, and adhere to these requirements. 
Presuming that this is what Parekh is trying to say, and that the 
notion of “having an opportunity X” should not only include the 
existence of the option X but also the capacity to choose X, the 
interesting question remains: would this alter the view on whether 
the turban wearing Sikh has an opportunity to work as a police 
officer, should the criteria for such work require him to take off his 
turban? Hardly so. It would not seem that such element of 
subjectivity would alter the fact of whether such opportunity existed 
for the Sikh man to take advantage of. Presuming, in accordance 
with the first chapter of this work, that we wish to maintain the 
view according to which people’s cultural commitments are not 
                                                 
313  Parekh 2000, 241. 
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something that people cannot not adhere to, and that it is, indeed, 
possible for people to change as well as to abandon their cultural 
commitments,314 it is difficult to see how one could maintain that 
the turban wearing Sikh, although having an objective option X 
(opportunity in Barry’s sense), would not be capable of choosing to 
take advantage of X. The turban wearing Sikh has an opportunity, 
both in the sense of having an option to take away his turban as 
well as having the capacity to make this choice, and to argue 
otherwise would require a seriously restricted conception of this 
person’s autonomy and agency.315 Unless one subscribes to the 
view of culture as a determining element of people’s actions, it 
makes no sense to say that one’s cultural or religious commitments 
would take away, either the option X or one’s capacity to choose 
X.316 
Perhaps Parekh could still argue that my interpretation of the 
subjective conception of opportunity (as an option X conjoined with 
a capacity to choose X) would be an oversimplification and that 
being culturally dispositioned to take advantage of the option does 
not mean merely that one has a capacity to choose to take 
advantage of the option in question, but that one is also likely to do 
so.317 This, however, might be stretching the concept of opportunity 
a bit too far. Whereas it is certainly possible to incorporate a 
subjective element into the concept of opportunity (as described 
above), it is difficult to see how the likelihood of one’s choice to 
                                                 
314 Esp. Ch. 1.1. 
315 For an excellent critique of how some multiculturalists (including 
Parekh) have ended up subscribing to a very restricted view of the agency 
of minority members, see Phillips 2006, 28; 2007, 112-113. 
316 This is not to say that, at times, people might not even contemplate of 
choosing X, nor that the pressures for not choosing X could not be 
overwhelming – so much so that, in effect, the person cannot realistically 
be expected to choose X. The fact that one has the capacity to choose X 
does not necessarily mean that one can also be expected to make that 
choice, nor that one should also be held responsible for making / not 
making that choice. I will return to these issues of responsibility shortly. 
317 For an account of equality of opportunity incorporating the likelihoods 
of taking advantage of opportunities, see Roemer 1998. 
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take advantage of the option could affect the existence of the 
opportunity in question.318 Provided that one has an option that one 
could choose to take advantage of and that one also has the capacity 
to make this choice, it would seem irrelevant – for the mere 
existence of the opportunity – whether one chooses to take 
advantage of the opportunity, or how likely or unlikely one is to 
make such choice. 
Rejecting the idea that the question of whether one “has an 
opportunity X” would depend on how likely one was to take 
advantage of X, it would seem that the two plausible candidates for 
a conception of opportunity in the literature on multiculturalism 
would remain Barry’s objective conception of opportunity (an 
option X that one can, bar one’s physical constraints, take 
advantage of) and the subjective conception described above (the 
objective conception conjoined with the capacity to choose X). 
According to both of these conceptions, however, it is not the case 
that the turban wearing Sikh would not have the opportunity to 
work as a police officer, nor would it thus seem that the 
requirement preventing the turban wearing Sikh from working as a 
police officer would go against the principle of equality of 
opportunity – that is, at least if one conceives equality of 
opportunity in Barry’s broad sense of having roughly identical 
opportunity sets within which to make one’s choices. 
 
2.2. Opportunities and costs 
Within the framework of equality of opportunity in terms of 
roughly identical opportunity sets to choose from, the above 
conceptualizations of opportunity (whether as an objective or 
(partially) subjective state of affairs) would seem to lead to the 
same conclusion. The turban wearing Sikh has the opportunity to 
                                                 
318 It should be emphasized that, at this stage, the question is merely about 
the existence of an opportunity, and equality of opportunity in the sense of 
the roughly identical opportunity sets to choose from.  Whether this notion 
of equality of opportunity (as a roughly identical opportunity set to choose 
from) is viable, will be discussed in the following subsection 2.2. 
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take off his turban and work as a police officer, regardless of 
whether this opportunity is understood in purely objective or 
partially subjective terms. Despite this upshot (with respect to the 
existence of the opportunity in question), it is still possible to argue 
that, despite having an opportunity X, one might not have equal 
opportunities, in the sense in which the liberal state should be 
concerned about equality of opportunity. To recall, according to 
Barry’s broad conception, it is enough for equality of opportunity to 
obtain, if people are given (roughly) identical opportunity sets of 
X,Y,Z etc. to choose from. Within these sets, people are free to 
make their choices, and it is perfectly justifiable for a choice of X to 
cancel out Y, and vice versa. For example, it is perfectly justifiable 
that one’s choice of becoming a police officer cancels out the 
prospect of one becoming a brain surgeon, or that one’s choice of 
not wanting to conform to the requirements of a particular job 
cancels out the prospects of getting that job. What is important is 
that, initially, people have roughly identical opportunity sets within 
which to make their choices, not that these opportunity sets would 
remain intact, once certain choices have been made and taken 
advantage of. 
It has, however, been noted that Barry’s view of equality of 
opportunity as the provision of roughly identical opportunity sets 
may fail to capture something important about the kinds of equality 
of opportunity that the liberal state should be concerned about. As 
David Miller has argued, it is not only that the liberal state should 
be concerned about people having roughly identical opportunity 
sets to start with, but it should also be concerned with the contents 
of these sets (as measured against people’s actual ambitions), as 
well as about the costs that the taking advantage of these 
opportunities may involve.319 According to Miller, it is, firstly, not 
enough that people are given roughly identical opportunity sets of 
X,Y,Z, if the ambitions of (some) members of society are rather 
Q,P,R. And, secondly, it is not enough for a liberal state to be 
concerned about people having any particular opportunity to X, but 
                                                 
319 Miller 2002b, 46. 
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that people have this opportunity to X without excessive 
costs.320This incorporation of costs into the notion of equality of 
opportunity deserves some further attention.321 
 
The excessive costs –argument and strategies for its denial 
According to Miller, an opportunity X is not merely a physical 
possibility to X, but a possibility to X without incurring excessive 
costs or risks of such costs. One does not have an opportunity X, in 
Miller’s account, if the prospective costs of taking advantage of X 
are sufficient to deter a reasonable person.322 In the case of the 
turban wearing Sikh, it would thus be that the turban wearing Sikh 
would not have an opportunity to work as a police officer, if the 
costs of working as a police officer were high enough to deter a 
reasonable person from doing so.323  
                                                 
320 Miller 2002b, 51. 
321 For the time being, I ignore Miller’s first claim about the need of the 
opportunity sets to reflect people’s actual ambitions. In the light of our 
example case (that of the turban wearing Sikh and the dress requirements 
of the police force), it is not entirely clear how this would fit into the case 
at hand – that is, into the questions of equality of opportunity for a 
particular position or job X. Even if it was the case that the liberal state 
should be concerned about people having, not only roughly identical 
opportunity sets, but opportunities that reflected their actual ambitions, in 
the case of the turban wearing Sikh and the dress codes of the police 
officer, the ambition (that is, of being a police officer) would already seem 
to be fixed. The important question, in this case, would thus seem to be, 
not whether the opportunity to become a police officer was reflecting the 
actual ambitions of those to whom this opportunity was open, but whether 
people, regardless of their cultural background, would have equal 
opportunities to fulfill this particular ambition.  
322 Miller 2002b, 51. 
323 One could question the way in which Miller incorporates costs (or risks 
of costs) into the concept of opportunity itself, but one’s side of this debate 
need not determine one’s views on whether the dress codes of the police 
officer (that prevent turban wearing Sikhs from working as police officers) 
are consistent with the principles of equality of opportunity. Even if one 
took the view that the costs of doing X should be viewed as separate from 
the existence of the opportunity itself , one could still argue that, in order 
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In my discussions on fair equality of opportunity (section 1), I 
utilized the modified importance argument324 to show that, due to 
the potentially tremendous importance of one’s cultural 
commitments or practices and the harm that may be endured from 
abandoning these practices, it could not be argued that those 
adhering to the conflicting cultural practices would have, with the 
same amounts of talent and effort, the same prospects of success as 
those whose cultural practices did not conflict with the used criteria. 
Translated into the language of equal opportunities (in terms of an 
opportunity to X without excessive costs), it could be argued that 
those adhering to the conflicting cultural practices, despite having 
an opportunity X could not take advantage of X without 
encountering the costs resulting from the abandonment of their 
cultural practices. Provided that the modified importance argument 
is correct, and that the consequences of abandoning one’s cultural 
practices could be of such magnitude as the loss of one’s identity or 
self-respect, it could be argued that these costs would, indeed, be 
excessive, deterring a reasonable person from taking advantage of 
the opportunity in question. Criteria that would require certain 
people to abandon their deep-most cultural commitments would 
thus be in conflict with equality of opportunity, as the abandoning 
of these commitments would constitute a cost no reasonable person 
would be willing to bear in order to take advantage of the 
opportunity in question. 
                                                                                                     
for equality of opportunity to exist, these costs should not be excessive. 
Whereas for an opportunity to exist, one does not need to think of the costs 
that taking advantage of the opportunity would result in, for  equality of 
opportunity to prevail, one does. To put it in other words, for one to have 
an opportunity X, it only needs to be the case that one has “an option that 
is either conjoined or non-conjoined with a capacity to choose this option”, 
whereas for one to have equal opportunity to X, one also needs this option 
to be such that one can take advantage of this option without excessive 
costs. 
324 That is, that one’s cultural practices could be conceived of such 
potentially tremendous importance to people that it would not be 
reasonable to expect them to abandon such practices due to the harm that 
this could cause to their identity and self-respect. See also Ch. 1.1. 
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Not all liberal multiculturalists, including Brian Barry, would, of 
course, accept the excessive-costs –argument, but rather insist that, 
at least in some cases, the existence, or even the excessiveness, of 
the costs involved had no impact on whether equality of 
opportunity would prevail. In order to make such case, three 
different strategies could be utilized. Firstly, one could try to reject 
the view of one’s cultural practices as of potentially tremendous 
importance to one’s identity and self-respect. That is, one could 
refute the modified importance argument. Secondly, one could deny 
that the costs resulting from abandoning these commitments would 
be of such a kind as to constitute a relevant kind of cost for the 
denial of equality of opportunity. Or thirdly, one could reject the 
claim that equality of opportunity would have anything to do with 
the costs that may result from taking advantage of these 
opportunities.  
As one of the starting points of this work has been the 
acknowledgement of people’s cultural commitments as something 
of potentially tremendous importance to their bearers, and as this 
acknowledgement is shared, not only by those who worry about 
equality of opportunity in cultural cases (such as Parekh and 
Miller), but also by their critics (such as Barry), I will not discuss 
the implications of denying this to the questions of equality of 
opportunity in cultural cases.325 The two other strategies, those of 
denying the kinds of costs incurring in cultural cases as relevant for 
the assessment of equality of opportunity, or denying the relevance 
of (any type of) costs, however, deserve some further attention. 
Both of these strategies, I believe, are also present in Brian Barry’s 
                                                 
325 Perhaps it is sufficient to say that, if one denied the fact that people’s 
cultural practices were of any importance (let alone tremendous 
importance) to their practitioners, one would most likely also deny that 
abandoning such practices would constitute a cost to those abandoning 
these practices. Thus, the thesis according to which one would be denied 
equal opportunities if the costs of taking advantage of these opportunities 
would be sufficiently high to deter a reasonable person would not be 
applicable, as the abandonment of one’s cultural practices would not 
constitute a cost in the first place. 
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work, although neither of these strategies manages to fully refute 
the excessive-costs-argument, or so I try to argue. 
 
Rejection of costs 
With respect to Barry’s general conception of equality of 
opportunity (in terms of roughly identical opportunity sets to 
choose from), it is important to note that there is no mention about 
the costs, or the kinds of costs, acceptable (or unacceptable) for 
equality of opportunity to obtain. This general conception refers to 
and is only concerned with the initial situation within which people 
start making their choices.326 It is perfectly legitimate, according to 
Barry, that one’s choice of X cancels out one’s choice of Y – or, in 
terms of the cost terminology, that the cost of choosing X is the 
loos of the prospect Y. 
Importantly, however, this strategy of denying the relevance of 
costs (any costs) for equality of opportunity is strictly restricted to 
Barry’s general conception, and is not available once we move to 
the more narrow conception applicable in cases such as education 
and employment. According to Barry, equality of opportunity in the 
specific cases of employment or education requires a very different, 
and much narrower interpretation, stating (roughly) that those, 
similarly suited or qualified, should have roughly same prospects of 
success. As Barry himself argues, this narrower conception of 
equality of opportunity entails, among others, that, in the context of 
education, those endowed with similar qualifications and 
motivation should also encounter roughly equivalent financial 
hurdles,327 thus placing at least some costs (i.e. financial costs) at 
the very center of equality of opportunity in the case of education. 
Equality of opportunity, as defined with respect to education or 
employment, must, according to Barry, be refined from the general 
                                                 
326 For the time being  I ignore the debate on the extent to which people 
can be seen to make choices in cultural matters. For an illuminating 
critique of the role of the chance / choice –distinction in multiculturalism, 
see Mendus 2002. 
327 Barry 2002, 217. 
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conception (of roughly identical opportunity sets), and the strategy 
for arguing that the turban wearing Sikh (of our example case) 
would not be denied equal opportunities cannot thus lie in the 
strategy of denying that costs – whatever they be – would be 
irrelevant in deciding whether equality of opportunity, in this 
specific case, would prevail.  
This would seem to leave us with the second strategy, that is, the 
denial that the costs of abandoning one’s cultural commitments 
would be of such a kind as to be relevant for the assessment of 
equality of opportunity, in order to refute the excessive-costs –
argument. 
 
Types of costs 
As noted by David Miller, the conception of equality of opportunity 
in terms of opportunities without excessive costs brings forth the 
difficult questions about what kinds of costs are relevant, as well as 
at which point these costs can be considered as excessive.328 Noting 
that Barry subscribes to an objective conception of opportunity 
(independent of one’s cultural disposition to take advantage of the 
opportunity), it could be anticipated that Barry would, also, 
consider the relevant kinds of costs as somehow objectively 
defined. That is, as costs that could be objectively measured, such 
as financial or material costs. Consequently, many of the costs 
involved in cultural cases could be deemed as irrelevant, such as the 
necessarily subjectively experienced costs of abandoning one’s 
cultural commitments in terms of the psychological costs of losing 
one’s sense of self, or one’s identity as a member of a particular 
cultural community.329 
                                                 
328 Miller 2002b. 
329 When analysing the costs of exit, Barry does, indeed, note that there are 
bound to be certain intrinsic costs (that is, costs relating inherently to the 
fact that one is no longer a member), and that there is nothing that the state 
can or should do about these kinds of costs. Barry 2001, 150-151. For the 
measuring problem within egalitarianism more generally, see e.g. Sen 
1997; Temkin 1993. 
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Curiously, the approach taken by Barry does not rest on an 
assumption that the costs relevant for the assessment of equality of 
opportunity should be objectively defined. Barry is perfectly happy 
to maintain that the wearing of a head scarf or a turban may be of 
tremendous importance to those who wear them, and that, in certain 
cases, requiring one to abandon such head gear for being able to 
work in certain occupations (such as office jobs or retail outlets) or 
to attend certain educational institutions (with particular kinds of 
school uniforms) is in conflict with equality of opportunity.330 This, 
Barry argues, is due to the excessive cost or sacrifice331 that the 
wearer of the head scarf or turban would need to make in order to 
take advantage of the opportunity in question. 
Provided that the cost of abandoning one’s cultural practice can 
thus, at least in some cases, be seen as a relevant kind of cost for the 
assessment of equality of opportunity, it becomes interesting to see, 
how, in the example case of the turban wearing Sikh and the dress 
codes of a police officer, the case either against or for the existence 
of equality of opportunity could be made. To be fair to Barry, he 
would, most likely, argue that the turban wearing Sikh would, in 
this particular case, be denied equality of opportunity,332 although 
he would also insist that in several other cases (such as when the 
cultural practice of wearing a turban collides with the safety 
requirements on a construction site) no complaints, based on 
equality of opportunity, could be made. The apparent mismatch 
between the two cases, I believe, rests on a strategy of incorporating 
reasons for upholding certain criteria in the conception of equality 
of opportunity itself, and on a rather dangerous conflation (or so I 
try to show) of inequality of opportunity per se, and justification of 
such inequality in particular instances. 
 
                                                 
330 Barry 2001, 54-62. 
331“Sacrifice” is the term used by Barry. (Barry 2001, 59.) 
332 See Barry 2001, 49. 
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Costs vs. justification 
In order to show why I think Barry conflates the notion of 
inequality of opportunity itself and the possible justifications for 
this inequality, one needs to look at the way in which the case for 
the inequality of opportunity in the case of the police officer, and 
the equality of opportunity in the case of the construction worker 
are made. The strategy adopted by Barry is to look at the reasons 
for upholding criteria that, in effect, prevent some people from 
working in these occupations. According to Barry, the dress codes, 
required by certain occupations, are, in most cases, merely 
conventional, and cannot thus be argued as essential for the 
performance of that particular job.333 Wearing (or not wearing) a 
particular type of head gear is not, in most cases, essential for a 
successful performance as an office worker or as a police officer,334 
nor is it essential for attending school or some other educational 
institution. Lacking proper justification (apart from convention), 
these criteria can be seen as imposing an unjustified burden on 
those whose cultural commitments are in conflict with such criteria, 
denying them equality of opportunity with respect to these 
occupations. 
On the other hand, Barry argues that, in the case of the turban 
wearing Sikh and the requirement of wearing safety helmets on 
construction sites, there are good reasons for upholding this 
requirement, even if it imposed a burden on those whose cultural 
commitments (such as wearing a turban) were in conflict with the 
requirement.335 Being a justified requirement, conceived as 
                                                 
333 Barry 2001, 59; 2002, 216. As Barry notes, there may be certain 
symbolic value to the dress codes, although this is true both of the 
professional dress codes as well as, and especially, of the dress codes of a 
certain culture or religion. 
334 There may be exemptions to this, such as that of the motor cycle police, 
required to wear a helmet for safety reasons. Barry 2001: 49. 
335 As it stands, in the UK, the turban wearing Sikhs are exempted from 
wearing hard hats (Employment Act 1989), although the liability for 
injuries is restricted to the injuries that would have been sustained if a hard 
hat was used. 
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necessary for a successful (and safe) performance on the 
construction site, Barry holds that it is not a question of inequality 
of opportunity if those wearing a turban are faced with the burden 
of abandoning this commitment, should they wish to take advantage 
of the opportunity to work on the construction site.336 
However, even if it made perfect sense to argue that the 
difference in the rationale of the conventional dress-codes (of office 
workers or police officers) and safety helmets (of those working on 
construction sites) should be taken into account when thinking of 
whether those with conflicting cultural practices can be required to 
abandon these practices (in order to do the job), what I disagree 
with, is that this rationale should affect our judgments on whether, 
in these particular cases, equality of opportunity would prevail, or 
whether one could make claims – based on considerations of 
equality – to be allowed to maintain one’s cultural practices despite 
the conflicting criteria.  
My skepticism about including the reasons for having certain 
rules in the assessment of the existence of equality of opportunity 
comes from two sources. Firstly, it is important to notice that, in 
both cases (those of conventional dress codes and safety helmet 
requirements) the costs that the used criteria impose on those whose 
particular cultural practice (such as the wearing of the turban) 
conflict with the criteria are identical. Regardless of the rationale of 
the criteria or the rule in question, the person with the conflicting 
cultural practice cannot conform to such rules without encountering 
the burden or the costs of abandoning such practice. Provided that 
the abandoning of the conflicting practice can be seen as resulting 
in such costs that would deter a reasonable person from taking 
advantage of the opportunity (the job) in question, it is clear that, 
the person with the conflicting practice, does not have equal 
opportunity to be chosen to or to perform in such job – that is, she 
                                                 
336 See Barry 2002, 219. It should be noted that Barry does give other, 
purely practical arguments for allowing Sikhs to work on construction 
sites without safety helmets (Barry 2001, 49-50), although he denies that 
these rationale would have anything to do with equality of opportunity. 
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lacks the opportunity to take advantage of such an opportunity 
without excessive costs. From the perspective of those whose 
cultural practice conflicts with the rules or criteria in question, the 
situation is identical, regardless of the rationale behind the rule or 
criteria in question. 
Secondly, whereas it may well be that, in some cases, the 
rationale for the rule or criteria in question is strong enough to 
overrule the claims of those disadvantaged by the rule, it is by no 
means the case that all rules (with perfectly justifiable rationales) 
would do so. For example, the dress codes in work places or 
educational institutions can be argued for on several grounds, 
including pure convention, internal coherence, public recognition, 
worker safety, public safety etc., and it is not the case that these 
rationales should be considered as creating equally pressing reasons 
for upholding the rule or criteria in question. Rather, there may be 
several kinds as well as levels of reasons for having a particular rule 
or criteria, some of which may be strong enough to justify the 
upholding of the rule for everyone (and the consequent requirement 
for those with conflicting cultural practices to abandon these 
practices), some of which may not. What would seem to be 
important, is thus not whether there are good reasons for having the 
rule in question (in most cases, there are), but whether the reasons 
for having such rules are strong enough to counter the claims that 
the upholding of such rules creates. Such an act of balancing, 
however, can only be done once both the rationale for the rule as 
well as the extent of the cost have been assessed, and to claim that, 
in the face of justified rules or criteria, no issues of equality of 
opportunity arise, would be to deny two important things. Firstly, it 
would be to deny the experiences of those whose cultural practices 
conflict with the rules or criteria in question,337 and secondly, it 
would also diminish the rationale that those, not being able to 
conform to a rule without excessive costs, could have for their 
                                                 
337 Recall that, from the perspective of those whose cultural practices 
conflict with the rule or criteria in question, the experience is the same, 
regardless of the justification of the rule or criteria 
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complaints. Instead of claiming that the rationale of the rule or 
criteria would affect the existence of (in)equality of opportunity 
itself, a better approach, I believe, would be to accept that, should 
one’s cultural practices prevent one from conforming to the existing 
rules or criteria without incurring excessive costs, then a case of 
inequality of opportunity is made. Whether this inequality is, in 
some cases, justified, is, of course, another matter, only assessable 
once both the rationale for the rule as well as the excessiveness of 
the cost have been assessed and balanced against one another. 
 
3. The proper object of opportunity 
David Miller’s conception of equality of opportunity in terms of 
opportunities without excessive costs does, as already discussed, 
manage to capture something important about the kinds of equality 
of opportunity that the liberal state should be concerned about. At 
the same time, however, this conception brings forth the difficult 
questions of whether and when the costs of abandoning one’s 
cultural commitments or practices can be seen as excessive. Quite 
clearly, not all cases of having to abandon one’s cultural practices 
constitute the relevant kinds of excessive cost, as these costs may 
well vary from relatively minor discomfort to the serious alteration 
or even loss of one’s identity. Depending on both the practice in 
question, as well as on any particular person’s relation to this 
practice, the costs of abandoning such practice may be excessive or 
non-excessive, leaving considerable scope of disagreement into 
whether any particular conflict between certain cultural practices 
and the existing rules or criteria should be viewed as leading to 
inequality of opportunity. In order for any particular case to be 
judged in terms of inequality of opportunity, one must judge the 
excessiveness (or non-excessiveness) of the costs in question, and 
in many cases, it is only once the excessiveness of the cost has been 
established (or convincingly argued for) that the claims, based on 
considerations of equality, are given proper attention. 
In order to be clear, I do not believe that the difficulties 
incorporated in the notion of equality of opportunity in terms of 
opportunities without excessive costs lie solely (or necessarily) in 
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the indeterminacy of whether the costs of abandoning certain 
cultural practices can be conceived as excessive. Certainly, there is 
always scope for disagreement in judging the excessiveness of the 
costs in question, and I perfectly agree that, at the level of cultural 
policies, it is not the case that a conflict between any cultural 
practice and any existing criteria should be viewed as the kind of 
inequality that the liberal state must rectify. Rather, the answer to 
the question of whether any particular conflict should be viewed as 
constituting the kind of inequality that the liberal state should 
rectify should take into account the importance of the practice to its 
practitioner, the excessiveness of the costs that abandoning such 
practice would result to, as well as the strength of the rationale for 
having the rule that the cultural practice in question is in conflict 
with. Not all conflicts between people’s cultural practices and the 
existing rules or criteria are, or should be, viewed in such strong 
terms, and the understanding of equality of opportunity in terms of 
opportunities without excessive costs is right to take this insight on 
board. 
Having said that, I do worry about the way in which the notion 
of equality of opportunity in terms of opportunities without 
excessive costs utilizes the default position of “having an 
opportunity X”. By doing so, it puts the burden of proof on those 
who, being disadvantaged by the rule, are left with the task of 
establishing that the costs of taking advantage of the opportunity in 
question are, indeed, excessive. That is, this conception of equality 
of opportunity starts from the presumption that, for example, the 
turban wearing Sikh of our example case does, indeed, have the 
opportunity to X (be a police officer), and the possible problem of 
inequality of opportunity is brought in only as a qualification of the 
initial position of “having an opportunity X”. Despite having an 
opportunity X, the turban wearing Sikh could be seen as lacking 
equal opportunities, but only if the taking of advantage of the 
opportunity in question is viewed as resulting to excessive costs. 
The utilization of the default position of “having an opportunity X”, 
would thus seem to put the burden of proof on those disadvantaged 
(that is, the Sikhs themselves), who are, from the very beginning, 
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required to prove that the costs of taking advantage of X are such 
that they would deter a reasonable person from taking advantage of 
X – that is, that the costs of abandoning one’s cultural practices are, 
indeed, excessive. 
Contrary to this view, the view that I outline in this section – 
that of equality of opportunity in terms of joint opportunities – aims 
at shifting the burden of proof from those disadvantaged by the rule 
in question to those who claim that a conflict of one’s cultural 
practices and the rule in question does not amount to inequality of 
opportunity. This shifting of the burden of proof is done by 
changing the focus of the debates on equality of opportunity from 
the questions of whether one can take advantage of an opportunity 
without excessive costs back to the very basic questions of whether 
one has an opportunity in the first place. However, rather than 
asking whether one’s having an opportunity should be conceived as 
an objective or subjective state of affairs,338 the central question 
asked in this section is, rather, what exactly one should have an 
opportunity to – what should the proper object of opportunity be. 
The following conception of equality of opportunity in terms of 
joint opportunities, it is argued, has the advantages, not only of 
simplicity (being primarily concerned with the question of “having 
an opportunity” rather than with the questions of excessive costs), 
but also of taking the disadvantages faced by minority members 
seriously. 
 
3.1. Opportunity to what?  
According to Jonathan Quong, much of the discussion on equality 
of opportunity within multiculturalism misconceives the level upon 
which the inequality (that is the proper concern of the liberal state) 
lies.339 Whereas for theorists such as Barry and Miller, equality of 
opportunity is often discussed within the framework of singular 
cases – such as (equal) opportunity to X (employment), or (equal) 
                                                 
338 A question that, as seen in the previous section, creates no difference to 
the actual existence of the opportunity in question. 
339 Quong 2006. 
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opportunity to Z (education) – Quong argues that the main issue of 
equality of opportunity should not be whether people have (equal) 
opportunities to X or Y or Z, but whether they have (equal) 
opportunities to X and Y and Z. For Quong, equality of opportunity 
is not simply about having roughly identical opportunity sets X,Y,Z 
to choose from (Barry’s general position), or about being able to 
take advantage of an opportunity without excessive costs (Miller’s 
position), but about having an opportunity to X and Y – that is, to 
combine one’s cultural commitments with one’s aspirations is 
public life, such as education and employment.340 
Quong’s notion of equality of opportunity in terms of joint 
opportunities utilizes the idea of certain basic opportunities as being 
primary opportunities, and the non-tradability of these 
opportunities.341 By basic or primary opportunities, Quong refers, 
not only to employment and education, but also to things such as 
having a family or pursuing of religious values – those aspects of 
human life that are generally conceived as fundamental 
opportunities in human life. Given the centrality of these 
opportunities, Quong argues that a system, requiring certain people 
to make choices between these basic opportunities (say, one’s 
cultural or religious commitments and one’s employment), would 
not fulfill the requirements of equality of opportunity.342 
The idea of the non-tradability of basic opportunities can be 
demonstrated by a rather uncontroversial case of combining family 
and employment. According to Quong, it is not enough that people 
have equal opportunities either to have a family or to have 
                                                 
340 Quong 2006, 62-66. 
341 Quong 2006, 66. 
342 Quong’s argument is based on the utilization of the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance. Although Rawls does not include family, religion or culture 
into his original list of primary goods, these are, however, central elements 
of people’s conceptions of the good. Thus, Quong argues that people 
(behind the veil of ignorance) would prefer a system in which one can 
combine one’s family, religion and culture with employment and 
education over a system in which one would be required to make a choice 
between, for example, culture and employment. (Quong 2006, 66.) 
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employment, as it would not be reasonable to ask people to make a 
choice between these two. Within liberal societies, we already think 
that having a family should not be something that creates a 
disadvantage in the employment market, and it is thus the equality 
of opportunity to combine family with employment that the liberal 
state should be concerned about.343 Transferred into the more 
controversial case of culture, the argument goes, it is widely held 
that one’s culture or religion should not create a disadvantage in the 
employment market, and it is therefore not only the provision of 
roughly identical opportunity sets of X,Y,Z (e.g. employment, 
culture, religion) that the liberal state should be concerned about, 
but the opportunities to combine the different variables within these 
sets.344 
 
General categories vs. particular cases 
The obvious advantage of Quong’s model, I believe, lies in its 
ability to bring the discussions on equality of opportunity back from 
the debates on the excessiveness of costs to the more basic 
questions of whether one has an opportunity (to X and Y and Z).  
As already indicated, the incorporation of costs (and the assessment 
of the excessiveness of costs) into the notion of inequality of 
opportunity itself brings forth several difficulties with respect to the 
assessment of whether any particular situation should be viewed in 
terms of inequality of opportunity. The utilization of the default 
position of “having an opportunity X” would also seem to put the 
burden of proof on those who are already disadvantaged by the rule 
in question, and who thus have to show that, despite having an 
opportunity X, they may not have equal opportunities to X, due to 
the excessive costs that the taking advantage of X creates. In 
Quong’s model, however, the assessment of the excessiveness of 
costs plays no role in the initial assessment of whether equality of 
                                                 
343 Quong 2006, 63-64. 
344 Quong 2006, 62-65. 
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opportunity prevails,345 as the question of equality of opportunity is 
assessed purely in terms of whether one has an opportunity to join 
one’s cultural commitments (Y) with employment (X) or education 
(Z). 
On the down side of Quong’s model, however, lies its generality 
that may prevent it from being applicable to the specific cases of, 
for example, the turban wearing Sikh and the dress requirements of 
a police officer. Whereas Quong holds that people should have 
equal opportunities to combine X (employment) with Y (cultural 
commitments), in the case of the turban wearing Sikh, the question 
is not of the general case of combining one’s culture (Y) with 
employment (X), but of combining a particular cultural 
commitment Y* (wearing of a turban) with a particular job X* 
(working as a police officer). Provided that, in most cases, the 
turban wearing Sikhs were allowed to wear turbans in the work 
place, it would certainly stretch the argument to claim that a denial 
of an opportunity to X* and Y* would also be a denial of an 
opportunity to X (employment) and Y (culture). Apart from 
becoming police officers, the turban wearing Sikhs would have an 
opportunity to work in all sorts of other professions, and may even 
work in the police force, albeit not in areas that require the wearing 
of the hat, or other particularly specified head gear.346 
                                                 
345 This is not to say that the assessment of the costs, and the balancing of 
these costs against the rationale of the rule in question, would not play any 
role in assessing whether such inequality may, nevertheless, be justified. 
The viewing of equality of opportunity in terms of joint opportunities 
does, however, better job in acknowledging the situation of those 
disadvantaged by utilizing the default position of inequality of opportunity 
(when the opportunity to X and Y does not exist), after which the 
questions about the justifiability of such inequality are attended to. 
346 Barry makes this point when discussing the requirements of the 
motorcycle police officers to wear safety helmets: “If not being able to 
ride a motorcycle ruled out a significant proportion of all the jobs in an 
area open to somebody with a certain level of trained ability, that would be 
relevant [for the liberal state that is concerned of equality of opportunity]. 
But it does not. It would also be a matter of specific concern if the inability 
to ride a motorcycle prevented Sikhs from joining the police force, 
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Whereas I believe this objection to hold some force, I also think 
that, in many cases, the scope of equality of opportunity to X and Y 
can be extended to cover cases in which either X or Y or both are 
modified into specific instances of X* (having a particular job) or 
Y* (adhering to a particular cultural commitment).  Two such 
examples (an opportunity to X and Y*, and an opportunity to X* 
and Y*) are discussed below. 
 
Opportunity to X and Y* 
Take, first, an instance in which a particular cultural or religious 
practice (Y*) is seen to prevent those who participate in this 
practice from gaining employment or education (X). An interesting 
example of this kind of case would be the French case of laïcité, 
and the banning of conspicuous religious signs in educational 
institutions. For the most part, the debate has concentrated on 
Muslim head scarves, and the ways in which the banning of head 
scarves has affected the school attendance of Muslim girls.347 
Notably, like most cases in which one’s cultural or religious 
commitments conflict with the general rules or criteria, the head 
scarf –affair, too, fails to fall neatly into the model of having an 
opportunity to X (education) and Y (culture).  The wearing of the 
scarf is, no doubt, only a particular, as well as a contested, 
manifestation of Muslim culture,348 and should thus be referred to 
as Y* rather than as Y(general).349  
                                                                                                     
because it is important that the police should be open to all, and should in 
fact contain representatives of all minorities. This is not so much a matter 
of doing a favor to Sikhs as one of pursuing a benefit to all of us. But there 
is nothing to prevent police forces from organizing themselves so that Sikh 
members are not assigned to duties that entail riding a motorcycle.” (Barry 
2001, 49) 
347 For the complexity of the head scarf –affair, see e.g. Bowen 2007; 
McGoldrick, 2006; Scott 2007; Laborde 2008. 
348 For some of the rationales behind the wearing of the scarf, see Lyon 
and Spini 2004; Hirschmann 2003, ch. 6. 
349 With respect to the other variable, that of education (X), no such 
modifications to specific instances of education (X*, X** etc.) are 
required. In the case of the French laïcité, the banning of head scarfs does, 
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Regardless of this modification (from Y(general) to Y*), it is, 
however, possible to argue that the principle of laïcité denies the 
scarf-wearing Muslims equal opportunities to combine their cultural 
commitments with their educational aspirations, in the sense in 
which the liberal state should be concerned about equality of 
opportunity to conjoin X and Y. Most obviously, the principle of 
laïcité denies the scarf wearing Muslims an opportunity to X 
(education) and Y* (wearing of a scarf), whereas for those with no 
equivalent religious signs, no such denial of opportunity exists. 
Provided that, as a general rule, one should have an opportunity to 
conjoin education (X) with one’s cultural commitments (Y), it 
would not seem to matter which particular cultural commitment 
(Y*) was preventing one from enjoying the prospects of education. 
The general formulation of an opportunity to conjoin education (X) 
with one’s cultural commitments (Y), although not referring to any 
particular cultural commitments (Y*), is general enough to 
incorporate a wide variety of these commitments, any of which may 
be enough to deny one’s opportunity to enjoy the other variable of 
education (X). Although the principle of laïcité by no means 
prevents the scarf wearing Muslims from engaging in several other 
manifestations of their culture (apart from the wearing of the scarf 
in public schools), it is clear that it does, nevertheless, create a 
situation in which the scarf wearing Muslims need to make a choice 
between their education and a practice that (in accordance with the 
modified importance-argument given earlier) can be viewed of 
(potentially) tremendous importance for the well-being and self-
respect of its practitioner. Provided that, as a default, it would be 
unreasonable to ask people to abandon those cultural commitments 
that they so deeply cherish, it would, I believe, also be 
                                                                                                     
in effect, deny access of those wearing a head scarf to all public schools 
(with a curious exemption of universities). Whereas there are, no doubt, 
also ways around the ban, I believe the case of laïcité to be general enough 
to justify the keeping of the other variable of education as X (general). 
Part I Justifying Minority Rights 
212 
 
unreasonable, as a default, to ask them to make a choice between 
these particular commitments and their education. 350 
 
Opportunity to X* and Y* 
Whereas the French case of laïcité can be used to demonstrate why 
the lacking of an opportunity to X (education) and Y* (wearing a 
scarf) could be seen as falling within the more general instance of 
lacking an opportunity to X and Y, a further argument for including 
cases of X* (particular education or particular job) and Y* 
(particular cultural or religious commitment) is needed. Whereas 
the importance -argument given in Ch. 1 strongly suggests 
accepting that, should one’s adherence to a particular cultural 
commitment prevent one from gaining education or acquiring 
employment, the principle of equality of opportunity to X and Y is 
violated, this is not necessarily the case, should one’s specific 
cultural commitments (Y*) prevent one from gaining some 
particular employment (X*). As Brian Barry argues, there is a 
difference between whether the turban wearing Sikhs are being 
denied an opportunity to work in some particular profession (that, 
for a good reason, requires taking off the turban) and them being 
systematically excluded from the job market as a whole.351 In 
                                                 
350 The acceptance of a particular cultural practice as one of the variables 
of an opportunity to X and Y(*), is thus supported (as well as possibly 
constrained) by the importance –argument given in Ch. 1. Provided that a 
particular cultural practice (such as the wearing of a head scarf) can be 
seen as an integral element of a person’s identity and well-being, and that 
it would not thus be reasonable, as a default, to expect one to abandon 
such practice, a choice between such practice and education would seem to 
be equally unreasonable. This does not, it should be emphasized, imply 
that any Y* should thus be allowed in public schooling or workplaces, as 
there may well be other strong reasons for prohibiting such practice. It is 
simply to say that, should one’s cultural commitment, Y*, conflict with 
the general criteria for education (or employment), inequality of 
opportunity obtains. Whether this inequality is, nevertheless, justified, is 
another matter that needs to be assessed with all the relevant information 
at hand. 
351 Barry 2001, 49; 104-105. 
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Barry’s view, only the latter kinds of instances (involving 
systematic exclusion) should be viewed in terms of inequality of 
opportunity, whereas the exclusion of the turban wearing Sikhs 
from a relatively small number of jobs should not, due to this kind 
of exclusion still leaving the majority of jobs open. As long as the 
pool of options (jobs) available  for the turban wearing Sikhs is not 
substantially cut down by not allowing the wearing of turbans in a 
(relatively small) number of jobs, equality of opportunity, in 
Barry’s account, prevails. 
Barry’s position of excluding the specific cases of Y* and X*  
from the realm of inequality of opportunity would, at least at first 
sight, be perfectly consistent with the idea that people should have 
equal opportunities to combine their cultural or religious 
commitments (Y) with employment (X). Provided that the number 
of jobs not available to the turban wearing Sikhs was relatively 
small, one could argue that equality of opportunity to X and Y 
would still prevail, as the number of jobs with which the wearing of 
the turban could be conjoined was only minutely smaller (and, thus, 
roughly identical) to the number of jobs available for those not 
wearing a turban. The case of turban wearing Sikhs being prevented 
from working as police officers (or, in Barry’s account, as motor 
bike officers or as construction workers)352 could not thus be 
conceived of as constituting inequality of opportunity, as long as 
the vast majority of other jobs did not prevent the wearing of the 
turban in the work place. 
There is, however, something afoul in arguing that the equality 
(or inequality) of opportunity in specific cases (X* and Y*) would 
be dependent on the equality (or inequality) of opportunity in the 
general case (X and Y*). That is, as Barry seems to claim, that the 
assessment of whether the lacking of an opportunity to X* and Y* 
constitutes inequality of opportunity would depend on whether one 
has an opportunity to X (sufficient number of other jobs) and Y*. In 
                                                 
352 As already indicated, Barry does not advocate an immediate 
repudiation of the hard hat exemptions, although reasons for doing so are 
more practical than principled. (Barry 2001, 49-50.) 
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order to see this, it may be worth utilizing a parallel case of having 
an opportunity to have both employment and raise a family. 
Provided that we already think that one’s choice of having a family 
should not be a disadvantage in the employment market, and that 
people should have equal opportunities to conjoin having a family 
with employment, would it not constitute a case of inequality of 
opportunity if one was denied access to a particular profession due 
to one having a family? Or, to make the case reflect more closely 
the particularity of the cultural case, would it not be a case of 
inequality of opportunity if a particular profession (X*) was not 
open to those who, say, had children (Y*) on the basis that people 
with children would still have a wide variety of professions to 
choose from? 
Whereas one could, no doubt, consistently argue that, as people 
with children would still have a wide variety of professions to 
choose from, and that a denial of access to a particular profession 
due to one having children would not constitute inequality of 
opportunity, I doubt that this is the conclusion that many liberals 
would be willing to endorse. As there is already an agreement that 
having a family (or, a particular aspect of having a family, having 
children) should not create a disadvantage in the employment 
market, it would seem that any case, denying one the opportunity to 
combine employment with having children, should be viewed as 
constituting a case of inequality of opportunity. In a parallel vein, as 
there is already agreement that one’s culture or religion should not 
create a disadvantage in the employment market, any case violating 
this principle should be viewed as constituting a case of inequality 
of opportunity – irrespective of the number of other jobs with which 
the adherence to a particular cultural practice was compatible. 
It should be emphasized that the above is, of course, a purely 
structural argument against the view according to which people 
with certain cultural commitments are not relevantly disadvantaged 
by not having an opportunity to X* and Y* because the denial of 
X* and Y* does not sufficiently hamper their opportunities to X 
and Y*. As discussed in the previous section (2.2.), Barry’s 
argument for denying that the specific cases of denying opportunity 
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to X* and Y* would constitute inequality of opportunity is based, 
not only on the number of other jobs (with which the cultural 
commitment in question is compatible), but also on the reasons for 
why one is prevented from adhering to this particular commitment 
in some particular job. In the above cases of having children and 
wearing a turban, it could be objected that, whereas having children 
does not necessarily effect one’s successful performance in the job 
(at least if children are not brought to the work place or result in 
excessive leaves of absence), the wearing of the turban does. For 
example, in jobs that require the wearing of safety helmets, the 
wearing of a turban can be seen as lowering safety at the work 
place, and in the example case of the dress requirements of the 
police officer, it could be argued, the identifiability, internal morale, 
or public respect of the police force may be substantially reduced. 
However, as I already tried to show (2.2.), I believe that the 
incorporation of the reasons for upholding certain rules or criteria 
into the assessment of equality of opportunity ignores the important 
distinction between the existence of equal opportunities and the 
possible justification for their denial, as well as undermines the 
experiences of those who are, as a matter of fact, disadvantaged by 
the incompatibility of their cultural practices with the rule in 
question. Instead of arguing that only those cases of denying 
opportunity to X* and Y* qualify as cases of inequality of 
opportunity where there clearly is no justification for the rule in 
question (or where the exclusion is systematic), the proposed 
account of assessing equality of opportunity simply in terms of 
“having an opportunity to X(*) and Y(*)” would seem to take better 
into account, both the complexity of the situations at hand, as well 
as the experiences of those disadvantaged.  
Whereas I do not deny that, in some cases, there may well be 
overriding considerations that justify the denial of equality of 
opportunity (some of which will be discussed shortly in section 
3.2.), I also believe that, from the perspective of the disadvantaged, 
it is essential that the claims, based on considerations of equality, 
are not denied in advance. The turban wearing Sikh who is faced 
with a rule that is incompatible with him wearing his turban is, de 
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facto, in an unequal position to that of the majority, regardless of 
whether the rule in question is justified. The turban wearing Sikh 
lacks the opportunity to X* and Y* and, by virtue of lacking this 
opportunity, also has a claim, based on considerations of equality, 
to complain about this situation. Whether this case, based on the 
acknowledgement of the inequality of opportunity to X* and Y*, is 
strong enough to warrant action (including possible exemptions or 
the abolishment of the rule itself), is a different matter, requiring 
careful assessment and balancing of the rationales on each side of 
the debate.353  
 
3.2. Joint opportunities and cultural exemptions 
Having outlined a specific conception of equality of opportunity in 
terms of joint opportunities (to X(*) and Y(*)), it is time to 
conclude this chapter by looking at some of the objections that may 
be brought forth against this conception and, by way of doing so, 
also outline some of the implications that this conception may have 
on debates on multiculturalism and, especially, on cultural 
exemptions. The main claim so far was that the understanding of 
equality of opportunity in terms of joint opportunities had the 
benefit of taking the disadvantages of those who lack an 
opportunity to X(*) and Y(*) seriously. That is, contrary to the 
alternative conceptions (those of equality of opportunity in terms of 
roughly identical opportunity sets, or in terms of opportunities 
without excessive costs), the conception of equality of opportunity 
in terms of joint opportunities was able to recognize the 
                                                 
353 One of the main benefits of the conception of equality of opportunity in 
terms of joint opportunities to X(*) and Y(*) thus lies in its ability to give 
certain kind of legitimation to the claims of those who are, de facto, 
disadvantaged by the incompatibility of their particular cultural practices 
and general rules or norms of society. Whereas it may well be that, in 
many of these cases, the inequality in question is deemed justified, it 
makes a huge difference (especially to those disadvantaged) whether this 
conclusion is reached by a careful balancing of reasons on each side of the 
debate, or by the exclusion of the claims of those disadvantaged in the face 
of rules that have already been deemed as justified. 
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disadvantages resulting from the incompatibility of particular 
cultural practices and general rules, without imposing extra burdens 
of proof on those disadvantaged. Any situation, denying one’s 
opportunity to X(*) and Y(*), could, in this conception, be viewed 
in terms of inequality of opportunity, without the need to 
incorporate questions about the extensiveness of costs or of the 
rationales for upholding the conflicting rules into the initial 
assessment of the situation. 
One of the obvious objections to this view is that it would 
expand the cases, viewed in terms of inequality of opportunity, 
almost exponentially, as it would incorporate any case of cultural 
incompatibility (and the consequent lack of opportunity to X(*) and 
Y(*)) into the realm of inequality of opportunity. Anyone, whose 
cultural or religious commitment prevented her from adhering to a 
particular rule or criteria (while simultaneously adhering to the 
cultural commitment in question) could complain of inequality of 
opportunity, regardless of what the actual commitment was, how 
costly/non-costly it was to abandon, or how pressing the rationale 
for having the conflicting rule was. Viewing equality of opportunity 
in terms of joint opportunities, and in terms of “having an 
opportunity to X(*) and Y(*)”, the objection continues, fails to 
differentiate between cases of serious injustice and cases in which 
the lacking of an opportunity to X* and Y* is simply an 
unfortunate, albeit necessary fact of the world. If the assessments of 
the importance of one’s cultural practice, the extensiveness of the 
costs of abandoning such practice, and the rationale of the 
conflicting rule are ignored, there would seem to be nothing left to 
differentiate between cases in which the person disadvantaged can, 
perfectly legitimately, be asked to abandon their conflicting cultural 
commitment, and cases where the appropriate response may well be 
the granting of an exemption, or the reformation or abandonment of 
the conflicting rule or criteria itself. 
Whereas I acknowledge this objection, I also believe that the 
objection goes only half way, misconceiving the level upon which 
the conception of equality of opportunity in terms of joint 
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opportunities operates, as well as failing to recognize some of the 
benefits of this conception as opposed to alternative views. 
 
The burden of proof 
Firstly, it should be noted that one of the benefits of this conception 
lies precisely in its simplicity, and in its blindness to differentiate 
between cases in which the claims of those, denied an opportunity 
to X(*) and Y(*), should lead to changes (e.g. exemptions or 
changing of the rules or criteria), and cases where they should not. 
As already indicated, one of the downfalls of conceiving equality of 
opportunity in terms of opportunities without excessive costs was 
that this conception utilized the default position of “having an 
opportunity X” and, by doing so, placed the burden of proof on 
those whose cultural commitments were in conflict with the rule or 
criteria in question. In accordance with the conception of equality 
of opportunity in terms of extensive costs, the turban wearing Sikh 
would need to establish, not only that his wearing of the turban was 
incompatible with the rule or criteria in question, but also that the 
taking off his turban would constitute the kind of excessive cost that 
would deter a reasonable person from taking advantage of the 
opportunity in question. In order to have a claim, based on 
considerations of equality, the turban wearing Sikh would, already, 
need to prove several issues – all before being even acknowledged 
as lacking the kinds of opportunities readily available to the 
majority. 
The proposed conception of equality of opportunity in terms of 
joint opportunities, however, shifts the burden of proof from those 
already disadvantaged by the incompatibility of their cultural 
practices and the used criteria, to those who claim this disadvantage 
to be justified. The lack of an opportunity to X(*) and Y(*) is 
enough to give certain legitimation to the complaints of the 
disadvantaged, and it is the liberal state (rather than the person thus 
disadvantaged) that needs to prove why the denial of an opportunity 
to X(*) and Y(*) would be justified. The initial situation, provided 
by the proposed conception, is thus far more sympathetic towards 
those who are, already, disadvantaged by the incompatibility of 
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their cultural practices and the used criteria, providing also strong 
reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about these 
disadvantages, created by one’s lack of opportunity to X(*) and 
Y(*). 
 
Balancing of rationales 
Secondly, it should be emphasized that far from leading to a 
situation in which any case of lacking an opportunity to X(*) and 
Y(*) should lead into a substantive alteration of the situation at 
hand (either by the granting of exemptions or by the altering of the 
existing rules), this conception of equality of opportunity should not 
be thought of as aiming to resolve the difficult questions of how 
people’s cultural inequalities should be responded to. Rather, the 
proposed conception simply points out the rationale that the liberal 
state has for being concerned about the inequalities in question, and 
why the claims of those, being thus disadvantaged, should not be 
left unheard. In line with the arguments of the previous chapters, 
the acknowledgement of inequality of opportunity in any particular 
situation does not necessarily lead into any specific responses to 
this situation, but the assessment of any particular response (be it 
the upholding of the status quo, the granting of exemptions, or the 
alteration of the rules) needs to take several other issues into 
account – including the difficult questions about the importance of 
one’s cultural practice, the costs of abandoning this practice, as well 
as the strength of the rationale for having the rule or criteria at 
hand.354  
                                                 
354 An objection could be raised that, in the end, the conception of equality 
of opportunity in terms of joint opportunities makes no difference to the 
ways in which the disadvantages faced by minority members should be 
responded to. The liberal state’s response should, after all, depend on 
one’s assessment of the centrality of the practice in question as well as of 
the rationale of the rule at hand, thus creating a need for those 
disadvantaged to show the centrality of their cultural practice as well as 
the extensiveness of the costs of abandoning this practice. One of the main 
differences in my proposal lies in the initial framing of the situation giving 
certain equality-based legitimation to the claims of the minority members 
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What is important, in this model, is that the actual responses to 
cultural inequalities should depend more on the balancing of the 
rationales on each side of the debate, rather than on the one-sided 
assessment of the justifiability of the rule in question (Barry’s 
position), the extensiveness of the costs of abandoning one’s 
cultural practices (Miller’s position), or, indeed, the 
acknowledgement of the inequality of opportunity to X(*) and 
Y(*). Whereas the acknowledgement of the initial situation of 
inequality of opportunity gives strong reasons for the liberal state to 
be concerned about these inequalities, as well as legitimizes the 
complaints of those disadvantaged, no straight forward application 
to any particular cultural policies is made. Rather, the eventual 
assessment of the appropriate responses to such inequalities should 
be done in context, balancing the different types of reasons, and 
strengths of these reasons, on each side. 
As an example, it is clear that, according to the conception of 
equality of opportunity in terms of joint opportunities to X(*) and 
Y(*), the turban wearing Sikh lacks the opportunity to combine his 
wearing of the turban (Y*) with those forms of employment that 
require the wearing of alternative head gear, incompatible with the 
wearing of the turban. Due to this inequality, the turban wearing 
Sikh is, indeed, in a disadvantaged position to that of the majority, 
and has grounds, based on considerations of equality, to complain 
about this inequality. The task of the liberal state in this situation is 
then to assess whether the inequality in question may, nevertheless, 
be justified and how it should be responded to. Contrary to the 
“either/or” –position of Brian Barry,355 however, the 
                                                                                                     
and, as will be seen, on the emphasis on the balancing of the rationales on 
each side of the debate. 
355 As Barry states “either the case for the law (or some version of it) is 
strong enough to rule out exemptions, or the case that can be made for 
exemptions is strong enough to suggest that there should be no law 
anyway” (Barry 2001, 39; see also Barry 2001, 59-60; 321.) Barry does 
accept the possibility of there being cases in which both the law as well as 
an exemption would be defensible, although he does think of these cases 
as few and far in between. 
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acknowledgement of the complexity of the situations at hand, and 
the legitimacy of the rationales on each side, brings forth the need 
to balance between the different reasons on either side of the 
debate, thus leaving considerable scope for the liberal state to also 
adopt responses of rule-and-exemption to the cases at hand.  
For example, should the requirement of alternative head gear be 
based on important reasons for protecting the safety of the work 
force as a whole (as may be the case on construction sites), the 
balance of reasons may well tilt towards the upholding of the rule in 
question, regardless of the disadvantage that this may cause for 
those wearing a turban as part of their Sikh identity.356 On the other 
hand, should the rationale for alternative head gear come from the 
requirements of public identifiability and/or the advantages of 
having a particular kind of uniform for the morale of the work force 
(as the case may be, for example, with the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police), the balance may well point towards the granting 
of exemptions, rather than towards either of the two extremes (of 
holding the status quo or of abolishing the requirements altogether). 
Contrary to what Barry thinks, there may well be strong enough 
reasons for maintaining a particular rule or law for the majority 
while exempting a minority that is disadvantaged by the rule in 
question, and these cases may be brought forth by the balancing of 
the reasons for having such rule, and the disadvantage that having 
such rule causes to those affected.357 
                                                 
356 Whether the balance of reasons would, indeed, tilt towards such 
conclusion should, of course, be more thoroughly argued, taking into 
account the vast variety of considerations that any particular case may 
involve. The purpose of the examples, given here, are simply to 
demonstrate the ways in which the balancing of reasons may lead into 
different kinds of responses. 
357 This is not to say that the rule-and-exemption approach would be the 
only possible policy approach in these situations, but merely that, based on 
the balancing of the reasons on each side of the debate, such approach may 
be justified. 
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The case of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may illustrate 
this point. As has been noted, there may well be good reasons358 for 
upholding the requirement of the RCMP to wear the traditional 
Stetson (rule ‘A’). The impact of this rule, to the members of the 
majority, is relatively low, creating (at the most) a fairly 
insignificant source of discomfort to those who wish to become part 
of the RCMP and have to, thus, comply with the requirement of 
wearing the traditional Stetson. The reasons for having the rule ‘A’ 
thus outweigh the reasons that there may be for not requiring the 
majority to comply with such rule, making the upholding of the rule 
‘A’ justified. For the minority of the turban wearing Sikhs, 
however, the same rule ‘A’ has a very different impact, although 
the strength of the rationale for having such rule remains intact. 
Due to the rule ‘A’, the turban wearing Sikh lacks the opportunity 
to combine Y* (wearing of the turban) and X* (joining RCMP), 
and this inequality may, in the end, weigh more than the rationale 
for having the rule ‘A’. Whereas the lack of opportunity to Y* and 
X* does not, in itself, suffice to outweigh the reasons for having 
‘A’, it does, nevertheless, provide an ample starting point from 
which the strength of the rationale for not requiring the turban 
wearing Sikhs to comply with the rule ‘A’ can be assessed. In this 
instance, this rationale may be especially strong, due to the 
centrality of the wearing of the turban to Sikh identity as well as 
due to the public nature of the employment from which the turban 
wearing Sikhs would be excluded. Whereas with respect to the 
majority, the balancing of reasons may well tilt towards upholding 
the rule ‘A’, with respect to the minority, this balance may be 
turned. 
 
4. Conclusion on liberal egalitarianism and equality of 
opportunity 
Much of the discussions on equality of opportunity within 
multiculturalism have revolved around the very basic questions of 
                                                 
358 For example, reasons of public identifiability, internal coherence, 
morality of the force, identitarian or symbolic reasons, etc. 
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what it means to have an opportunity, which notion of equality of 
opportunity should be adopted, and how the adopted notion affects 
the ways in which cultural minorities are treated within liberal 
democratic societies. As I have discussed in this chapter, one’s 
understanding of both the nature of opportunity as well as the 
conception of equality of opportunity have implications, both for 
the ways in which to think about the rationale for the liberal state 
being concerned about cultural disadvantages (and which kinds of 
disadvantages), as well as for the kinds of responses that the liberal 
state may adopt with respect to these disadvantages. One of the 
more specific debates, conducted largely within the framework of 
debates on equality of opportunity, has involved the justifiability of 
the so-called rule-and-exemption –approach that aims to rectify 
those inequalities that result from the incompatibility of certain 
cultural practices with some particular rules or norms of society. 
In this chapter, I have defended a conception of equality of 
opportunity in terms of joint opportunities (to X(*) and Y(*) – that 
is, to combine one’s cultural commitments with, for example, 
employment and education), and the strong egalitarian rationale that 
this conception brings for the liberal state to be concerned about 
those disadvantages that result from the incompatibility of minority 
cultural practices and the general rules of society. This conception 
was developed largely as a response to the liberal egalitarian 
critique according to which there were no egalitarian reasons for the 
state to be concerned about these disadvantages, apart from a small 
number of cases in which there were no independent justification 
for the upholding of the conflicting rule or criteria. The 
incorporation of the questions of justification into the assessment of 
equality of opportunity itself, however, were seen to largely ignore 
the experiences and the viewpoints of those disadvantaged, pointing 
towards the need to differentiate between the questions on the 
existence of (in)equality of opportunity and its (possible) 
justification.  
The benefits of the proposed conception of equality of 
opportunity in terms of joint opportunities (to X(*) and Y(*)) come 
from two sources. Firstly, contrary to the alternative views (those of 
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equality of opportunity in terms of roughly identical opportunity 
sets, or in terms of opportunities without excessive costs), the 
proposed conception has the advantage of taking the experiences of 
those disadvantaged seriously, and shifts the burden of proof from 
those thus disadvantaged to those who claim these disadvantages to 
be justified. The viewing of equality of opportunity in terms of joint 
opportunities provides certain legitimation to the claims of those 
who are, de facto, disadvantaged by the incompatibility of their 
particular cultural practices and certain rules or criteria, regardless 
of whether these rules or criteria are justified, or whether the 
disadvantage in question should, in the end, be rectified.  
Secondly, the proposed conception of equality of opportunity in 
terms of joint opportunities may also help to understand the 
rationales behind different kinds of policy approaches, including the 
much debated approach of granting exemptions from otherwise 
generally applicable rules. Viewing equality of opportunity in terms 
of joint opportunities – although giving certain legitimation to the 
claims of those who lack the opportunity to combine their particular 
cultural practices (Y*) with, for example, certain prospects of 
employment (X*) – should not be viewed as giving any 
authoritative guidance into how the liberal state should respond to 
the inequalities at hand. Rather, the view proposed in this chapter, 
emphasizes the need to balance between different rationales on 
either side of the debate, acknowledging that there may well be 
good reasons both, for upholding particular rules or criteria, as well 
as for not applying these criteria to everyone. Whereas, at times, 
this balance may well turn to either, upholding the rule to everyone, 
or to getting rid of the rule as a whole, this balancing of reasons 
also leaves open the possibility that, at times, the rationale of the 
rule in question is strong enough to justify the upholding of the rule 
for the majority but not for the minority, thus legitimizing the much 
debated approach of granting exemptions from otherwise generally 
applicable rules or laws. 
 
--- 
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This discussion on equality of opportunity and cultural exemptions 
concludes the Part I of this work. In this part, I have concentrated 
on some of the grand theories of liberal multiculturalism, and 
espoused some of their weaknesses as well as strengths with respect 
to both, the rationale of the liberal state to be concerned with issues 
of cultural diversity, as well as with respect to the justifiability of 
differentiated rights in practice. Contrary to the grand theorists 
themselves, the purpose of these chapters has not been to argue for 
any comprehensive theory of liberal multiculturalism, or any 
particular policy approach of responding to cultural diversity within 
liberalism. Each of these chapters have taken a rather critical view 
on whether such comprehensive theories could (consistently) be 
established, and on what kinds of guidance these theories could 
give for the liberal state to respond to cultural diversity. One of the 
main claims of this part has been that the grand theories of liberal 
multiculturalism leave considerable scope of legitimate variation 
into the ways in which the liberal state can respond to cultural 
diversity, and that any particular response should, in the end, be 
carefully assessed in context. 
Having said that, these three chapters have also tried to show 
that there are strong liberal reasons for the liberal state to take 
issues of cultural diversity seriously. Most prominently, there are 
strong egalitarian reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about 
and to try to rectify people’s cultural disadvantages, and one of the 
legitimate responses to these disadvantages remains the granting of 
differentiated rights to those disadvantaged. The arguments, 
presented in this part, for the strong egalitarian rationale as well as 
for the justifiability of differentiated treatment, are, of course, far 
from conclusive and leave several questions unanswered – 
including the difficult questions of when and precisely how any 
particular minority right should be adopted. Moreover, they also 
bring forth another important question regarding the ways in which 
these rights are implemented in practice – that is, the questions 
about who, and according to which principles, should come under 
the differentiated rights in question. These questions of allocation 
are the focus of Part II, to which I will now turn. 
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PART II 
 
Liberal multiculturalism and minority rights  
 in practice 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, academic (as well as public) 
debates on multiculturalism have become ever more fragmented. 
The heterogeneity of normative considerations present in different 
kinds of right claims have – quite rightly – directed the debates 
away from the early emphases on the general justifiability of 
differentiated rights within liberalism, to more differentiated 
approaches, assessing each type of right on its own terms. The 
language rights of linguistic minorities, the land claims of 
aboriginal or indigenous people, the self-government rights of 
national minorities, integration policies, religious exemptions etc. 
have all prompted extensive debates of their own, taking better into 
account the specificities in each case. The individual case studies of 
different cultural and religious minorities, and the already adopted 
(or debated) cultural policies of different countries and 
jurisdictions, have provided valuable material for political theorists 
and philosophers to work on. Whereas this specification of debates 
has certainly served the purpose of developing more sophisticated 
understandings and analyses of different kinds of rights in different 
contexts, it may, however, also have made it more difficult for the 
theorists of multiculturalism to see the broader picture, including 
the kinds of background assumptions that the debates on 
multiculturalism (old and new) have come to take for granted.  
One of these background assumptions, and the main focus of 
this Part II, is the assumption of minority- or differentiated rights as 
being specifically group-differentiated rights. That is, the 
assumption about the scope of culturally differentiated rights as 
being rights of particular cultural groups or their members. 
Essentially, this assumption comes down to two things. Firstly, with 
respect to the group rights proper (that is, rights granted to and 
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exercised by the group as a collective),359 it is presumed that there 
is, indeed, some relevantly defined group of people that can, as a 
collective, exercise the right in question. A national minority, such 
as the Welsh, or an indigenous group, such as the Pueblo Indians, 
would be primal examples of such groups, although certain 
religious minorities, such as Muslims and Jews, may also be given 
rights that are exercised by the group as a collective, for example, 
by the recognition of parallel family or inheritance laws. Moreover, 
and more interestingly for my purposes, it is also presumed that the 
authority exercised by the group in question is primarily restricted 
to its own members, presuming that one’s membership of a cultural 
group serves as the relevant criterion for coming under the 
influence of the group right in question.360 
Secondly, with respect to individually exercised membership 
rights, such as exemption or assistance rights, it is often presumed 
that one’s membership of a particular cultural or religious group 
operates as the relevant criterion for being eligible for such rights. 
Individually exercised membership rights are given to people by 
virtue of their membership in a cultural or religious group, 
presuming, not only the existence of cultural groups and their 
constituent members, but also that the group of people called 
“members” coincides sufficiently with that group of people whose 
benefit the rights in questionares trying to serve. 
In this second part of my book, I aim to question these common 
assumptions of culturally differentiated rights as specifically group-
differentiated rights by questioning the whole notion of group 
membership and its applicability as a relevant criterion for 
                                                 
359 Such as different forms of self-government, including the recognition 
of parallel codes of legislation. 
360 Not all effects of group rights proper fall on the group members, 
although this is, primarily, the case. For example, the rights of territorial 
autonomy have an effect on everyone who resides or wants to reside 
within the given territory. The group rights proper also affect the ways in 
which others conceive and come to treat the group or its members, thus 
having an effect also on the relations between different groups and their 
members. 
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allocating differentiated rights. By the allocation of differentiated 
rights, I refer to the questions of who, and on what grounds, should 
come under the influence of the right in question (group rights 
proper) and who, and on what grounds, should be eligible for the 
right in question (individually exercised membership rights). These 
questions of allocation, it should be noted, are somewhat different 
from the questions of justification (discussed in Part I) although, as 
will be seen, one’s understanding of the proper aim of differentiated 
rights will, quite rightly, also affect one’s understanding of how 
these rights should be allocated. By way of analysing the 
constitution of politically relevant group membership, I argue that, 
in most cases, there are no uncontested ways of establishing one’s 
membership of any particular cultural or religious group, and that 
even if there were, this membership would, in most cases, fall well 
short of identifying those individuals whose benefit the 
differentiated rights are supposed to serve. As opposed to the 
commonly accepted criterion of group-membership, I argue for a 
more individual-centered approach for allocating culturally 
differentiated rights that is consistent not only with the basic liberal 
commitment to the primacy of the individual but also with the 
purpose of these rights as rectifying people’s cultural 
disadvantages. 
The main basis of my argument for a more individuated account 
of allocation is given in Ch. 4, Liberal multiculturalism, group 
membership, and allocation of differentiated rights, with the finer 
details as well as application of this framework being discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6. Whereas the first two chapters (4 & 5) form the 
very core of my argument (concentrating more directly on the 
problematics of defining group memberships and the implications 
of this indeterminacy to cultural policies), it is clear that the 
theoretical framework, presented in these two chapters, needs to be 
filled in and modified in accordance with the context within which 
it is used. Thus, in the final chapter, Liberal Individualism and 
cultural defence, I put my theoretical findings to the test by looking 
at some of the difficulties incorporated in the legal-theoretical 
context of criminal law and criminal courts, and by doing so, also 
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demonstrate some of the practical considerations that any approach 
to accommodating people’s cultural differences needs to take into 
account.   
Whereas these three chapters, by no means, aim to diminish or 
play down the importance that one’s cultural membership or 
belonging to a cultural group may have for any particular 
individual, they nevertheless question the viability of the 
membership-based allocation in addressing issues of cultural 
disadvantages. Instead of viewing culturally differentiated rights as 
specifically group-differentiated rights, in this part, I argue for a 
liberal, more individuated approach to cultural diversity that, 
nevertheless, takes people’s cultural commitments and their group 
identities seriously. 
 
 
 231 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Liberal multiculturalism, group membership, and 
allocation of differentiated rights 
 
Within the tradition of liberal multiculturalism, the 
acknowledgement of people’s cultural differences is conjoined with 
the basic liberal values of individual freedom, autonomy and 
equality. People’s identities – who they are and what they are able 
to choose – are shaped by their memberships in larger collectives, 
cultural groups. Culture is seen as shaping the meaningful options 
and opportunities of individuals, and successful participation in 
one’s cultural group is seen as enhancing rather than diminishing 
individual freedom, autonomy and well-being. At the level of 
cultural policies, many liberal multiculturalists have come to argue 
for differentiated treatment of cultural groups or members of these 
groups, based on the protection or, at times, promotion of these key 
liberal values. From the perspective of liberal equality, 
differentiated rights aim to rectify the disadvantages faced by 
minority members, and the differentiated treatment, according to 
many, is seen to best guarantee the freedom and autonomy of those 
different from the majority.361 
In this chapter, I start from the assumption that culturally 
differentiated rights may well be a way to successfully 
accommodate people’s cultural differences.362 For the purposes of 
this chapter, I take it for granted that, firstly, people’s cultural 
membership serves an important function in the constitution of their 
identities and opportunities, and that political decision making 
should also take this into account. Secondly, I acknowledge that the 
proposals for differentiated treatment of cultural groups or members 
                                                 
361 See e.g. Kymlicka 1989, 1995, 2001; Raz 1994, 1998; Deveaux 2000. 
362 This assumption is perfectly in line with the discussions of the first part 
of this work, where I argued that there was a considerable scope of 
legitimate variation to the ways in which the liberal state could respond to 
cultural diversity, including the granting of differentiated rights. 
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of these groups at least aim at accommodating people’s cultural 
differences by allowing them to pursue their own conceptions of the 
good.363 Keeping these preliminary commitments in mind, my focus 
from now on is on a further theme of liberal multiculturalism – that 
is, the idea of allocating differentiated rights along the lines of 
group memberships. Having my focus on the differentiated 
treatment of group members, my purpose in this chapter is to look 
at the ways in which membership in a cultural group is constituted 
and the kinds of problems that this constitution creates for liberal 
multiculturalists, and for the idea of allocating differentiated rights 
along the lines of group memberships.  
My argument builds upon two earlier conceptualizations of 
group membership, that of Joseph Raz and Avishai Margalit, given 
in their originally 1990 published paper “National Self-
Determination”,364 and that of Kwame Anthony Appiah, given in 
his 2005 work Ethics of Identity.365 I argue that, whereas both 
conceptualizations rightly acknowledge the importance of 
recognition in the constitution of group membership, they may fail 
to take sufficiently into account the discrepancies in recognition, 
and the implications these discrepancies have for the allocation of 
differentiated rights. I show that, due to the specific nature of 
differentiated rights, the view of allocating these rights along the 
lines of group memberships is flawed, as membership in a cultural 
group hardly parallels the cultural contents inherent in any given 
policies. By developing further analysis of group membership, I 
show why liberal multiculturalists should reconsider their views of 
group membership as the relevant criterion of allocation, and why, 
in contemporary circumstances of cultural diversity, alternative 
criteria are needed. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first part, Analysing group 
membership, builds upon Raz and Margalit’s analysis of groups and 
                                                 
363 Whether the differentiated rights do, in fact, manage to perform this 
task has been discussed in Part I, esp. Ch. 1, 2. 
364 Raz and Margalit 1994. 
365 Appiah 2005. 
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group memberships, and lays the ground for a recognition-based 
account of politically relevant group membership. I start (1.1.) by 
giving a short overview of Raz and Margalit’s conception of groups 
potentially eligible for rights of self-determination, and explicate 
some of the ways in which culture and cultural membership can be 
seen to affect people’s lives. I then (1.2.) turn to some of the 
conceptual issues relevant for cultural accommodation, and discuss 
some of advantages of membership-based accounts of cultural 
accommodation over the accommodation of particular cultural 
contents. In this section, I also return briefly into the problem of 
differentiated rights as always promoting certain cultural contents 
(as discussed in more detail in Ch. 1, 2.2.). In section 1.3., I further 
specify the role, as well as the source, of recognition that, I believe, 
is primarily relevant for the constitution of politically relevant 
group membership. 
The second part, Group membership and allocation, focuses on 
the kinds of difficulties that the discrepancies in different actors’ 
recognition (as well as their reasons for recognizing someone as a 
group member) bring to the view of group membership as a 
relevant criterion of allocation. In the first section (2.1.), I utilize 
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s account of a threefold structure of social 
identities in order to espouse some of the discrepancies that 
different actors may have for either recognizing, or not recognizing 
one as a member of a particular group ‘M’. This analysis is then 
used to question two prevailing assumptions within discussions on 
liberal multiculturalism. In section 2.2., I discuss the commonly 
accepted ideal that it should be left to the group itself to decide who 
it conceives of as its members, before turning more directly into the 
questions of allocating differentiated rights along the lines of group 
memberships (2.3.). All in all, I argue that the indeterminacy of 
group membership, conjoined with the view of cultural policies as 
promoting certain contents of culture, should steer us away from the 
membership-based allocation, and direct us towards a more 
individuated approach to allocating differentiated rights in practice. 
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1. Analysing group membership 
People’s cultural membership plays a special role in discussions on 
multiculturalism, and on liberal multiculturalism in particular. Most 
(perhaps all) liberal multiculturalists would acknowledge the 
importance of cultural membership for individual well-being, and 
most (although not all) would also view this membership as 
relevant for the distribution of benefits and burdens in a liberal 
society. Minority- or differentiated rights are often labelled as 
specifically group-differentiated rights,366 indicating that these 
rights are, indeed, either rights of cultural groups (group rights 
proper) or members of these groups (membership rights). Despite 
the centrality of these notions (‘cultural group’ and ‘group 
membership’), there have been surprisingly few attempts to 
systematically analyse these notions and their role in discussions on 
cultural accommodation.367 In this part, I thus aim to look at both, 
the role that one’s membership in a cultural group may play, as well 
as the ways in which this membership, from a political point of 
view,368 may be constituted. 
 
1.1. Raz and Margalit on group membership 
In their influential essay ‘National Self-Determination’, Joseph Raz 
and Avishai Margalit set to find a moral case for the right of self-
                                                 
366 The term ‘group-differentiated rights” being coined by Kymlicka 1995. 
367 Some such analyses can be found in Pierik 2004; Killmister 2011; for 
an interesting critique of “groupism” in social and political theory, see: 
Brubaker 2004. 
368 It may be helpful, already at this stage, to make a differentiation 
between the notions of ‘cultural membership’ and ‘membership in a 
cultural group’. Although these two notions have largely been used 
interchangeably in the literature on multiculturalism, it is important to note 
that these two notions also incorporate slightly different emphases. 
Whereas one’s cultural membership can be seen as referring more directly 
to one’s shared identity (or belonging), one’s membership in a cultural 
group can also be viewed in purely political terms, as an act of labelling on 
behalf of someone else. For the time being, these two notions are, 
however, used jointly, with a more proper analysis of one’s belonging 
having to wait until chapter 5. 
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determination. According to Raz and Margalit, it is a fact of the 
world that people are members of different groups and that 
memberships in certain groups are also essential to the valuable and 
worthwhile lives of individuals. Further, they claim that, on 
occasions, only self-rule can guarantee that a group can conduct its 
affairs in a manner necessary for the well-being of its members. 
Thus, in certain cases, the case for the right of self-determination is 
made.369  
In their search for a moral grounding for self-determination, Raz 
and Margalit build a six-stage criteria under which groups most 
suitable for self-rule are identified. The criteria include (1) a 
common, pervasive culture, (2) a strong impact of that culture on 
those living amongst its members, (3) formulation of membership 
through mutual recognition, (4) high social visibility, (5) stability of 
membership through non-voluntaristic criteria of membership, and 
(6) anonymity of members whose recognition is guaranteed by 
common characteristics.370 The criteria have a twofold task. On the 
one hand, they attempt to pick out those features that may explain 
the value of self-determination. On the other hand, they also work 
as a tool of identification. The criteria help to identify those groups 
that may have a legitimate claim for self-determination, although 
they should not be conceived as singular, straightforward criteria 
according to which the groups worthy of self-determination are 
decided.371  
 
Group memberships vs. groups per se 
Contrary to Raz and Margalit, who attempt to find criteria most 
suitable for those groups potentially eligible for rights of self-
determination, my focus, in this chapter, is on a different issue, that 
of the identification of members of cultural groups. In what is to 
follow, I thus focus mainly on Raz and Margalit’s criterion 3 – the 
formulation of membership through mutual recognition. As my 
                                                 
369 Raz and Margalit 1994, 110-130. 
370 Raz and Margalit 1994, 114-117. 
371 Raz and Margalit 1994, 113-114; 118. 
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intention is not to contribute to the debates on self-determination as 
such, nor to the descriptions of those groups eligible for self-
determination, I believe this focus to be justified. As opposed to 
different conceptions of groups and collectively exercised group 
rights, my interest lies in the – at least analytically separable – 
conceptions of group membership and differentiated treatment of 
group members. Thus, the other five criteria are discussed only so 
far as they are relevant for the main task at hand – that is, an inquiry 
into the ways in which conceptualizing group membership affects, 
and also should affect, the principles according to which 
differentiated rights are allocated. 
As my focus is on the differentiated treatment of group members 
(qua group members) rather than of groups as collectives, it may be 
objected that the formulation at hand – membership in groups 
potentially eligible for self-determination – fails in being applicable 
to memberships in other groups. Those groups, the objection goes, 
potentially eligible for the right of self-determination are groups of 
special status, and the formulation of group membership with 
respect to these groups should also be taken only to apply to the 
particular groups in question.  
Although there may be some weight in such a claim, it is not 
entirely persuasive. Firstly, it is possible to make an analytic 
distinction between the formulation of group membership and the 
context of identifying those groups potentially eligible for the right 
of self-determination. Having certain criteria of group membership 
is not, in itself, sufficient to establish a group as a group potentially 
eligible for self-determination, and can also be interpreted as a 
formulation of group membership in a cultural group in general. 
Secondly, even if one was to insist that this formulation of group 
membership applied only to groups potentially eligible for self-
determination, using this formulation for our present purposes 
would still make sense. Being a member of a group potentially 
eligible for self-determination does not as yet guarantee this group 
self-determination. Thus, the members of those groups potentially 
eligible for self-determination may, in reality, come under other 
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forms of group-differentiated policies, and be accorded 
differentiated rights and allowances by virtue of their membership.  
 
Groups of pervasive cultures 
In order to identify some of the difficulties of allocating 
differentiated rights along the lines of group memberships, one 
must first have an understanding of how culture and cultural 
membership can be seen as affecting people’s lives. Following Raz 
and Margalit, a cultural group – be it ethnic, tribal, religious, racial 
etc. – can be conceived as a group that has “a common character 
and a common culture that encompass many, varied, and important 
aspects of life, a culture that defines or marks a variety of forms or 
styles of life, types of activity, occupation, pursuit, and 
relationship.”372 According to Raz and Margalit, cultural groups do 
not need to be comprehensive in the sense that a person could 
belong to only one such group, but they do need to be pervasive in 
the sense that the common culture “penetrates beyond a single or 
few areas of human life”.373  
In Raz and Margalit’s view, both cultural contents as well as 
membership in a cultural group are inherent elements of people’s 
well-being. On the one hand, pervasive culture is seen as an 
essential ingredient in the constitution of a person’s identity. 
Culture is not, it is emphasized, the sole determining factor of one’s 
identity, but it is, nevertheless, an important and inalienable factor 
in shaping who people are and how they conduct their lives. 
Culture, so to speak, draws the boundaries of the imaginable and 
provides people with their own, culturally specified contexts of 
choice. As such, pervasive culture (the norms, values, beliefs, 
practices – the content of culture) is seen as fundamental to the 
well-being of those who share that culture.374  
                                                 
372 Raz and Margalit 1994, 114. 
373 Raz and Margalit 1994, 114. This conception of culture thus 
incorporates the view of broad culture (BC), although not the ideas of 
singular or determining culture (SC, DC). See also, Background 2.2. 
374 Raz and Margalit 1994, 118-121. 
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On the other hand, it is not only cultural content that provides 
for the well-being of its members, but also membership in a cultural 
group. Membership, in Raz and Margalit’s view, has a double 
function. (1) It is an essential part of one’s self-identification and 
(2) it is also a prerequisite for person’s full access to the contents of 
culture. Cultural content, its norms, values, beliefs, practices, affect 
all those living amongst members of a cultural group, but it is only 
through membership that a person can fully enjoy the opportunities 
created and shaped by culture. Further, membership provides 
persons with security and sense of belonging, also seen as central to 
the constitution of one’s identity and well-being.375 
 
1.2. Membership-based accounts of cultural accommodation 
As has often been noted, the notions of cultural content and 
membership in a cultural group have often been mixed in 
contemporary discussions on multiculturalism.376 For liberal 
multiculturalists, however, this distinction is of central importance. 
Within the tradition of liberal multiculturalism, cultural policies are 
often justified by emphasizing the importance of membership over 
the importance of particular cultural contents. Cultural membership 
provides for people’s identities, and creates meaningful options and 
opportunities. Consequently, the notion of culture, seen as 
politically relevant, has been formulated to fit these emphases. As 
already discussed, Will Kymlicka promotes the view of culture as 
referring to membership in a cultural group rather than to any 
particular cultural content, and also draws certain normative 
conclusions from this view.377 In Kymlicka’s view, the 
accommodation of different cultures or the granting of rights to 
cultural groups (or their members) is tantamount to the 
accommodation of groups and their ways of living (whatever they 
                                                 
375 Raz and Margalit 1994: 114-117; see also Raz 1994, 162. The relation 
between one’s belonging and one’s membership in a cultural group will be 
discussed in more detail in Ch. 5. 
376 See e.g. Kymlicka 1989, ch. 8; Appiah 2005, ch. 4. 
377 Kymlicka 1989, 167-168; see also Ch. 1, 2.3. 
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be), rather than to the accommodation of any particular cultural 
norms or practices.378 At the same time, membership – rather than 
the sharing of some particular cultural content – comes to operate as 
the relevant criterion of allocation.379  
 
Advantages of membership-based accounts 
For liberal political theory, the advantages of focusing on cultural 
groups and group memberships rather than on any particular 
cultural contents would seem – at least at first sight – obvious. 
Concentrating on groups and group memberships rather than on 
specific cultural contents would seem to be consistent with the 
liberal commitment that the state should stay neutral with respect to 
people’s different conceptions of the good. Groups and group 
members could decide which norms, values, beliefs or practices 
they wish to adhere to, and the role of cultural policies would 
simply be to enable these groups to do so. Further, this conception 
would seem to have the advantage of allowing cultural contents to 
be understood as complex and fluid, as well as of recognizing the 
heterogeneity of cultural interpretations. It incorporates the 
possibility of change into the realm of cultural values, norms, 
                                                 
378 It should be noted that the idea of accommodating groups and their 
ways of living (whatever they may be) does not come without 
qualifications. In the tradition of liberal multiculturalism, much recent 
debate has concentrated on the limits of respecting group autonomy. 
Whereas some argue that a principled freedom of exit suffices to 
legitimate a group’s right to decide about its own ways of being (e.g. 
Kukathas 2003; 2012), Kymlicka, for instance, has maintained that there 
are also substantial limits for the accommodation of different groups. 
According to Kymlicka, groups may preserve whatever lifestyles they 
wish, as long as these lifestyles are consistent with the liberal ideals of 
individual freedom and autonomy (Kymlicka 1989, 198; 1995, 153; 2001, 
41-42). 
379 For Kymlicka’s views on membership as the relevant criterion for 
distributing benefits and burdens in society, see e.g. Kymlicka 1989, 162; 
1995, 45; for other membership-based accounts of allocation, see e.g.: 
Miller 2002b; Loobuyck 2005. For critical remarks, see: Barry 2001, esp. 
ch. 4. 
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beliefs and practices, without necessarily prioritizing either the 
status quo or, for that matter, change for the sake of change. The 
common accusations of cultural essentialism, homogenization and 
reification would seem to be avoided, as accommodation of cultural 
groups and members of these groups in no way entails a unified 
conception of the members’ views, nor fixity in the cultural 
contents that any particular cultural group is associated with. 
However, if we take a more careful look at the way this 
conception relates to actual cultural policies, two immediate 
concerns arise. Firstly, it is not at all clear whether accommodating 
groups instead of cultural contents manages to stay clear of 
promoting certain conceptions of cultural content and, secondly, 
whether it also manages to sufficiently accommodate differences 
within the cultural groups in question.  
 
Cultural policies and cultural contents 
As already indicated in Ch. 1 (2.2.), granting groups or group 
members specific group differentiated rights does not – and cannot 
– avoid being committed to certain conceptions of cultural content. 
Group rights or other group-differentiated treatment are not 
produced in a vacuum, but are always specified in certain contexts. 
Granting a Sikh a right to wear a turban instead of a crash helmet 
already advances a conception according to which wearing a turban 
is an essential part of Sikh culture and an integral ingredient of Sikh 
identity. Granting a group a right to, say, decide about its own 
language policies – such as, for example, in the case of Welsh in 
Wales – advances a conception of language as being an integral 
ingredient of one’s culture and identity, and may also end up 
advancing a conception of Welsh language as being an integral and 
inalienable element of Welsh culture. Not only do the policies 
granted by the state prioritize certain conceptions of culture and 
identity, the actual policies decided by the group also prioritize 
certain conceptions of the content of culture over alternative 
conceptions.380 Treating groups or group members in a 
                                                 
380 See also: Festenstein 2005, 81-82. 
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differentiated manner – be it in terms of group-differentiated rights, 
allowances or general cultural sensitivity – necessarily prioritizes 
certain interpretations of cultural content, and may also encourage, 
rather than criticize, the much contested assumptions of cultural 
homogeneity and stability. And, if this is the case, more harm may 
be done to those members of cultural groups that do not subscribe 
to the particular norms, values or practices that the group-
differentiated treatment however indirectly advances. 
The claims that cultural policies may rather encourage notions of 
cultural homogeneity and inflict harm or injury on those who do not 
accept the dominant interpretations of their culture are, of course, 
very complex, and a few clarifications are thus in order. Saying that 
cultural policies may encourage cultural homogeneity is not to say 
that any group-differentiated treatment would necessarily 
encourage cultural homogeneity, nor that it would necessarily do 
harm to those with different conceptions of cultural content and 
identity. However, as discussed in Ch. 1 (2.2.), cultural policies do 
also give certain legitimation to certain cultural practices as proper 
elements of that culture and, by way of doing so, may also play into 
the hands of those who wish to see these practices as the only 
legitimate elements of that culture. Nor am I claiming that the level 
of directness according to which cultural policies advance certain 
conceptions of cultural content would be indicative of the level of 
harm that may (or may not) be done to those not ascribing to the 
cultural contents advanced. Giving a group a right to decide about 
its own language policies (advancing a conception of culture as 
incorporating language rather than a conception of cultural content 
as incorporating a particular language) may end up causing 
tremendous harm – for instance, in cases where the decided policies 
end up upholding strict mono-lingualism and ban the usage of other 
languages in public. On the other hand, a policy of, say, allowing 
Muslim girls to wear a hijab in school (directly advancing the view 
of wearing a hijab as an important element of Muslim culture and 
identity) does not necessarily cause harm to those girls not wishing 
to wear a hijab. However, whereas the link between cultural 
policies and the harm or injury inflicted on those who do not 
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subscribe to the dominant interpretations of culture is far from 
straight forward and, by no means, necessary, it is still a concern 
that needs to be taken seriously. As many have pointed out, those 
policies that aim at enabling people to live in accordance with their 
cultural identities may, in effect, end up necessitating that people 
live in accordance with the dominant conceptions of cultural 
content – a worry that should not to be bypassed lightly.381 
 
1.3. Recognition based accounts of group membership 
Granted that differentiated rights always prioritize certain 
conceptions of cultural content – whether directly, as in the case of 
granting Sikhs the right to wear a turban instead of a crash helmet, 
or indirectly, as in the case of granting a cultural group a right to 
decide about its own language policies – and that this may inflict 
injury on those members who do not subscribe to such conceptions, 
it is worth investigating what role cultural content has in the 
constitution of membership in a cultural group. Returning to Raz 
and Margalit’s view, they are committed to the idea of a group of 
pervasive culture being, at least partially, characterized by its 
common cultural content. The prevailing cultural norms and 
practices are characteristic of any particular cultural group, and 
these characteristics also operate as essential clues for recognizing 
those belonging to such groups (criteria 6). On the other hand, 
however, Raz and Margalit also acknowledge that cultures are fluid 
and heterogeneous, and that cultural contents also affect people’s 
lives very differently. People may be socialized into the prevailing 
cultural norms and practices, but they may also reject such 
practices, or interpret them in different ways.382 Furthermore, the 
different ways of being affected by cultural content applies both to 
                                                 
381 The relations between cultural policies and the harm that these policies 
may inflict on those most vulnerable in cultural groups have been analysed 
especially by many feminists scholars. See e.g. Benhabib 2002; 2004; 
Deveaux 2000; Okin 1999; 2005; Shachar 1998; 2000; 2001; Song 2007; 
Phillips 2007; 2010 
382 Raz and Margalit 1994, 114-115; Raz 2001, 35 ff. 20. 
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members and non-members alike. Thus, it is possible to be a 
member of a cultural group without sharing its cultural content, as it 
is also possible to be a non-member, even if one shared the 
prevailing norms, values, beliefs and practices.  
Provided that cultural content cannot (at least on its own) be 
used to denote group membership, just like group membership 
cannot be seen as indicating the sharing of any particular cultural 
content, some alternative criteria of membership is needed. One of 
the candidates for such criterion is recognition. 
 
Value laden and instrumental conceptions of recognition 
In the literature on recognition, much attention has been paid to the 
positive, identity-forming functions of different forms of 
recognition. For Axel Honneth, positive recognition provides for 
people’s self-respect and self-esteem, and lack of such recognition 
is tantamount to moral injury and an attack on one’s personal 
integrity.383 Similarly, for Charles Taylor, people’s identities are 
partly shaped by the recognition of others, and being mis- or 
lacking recognition can cause people harm by stunting their 
identities and creating demeaning or contemptible views of 
themselves.384 Although Honneth’s and Taylor’s views on 
recognition are by no means identical, they nevertheless share two 
important features. Firstly, they both subscribe to an inherently 
value-laden notion of recognition, portraying recognition as 
entailing certain forms of respect towards the person recognized. 
Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this chapter, 
they also acknowledge an important group dimension of 
recognition. For Honneth and Taylor, people are not only 
recognized as individual persons of certain traits and characteristics, 
but they can also be recognized collectively, as groups and as 
members of groups385 – as Muslims, blacks, women or gay.  
                                                 
383 Honneth 1997; 2001. 
384 Taylor 1994. 
385 Whereas for Honneth, this group dimension of recognition can best be 
understood under the rubric of other forms of recognition essential for 
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Whereas the value-laden formulations of recognition involving 
respect have dominated recent discussions,386 recognition can also 
be understood differently. According to this instrumental 
conception of recognition, recognition is used simply as an 
instrument for deciding people’s memberships in cultural groups. In 
this usage of the term, recognizing people as Muslims, as women, 
or as gays, simply picks out people as members of groups. 
Although not necessarily entailing respect, this form of recognition 
can also operate as a positive source of people’s self-identification 
and well-being. The crucial difference, however, is that recognizing 
a person as a member of a group does not, in itself, provide for that 
person’s self-respect or self-esteem, but does so instrumentally, 
through the ways in which group membership provides for people’s 
identities and meaningful opportunities. 
Raz and Margalit use this instrumental notion of recognition as 
follows: 
 
Membership in the group is, in part, a matter of mutual recognition. 
Typically, one belongs to such groups if, among other conditions, one 
is recognized by other members of the group as belonging to it. The 
other conditions (which may be the accident of birth or the sharing of 
the group culture, etc.) are normally the grounds cited as reasons for 
such recognition.387  
 
What is important to notice is that whereas shared cultural content 
certainly plays some part in the process of deciding who is 
recognized as a member, it is ultimately mutual recognition that 
determines who is and who is not a member of the group. As Raz 
and Margalit continue: “But those who meet those other conditions 
                                                                                                     
individual’s self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (see esp. Fraser 
and Honneth 2003: 2.III), Taylor takes a more substantial view of 
recognition as involving respect also for the values and forms of life of a 
cultural group (Taylor, 1994). 
386E.g. Taylor 1994; Honneth 1997; 2001; Galeotti 2002; Jones 2006. 
387 Raz and Margalit 1994, 115. 
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and are yet rejected by the group are at best marginal or 
problematic members of it”.388 Although the reasons for 
recognizing someone as a member often have some criteria and 
content – such as accident of birth (or other non-voluntary 
characteristic (criteria 5)) or participation in common practices and 
traditions (or other characteristics helping members to recognize 
each other (criteria 6)) – these criteria are, by no means, sufficient 
for indicating a person’s membership, nor are they even necessary 
criteria for such recognition. On the contrary, in Raz and Margalit’s 
view, a person is a full or uncontested member of a group only if 
other group members recognize this person’s membership. Given 
the double function of group membership, this instrumental form of 
recognition comes to play a key role in controlling people’s 
possibilities for worthy and meaningful lives. Being a member of a 
group – being recognized as a member – is an essential ingredient 
in the constitution of people’s identities, and it also operates as a 
gatekeeper, regulating people’s access to lives fully characterized 
by those identities.389 
 
Internal and external recognition 
Although I am sympathetic towards the above idea of recognition 
as operating, both as an important ingredient in the constitution of 
people’s identities and as a regulator of their opportunities, I also 
believe that Raz and Margalit’s characterization of recognition as 
primarily mutual recognition fails to capture something important 
about the source of recognition particularly significant in 
contemporary circumstances of cultural diversity. To recall, Raz 
and Margalit claim that it is the group’s internal, mutual 
recognition that ultimately matters in questions of group 
membership: “Membership in them [groups of pervasive cultures] 
is a matter of informal acknowledgement of belonging by others 
generally, and by other members specifically.” “[T]hose who […] 
                                                 
388 Raz and Margalit 1994, 115. 
389 Raz and Margalit 1994, 118-119. 
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are yet rejected by the group are at best marginal or problematic 
members of it”.390 
However, whereas this may be the case in relatively isolated 
groups not bound by the rules and regulations of the liberal society, 
in contemporary contexts of cultural diversity the situation is 
fundamentally different. In culturally diverse societies it is 
primarily the external recognition – that of the state and the wider 
political community it represents – that comes to play the 
prominent role. This, of course, is not to say that that the group 
members themselves could not be conceived as being part of this 
larger political community, but merely that it is never solely 
through the recognition of the group members themselves that 
politically relevant membership is constituted.391 As the rights of 
self-determination and other group-differentiated rights or 
allowances are granted by the state, representative of the larger 
political community, it is ultimately the recognition of others that 
matters, not the recognition of other group members. People’s 
identities as well as the means through which people are able to 
pursue their lives according to these identities are – in culturally 
diverse societies – affected largely by the recognition of others, as it 
is the larger political community that decides to whom 
differentiated treatment is applied and who is – in a politically 
relevant sense – a member of any particular group.392 
                                                 
390 Raz and Margalit 1994, 118-119, my emphases. 
391 It should be noted that my argument here in no way denies the 
possibility of internal recognition as influencing the recognition of others. 
However, as will be argued in the remaining sections of this chapter, it is 
highly unlikely that the politically relevant group membership would (or 
could) be dependent solely on the internal recognition of other group 
members, or that – at least in the case of minority groups – the recognition 
of others would not be ultimately decisive in the constitution of politically 
relevant group membership 
392 This is not to undermine the importance of internal recognition in the 
constitution of one’s identity and well-being. The opportunities as well as 
the sense of belonging given to, say, a Muslim youngster by the 
recognition of the Muslim community may, indeed, be central for the well-
being of this youngster. However, my claim is that, in the issues regarding 
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2. Group membership and allocation 
So far, I have discussed some of the ways in which one’s 
membership in a cultural group operates as an important ingredient 
in the constitution of one’s identity as well as a regulator of one’s 
access to opportunities. I also showed how an instrumental 
conception of recognition could be used to pick out this 
membership and how, with respect to public policies such as group-
differentiated rights, it was specifically the recognition of others 
that came to play an important role in deciding who was to come 
under, or be eligible for, such rights. Having laid some ground for a 
specifically recognition-based account of politically relevant group 
membership, in this part, I develop a more systematic account of 
group membership, including the possible indeterminacies of 
membership, based on the possible discrepancies of recognition. 
This analysis is then used to show some of the problems 
incorporated in the idea of allowing group members themselves to 
decide their own memberships, before turning into the difficulties 
that the indeterminacy of group membership brings to the questions 
of allocating minority rights in practice. These analyses, however, 
cannot be conducted without some understanding of what it means 
for a cultural group or group membership to be politically relevant, 
and how such relevancy is constituted. 
 
2.1. Politically relevant groups and group memberships 
By politically relevant groups (and politically relevant group 
memberships) I refer to those groups (and group members) that are, 
in the wider public debate, considered as potential claimants for 
differentiated treatment. Cultural and religious groups, but also 
groups described in terms of one’s gender, sexual orientation, 
                                                                                                     
cultural policies, what matters is ultimately the recognition of the larger 
political community, as it is the larger political community that decides, 
for instance, whether this particular youngster is provided with a certain 
diet in his school or is allowed to wear a particular type of garment in 
public. 
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physical capability etc. are commonly viewed as politically relevant 
groups in this sense of the term. Not all groups, however, are 
viewed as potential claimants for differentiated treatment, and it is 
thus important to identify those criteria that a group needs to fulfil 
in order for it to be considered a politically relevant group. 
 
Appiah on the structure of social identities 
Following Kwame Anthony Appiah’s conceptualization of the 
structure of social identities, there are certain requirements that 
should be fulfilled in order for a group to be a group in any 
politically relevant sense. Firstly, a minimum requirement of a 
general consensus regarding the existence of such a group must be 
established. It must make sense for people to use a particular label – 
Muslim, black, women, gay – in order to classify people under that 
label.393 
The mere existence of such label does not, however, suffice to 
make these groups politically relevant. Red-haired people or blue-
eyed people may well be considered sensible labels under which 
people are put, but they are hardly relevant in the realm of public 
politics.394 In addition to the formal classification, we must also 
                                                 
393 Appiah 2005, 65-66. Appiah’s account is strongly based on the so-
called dynamic nominalist view, promoted by Ian Hacking. (Hacking 
1992a; 1992b; see also Appiah 2005, 23; 65.) Following Hacking, Appiah 
argues that social identities are produced and brought into existence hand 
in hand with the invention and application of the label itself, and that it 
may well be that the invention and application of the label have operated 
as producing cultural differences, rather than cultural differences having 
brought about such labels or people’s identifications with the cultures in 
question. Whether Appiah is right on the origins of cultural differences or 
the coming into existence of labels attached to cultural groups do not, 
however, need to bear upon the analysis of the structure of social 
identities. 
394 Which labels are relevant in public politics is, of course, political itself, 
and may vary in different times and places. 
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have what Appiah calls a social conception of a label.395 This, 
according to Appiah, consists of two further considerations. Firstly, 
that there are some people who – at least occasionally – identify 
themselves as, say, Muslim, and secondly, that there are occasions 
on which some people are also treated as, say, Muslims. Identifying 
oneself as an M, according to Appiah, refers to the way in which a 
person lets his belief in being an M operate as a reason for his 
behaviour (say, a person prays five times a day because he believes 
this to be the appropriate thing for him, as a Muslim, to do). Being 
treated as an M, refers to the way in which the belief in someone 
being an M operates as a reason for a particular type of treatment 
(say, a person is not invited to the office Christmas party because 
the invitee believes this person, as a Muslim, to refuse anyway).396 
The political relevance of the groups of certain labels thus flows, 
not from the mere existence of the labels under which people are 
put, but from the expectations attached to people under these labels, 
as well as from the behaviour resulting from these expectations.  
 
                                                 
395 For a full account of Appiah’s conception of the structure of social 
identities and the social conception of a label, see Appiah 2005, ch. 3; see 
also Appiah 1996; 2001. 
396 Jorge J.E. Gracia gives a slightly different reading of Appiah’s account 
of the structure of social identity. According to Gracia, the structure of 
social identity is constituted by 1) availability of the term in public 
discourse, 2) internalization of those picked by the label, and 3) the 
existence of the patterns of behaviour in the group picked by the label. 
(Garcia 2006, 289.) However, whereas Gracia may be right in 
distinguishing between (2) the internalization of a label (or what I have 
called identification as) and (3) the behaviour resulting from this 
internalization, he makes a mistake in ignoring what Appiah really 
considers as the third element of social identity, that of someone’s 
treatment as a member of a certain group. This element, however, is an 
essential element of Appiah’s theory of social identity, and, as will be 
seen, it is also an element that plays an important part in the utilization of 
this structure to the questions of group membership. 
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Discrepancy in group membership 
Apart from identifying those elements that make groups politically 
relevant, the threefold structure of social identities can also be used 
in an analysis of politically relevant group membership. As ‘the 
expectations’, ‘the proper modes of behaviour’ or ‘the kinds of 
persons’ denoted by certain labels are multiple, heterogeneous and 
flexible,397 it is of no surprise that, in Appiah’s account, no 
particular cultural content can operate as the deciding factor of 
person’s membership in any particular cultural group. The 
expectations of, say, being a Muslim may well vary from a peace-
loving, God-abiding, upright person to a violent, fundamentalist 
zealot, and it would be rather foolish to even attempt to attach either 
– or, indeed, any – such described value-structure as the essential 
marker of Muslims, or of those considered members of a group 
denoted by the label ‘Muslim’. Instead, much like Raz and 
Margalit’s work, Appiah’s work can also be read as promoting a 
conception of group membership that is primarily not a matter of 
any specific cultural content, but a matter of particular sorts of 
recognition, those of self-identification (recognition of oneself as 
M) and of external ascription (recognition by others as M).  
Viewing recognition as the deciding factor of one’s group 
membership does not, however, necessarily provide a very straight 
forward account of who is and who is not a member of any 
particular cultural group. By utilizing the earlier distinction between 
internal and external recognition, the following analysis of different 
sources and relations of recognition can be constructed:398 
                                                 
397 Appiah 2005, 67; 108; see also: Appiah 1994, 159-160; 1996, 80; 97; 
2001, 326. 
398 For the sake of clarity, I have divided the table to consist of a) a 
singular person X who either identifies or does not identify as M, b) those 
(others) who identify as M and recognize X in certain ways, and c) those 
(others) who do not identify as M and recognize X in certain ways. It 
should, of course, be noted that, due to the possibility – or even probability 
– of different responses within the two latter columns, the table is very 
much a simplification. It is also a simplification in so far as the table does 
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Table 1 
 X Those (others) who 
self-identify as M 
Those (others) not 
identifying as M 
1. Identifies as M Recognizes X as M Recognizes X as M 
2. Identifies as M Recognizes X as M Does not recognize 
X as M 
3. Identifies as M Does not recognize 
X as M 
Recognizes X as M 
4. Identifies as M Does not recognize 
X as M 
Does not recognize 
X as M 
5. Not identifying as M Does not recognize 
X as M 
Does not recognize 
X as M 
6. Not identifying as M Does not recognize 
X as M 
Recognizes X as M 
7. Not identifying as M Recognizes X as M Does not recognize 
X as M 
8. Not identifying as M Recognizes X as M Recognizes X as M 
 
What is important is that only lines one and five give us results in 
which the recognition of all three parties towards X coincide. My 
self-identification as a woman, coinciding with other self-identified 
women’s as well as non-identifiers’ recognition of me as a woman 
gives us a rather unproblematic case as to whether I am to be 
considered a member of the group ‘women’. On the other hand, it is 
not difficult to imagine someone not-identifying himself as, say, a 
Sikh, not being recognized as a Sikh by other Sikh-identifiers nor 
by non-identifiers, and to conclude that such a person is, indeed, not 
a member of a group called ‘Sikhs’. Taken in isolation, these two 
cases are rather uninteresting. This, of course, is not to say that they 
could not become interesting once connected to the wider 
normative questions of whether members of certain groups should 
                                                                                                     
not include political actors (such as group leadership or liberal state), the 
role of which will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 5. 
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also be treated in ways specific to such groups, or whether non-
members should also have the right to enjoy the privileges given to 
members of some groups. Whether I, as a woman, should be able to 
occupy a position reserved specifically to women by a positive act 
of discrimination, or whether someone non-Sikh should also be able 
to wear a turban instead of a crash helmet whilst riding a motor 
bike, a privilege normally granted to Sikhs only. However, as my 
purpose, in this chapter, is not to participate in discussions 
regarding the general justifiability of group-differentiated treatment 
as such, but merely to contribute to the discussions by pointing out 
some of the underlying difficulties in defining group-memberships, 
I will take cases one and five as unproblematic, as far as defining 
group membership is concerned. 
What is of particular interest in the table above, however, are the 
ways in which it highlights heterogeneities in recognizing people’s 
memberships in cultural groups. Whereas the homogeneous 
conception of cultural content has had its fair share of critique in 
recent discussions on multiculturalism, the idea of group 
membership, on the other hand, has in much contemporary 
literature remained relatively under analyzed. Whereas pleas for 
letting groups or group members themselves decide about their own 
cultural commitments are common, not too much attention has been 
paid to the criteria according to which those eligible for making 
such decisions – that is, group members – are to be decided.399 
The problem, as should be fairly clear by now, is that there does not 
seem to be a particularly clear way of defining who, and on what 
grounds, should count as a member of this or that cultural group. If 
we take the cultural content – shared values, norms, practices and 
                                                 
399 To be fair, many recent thinkers have accepted the idea of cultural 
groups as groups of no fixed boundaries (see e.g. Benhabib 2002; Carens 
2000; Mason 2000; Phillips 2007). Many have also explicitly recognized 
the existence of ‘marginal’ or ‘problematic’ members of cultural groups 
(e.g. Parekh 2000, 148; Raz and Margalit 1994, 115). However, whereas 
the idea of the indeterminacy of cultural groups and group memberships 
has acquired some prominence, a detailed analysis of the constitution of 
membership (and marginal membership) has often remained lacking. 
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beliefs – to be the constitutive elements of group membership, we 
are bound to fall back to the much criticized notions of cultural 
homogeneity, to privilege status quo and make the ideas of cultural 
fluidity and change increasingly difficult to attain. If, on the other 
hand, we disregard the ideas of cultural content and let them 
operate, at the most, as some of the reasons for recognizing one as a 
member of a group, we come to notice that it is not only cultural 
content, but also membership that should be conceived of as 
heterogeneous and contested. 
 
2.2. Groups deciding their own members? 
In section 1.3. I highlighted the influence that the recognition of 
others, or of the larger political community as a whole, had for the 
constitution of politically relevant group membership. The group-
differentiated rights and their beneficiaries were, in the end, decided 
by the liberal state (and the larger political community it 
represents), casting some doubt on whether, and to what extent, the 
members of minority cultures could be seen as being in charge of 
their own destiny. Granted the way in which treatment by others 
affects the ways minority groups and their members can pursue 
their lives, many theorists have adopted views according to which, 
at least in matters of content, groups should be able to decide for 
themselves, which customs, traditions, values or beliefs they wish 
to adopt. For Bhikhu Parekh, for instance, it is highly unlikely that 
those outside a particular culture can understand all the subtleties 
and complexities of that culture, and that it is therefore best that the 
possible changes in culture come from within.400 According to 
Kymlicka, “It is right and proper that the character of a culture 
change as a result of the choices of its members. (…) People should 
be able to decide what is best from within their own culture”.401 
Similarly, for Raz and Margalit, the right of self-determination 
ultimately gives groups themselves the right to decide – irrespective 
                                                 
400 Parekh 2000, 177-178. 
401 Kymlicka 1995, 104-105. 
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of the content of decisions – how to live and what norms or values 
to uphold.402  
From the perspective of acknowledging the internal 
heterogeneity of cultural groups, these calls for allowing cultural 
groups to decide their own cultural contents would seem 
compatible. Far from promoting any essentialized, homogenized 
conception of group culture, the ideas of cultural heterogeneity are 
incorporated, as the group’s right to decide about its own cultural 
contents does not necessarily entail a unity in the members’ views 
about the appropriate contents of these decisions. It merely dictates 
that the group members, rather than non-members or even the larger 
political community as a whole, should have the principal say in 
deciding which ways of life, values, norms or practices they, as a 
group, adhere to. Thus, it is possible for group members to have 
different conceptions of their cultures, to express fierce critiques of 
their cultures, as well as even reject the whole idea of any 
relevantly shared cultural content.403 
In the light of the discussions of the previous sections, it should, 
however, be clear that the idea of letting group members themselves 
decide about the contents of their culture is more problematic than 
is often acknowledged. In order to let the group members 
themselves decide about their own cultural contents, one needs to 
already have some conception of who those members are, in order 
to take into account the views of those who, in Kymlicka’s words, 
“should be able to decide what is best from within“. As 
demonstrated by the table 1 above, however, there may be several 
different interpretations of the question of who is a group member, 
as different people (the identifiers and non-identifiers alike) may 
have different views on who they recognize as a member of a group 
M. 
 
                                                 
402 Raz and Margalit 1994, 124. 
403 See also: Raz 2001, 35, ff. 20. 
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Weaker and stronger formulations of mutual recognition 
One of the ways to address the problem of defining group 
membership would be to argue that group members should 
themselves decide not only the cultural content, but who are to be 
considered group members. To an extent, this is what Raz and 
Margalit are doing, as for them, membership in a cultural group is 
primarily a matter of mutual recognition. Two versions of 
conceiving membership in terms of mutual recognition can be 
distinguished. In the stronger formulation,404 group members are 
those who fit the criteria presented on lines one and two of the 
above table. To be a group member, a person needs to identify 
herself as a group member and those also identifying as members 
must recognize this person as a member. Whether others – the non-
identifiers – agree with such membership is, at least to an extent, a 
secondary concern. As an example, we may think of a girl (say, 
now 13 years of age), who turned to Islam when she was 11, is 
recognized by her Muslim community as a Muslim, but is not 
recognized by others as a Muslim due to her youth. Or, we could 
think of a gay man who engages actively with the gay community, 
identifies himself as gay and is also recognized as gay by other gay-
identifiers, but gives no sign of his sexual identity to the outside 
world. However, whereas defining group membership in such a 
way may have some advantages (such as conceiving membership as 
always also dependent on the person’s own identification as a 
member), it nevertheless seems to fail to capture many of the ways 
in which membership operates in the wider political sphere. 
In the weaker formulation, the conception of membership 
through mutual recognition includes not only lines one and two but 
also lines seven and eight. A person may be a member, even if he 
does not identify himself as a member, as long as other self-
identifying members recognize him as a member (again irrespective 
                                                 
404 I refer to these two versions as stronger and weaker formulations, the 
“stronger” being stronger in terms of requiring unanimity of recognition 
from all involved, whereas the “weaker” formulation may also 
accommodate certain discrepancies in recognition. 
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of the recognition of non-identifiers). Granted the double function 
of group membership as the source of one’s identification and the 
gatekeeper of culturally defined opportunities, this formulation 
captures many of the ways group membership affects people’s lives 
by regulating their opportunities. Regardless of whether one 
identifies oneself as a member of, say, the Catholic community, if 
other Catholics (or, in cases, the Catholic church)405 recognize him 
as a member, he has a right to a church wedding and communion, 
his children may have access to Catholic schooling, and – in times 
of distress – he may resort to and be given the support of his 
congregation. This, again, is irrespective of the recognition of those 
not identifying themselves as Catholics. 
However, although the above, weaker conception of group 
membership in terms of mutual recognition may sound initially 
promising, it may also cease to be so, at least in cases where 
membership creates a burden on those attempting to shy away from 
such identification. Cases of non-identifiers being pressurized to, 
say, live in certain locations, dress in certain ways, or – for example 
– have one’s children, or oneself, circumcised, strongly questions 
the attractiveness of letting self-identifiers choose who are to be 
considered as members. Further, proceeding from the results 
obtained in the earlier sections, the idea of defining group 
membership solely in terms of group’s internal recognition does not 
match well with the contemporary circumstances of cultural 
diversity. In culturally diverse societies, it is often the recognition 
of others that operates as the main regulator of people’s culturally 
defined opportunities. If members (and only members) of a Sikh 
community have been granted a right to wear a turban instead of a 
crash helmet, it is not the internal recognition of the Sikh 
community that defines whether I will be able to (legally) wear a 
turban while riding a motorbike. Rather, my opportunity is 
dependent on the recognition of the state, and thus primarily of 
others, irrespective of what other Sikh-identifiers may say about my 
membership. In this account, membership (that is politically 
                                                 
405 I will discuss the role of institutionalised actors in more detail in Ch. 5. 
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relevant) is captured by lines one, three, six and eight, excluding the 
lines two and seven included in the previous account. 
To avoid these discrepancies, one could, perhaps, argue that the 
fact that group membership (of political relevance) is often decided 
by others who are not members themselves is an unfortunate fact of 
the world and that, in ideal circumstances, group membership – like 
cultural content – would be decided by the group itself. To an 
extent, this may already be the case, as the group’s internal 
recognition may have an influence on the recognition of others. The 
others may wish to listen to the group itself in matters of who is to 
be seen as a member, and also attempt to align their recognition 
with the recognition of the group members.  
However, whereas listening to group members themselves may, 
in contemporary circumstances of cultural diversity, be a very 
respectable effort, it is not entirely unproblematic. In order for the 
group to decide on its own members and in order for others to align 
their views with this decision, there already needs to be criteria 
according to which those eligible for participating in this decision 
are decided. Who are those members whose decisions on 
membership should be listened to by others? Should people’s self-
identification be the relevant criteria in deciding who can 
participate in this decision making – qualifying lines one, two, three 
and four? Or should the group’s internal recognition operate as the 
criteria for deciding who decides – qualifying lines one and two 
(stronger formulation) or lines one, two, seven and eight (weaker 
formulation)? Or should we perhaps accept that it is an 
unavoidable, although not necessarily unfortunate, fact of the world 
that, at least in contemporary circumstances of cultural diversity, 
any criteria of deciding people’s group membership (that is 
politically relevant) necessarily coincides with the general public 
conception of group membership and, thus, primarily with the 
conception of others irrespective of whether this conception 
coincides with the conception of those identifying themselves as 
members of the group (lines one, three, six and eight)? If so, the 
idea of letting groups themselves decide their own members seems 
an impossibility. In circumstances of cultural diversity, group 
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membership (that is of political relevance) is always at least partly 
dependent on the recognition of others, as it is the larger political 
community that decides to whom they listen in questions, both of 
cultural content, as well as of membership in a cultural group. 
 
2.3. Cultural policies and membership-based allocation 
Having shown some of the problems of defining group membership 
in terms of different kinds of recognition, it is time to conclude this 
chapter by looking at some of the ways these problems relate to 
actual cultural policies, and to the liberal multiculturalists’ views on 
the allocation of differentiated rights. To recap, for liberal 
multiculturalists, membership in a cultural group is often taken as 
the relevant criterion according to which cultural policies – be they 
group-differentiated rights, allowances or other culturally sensitive 
measures – are granted. According to Kymlicka, “membership in a 
cultural community may be a relevant criterion for distributing the 
benefits and burdens which are the concern of a liberal theory of 
justice.”406 David Miller states the case even more clearly: “[group 
rights] are given to group members by virtue of their membership of 
the group in question, and not merely by virtue of their having some 
feature that as it happens all members of the group share” .407 Being 
a member of a cultural group is not, however, a matter of sharing 
some particular feature or particular cultural content. One can be a 
member of a cultural group without sharing its prevailing cultural 
contents, as one can be a non-member even if one shared the 
prevailing cultural norms, values, beliefs or practices. As 
commonly accepted, cultural contents are fluid and heterogeneous, 
and may include several, even contradictory, interpretations.  
Defining group membership in terms of recognition is an 
attempt to avoid homogeneous and stable conceptions of cultural 
content. In Table 1 presented above, no cultural contents are visible, 
but the question is solely of being recognized (being picked out) as 
a member of a cultural group. Cultural contents can be thought of as 
                                                 
406 Kymlicka 1989, 162. 
407 Miller 2002a, 180, emphasis in the original. 
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reasons for recognition,408 but this in no way fixes the reasons to 
any particular cultural norms, values, beliefs or practices. 
Importantly, if we accept that cultures are fluid and heterogeneous 
(and I see no reason for rejecting such view), the table may well be 
better off not incorporating any cultural contents or any particular 
actor’s reasons for recognition (or non-recognition).  
 
Reasons for recognizing one a member 
In the context of actual cultural policies and accommodation of 
people’s cultural differences, these reasons for recognizing (or not 
recognizing) X a member, however, come to play an important role. 
Taking just line one of the above table, and the most 
uncontroversial case of being a member of M, several combinations 
regarding the reasons for recognition unfold. 
 
Table 2 
 X Those (others) who 
self-identify as M 
Those (others) not 
identifying as M 
 
1a Identifies as M,  
And a 
Recognizes X as M, 
because of a 
Recognizes X as M, 
because of a 
1b Identifies as M, 
And a 
Recognizes X as M, 
because of b 
Recognizes X as M, 
because of c 
1c Identifies as M, 
And a 
Recognizes X as M, 
because of a1 
(contradicting a) 
Recognizes X as M, 
because of a2 
(contradicting a and a1) 
 
On line 1a, X is identified as a member of M, say, because X 
follows a certain practice of prayer, and this operates as a reason for 
everyone’s recognition of X as a member of M. On line 1b, 
however, X identifies as M and follows a certain practice of prayer, 
but this is not the reason for anyone else’s recognition of X as M. 
Other self-identifying M’s recognize X as a member not because of 
                                                 
408 Raz and Margalit’s criteria 6 in: Raz and Margalit 1994, 117. 
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his praying practices, but, say, because he follows a certain type of 
diet – a very important cultural practice according to other self-
identifying Ms. For non-identifiers, however, X’s praying or eating 
practices do not operate as reasons for recognition, but X is 
recognized as M because he wears certain types of garments. In this 
account, all parties have different conceptions of the relevant 
cultural content of the group M, although they all agree on X’s 
membership.  
On line 1c – to complicate things further – the conceptions of 
cultural content and, thus, reasons for recognition are, not only 
different, but also contradictory. For X, his self-identification is still 
connected to him following a certain practice of prayer, but for 
other self-identifiers the reason for recognizing X as M may be, that 
they believe X to follow a different practice of prayer, contrary to 
the practice X actually follows. Further, for non-identifiers, the 
reason for recognizing X as a member may be a belief contradicting 
both X’s actual practice as well as the practice other self-identifiers 
believe X to follow. Needless to say, the combinations regarding 
the cultural content of M and thus the different reasons for 
recognizing X as a member are multiplied, as the interpretations of 
cultural contents are heterogeneous – even among both the self-
identifiers as well as the non-identifiers. 
 
Reasons and contents of cultural policies 
The acknowledgement of the possibly different reasons for 
recognizing X as M become particularly interesting when 
connected to the view, presented earlier (1.2.), of cultural policies 
as incorporating, necessarily, certain contents of culture. Keeping 
this view in mind, the allocation of differentiated rights can now be 
examined, firstly, with respect to definitions of group membership 
and, secondly, with respect to the reasons for recognizing one as a 
member. Considering that, in contemporary circumstances of 
cultural diversity, membership in a cultural group (that is politically 
relevant) is often denoted by lines one, three, six and eight of Table 
1, it is fairly clear that cultural policies, allocated along the lines of 
group memberships, come to apply to many who identify 
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themselves as M (lines one and three), but also to many who do not 
identify as M (lines six and eight). At the same time, some, 
identifying as M, are left out, being rejected as members by the 
wider political community (lines two and four). This may, already 
on its own, question the sensibility of allocating differentiated 
rights along the lines of group memberships. 
Moreover, if we regard the nature of cultural policies as 
necessarily prioritizing certain conceptions of cultural content and 
the heterogeneity of the reasons behind recognizing one as a 
member, the allocation of such rights along the lines of group 
memberships becomes even more problematic. This, I believe, has 
to do with the fact that it is not only politically relevant membership 
that is decided by the larger political community (and thus, 
primarily by others), but that the contents of cultural policies are 
also inherently dependent on others and, more specifically, on the 
reasons that others have for recognizing someone as a member. 
In order to illustrate this claim, let us consider two cases. In the 
first case, the wider political community recognizes X (let us now 
use abbreviation S) as an S because they believe (among other 
reasons) that for X, wearing certain headgear is an important and 
integral element of his culture, identity and well-being. For the sake 
of cultural sensitivity, the wider political community passes a law 
which allows all members of S to wear this particular headgear, 
even in circumstances where, say, road safety regulations or 
professional dress codes ban wearing such gear. Of course, it may 
be that for X, identifying himself as S, wearing such headgear is an 
integral element of his identity and well-being and that such 
cultural policy benefits him by giving him equal opportunities to 
travel on roads or to be chosen for certain professions. This, 
however, only applies to those identifiers who are recognized by the 
larger political community as being members of S (lines one and 
three). On the other hand, it may be that for X, identifying himself 
as S, wearing such headgear is not essential – or he may even 
consider it detrimental – for his identity and well-being as an S. 
Being granted such a right, he may, nevertheless, feel pressurized or 
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even obliged to take advantage of such a right, just to guarantee his 
position as being recognized as S.  
In the second case, the allocation of cultural policies along the 
lines of group memberships is not only disadvantaging some self-
identifiers but also some non-identifiers. In this case, the wider 
political community recognizes X as an M because (among other 
reasons) they believe that for X, maintaining strict physical 
separation between the sexes is an important and integral element 
of her culture, identity and well-being. For the sake of cultural 
sensitivity, the wider political community adopts a policy of 
assigning same-sex physicians to all members of M. Of course, it 
may be that for X, identifying herself as M, maintaining strict 
physical separation between the sexes is an important and integral 
element of her identity, and such policy benefits her by 
guaranteeing that every time she is in need of medical treatment she 
is assigned a physician of the same sex as she is. This, however, 
only applies to those identifiers who are recognized by the larger 
political community as being members of M (lines one and three), 
and disadvantages those self-identifiers who, for one reason or 
other, are not recognized by the larger political community as 
members of M (lines two and four).  
On the other hand, it may be that for X, identifying herself as M, 
maintaining strict physical separation between the sexes is not an 
essential element of her identity. However, applying a ‘better safe 
than sorry’ -policy of assigning same-sex physicians to all members 
of M, she is put in a queue to see a physician of the same sex as she 
is – even though, due to the shortage of physicians of the same sex 
as she is, this queue is much longer than the queue to see other 
physicians. Furthermore, it is not only the self-identifiers that may 
be disadvantaged by the policy, but also some non-identifiers. Say, 
a person Y, who does not identify herself as M, also finds the 
maintaining of strict physical separation between the sexes as an 
integral element of her identity – only for other reasons than being 
self-identified M. However, due to the shortage of physicians of the 
same sex as she is, her opportunity to be treated in accordance with 
her identity is now hampered by the policy of assigning same sex 
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physicians to all members of M. Of course, it may be that, on 
occasions, this person Y is also assigned to same-sex physician 
when in need of medical treatment, but only if there are enough 
same-sex physicians around or, even more awkwardly, only if she 
is recognized by the larger political community as an M, even if she 
does not herself wish to be thus recognized (lines six and eight). 
 
Individuated allocation 
Provided that the membership-based allocation would thus seem to 
fail in fully tracking the proper beneficiaries of differentiated rights 
and, at times, even create disadvantages to certain identifiers and 
non-identifiers alike, it is worth asking, according to which 
principles the differentiated rights should then be allocated. My 
intention, it should be emphasized, is not to give any conclusive 
guidance into the questions of allocation, as I believe that, like in 
the questions of justification, the proper answers can only be 
arrived at in context. Having said that, I do believe that some 
general remarks with respect to the appropriate allocation of 
differentiated rights can be made, emphasizing the importance of 
steering away from the group-based model of allocation described 
above, to a more individual centred approaches. 
One of the alternatives to the membership-based allocation 
promoted by many liberal multiculturalists has been outlined by 
Brian Barry, who argues that differentiated rights should be 
allocated to people by virtue of their individual needs, and needs 
alone. According to Barry, group-differentiated rights create both 
under- as well as over-inclusive groups of people, thus failing to 
adequately track those whose disadvantages the rights in question 
are trying to rectify. By concentrating on individual needs, instead 
of group memberships, Barry argues for a more individual centred 
model of accommodation that would also seem to be able to escape 
some of the problems that a membership-based account would 
inevitably seem to create.409 
                                                 
409 Barry 2001, esp. ch. 4; 2002. 
Part II Liberal Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in Practice 
264 
 
Whether such a need-based approach manages to provide a 
satisfactory account of allocation in all cases, and exactly what kind 
of allocation such an approach leads to, depends to a great extent on 
how such a need-based account is interpreted. With respect to the 
two cases described above, the need -based allocation, properly 
construed, would seem to provide a more adequate way of 
allocating the cultural policies in question. In the first case, one’s 
eligibility to the exemption from wearing a particular kind of head 
gear in particular situations would not be based on the other’s views 
on whether one was considered a member of the group S (lines one, 
three, six and eight), but rather on the assessment of whether the 
wearing of the head gear was such an important element of the 
person’s identity that it would not be reasonable, as a default, to 
expect that person to abandon such head gear (incorporating people 
from possibly every line on the table). In the second case, the 
allocation of the same sex physicians would depend, not on other’s 
recognition of X as an M (lines one, three, six and eight), but on 
whether the maintaining of strict physical separation was, indeed, 
an integral element of X’s identity and well-being (again, 
incorporating people from possibly every line of the table above).410 
The need-based account of allocation would thus seem to take 
better into account the discrepancies in different actors’ recognition 
as well as reasons for recognizing someone as a member, as well as 
be better able to track those people whose disadvantages the 
policies in question were trying to rectify. Instead of the allocation 
of differentiated rights being dependent on one’s membership in 
any particular cultural group (S), the allocation would now depend 
on whether one needed such differentiated rights (say, an 
exemption from certain safety helmet regulations) in order to be 
able to use certain kinds of transport or to be chosen to certain 
                                                 
410 It should be noted that the need-based model of allocation presented 
here is substantively different from that of Brian Barry’s, who tries to 
exclude cultural considerations from the realm of justifying differentiated 
treatment. My reasons for including such considerations have been 
discussed in more detail in Ch. 3. 
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professions, without having to abandon that element of one’s 
culture that one should not, as a default, be expected to abandon.411 
Whereas I believe that the need-based allocation, as described 
above, does, in many cases, a better job in tracking the proper 
beneficiaries of those policies commonly viewed as group-
differentiated, it is also important to note that not all cases of 
differentiated rights fall within this category. On the contrary, at 
times, the criticised criterion of group membership (as defined 
primarily by the recognition of others) or self-identification may 
well serve as more appropriate criteria of allocation. Special 
representation or preferential treatment policies may help illustrate 
this point. As Samuel Freeman has noted, the aim of special 
representation rights or preferential treatment is often to effect 
structural changes, and/or tackle the structural discrimination that 
the members a certain group encounter.412 The underrepresentation 
of certain ethnic, cultural or religious groups in positions of power 
may have long historical roots and perpetuate the current power 
structures that, on their behalf, discourage the members of minority 
groups from even aiming at such positions. Such 
underrepresentation may, at times, also be explained by structural 
discrimination or by deeply held prejudices that prevent people of 
particular minority groups from attaining such positions. In these 
cases, it may well be sensible to allocate differentiated rights (such 
as quotas) either in accordance with membership (should the 
underrepresentation be based purely on external discrimination or 
prejudice against members of certain groups), or – as may in most 
cases be appropriate – in accordance with people’s self-
identifications, acknowledging also the ways in which people 
themselves view their identities and the disadvantages that these 
identities may bring along. Even in these cases, however, no default 
position of membership-based allocation should be utilized, as it is 
                                                 
411 For a fuller analysis of the joint notion of equality of opportunity to 
combine one’s cultural commitments with one’s aspirations in public life, 
see Ch. 3, 3.  
412 Freeman 2002, 26-27. 
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only through a careful analysis of the causes of disadvantage, as 
well as the aims of the policies in question, that the appropriate 
principles of allocation can be arrived at. 
 
3. Conclusion on liberal multiculturalism, group membership, 
and allocation of differentiated rights 
In this chapter, I have focused on one very specific aspect of liberal 
multiculturalism – that of the idea of allocating differentiated rights 
along the lines of group memberships. The first part of this chapter 
focused on the ways in which people’s memberships could be seen 
as important for both people’s identities and well-being, as well as 
for the accommodation of people’s cultural differences. I also 
showed some of the benefits that a recognition-based account of 
membership had over viewing group membership in terms of 
cultural contents, thus laying the ground for a specifically 
recognition-based account of politically relevant membership. 
In the second section, I developed a more systematic analysis of 
the constitution of group membership, pointing out the possible 
discrepancies that different actors may have, both in recognizing 
one as a member of any particular group M, as well as in reasons 
for such recognition. Building upon these discrepancies, I argued 
that the acknowledging of the heterogeneity and contestability of 
group membership should put pressure on qualifying the criteria 
according to which differentiated rights were allocated, as the 
membership-based criteria hardly succeeded in tracking the proper 
beneficiaries of such rights. As the politically relevant membership 
is often primarily dependent on the recognition of others, and as the 
contents of cultural policies are largely shaped by the reasons for 
such recognition, being a member of a cultural group could not be 
seen as a justifiable criterion for allocating such rights. Having 
shown some of the weaknesses of the membership-based criterion, I 
suggested that a more individuated criteria, based either on 
individual needs or self-identifications, may be in order, in order for 
the differentiated rights to adequately track their targets. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Exit, identity, and membership 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed some of the difficulties that the 
constitution of politically relevant membership in terms of 
recognition brought to the view of allocating differentiated rights 
along the lines of group memberships. Much of this discussion was 
conducted on a fairly abstract level, analysing the discrepancies 
both in different actors’ recognition, as well as their reasons for 
recognizing one as a member of any particular group. Due to the 
possible discrepancies and the nature of differentiated rights as 
necessarily incorporating certain interpretations of cultural contents, 
it was argued that the default position of membership-based 
allocation should be abandoned, giving way to more individuated 
approaches that would take better into account the actual aims as 
well as reasons for having particular differentiated rights in 
practice.  
In this chapter, I further develop and utilize the recognition-
based account of group membership, and discuss some of the 
implications that this account has on the debates on the right of exit. 
The right of exit, in discussions on multiculturalism, has become 
one of the default positions and primary safeguards of individuals 
against their own cultural groups, operating as the minimal 
(although by no means always sufficient) requirement for different 
kinds of groups to be allowed to govern their internal affairs. In 
order to understand the role of the right of exit and the possible 
limitations of this right, however, one needs to understand what it 
means to exit a cultural group, and what it means to belong to or to 
be a member of such groups. In this chapter, I attempt to shed some 
light on these questions by looking at the ways in which one’s 
belonging, one’s membership and one’s exit from cultural or 
religious groups can be understood, and what kinds of implications 
these understandings have for multicultural policies and the role of 
the liberal state in accommodating people’s cultural differences. 
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This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin the first part, “Cultural 
groups and the right of exit –approach”, by identifying those 
groups most problematic from the perspective of exit as identity-
conferring or constitutive groups, and work on some distinctions 
with respect to the senses in which one’s belonging to such groups 
can be viewed as constitutive of one’s identity. I then turn to a more 
detailed analysis of the ways in which one’s membership in an 
identity-conferring or constitutive group can be conceptualized by 
looking at the ways in which different people, as well as 
institutionalized actors, may have different views on who, and on 
what grounds, counts as a group member. This section utilizes and 
further develops the recognition-based account of group 
membership already discussed in chapter 4.  
The second part of this chapter, “Exit and membership”, 
discusses some of the implications that the different ways and 
levels of understanding one’s belonging and one’s membership 
have on the right of exit –debate. Firstly, I argue that there are 
several ways of understanding what it means to exit one’s group, 
and that those signs, most commonly associated with exit, do not 
necessarily entail that the person exiting has also renounced her 
belonging – her deep most identity as an M. Secondly, I propose a 
way in which the liberal state could be more sensitive to the ways in 
which one’s membership in a cultural group operates as one of the 
constitutive elements of one’s identity by continuing to recognize 
those who have exited the contours of their group as group 
members, should they so wish to be recognized. This recognition, 
on behalf of the liberal state, not only provides certain external 
affirmation to people’s identities as group members, but also comes 
closer to fulfilling the idea that the liberal state should not take a 
stand on the substantive requirements of group membership, but 
rather leave it to the group members themselves to decide what 
these requirements may be. At the end of this chapter, I respond to 
some of the objections that my suggestions for continued state 
recognition may bring, and further strengthen the case for a more 
individuated, yet culturally sensitive approach to accommodating 
people’s cultural differences. 
Exit, Identity, and Membership 
269 
 
 
1. Cultural groups and the right of exit -approach 
In recent literature on multiculturalism, much has been written 
about the right of exit as the primary safeguard of individuals 
against their own cultural group. According to a variety of 
multiculturalists, cultural groups (including a variety of traditional, 
ingenious and religious minorities) should, as a default, be able to 
govern their internal affairs without the interference of the liberal 
state, or the imposition of the liberal norms and values of the 
majority. The group’s right to govern its own affairs, however, 
needs to be balanced with the rights of individuals, including the 
rights of those who belong to the cultural group in question. For 
many, the balancing act between the right of the group to govern its 
own affairs and the rights of its individual members comes in the 
form of a right of exit – that is, the right of the individual to leave 
her group, should she no longer find it worthy of her allegiance. 
The proponents of the right of exit do, of course, come in many 
shapes and forms. For some, it is enough that the individual 
possesses formal right of exit – that is, that she is not forced to 
remain a member of her cultural group.413 For others, the formal 
right of exit carries no weight, but the right of exit should also be 
realistic – that is, the individual should also have the necessary 
capacities to take advantage of this right and to leave, should she so 
want to.414 Further still, some argue that a meaningful right of exit 
requires, not only that the individual has the capacity to take 
                                                 
413 Kukathas 1992; 2003, see also Ch. 2, 2.2. For a restatement of the role 
of the plain exit principle, see Kukathas 2012 
414 Most of the theorists of the right of exit fall within this category, 
arguing for certain conditions for the right of exit to be meaningful, 
although there certainly is disagreement on what these conditions might 
be. For some accounts on the preconditions for meaningful right of exit, 
see Galston 1995; Spinner-Halev 2000; 2005; Okin, 2002; Phillips 2007; 
Holzleithner 2012. Kukathas, too, insists on some preconditions in order 
for the right of exit to be substantive (Kukathas 1992a, 133-134), although 
these preconditions are substantively weaker than those of the theorists 
above.  
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advantage of the right of exit, but that the costs of such exit are 
fairly distributed.415 Much, in the right of exit debate, has been 
written on what it means for a right of exit to be meaningful, and 
what it requires, with respect to the individual, the group, or the 
state, to guarantee this right to everyone. 
Whereas the preconditions for a meaningful right of exit, and the 
costs of such exit, have been widely discussed, surprisingly little 
has been written about how to conceptualize cultural membership, 
and how one’s understandings of cultural identity, membership and 
exit may affect the liberal state’s responses to exit. In this section, I 
attempt to address these issues by looking at, firstly, the kinds of 
groups in relation to which the right of exit is most problematic, 
and, secondly, the kinds of difficulties that the constitution of group 
membership in such groups create for the understanding of the right 
of exit. Building upon the recognition-based theory of group 
membership (discussed in Ch 4), my focus is on the ways in which 
one’s identification, along with the recognition of others, creates a 
very complex set of variables through which one’s membership in a 
cultural group can be understood, and the difficulties that this 
complexity brings to the ways in which the liberal state recognizes 
people as members of cultural or religious groups. 
 
1.1. Conceptualizing cultural groups 
Daniel Weinstock (2005) identifies five axes according to which 
groups, commonly discussed in liberal political theory, may differ. 
According to Weinstock, groups differ,416 depending on (1) how  
                                                 
415 For an analysis on the different kinds of costs of exit, see e.g. Barry 
2001, 149-154; For critique, e.g. Levy 2004, 335-336; Brochers 2012. 
416 Weinstock also posits certain common requirements for groups to be 
considered as politically relevant groups, such as the idea of having certain 
degree of self-consciousness:  That is, the group members must, to some 
degree, recognize themselves as belonging to the group in question. 
(Weinstock 2005, 233-234) This requirement for the group members 
themselves to recognize their membership may, however, be too strong a 
requirement, as there may also be substantive disagreements on who are 
those members that should recognize their membership. However, as 
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the membership in such groups is acquired (birth groups / groups of 
choice), (2) whether they have some specific goal or agenda (issue 
specific / general), (3) how strongly they affect their members’ 
sense of their selves (identity-conferring / identity-neutral), (4) how 
they are governed (democratic / undemocratic), and (5) how 
broadly they affect or regulate their members’ lives (broad / 
narrow). In Weinstock’s view, those groups, most problematic from 
the liberal standpoint, are groups that regulate a broad spectrum of 
their members’ lives (4), but that are undemocratically governed 
(5).417 
 
Broad undemocratic groups 
By broad, undemocratic groups, Weinstock refers to those groups 
that have a wide ranging influence on their members’ lives 
(regulating, for example, their members’ choices of marriage and 
family; modes of worship; occupational pursuits etc.), and that are 
undemocratically governed (for example, by excluding some 
members (often women or younger males) from the group’s 
decision making procedures). A good example of such group would 
be The Old Order Amish418 who live in almost total isolation from 
the modern society with hierarchical rules of leadership, but the 
broad, undemocratic groups need not be thus isolated. For example, 
some religious groups with strong charismatic leaders could qualify 
as broad, undemocratic groups that live within the contours of the 
liberal society, as would certain immigrant groups, wishing to 
preserve their traditional customs of origin in their new 
surroundings.419 
                                                                                                     
discussed in Ch. 4, 2.1., some acknowledgement of the existence of the 
group itself may be required in order for the group to constitute a sensible 
category to be talked of. 
417 Weinstock 2005, 233-236. 
418 For an illustrative collection of articles on the Amish in the United 
States, see Kraybill 2003. 
419 This is not to say that all immigrant groups that wish to preserve some 
of their customs of origin would be broad, undemocratic groups. However, 
should these customs conflict with the norms and values of the liberal 
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Whereas the facts that a group is undemocratically governed, or 
that it has an effect on a wide array of its members’ lives, do not, on 
their own, put the group in conflict with the basic liberal values of 
individual freedom, autonomy and equality, many of the cases 
where group practices are in violation of individual rights are, 
nevertheless, associated with these kinds of groups. As the feminist 
critique has forcefully argued, many of the controversial, even 
violent practices that involve women and children (including 
clitoridectomy, forced marriage, denial of education) are practices 
that are often based on the wider, patriarchal norms of the 
community, and the unequal status of women and men in the 
community.420 Being based on the wider norms of gender 
inequality, the women (or others affected) may not have a chance to 
change their courses of life within their community, as the decision 
making, and the governing of the community is reserved for the 
leaders – often, the elderly men of the community. Notably, it is 
precisely in these cases – where some members of the group are 
systematically mistreated, and where the internal power structure of 
the group gives little hope for change – that the right of exit 
becomes most important. Although groups should, as a default, be 
allowed to govern their own affairs, no individual should be obliged 
to become or remain a member of a group within which her basic 
rights are not recognized and within which she has no prospects of 
changing her situation. 
It should, however, be noted that some of the main challenges 
associated with the right of exit do not stem from the authoritarian 
nature of the group or (at least directly) from the fact that the group 
engages in regulating a broad spectrum of its members’ lives. The 
undemocratically governed groups can, no doubt, implement 
                                                                                                     
society (for example, as in requiring women’s total submission to their 
guardians), the group (or the fraction of the group adhering to such 
customs) may be described as broad and undemocratic For an interesting 
analysis of one such conflict with respect to a Yemeni family raising their 
children in Germany, see Fischer 2012. 
420 See e.g. Okin 1999; 2002; Benhabib 2002; 2004; Song 2007; Phillips 
2007; 2010. 
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measures that are designed to deter their members from leaving, but 
this, it should be emphasized, does not rise directly from the fact 
that the group is undemocratically governed. As long as the group 
(whether democratic or undemocratic), recognizes its members’ 
right to leave, provides the minimal conditions421 for this right to be 
realistic, and refrains from preventing its members from taking 
advantage of this right, the right of exit may be secured, rregardless 
of whether the group in question is democratically or 
undemocratically governed. 
Nor is it the case that exit from those groups that govern a broad 
array of their members’ lives would necessarily be more difficult 
than exit from groups that only affect certain aspects of their 
members’ lives. Whereas it certainly is the case that both cultural as 
well as religious groups often have a wide ranging influence on 
their members – so much so, that exiting these groups may be 
extremely difficult – these difficulties do not, as such, come from 
the nature of these groups as having a wide influence on their 
members’ lives. Rather, the difficulties of exit, and the consequent 
challenges of securing the right of exit, often come from two 
sources: from the members’ lack of information about alternative 
ways of life, or their incapacity, or even unwillingness, to leave 
their group. The broadness of the influence that a cultural or 
religious group has on its members may, no doubt, create certain 
concerns with respect to whether these conditions prevail. Provided 
that the members’ lives are overwhelmingly influenced by their 
cultural or religious norms, it is, indeed, reasonable to ask, whether 
the members do, nevertheless, have sufficient information about 
alternative ways of life – and, even when they do, whether there 
exist such conditions that are required for the members to be able to 
abandon their current ways of living and to start anew. Much in the 
right of exit debate has been written on those conditions, provided 
both by the group as well as by the liberal society, that are required 
in order for the members to be able to leave their group and to 
                                                 
421 Whatever these may be. 
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adjust to a new life that is potentially very different from the one 
they have been accustomed to.422 
Whereas my intention is, in no way, to try to diminish or play 
down the importance of discussing those conditions necessary for 
the members of cultural or religious groups to be able to exit the 
contours of their group, I do, nevertheless, think that an overt 
emphasis on these conditions ignores that aspect of cultural 
belonging that makes exit, and the right of exit –approach,423 
perhaps most problematic. Whereas it is the case that, in order to be 
able to leave, the members must, firstly, have sufficient information 
about alternative ways of life, and, secondly, they must also be 
provided, either by the group or by the wider society, such 
conditions in which they can leave and start a new life outside their 
community, these conditions are not necessarily enough to make 
exit a feasible option. Even if these conditions were in place, exit 
might not be feasible, due to the ways in which one’s belonging to a 
cultural or religious group often has a much deeper effect on its 
members and on their sense of themselves. That is, exit may not be 
                                                 
422 These conditions, as Susan Okin has forcefully argued, may incorporate 
both material as well as psychological conditions necessary for a person to 
leave. (esp. Okin 2002) Whereas I agree with Okin that, in order for the 
right of exit to be meaningful, the group members must not be physically 
or mentally harmed, manipulated or forced to stay in their group, my 
focus, as will very shortly be elaborated, is somewhat different from 
Okin’s. Whereas Okin highlights the negative psychological effects that 
groups may have on their members, I focus on the positive – that is, on the 
ways in which one’s belonging to a cultural group operates as an integral 
element of one’s identity, and how people would not want to renounce this 
identity due to the extreme psychological harm that this abandoning of 
one’s identity would bring. This, it should be noted, irrespective of 
whether one’s membership in a group also incorporates those negative 
elements highlighted by Okin. 
423 By the right of exit-approach, I simply refer to the view according to 
which the right of exit is viewed as the primary safeguard of individuals 
against their own group. The critique against the right of exit –approach is 
thus not necessarily a critique against the right of exit as such, merely 
against the primacy (or, in cases, sufficiency) of the right of exit in 
protecting individuals from their own group. 
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a feasible option from those groups that, in Weinstock’s terms, are 
identity-conferring.424 
 
Identity-conferring groups 
By identity-conferring groups, I refer to those groups that are, to a 
smaller or larger extent, constitutive of their members’ identity.425 
That is, the belonging to these groups defines, to some substantive 
extent, the ways in which the members view themselves: who they 
really are and how they lead their lives. For the members of 
identity-conferring or constitutive groups, the being a member of 
such group (say, being a Muslim, Catholic, American Indian, 
Aboriginal) plays an important and integral role in who they 
themselves conceive to be, and the denial of such belonging would 
be unimaginable, resulting in such losses in their deep most identity 
that exit counts as no alternative, no matter how harsh or difficult 
their belonging to such group may otherwise make their lives to be. 
The ways in which the belonging to an identity-conferring group 
affects their members may vary in several different senses. Firstly, 
                                                 
424 Weinstock 2005, 235-238. It should be noted that the category of 
identity-conferring groups is analytically separate from the other 
categories in Weinstock’s analysis. The identity-conferring groups are not 
always broad or undemocratic, nor do they necessarily fall within either 
particular axis of the birth vs. choice, or issue-specific vs. issue neutral 
groups. Whereas it often is the case, as Weinstock aptly notes, that those 
groups, most problematic for the right of exit-approach, are groups that are 
identity-conferring, broad and undemocratic and to which one belongs by 
birth, they do not necessarily need to be so. 
425 The idea of groups (or communities) being constitutive of their 
members identity comes from the communitarian tradition that 
emphasized the social embeddedness of individuals against the allegedly 
disembodied and disembedded self of liberalism. (e.g. Sandel 1982; 
MacIntyre 1981; Taylor 1989; Walzer 1983) Whereas many of the 
classical communitarians emphasized the sharing of the communal values 
and traditions for the constitution of one’s identity, the constitutive role of 
one’s community, as will be seen, need not entail such sharing of any 
particular values or traditions – that is, of any particular contents of 
culture. 
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the extent to which the members’ identity is constituted by their 
belonging to the group in question differs from person to person. 
For some, being a Muslim or Catholic may indicate only a certain 
sense of affinity, something they have come accustomed to, but 
plays a fairly trivial role in defining what they conceive themselves 
to be, or how they come to conduct their lives. For others, being a 
Muslim or Catholic may be viewed as one of the most important 
things in their lives, and the idea of having to ever abandon such 
identity, or the ways in which this identity manifests itself in their 
lives, may be simply unthinkable. Nevertheless, the belonging to an 
identity-conferring group (as opposed to identity neutral groups) 
plays an important, constitutive role in the lives of its members and, 
in most cases, the members of identity-conferring groups would not 
want to abandon such groups, as they conceive the belonging to 
such group as an integral element of who they really are.426 
Secondly, whereas the belonging to an identity-conferring group 
plays an integral role in the constitution of one’s identity, it is not 
always clear, what exactly this belonging is, through which one’s 
identity is constituted. To anticipate the discussions of the 
following section, the elements that the members of an identity-
conferring group view as integral for their identity as members, 
may differ, from relatively content neutral identification as a 
member of such group, to a very specific form of behaviour and 
participation in the workings of the group as a whole. For example, 
                                                 
426 Some identity-conferring groups may, of course, also be groups from 
which some members would rather leave, but fail to do so, due to the ways 
in which their identity is inherently connected to the belonging to the 
group in question. Groups of relatively low social status (e.g. “inner-city 
working class”) but also many cultural and religious groups can operate as 
identity-conferring groups from which some would also want to leave. My 
point here is thus not to claim that all identity-conferring groups would be 
the kinds of groups from which all members would not want to leave (nor 
that some identity-conferring groups would be more so than others), but 
simply to point out that, in many cases, people would not want to abandon 
their identity-conferring groups, due to the ways in which their belonging 
to such groups intertwines with their deep-most identity. 
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for some, the importance of being, say, Catholic, may simply come 
from the person’s self-identification as Catholic and her very 
personal relation to God, incorporating no need to participate or be 
recognized as Catholic by those around her. For others, to the 
contrary, the importance of being Catholic may also be manifested 
in very specific forms of behaviour, for example in the active 
participation in their congregation. The belonging to a Catholic 
community and the participation in the workings of one’s 
congregation may, in these cases, be viewed as precisely that which 
the members cannot conceive of abandoning, as it is precisely this 
participation – together with others – that the members view as 
constitutive of who they really are: their deep most identity. 
Thirdly, besides the different extents and contents of one’s 
identification, it is not always clear how exactly one’s belonging to 
an identity conferring group relates to one’s membership in such a 
group – that is, what part does one’s own identification as an M (be 
it Catholic, Muslim, Aboriginal etc.) play in defining who are 
conceived of as members and on what grounds. Provided that there 
are several different ways in which people can belong (and view 
their belonging) to an identity-conferring group, there might also be 
several different ways in which one’s membership in such groups is 
understood. The different ways of understanding membership, and 
the criteria of defining membership, will also prompt the question 
of what it might actually mean to leave or exit such groups, and 
how one’s understandings of group membership may affect one’s 
understandings of, and one’s responses to, exit. Before turning to 
the questions of membership and exit, however, I need to say 
something more specific about group membership, and the different 
ways and levels of understanding membership in identity-
conferring groups. 
 
1.2. Identity-conferring groups and group membership 
In my view, those groups, most problematic from the perspective of 
exit, are identity-conferring or constitutive groups. That is, those 
groups the belonging to which plays an important and integral 
element in the constitution of one’s identity, and from which, in 
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most cases, one would not want to, or even contemplate of leaving, 
due to the extreme losses that this would cause to one’s deep most 
identity. The constitutive elements of identity-conferring groups 
may, of course, vary, as may the ways in which people view their 
belonging to the groups in question. Moreover, it may not always 
be the case that one’s own views – one’s self-identification – as a 
member of such group matches the generally accepted views of 
membership, and it is thus important to see, what role one’s self-
identification as a member plays in the constitution of membership, 
and how group membership, from the political perspective, is 
constituted. 
 
Self-identification and group-membership 
One’s own identification, as belonging to a certain group, provides 
one of the axes through which to start analysing membership in an 
identity-conferring group, but it is by no means the only axes 
through which one’s membership can be understood.427 Nor is it 
always clear what one’s own identification as a member of any 
particular group means. As Steven Lukes has noted, in all groups 
“[t]here will be identifiers, but there will also be quasi-identifiers, 
semi-identifiers, non-identifiers, ex-identifiers, multi-identifiers and 
anti-identifiers.”428 For my purposes, Lukes’s observation is 
important in two senses. Firstly, it shows how one’s identification 
with a group is not an either /or –affair, but can vary, even to an 
extent to which members can aim not to identify with the group of 
which they, nevertheless, are members. Secondly, and more 
importantly, Lukes’s observation brings nicely forth the idea that 
one’s membership in a group is not always, or solely, dependent on 
                                                 
427 I restrict my analysis to identity-conferring groups (and, more 
specifically, to cultural or religious groups), although I see no reason for 
why my analysis could not also be applied to other types of groups – that 
is, groups that one can identify oneself as a member, but that play a fairly 
trivial role in the constitution of one’s identity. 
428 Lukes 2003, 142. 
Exit, Identity, and Membership 
279 
 
one’s own identification, but incorporates some other, yet 
undefined, criteria.  
Going back to Weinstock’s distinctions, it would seem that, in 
some cases, one’s membership in a cultural or religious group could 
be relatively easily established. For example, the groups that one 
can only be born to (such as ethnic groups or certain religious 
groups)429 include those, and only those, who have been born into 
these groups and have not explicitly renounced their membership in 
such groups.430 Often (regardless of the method of joining), one’s 
membership in a cultural or religious group could be fairly easily 
established by a simple tick in a box, or by looking at the official 
membership register of the group. But these kinds of simplified 
means of establishing group membership fail to be particularly 
interesting when one starts to think of questions about how 
members of such groups should be treated, how the group can treat 
its own members, or how to guarantee that no member is mistreated 
against her own will. More specifically, they fail to note that not 
everyone has the same view of who they view to be a member and, 
provided that membership in a group also affects people’s 
behaviour (either as a member, or towards a member), they fail to 
be satisfactory in an analysis of those instances in which one’s 
group membership really matters, but in which this membership is 
also contested, either by the person herself, or by those around her.  
To clarify, my analysis of group membership starts from a 
presumption that being a member of a group affects, to a smaller or 
larger extent, people’s behaviour. That is, the being a member of a 
group called “Catholics” operates as a reason for people to behave 
in certain manners, either as a Catholic or towards Catholic(s). For 
example, as a Catholic, I might go to church every Sunday, attend 
                                                 
429 It should be noted that not all (or even the majority of) religious groups 
follow the criterion of birth in defining their memberships, and even those 
that do (such as Judaism) give some scope for those who want to become 
members to do so. 
430 That is, if such renouncing is even principally possible, as in the case of 
ethnic groups it might not be. 
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confession and observe lent, and I might also expect (other) 
Catholics to do the same (and modify my behaviour towards them 
to fit these expectations). My behaviour towards other people is 
(partially) formed by my view of them as members of different 
groups, and the kinds of expectations I hold of them as members of 
such groups.431 In discussions on exit, the idea that people’s 
membership in a particular group affects people’s behaviour (either 
as a member or towards a member) is particularly clear. What is at 
stake, in the right of exit-debate, are precisely the questions of how 
people, as members of certain groups, are allowed to behave, how 
the liberal state should respond to the behaviour of certain members 
(whether those willing to stay or those willing to leave), and how a 
group (and, consequently, its members) are allowed to treat others, 
based on their membership of the same group. 
 
Recognition-based account of membership 
In chapter 4, I started to develop a recognition-based account of 
group membership that would take better into account the possible 
discrepancies in different actor’s recognition, as well as reasons for 
recognizing one as a member of any particular group. For the sake 
of clarity, my analysis was restricted to three categories of actors, 
those of the person herself (X), the (other) self-identifiers, and the 
(other) non-identifiers, each category of which could have different 
views on whether they conceived the person X to be a member of 
the group M. (see Table 1, Ch. 4, 2.1.) In this sub-section, this 
analysis is taken further by incorporating explicitly institutionalized 
actors into the possible structures of recognition. 
Taken into account the institutionalized actors or official bodies 
of different groups, there would seem to be five different categories 
that need to be taken into account when analysing people’s 
membership in any particular group. Firstly, that of X’s self-
identification as a member of the group M. Secondly, that of (other) 
                                                 
431 My analysis here is based on Appiah 2005, 65-71; see also Ch. 4, esp. 
2.1. 
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self-identifiers’ recognition432 of X as a member of the group M. 
And thirdly, that of the non-identifiers’ recognition of X as a 
member of the group M. The fourth and fifth categories, those of 
the institutionalized actors, do, to an extent, overlap with the first 
three categories, but should, for my purposes, be kept separate. 
Thus, fourthly, one also needs to consider whether the deciding 
body of the group (for example, the religious leaders or the tribal 
council) recognizes X as a member of the group M. And fifthly, 
whether the state recognizes X as a member of the group M. The 
Table 1 (Ch. 4, 2.1.), may thus be modified to incorporate five 
different categories, multiplying the possible combinations of 
recognition from eight to 32. 
 
Table 3 
 Actor 1. Actor 2. Actor 3. Actor 4. Actor 5. 
 X Those 
(others) 
self-
identifying 
as M 
Those 
(others) not 
identifying 
as M 
Deciding 
body of M 
The liberal 
state 
1. Identifies 
as M 
Recognizes 
X as M 
Recognizes 
X as M 
Recognizes 
X as M 
Recognizes 
X as M 
2. Identifies 
as M 
Recognizes 
X as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
Recognizes  
X as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
3. Identifies 
as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
Recognizes 
X as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
Recognizes 
X as M 
4. Identifies 
as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
Does not 
recognize X 
as M 
                                                 
432 The term recognition, in this context, refers simply to one’s 
acknowledgement of someone (X) as a member of a particular group (M). 
(See also, Ch. 4, 1.3.)  
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Etc. 
5-32 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
What should be noted, as demonstrated by the table above, is that 
the answers to the question of whether X counts as a member of M 
may differ, depending on which category of actors one asks.433 The 
liberal state (category 5) may, for example, have very different 
views on whether X counts as a member than X herself, or the other 
self-identifiers, or the group’s deciding body (as demonstrated by 
line 2). 
Whereas the possible combinations of recognition extend to 32, 
there may also be certain amount of inter-linkage, making certain 
combinations of recognition more common than others. For 
example, the deciding body of the group (category four) may at 
least try to follow the views of the self-identifiers (categories one 
and two) when deciding who to count as a member, and the state’s 
response (category five) into whether it views someone a member 
may at least aim to track the views of the self-identifiers or the 
group itself (categories one, two and four). Problematically, 
however, the tracking of the views of self-identifiers (whether 
categories one and two in the case of the group body, or categories 
one, two and four in the case of the liberal state) may only be 
partial, due to the possible discrepancies between the views of these 
categories.  
To illustrate this point, let us look at a widely discussed example 
of Santa Carla Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) that addressed the 
membership rights of the children of Julia Martinez (the 
respondent), a full member of the Santa Carla Pueblo, who had 
                                                 
433 For the sake of simplicity, I have ignored the possible variations within 
different categories of actors. Most notably, categories two (self-
identifiers) and three (non-identifiers) are subject to internal variation in 
terms of how they conceive someone’s membership in a particular group 
although, for the sake of simplicity, I treat these categories as if their 
views were homogeneous. 
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married outside her tribe and whose children, although raised and 
living among the tribe, were not recognized as Pueblo due to the 
traditional rules of membership that passed tribal membership on 
paternal lines.434 
In this case, as in most cases of cultural or religious groups, the 
default position rested on the right of the group to decide its own 
rules of membership, but these rules were not broad enough to 
include any particular identifier (category one) as a member. The 
majority of the self-identifying members (category two) or the 
leaders (category four), could refuse to recognize the membership 
of those who did not fit to the traditional membership criteria of the 
group (Martinez’s children), even if they would identify themselves 
as Pueblo and, for all practical purposes, lived as members within 
the group. Problematically, from the perspective of the liberal state, 
these kinds of discrepancies render the attempts of the liberal state 
to track the self-identifiers themselves in questions of membership 
partial, as the self-identifiers (categories one, two and four) may 
have very different views on who counts as a member. In effect, the 
view of the state, although aiming to track the views of the self-
identifiers, often manages only to track the views of the deciding 
body (category four), which may, in itself, be in conflict with the 
views of any particular self-identifier (category one) or, in some 
cases, even with the majority of the identifiers (category two). In 
the case of Santa Carla Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court 
aligned with the views of the group leaders in upholding the 
traditional rules of membership against the views of particular self-
identifiers – that is, of Julia Martinez and her children. 
 
The rationale for state recognition 
Apart from the possible discrepancies between the views of the 
different actors with respect to who they conceive to be members 
(recognition of membership), there may also be very different 
                                                 
434 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978). For discussion, see 
e.g.  Resnik 1989; Shachar 2001, 18-20; Gutmann 2003, 44-47. 
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views on the contents of this membership – that is, on what one 
conceives to be required for one to count as a member (reasons for 
recognition). For example, the reasons for the tribal council of the 
Pueblo (category four, partially overlapping with category two) to 
deny membership from certain self-identifiers (category one) may 
simply be a result of differing views on what they conceive to be 
required for one’s membership.435 In the Martinez -case, the 
disputed requirements had to do with birth and the requirement of 
the male parent to be Pueblo,436 but, depending on the group in 
question, they may include various things, such as the following of 
certain codes of conduct, participation in certain rituals or 
subjecting oneself to the authority of the group leaders. Importantly, 
however, not all identifiers may agree with what the group leaders 
conceive to be required for group membership, thus creating a 
situation in which there is discrepancy, not only on the questions of 
who counts as a member, but also on what is required in order for 
one to count as a member. 
Taken that the self-identifiers (as well as the deciding body of 
the group) may already have different views with respect to what is 
                                                 
435 It should be noted that the differing views on what is required for one’s 
membership do not, necessarily, lead to differing views on who is counted 
as a member, as the differing criteria may be accidentally congruent. See 
also: Vitikainen 2009. In the case of Santa Carla Pueblo v. Martinez, 
however, the views of the group leaders (supported by the Supreme Court) 
and Julia Martinez (the respondent) were contradictory, leading to 
different views on who was counted a member. 
436 What made the case of Santa Carla Pueblo v. Martinez especially 
difficult was that the membership criteria of the Pueblo was explicitly 
sexist, conflicting with the wider society’s norms of gender equality. The 
main question addressed by the courts was thus whether the Pueblo had a 
right to continue imposing unequal membership criteria in order to 
preserve its cultural identity, rather than who had the right to decide about 
the used criteria. In order for the conflict between different views on 
membership to arise, however, these views need not be in conflict with 
gender equality or with any of the prevailing norms of the wider society – 
they simply need to be in conflict with one another, thus producing 
different views on who counts as a member. 
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required for one to count as a member, it should come as no 
surprise that the view of the state may not always coincide with the 
views of (all) self-identifiers. Often, in line with the liberal 
multicultural view, the state may – and even should – attempt to 
steer clear of defining any particular contents of membership, and 
leave it to the group itself to decide what these contents should 
be.437 For the liberal state, the rationale for recognizing one as a 
member may thus not be the same kind of rationale as for the self-
identifiers themselves, as it is not the business of the liberal state to 
decide what kind of criteria any particular group uses for its 
membership. Whereas the rationale for the self-identifiers to 
recognize someone a member may (although does not necessarily 
have to) include various substantive requirements (such as birth or 
parenthood, following of certain norms and customs etc.), for the 
state the rationale for recognizing one’s membership should lie 
simply in the recognition of the self-identifiers itself, regardless of 
what rationale they themselves have for recognizing one’s 
membership. 
There are, however, certain difficulties to the idea of the state 
rationale as being based on the recognition of the self-identifiers 
itself (rather than on any substantive criteria). Firstly, as already 
indicated, it may be impossible for the state to track all self-
identifiers’ views on who counts as a member, and, more often than 
not, the state may only track the views of the deciding body 
(category four), thus leaving some self-identifiers without due 
recognition as group members. Secondly, it must be questioned 
                                                 
437 As Will Kymlicka has forcefully argued, the liberal state should not 
aim at promoting any particular cultural contents, including contents of 
membership, but rather leave it to the group members themselves to decide 
what they view as integral elements of their culture. (Kymlicka, 1989; 
1995.) Ayelet Shachar makes a similar point, emphasizing the right of the 
identity groups (nomoi communities) to retain their right to decide their 
own memberships. (Shachar, 2001.) For Kymlicka’s treatment of the Santa 
Carla Pueblo v. Martinez –case, and the upholding of the group’s right to 
impose sexually discriminatory membership rules, see Kymlicka 1995, 
163-170; for Shachar’s treatment of the case: Shachar 2001, 18-20. 
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whether the state can ever refrain from taking a stand on some of 
the substantive requirements of membership, even if this, according 
to many liberal multiculturalists, is precisely what the liberal state 
should do. On the most basic level, the liberal state, tracking the 
recognition of the deciding body of the group, also comes to affirm 
some of the substantive requirements that the deciding body of the 
group has for group membership. If, for example, the deciding body 
views one’s membership to require one to follow certain codes of 
conduct or to participate in certain cultural or religious rituals, then 
– by tracking the recognition of the group leaders – the liberal state 
also ends up affirming (albeit indirectly) these requirements as the 
requirements for one’s membership. 438 
Further, as will be elaborated in more detail in the following 
section, it may also be that some of the state policies – including the 
right of exit – have an effect of reinforcing certain conceptions of 
what it means to be a member of a particular group, and what is 
required for one to be counted a member. By emphasizing the right 
of exit, and by promoting this right as one of the primary safeguards 
of group members against their own group, the state, in effect, 
comes to support the view according to which it is only by one’s 
participation and by the following of the dominant norms and rules 
of the community that one is counted as a proper member of the 
group. By exiting their group, the group members are seen as 
renouncing their membership, having abandoned those 
requirements that the group leaders have given for one to be 
counted a member. Even if the recognition of the state attempts to 
stay clear from supporting any substantive contents of group 
membership, it would thus seem to fail, due to the discrepancies in 
the self-identifiers’ recognition, as well as the ways in which certain 
state policies feed into certain conceptions of what is required for 
one to be a proper member of a cultural or religious group. 
 
                                                 
438 For a parallel argument with respect to the ways in which certain kinds 
of minority rights always incorporate certain contents of culture, see Ch. 1, 
2.2.; Ch. 4, 1.2. 
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2. Exit and membership 
So far, I have discussed group membership in the light of how 
different people (self-identifiers, non-identifiers as well as 
institutionalized actors) may recognize (or not-recognize) someone 
as a group member, and how there may be different reasons for 
such recognition. This analysis highlighted some of the difficulties 
of defining group membership, especially in cases where the views 
of the different actors did not coincide, either with respect to one’s 
status as a group member, or with respect to the contents of this 
membership, or both. Earlier on, I emphasized the role of the 
identity-conferring groups and the ways in which one’s belonging 
to these groups could be viewed as constitutive of one’s identity. I 
argued that one of the major problems for thinking about exit from 
these kinds of groups was that many of the self-identifiers would 
not want to, or could not even contemplate of, leaving such groups, 
due to the extreme losses that this would bring to their deep-most 
identity. In this part, I attempt to bring these discussions together 
and show how the debates on the right of exit may benefit from 
taking these discussions into account. My aims in this section are 
twofold. Firstly, I try to show how my analyses of belonging and 
group membership may affect our understandings of exit, and 
secondly, how they may affect the liberal state’s responses to exit. 
Finally, I discuss some objections that could be leveled at my 
account and, by doing so, clarify the extent to which my account 
contributes to the discussions on exit, and to the questions of how to 
secure realistic rights of exit for everyone. 
 
2.1. Different types of exit 
Oonagh Reitman identifies three roles, or functions, of exit that 
have come to play an important part in discussions on 
multiculturalism.439 According to Reitman, the basic role of exit is 
to operate as an option for the minority members to leave their 
group and to enter the realm of the wider society. In its basic, and 
most passive, role, exit provides an avenue for the individual to 
                                                 
439 Reitman 2005. 
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leave, although it does not, in itself, guard individuals against their 
group or provide incentives for the group to change.440 Apart from 
its basic role, Reitman also identifies, and criticizes, two other roles 
of exit: those of protective and transformative roles.441 In its 
protective role, exit is supposed to safeguard individuals against 
oppression; in its transformative role, it is also supposed to provide 
the group incentives for change. Whereas the protective and 
transformative roles of exit have been utilized in attempts to justify 
non-intervention, Reitman argues that these two roles of exit often 
fail to perform the task they are supposed to perform. That is, they 
fail to provide sufficient protection for individuals against their own 
group, as well as incentives for the group to change in the face of 
(threats of) exit.442 
Whereas Reitman’s analysis of the three roles of exit is 
illuminating, it is also clear that these normative functions of exit 
are also dependent on how exit is induced, and how, in any 
particular case, exit is manifested. The normative implications of 
voluntary and non-voluntary exit are different, as are the upshots of 
different levels of (full/partial) exit. For my purposes, it is 
important to make a distinction between types of physical and 
psychological exit, and the ways in which the external and internal 
signs of exit help us understand the multiplicity of ways in which a 
person can exit her cultural or religious group. 
 
Membership and belonging 
In order to understand what it may mean to exit a cultural group, 
and what types of exit there may be, it is worth beginning with a 
brief clarification of the notions “belonging to a cultural group” and 
“membership in a cultural group”.  So far, I have talked of one’s 
belonging to a cultural group in terms of how one, herself, would 
view one’s relation to the group in question. In my account, one is 
seen to belong when one identifies oneself as an M (be it Catholic, 
                                                 
440 Reitman 2005, 190-191. 
441 Reitman 2005, 192-204 
442 Reitman 2005. 
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Muslim, Aboriginal etc), and, in the case of identity-conferring 
groups, this sense of belonging operates as one of the constitutive 
elements of one’s identity. This belonging, however, is seldom 
entirely internally produced, but may also require certain external 
affirmation. More often than not, one can only feel to belong if 
others (at least, some significant group of others) affirm one’s 
belonging. This affirmation may come in the form of relatively 
content neutral recognition (I recognize you to be M), but it may 
also incorporate certain types of behaviour, such as one being 
allowed to participate in certain group practices together with 
others. 
Although the notions of belonging to a cultural group (one’s 
self-identification) and membership in such a group are closely 
related, these notions are not interchangeable. Whereas one’s 
belonging is primarily dependent on one’s own view of oneself 
(that, one must admit, is often dependent on the recognition of 
others),443 one’s membership is never solely dependent on one’s 
view of oneself, but is primarily constituted by the recognition of 
others. Notably, different people (as well as institutionalized actors) 
may have different views on who counts as a member, and there 
may not be any uncontested, objective criteria for defining who, in 
any particular instances, counts as a member, and who does not.444 
                                                 
443 The importance of external recognition for one’s views of oneself has 
been discussed extensively for example by Axel Honneth (1997; 2001) 
and Charles Taylor (1994). However, whereas these theorists of 
recognition often emphasize the importance of positive recognition to 
people’s self-respect and self-esteem, the notion of recognition used in this 
essay is relatively value neutral. To recognize someone as an M is simply 
to acknowledge that person’s status as a member of a group M, without 
making any value judgments about the nature of M. As will be seen, the 
effect of such recognition may also be positive (in terms of providing 
external affirmation for one’s status as a group member) although, 
contrary to Honneth’s and Taylor’s views, this recognition involves no 
value-judgments about the thing recognized (M). For alternative 
conceptions of recognition, see e.g. Kenny 2004: ch. 8; Jones 2006. 
444 As discussed in section 1.2. above, it may be possible to impose some 
objective criteria of membership (such as birth or official registration) to 
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Exit as leaving group influence vs. exit as renouncing belonging 
With respect to what it might mean to exit one’s cultural group, 
both of these perspectives – that of one’s sense of belonging and 
that of one’s membership dependent on the views of others – need 
to be kept in mind. From the perspective of one’s belonging, exit 
can, in its most extreme form, be understood in terms of one’s 
renouncing one’s belonging to the group in question.445 This 
renouncing may be manifested in a variety of ways, but the idea, 
from the perspective of the person exiting, is the same: that of 
abandoning that sense of belonging to which one has grown 
accustomed to. In the case of identity-conferring groups, however, 
this renouncing of one’s belonging may not be a feasible option due 
to the ways in which this belonging affects one’s sense of oneself. 
To renounce one’s belonging would be to renounce oneself, one’s 
deep-most identity – something not many (if any) of us would be 
willing to do. 
In the right of exit -discussions, however, exit is often 
understood in very different (and more concrete) ways. To exit a 
cultural or religious group is often understood in terms of leaving 
behind the influence that the group has on its members. This 
leaving may include (1) concrete physical separation from the 
group in question (especially highlighted in those groups that have 
isolated themselves from the rest of society, such as the Amish and 
Hutterites), but it does not necessarily need to involve such physical 
separation. In many cases (in fact, in most cases of cultural or 
religious communities that reside within the larger liberal society), 
exit may simply mean (2) the leaving behind those cultural or 
religious practices and ways of life that are characteristic of the 
                                                                                                     
some groups, but these criteria hardly manage to escape the kinds of 
contestations that make questions of membership, in the political context, 
most interesting. For further difficulties of using objective lists in defining 
group memberships, see e.g. Killmister 2011. 
445 As highlighted by Lukes’s observation about different types of 
identification, this renouncing may also be partial. Lukes 2003, 142, see 
section 1.2. above. 
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group in question. It may also mean (3) the renouncing of (some of) 
the dominant norms and rules of the community, or (4) the denial of 
the group authority (group jurisdiction), without having to 
physically separate oneself from the community in question.446 
It should be noted that, although analytically separate, these 
ways of understanding exit (physical separation, lack of 
participation, renouncing of the dominant rules and norms, and 
denial of group authority) often go hand in hand. The renouncing of 
the dominant rules or norms of the community, for example, may 
lead to a situation in which the person in question is no longer 
allowed to participate in the group practices or even be able to 
associate with those willing to affirm such norms and practices 
(thus akin to physical separation). Depending on the group in 
question, the other group members (paralleling categories two and 
four of the previous section) may impose much stronger forms of 
separation on the person in question, making her exit much more 
robust than it would otherwise be. In these cases, the person’s 
voluntary exit (for example, in terms of the renouncing of the 
dominant rules and norms of the community), may turn out to be 
involuntary (in terms of being forced to separate oneself from the 
group).447 Importantly, however, none of the above ways of exit 
necessarily entail that the person has also renounced her belonging 
to the group in question: her sense of herself as Catholic, as 
Muslim, as Aboriginal etc. Despite all the external signs, the person 
                                                 
446 These four examples of exiting one’s cultural group are, by no means, 
meant to be exhaustive. They do, nevertheless, demonstrate the 
multiplicity of ways in which one can be seen to exit one’s cultural 
community, incorporating also different forms of exit in relation to 
whether one’s exit is primarily from one’s social connections, or from the 
dominant cultural contents (norms and values) of the group in question. 
For further analysis on these two elements of exit, see Borchers 2012. 
447 Whereas there may well be some limitations into the ways in which 
groups can enforce the expulsion of their members, the involuntary exists 
may also be viewed as the other side of the coin of the freedom to refuse 
association (Barry 2001, 150). Whereas individuals should be free to 
refuse association by exit, so should the other group members be free to 
refuse association with the individual in question. 
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may still feel like they belong to the group in question, and would 
not, under any circumstances, be willing to abandon this sense of 
belonging: her deep most identity as an M. 
Before going further, it should be clarified that my intention is 
not to say that exit, in the sense in which exit is commonly 
understood (as leaving behind the group influence) would not be 
problematic due to it not necessarily entailing one’s renouncing of 
one’s belonging, or one’s deep-most identity. Quite the contrary, 
those aspects of one’s belonging that can be viewed as integral for 
the constitution of one’s identity may include both physical as well 
as psychological closeness with the group in question, including 
active participation in group life together with others. In these 
cases, exit (in the senses in which it is commonly understood) 
might not be feasible, due to it involving the abandoning of those 
aspects of one’s belonging that one views as integral for one’s 
identity. 
Nor is my intention to say that the only problems associated with 
exit would be those associated with one’s identity as an M. Quite 
clearly, regardless of whether one’s belonging operates as one of 
the integral elements of one’s identity, exit may be problematic, due 
to, for example, one’s economic dependence on the group (or some 
of its members), or the lack of alternative places to go to. As my 
focus, in this chapter, is on those elements and difficulties of exit 
that are brought about by the identity-conferring features of cultural 
groups, however, I will largely leave aside the other possible 
difficulties of exit, brought about by other considerations than those 
connected to one’s identity as an M. 
 
2.2. Reducing the costs of exit by state recognition 
Taking into account the different ways in which one’s belonging 
and one’s membership in a cultural group may be understood, also 
helps to understand some of the ways in which people can be seen 
to exit their cultural groups. The main distinction, made in this 
chapter, has been the distinction between ‘exit as renouncing one’s 
belonging’ and ‘exit as leaving behind the group influence’ (or exit, 
as commonly understood), and the acknowledgement that these two 
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ways of exiting a cultural group do not necessarily (although they 
certainly can) go together. Keeping this distinction in mind, it is 
time to turn to look at the ways in which the analyses of one’s 
belonging, membership and exit can be utilized in the right of exit-
debates, especially with respect to the liberal state’s responses to 
issues on exit. 
As indicated, many of the difficulties – and costs – of one’s exit 
from a cultural or religious group can be traced back to the fact that 
people do not want to, or cannot even contemplate of abandoning 
those senses of belonging that they view as central to their identity. 
The costs of abandoning that through which one’s identity is 
constituted would simply be too high, and the guarantees of the 
right of exit would be meaningless. This is especially problematic 
with respect to those identity-conferring groups that mistreat some 
of their members, but to which those mistreated have a strong sense 
of affinity and would not even contemplate leaving.  As Weinstock 
aptly points out, “exit rights do nothing for the person who feels she 
has no choice but to continue adhering to a group that treats her 
badly. Her preference would be to continue to affirm her 
membership while not having to put up with the poor treatment.”448 
Whereas I agree with Weinstock’s observation that the right of 
exit might do nothing for those to whom the belonging to her 
cultural group operates as an integral element of her identity, I also 
think that this observation is somewhat typical of the ways in which 
the debates on exit often ignore the different types of exit, and the 
ways in which the variations on exit and on one’s membership 
could be used in order to ease the costs of those for whom staying 
with the group proves too much. As noted by Weinstock, what 
many of the members of identity-conferring groups would like to 
do – and what they often cannot conceive not to do – is to affirm 
their membership in such groups. This want to affirm one’s 
membership links inherent in one’s want to belong, and to one’s 
view of oneself as an M (be it Catholic, Muslim, Aboriginal etc.). 
However, one’s belonging may not be solely dependent on the view 
                                                 
448 Weinstock 2005, 238. 
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of the person herself, but also on the views of others, whose 
affirmation of one’s membership may well play an important role in 
the ways in which the person is able to feel to belong – that is, to 
self-identify herself as an M. From the perspective of the liberal 
state, this linkage between one’s belonging (self-identification) and 
external affirmation (recognition of others) should, I believe, be of 
special importance, bearing also upon the state’s responses to exit, 
and to the recognition of those who either have, or are 
contemplating leaving the contours of their group. 
In order to see how this linkage may affect the liberal state’s 
responses to exit, let us return briefly to the ways in which the 
liberal state is said to track the recognition of the group itself on 
issues of group membership. As already indicated, it is often held 
that the state should stay clear of defining any substantive criteria of 
membership and, rather, leave it to the group to decide who they 
count as members and what is required for such membership. Due 
to the discrepancies in different actors’ recognition, however, it is 
not possible for the liberal state to track the recognition of all those 
who self-identify themselves as members, but the state needs to 
take a stand on which of the self-identifying members it chooses to 
listen to – that is, whose views of group membership it decides to 
track. To put it bluntly, in order for the liberal state to track the 
recognition of the group itself in questions of membership, the state 
already needs to have some view of who are those members that 
constitute the group whose views it is tracking. Interestingly, in 
trying to track the views of the group itself, the state often comes to 
track the views of those most powerful in the group in question – 
the group leaders or the deciding body – and, consequently, refuses 
to affirm the membership of those who are no longer counted as 
group members by the deciding body of the group.449 
                                                 
449 The case of Santa Carla Pueblo v. Martinez provides a good example 
of this kind of tracking on issues of membership, although it is clear that 
the instances of the state following the views of those most powerful 
within cultural groups are not restricted to issues of membership, but 
constitute a far wider pattern of biased state recognition. As particularly 
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For the debates on exit, this tracking of the views of the group 
leaders or the deciding body (category four of the previous section) 
have interesting consequences. Firstly, by tracking the recognition 
of the group leaders, the liberal state does, in effect, also come to 
affirm those criteria that the group leaders have for group 
membership. Even if the state would not explicitly confirm the 
substantive criteria decided by the group leaders, in recognizing the 
authority of the leaders, the state in effect also gives certain 
legitimation to its decisions (including decisions on the criteria of 
membership). 
Secondly, it would also seem that without making the distinction 
between exit in terms of leaving the influence of the group (or, exit 
as commonly understood) and exit in terms of renouncing one’s 
belonging, the state may enforce much stronger forms of separation 
on those who have decided to leave the contours of their group than 
would be necessary. Without this distinction, the state, tracking the 
views of the group leaders, views those who have decided to leave 
the contours of their group as having also renounced their 
membership in such groups, thus further feeding into the dominant 
view of what “proper” membership in any particular group entails. 
In the eyes of the liberal state, those who choose to take advantage 
of exit (as commonly understood) are seen, not only as leaving the 
influence of their group, but also as having renounced their 
belonging to such groups. Not only does the state thus track (and 
confirm) the views of the group leaders as appropriate criteria for 
group membership, it also encourages the view of exit as far more 
drastic and complete than it would need to be. Those who have left 
behind the group influence (be it in terms of physical separation, 
lack of participation, renouncing of the dominant rules and norms, 
                                                                                                     
the feminist critique has pointed out, it is often the group leaders (usually, 
the elderly men of communities) that are given priority in articulating the 
“authentic” views of their culture, including the criteria of membership, 
thus side-lining the views of those who may object to these traditional 
interpretations. See e.g. Okin 1999; Benhabib 2002; Song 2007; Phillips 
2010. Some of the problems relating to this bias in criminal courts will be 
discussed in Ch. 6. 
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or the denial of group authority) are no longer conceived of as full 
members of that group, but as dissenters who have renounced their 
membership, and who, in the eyes of the liberal state, no longer 
count as “proper” members of the group.  
What should be noted, is that this response of the liberal state to 
view those who have decided leave the contours of their group as 
non- or ex-members may, in itself, make the prospect of exit (as 
commonly understood) even harder for the group members to take 
advantage of. For a person to whom being an M (Catholic, Muslim, 
Aboriginal etc.) operates as one of the integral elements of her 
identity, leaving behind the influence of her group may count as 
even less of an option, should this entail, not only the rejection of 
the group leaders (category four) or other group members (category 
two), but also the rejection, or lack of recognition, of the liberal 
state (category five). Whereas there is not much the liberal state can 
do, should the group (whether its leaders or the majority of the self-
identifiers) no longer wish to recognize one as a member, what it 
can, and perhaps should, do is to give due recognition to those who 
have decided to leave the contours of their group, but who, 
nevertheless, still wish to affirm their membership in the group in 
question. Instead of viewing those who have left the influence of 
their group as non- or ex-members, the liberal state could, at the 
very least, still recognize them as members and, by doing so, reduce 
some of the costs of leaving the influence of one’s group by 
affirming the belonging of those who, despite having left the 
contours of their group, still deeply identify themselves as 
belonging to the group in question. 
 
2.3. Objections 
My proposal that in cases where a person has decided to leave the 
influence of her group without, nevertheless, renouncing her 
belonging to that group (her identity as an M), the liberal state 
should carry on recognizing her as a member of the group, is bound 
to encounter several objections. In this section, I outline and 
respond to three of these: those of the argument from insufficiency, 
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the problem of the source of recognition, and the argument against 
external interference.  
 
Insufficiency 
From the perspective of those who worry about the realistic rights 
of exit and the conditions required for such rights, two objections 
ensue. Firstly, it may be objected that my call for the liberal state to 
continue recognizing those who have left the influence of their 
group as group members (should they so wish to be recognized), is 
insufficient in providing those conditions in which the formal rights 
of exit become realistic. From a practical point of view, it is more 
important that the members of cultural groups are provided 
information about the life outside their group, and that they also 
have both material as well as psychological means for accessing 
this life outside their group. The continued state recognition hardly 
provides for these conditions, but may, on the contrary, discourage 
people from leaving, as it encourages the impression that it is never 
possible to fully exit one’s cultural group (as demonstrated by the 
continued state recognition). 
Whereas I completely agree that the continued state recognition 
does not, on its own, provide sufficient conditions for the exit to be 
realistic, I do not think that the insufficiency of state recognition 
takes away the important role that this recognition can, 
nevertheless, play in easing the costs of exit and, consequently, in 
making exit more realistic. Instead of indicating that it is never 
possible to fully exit one’s cultural group, the continued state 
recognition aims to show that it is, indeed, possible to leave the 
contours of one’s group without having to abandon one’s deep most 
identity as a member of such group. My argument for continued 
state recognition, it should be emphasized, is thus a qualified one. 
By no means do I claim that the liberal state should continue to 
recognize all those who have decided to leave the influence of their 
group as group members, but rather, that those who have, and who 
still wish to affirm their belonging – their deep most identity as an 
M – should be thus recognized. Conversely, should a person, 
having left the contours of her group, no longer wish to affirm her 
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belonging, she should also not be obliged to do so. Importantly, by 
tracking the self-identification of those who have left the contours 
of their group (rather than the recognition of the group leaders), the 
liberal state affirms both possibilities: those of exiting one’s cultural 
group by also renouncing one’s belonging, as well as of exiting the 
influence of one’s group without renouncing that aspect of one’s 
identity one may be most strongly connected to – one’s deep-most 
identity as an M. 
Secondly, it could be objected that the continued state 
recognition, although fine in principle, fails to do much in practice, 
as for most people, their identity is inherently tied up with their 
living with the group in question and with their participating in the 
group activities together with others. For most people (most 
problematic from the perspective of exit), it is precisely this aspect 
of sharing one’s life with other group members that one cannot 
contemplate of abandoning, as it is precisely this participation that 
one views as central to one’s identity. The recognition of those who 
have decided to leave the contours of their group thus fails to give 
enough to those whose identity is inherently connected to the group 
practices and to living with the group in question, as it is precisely 
this aspect of one’s identity that one cannot contemplate of leaving. 
Although I acknowledge that the continued state recognition of 
those who have, already, left the contours of their group may not 
lower the burdens of exit enough to make exit (as commonly 
understood) a realistic option for all, I do, nevertheless, think that 
the continued state recognition can operate as one of the ways in 
which the burdens of exit can be lowered. For someone who still 
wishes to stay with her group and who still wishes to live the kinds 
of life characteristic of her group together with others, there will, no 
doubt, be costs, should she decide to leave the contours of her 
group.450 These costs could, however, be reduced (sometimes to the 
extent of tipping the balance between staying and leaving) by the 
                                                 
450 As Brian Barry has noted, some costs of leaving a cultural group may 
be both inevitable as well as impossible to compensate. Barry 2001, 149-
154. 
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state continuing to recognize her as a group member and by 
continuing also to treat her as one, should her membership entail 
certain benefits or privileges that she can enjoy, despite having left 
the influence of her group.451 The continued state recognition would 
provide, not only certain affirmation for her sense of herself as an 
M, but also enable her to live as close to the kind of life she would 
want to live, should she have remained with her group. Whereas the 
continued state recognition is far from giving any absolute 
guarantees for a meaningful right of exit, it does, nevertheless, 
make exit (as commonly understood) more feasible for those to 
whom identifying oneself as an M (Catholic, Muslim, Aboriginal 
etc.) is an inherent element of their identity.  
 
                                                 
451 By benefits and privileges I refer to those measures that the state may 
have adopted in order to accommodate the differing values, world views 
and ways of life of cultural or religious minorities – for example, certain 
levels of self-determination, exemptions from the dominant rules and 
norms of society, preferential treatment policies, or financial benefits, 
aiming to enable the group members to live in accordance with their own 
culture without being unduly disadvantaged by the infrastructure that has 
been organized in accordance with the norms and values of the majority. 
Undoubtedly, the benefits of those who have left the influence of their 
group may not be quite as extensive, as some of these benefits can only be 
enjoyed collectively, but they may, nevertheless, include measures that are 
not dependent on the beneficiary’s relation to other group members (most 
notably, individually exercised group rights such as exemptions, or 
eligibility for membership-based benefits such as housing, health care or 
educational opportunities, including membership-based quotas). A more 
thorough analysis of the kinds of measures (minority rights) that those 
who have left the contours of their group should be entitled to, as well as 
the extents to which the liberal state may enforce these rights is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, as is the question of the justifiability of such 
membership-based measures in the first place. For my purposes, it suffices 
to say that, should there be such benefits, allocated to people on the basis 
of their group membership, then one’s leaving the influence of her group 
should not, necessarily, take these benefits away. 
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Source of recognition 
A slightly different objection, with respect to my proposal for 
continued state recognition, focuses on the kinds of recognition 
conceived as especially important for one’s identity. As many 
theorists of recognition have noted, recognizing one as an M (be it 
Catholic, Muslim, Aboriginal, but also female, black or gay) may 
operate as an important source of one’s self-respect and self-
esteem, with mis-recognition or lack of recognition operating to an 
opposite effect.452 Although my usage of the term “recognition” is 
somewhat different from these traditional notions of recognition,453 
it is clear that the external affirmation of one’s membership – of 
one’s status as an M – can nevertheless play an important role in 
one’s understanding of one’s belonging – of one’s most profound 
identity as an M.  As already mentioned, one’s self-identification as 
an M is seldom entirely internally produced, but may require certain 
external affirmation – that is, recognition by others as a member of 
the group M. 
There may, however, be objections raised that my call for 
continued state recognition fails to acknowledge the kind of 
recognition most important to the affirmation of one’s identity as an 
M. For those to whom the belonging to a cultural group means the 
most, it is often of secondary importance whether the liberal state 
recognizes their status as a group member, if the group itself – the 
other group members – refuses to recognize such membership. For 
most, it is the recognition of those one cares most about (other 
group members) that is of the utmost importance, and the 
recognition by the state can only operate, at the most, as a poor 
substitute for such recognition. 
Again, I need to acknowledge that there is some weight in this 
objection, although I do not think that it makes my call for the 
continued state recognition redundant. Whereas it often is the case 
that the most important affirmation of one’s identity comes from 
those one feels the strongest relation to – that is, other group 
                                                 
452 Honneth 1997; 2001; Taylor 1994. 
453 See note 443, p. 289 above; see also: Ch. 4, 1.3. 
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members – one should not underestimate the importance and 
influence that the recognition on behalf of the state may have. As 
many recognition theorists have pointed out, one of the most 
pressing issues for many oppressed or discriminated against groups 
has been precisely the acquiring of due recognition from the state, 
and the acknowledgement of the group members’ worth as M’s ( as 
gays, as women, as blacks) instead of lacking recognition or being 
recognized despite being an M.454 Whereas there is no denying the 
importance of the recognition of one’s peers for one’s sense of 
oneself, there is not much that the state can do to convince the other 
group members to recognize one as a member. However, by 
continuing to recognize the person who has left the contours of her 
group as a member (should she so want to be recognized), and by 
continuing to also treat her as a member (insofar as feasible), this 
person does acquire some recognition as a group member, and is 
also provided with some tools for affirming her identity as an M. 
Provided that one’s belonging, and one’s deepest sense of oneself, 
is often dependent on some external affirmation, it is essential that 
at least the state provides this affirmation, even if the other group 
members would not.  
 
External interference 
The two first objections, those of insufficiency and the source of 
recognition, point out some important limitations of the continued 
state recognition in lowering the burdens of exit (as commonly 
understood) from identity-conferring or constitutive groups. My 
call for the liberal state to continue recognizing those who have 
exited the contours of their group without renouncing their 
belonging as group members should not thus be thought of as a 
grand solution to the problems associated with the realistic rights of 
exit. Quite the contrary, the continued state recognition operates 
                                                 
454 On the construction of positive, collective identities through positive 
recognition as an M, see e.g. Appiah 2005, 108-109. For an illuminating 
critique of the strategy of claiming recognition as M instead of claiming 
recognition and M, see Moody-Adams 2006. 
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only as one of the means through which the burdens of leaving the 
influence of one’s group can be lowered, but gives no guarantees 
for realistic rights of exit. Contrary to the two first objections that 
manage only to establish certain limitations of my suggestion, the 
third objection, if successful, may lead to rejecting my proposal of 
continued state recognition altogether. According to this objection, 
the continued state recognition diminishes the group’s right to 
decide about its own membership and constitutes an illegitimate 
external interference into the group’s internal affairs. 
This objection – let us call it the argument against external 
interference – can be best understood from the perspective of those 
who argue for the right of the cultural groups to decide their own 
memberships, complemented by the requirement of the liberal state 
not to interfere in these decisions. To recall, the rationale for the 
liberal state to recognize X as a group member was – and also 
should be – distinguished from the rationale that the group itself 
(whether the deciding body or the self-identifiers) could have as 
criteria of membership. In order to steer clear from defining any 
substantive criteria of membership, the state should simply track the 
recognition of the group itself, and to recognize as group members 
those, and only those, who have been accepted as group members 
by the group itself (see 1.2. above). By continuing to recognize 
those who have exited the contours of their group as group 
members, the objection goes, the liberal state interferes in the 
internal affairs of the group, imposing a view of membership that is 
not accepted by the group itself. 
In response to this objection, two things need to be said. Firstly, 
let us presume for the time being that the continued state 
recognition does, indeed, constitute interference to the group’s 
internal affairs. Should this be the case, it is worth imagining what 
this interference would look like. Those who would have exited the 
contours of their cultural group (exit as commonly understood) 
would continue to be recognized by the liberal state as group 
members (should they so wish to be recognized). Due to state 
recognition, they would also be entitled to many of the group-based 
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benefits (e.g. preferential treatment, legal assistance, exemptions)455 
enabling them to live as close to the kind of life they would wish to 
live should they still have been able to stay within the contours of 
their group. The continued state recognition does not, however, in 
any way force the other group members to recognize the dissenter’s 
membership, nor can it force the other group members to treat the 
dissenter as a member of their group. On the contrary, the continued 
state recognition is compatible with the group itself (whether its 
leading body or other self-identifiers) having the right to expel 
dissenters from its midst and to shun those they no longer view as 
belonging to the group in question. Keeping this in mind, the 
continued state recognition, should it constitute an interference to 
the group’s internal affairs, is very minimal, having more of an 
effect on the person who has decided to leave the contours of her 
group than on those who have decided to stay. 
Secondly, one must question the claim that my proposal for 
continued state recognition would constitute an illegitimate 
interference into the internal affairs of the group. As already 
indicated, in order for the liberal state to respect the group’s right to 
decide its own membership, the state needs to steer away from 
trying to define any substantive criteria of membership and, rather, 
attempt to track the recognition of the group itself in issues of group 
membership. However, in order to track the recognition of the 
group itself in issues of membership, the state already needs to have 
some conception of who constitutes that group, the recognition of 
which it is supposed to be tracking. Often, this problem is solved by 
the state tracking the recognition of the group leaders or the 
deciding body of the group (as demonstrated by Santa Carla 
Pueblo v. Martinez). However, by tracking the recognition of the 
group leaders or the deciding body, the state can no longer be seen 
as staying clear from the issues of defining membership, as it has 
already acknowledged the group leaders as the legitimate spoke 
persons of the group and, by doing so, also given certain 
                                                 
455 The list of such benefits would naturally depend on the group in 
question and on the existing membership benefits for the group.  
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legitimation to those criteria that the group leaders have for group 
membership. 
The tracking of the recognition of group leaders or the deciding 
body of the group is not, however, the only way for the liberal state 
to attempt to respect the group’s right to decide its own 
membership.456 By tracking the recognition of the group leaders (or, 
indeed, any fraction of the group), the liberal state does, in effect, 
interfere in the internal affairs of the group by giving its support to 
those most powerful within the group. As already demonstrated, the 
tracking of the group’s own recognition on issues of group 
membership is bound to encounter several difficulties as the 
recognition of different actors (be they the group leaders, majority 
of self-identifiers, or any individual self-identifier (X)) may be very 
different with respect to who they conceive to be members. The 
alternative approach, that of tracking people’s self-identifications, 
on the contrary, would seem to be able to take these discrepancies 
into account and also come closer to fulfilling the requirement of 
the liberal state to stay clear from defining any substantive 
requirements of membership. Whereas the self-identifiers 
themselves (be they those who are staying firmly within the 
contours of their group, or those who have decided to exit (as 
commonly understood) from their group) may have very different 
views on who counts as a member of the group, these discrepancies 
no longer carry weight, as it is not the recognition of the self-
identifiers that the state attempts to track, but the self-identification 
itself. The tracking of people’s self-identifications rather than any 
particular recognition may, no doubt, lead the liberal state to 
recognize very different groups of people as group members (as 
demonstrated by the continued state recognition of those who have 
left the contours of their group), but it would also seem to do a 
                                                 
456 Indeed, my intention is not to argue against the view according to 
which the liberal state should steer away from defining any substantive 
criteria of membership and let the group itself define its own membership, 
but rather to show that an alternative approach, that of tracking people’s 
self-identifications, may do a better job in this. 
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better job in allowing the group itself decide its own membership 
by resisting to give support to any particular fraction’s views on 
who counts and who does not count as a group member. 
 
3. Conclusion on exit, identity, and membership 
In this chapter, I have focused on the difficulties that one’s 
identification with a cultural or religious group may bring for 
thinking about exit from such groups. I started by analysing the 
different ways and extents to which one’s belonging to a cultural 
group could be understood before turning into the possible linkages 
between one’s self-identification as belonging to the group in 
question and one’s membership in such group. My analysis of the 
different ways and extents of one’s belonging on the one hand, and 
of one’s membership on the other was then used to analyze the 
different ways in which exit from a cultural group could be 
understood. The main distinction, made in this chapter, was 
between exit in terms of renouncing one’s belonging and exit in 
terms of leaving behind the influence of one’s group (or, exit, as 
commonly understood). I argued that this distinction should be kept 
in mind, not only in order to have a more sophisticated 
understanding of what it might mean to exit one’s cultural group, 
but also for developing more satisfactory approaches for the liberal 
state to respond to issues of exit.  
My proposal, with respect to the liberal state’s responses to exit, 
was that the state should continue to recognize those who have 
decided to leave the contours of their group (exit, as commonly 
understood) as members of the group should they so wish to be 
recognized. This approach, it was shown, had several benefits. 
Firstly, the continued state recognition would give at least some 
affirmation to the person’s identity as an M, thus contributing to the 
possibilities of this person continuing to identify herself as an M 
despite having left the contours of her group. Secondly, the 
affirmation of one’s identity as an M would operate as one of the 
ways in which the burdens of exit (as commonly understood) could 
be lowered, thus contributing to making the formal rights of exit 
more realistic. Thirdly, the continued state recognition would also 
Part II Liberal Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in Practice 
306 
 
take better into account the discrepancies that different actors may 
have for recognizing (or not recognizing) someone a member, and 
refuse to prioritize any particular fraction’s views on who counts as 
a member. This tracking of people’s self-identifications (instead of 
any fraction’s recognition) would also better fulfill the requirement 
of the liberal state to stay away from defining any substantive 
criteria of membership, as the state recognition would depend, not 
on any fraction’s views on who counts as a member, but on 
people’s self-identifications themselves. All in all, the continued 
recognition of those who have exited the contours of their group 
without renouncing their belonging would take better into account 
both the importance that one’s belonging to a cultural or religious 
group may have for the constitution of one’s identity, as well as 
acknowledging the multiplicity of ways in which one’s group 
membership, as well as the requirements for such membership, may 
be understood. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Liberal Individualism and cultural defence 
 
One of the overarching themes of this study has been its focus on 
individuals as cultural beings, and the assessment of the issues of 
cultural accommodation from the perspective of these individuals. 
Subscribing to liberal individualism – that is, to the view according 
to which it is ultimately the well-being of individuals that matters, 
and that the assessment and implementation of cultural policies 
should also keep this in mind – I have argued for an approach that 
attempts to take people’s cultural commitments seriously by 
emphasizing the person’s own views of her culture and her 
belonging to the cultural group in question. Most notably, I have 
argued against the commonly accepted criterion of membership as 
the default criterion for allocating differentiated rights and 
discussed some of the ways in which a more individuated approach 
could better perform the job of tracking the proper beneficiaries of 
these rights.  
Whereas the two previous chapters (Ch. 4 & 5) form the very 
core of my theoretical argument for a more individuated approach 
to accommodating people’s cultural differences, they do not, as 
such, say much about the ways in which this approach should be 
implemented in practice, or what kinds of consequences this would 
have on actual cultural policies. Although it is well beyond the 
scope of this work to develop any comprehensive account of the 
individuated approach in practice (no doubt, different cases should 
also be assessed in context), in this final chapter, I attempt to shed 
some light on these questions by looking at one instance of cultural 
accommodation, that of the usage of culture in criminal courts. This 
discussion builds upon the analyses of the previous chapters on 
group membership (Ch. 4) and cultural identity (Ch. 5), and also 
deepens my analysis, moving on from the issues of membership and 
belonging to questions of how people’s actions can be motivated by 
culture, and how these motivations should be taken into account in 
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criminal courts. By looking at a variety of ways in which people’s 
actions can be culturally motivated, and the difficulties in 
identifying these motivations, I show some of the deficiencies in the 
current practices of using culture in criminal courts.457 I argue that, 
as currently practiced, cultural defence fails to treat all members of 
minority groups fairly and equally, and that, in order for it to do so, 
more attention should be placed on the identification of the 
subjective elements of culturally motivated actions, rather than on 
the seemingly objective elements of membership or the existence of 
any particular cultural practice or tradition. 
As the debates on cultural defence are rather specific and, to 
certain extent, distinct from the more general debates on 
multiculturalism, I begin this chapter by outlining the general 
framework of these debates, including the different types of cultural 
defence and the standard arguments both for as well as against such 
defence. The first part, What is cultural defence?, focuses on 
different types of cultural defence and the basic presumptions 
behind these defences. It highlights both the variety of ways in 
which culture can be used in criminal courts, as well as the 
multiplicity of ways in which culture is seen to affect people’s 
behaviour depending on the type of defence in question. 
In the second part, Normative issues, I discuss some of the main 
arguments that have been laid out both for as well as against the 
allowing of the defendant’s cultural background as a mitigating 
factor in criminal courts. I argue that, whereas there are good 
reasons both for as well as against cultural defence (especially, 
formal cultural defence), there are also significant variations to the 
kinds of cases to which cultural defence may be applied. Whereas 
in some cases, cultural evidence can, fairly non-controversially, be 
                                                 
457 It should be noted that my discussions are not dependent on any 
particular legal system, but concentrate on an analysis of some of the 
normative suggestions given for the usage of culture in criminal courts. As 
with most of the literature on cultural defence, the framework of this 
chapter is in the Anglo-American tradition, although I see no reason why 
some of the more general suggestions of this chapter could not be applied 
also in relatively different contexts. 
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used as a mitigating factor in the assessment of the defendant’s 
culpability, in others there are strong reasons to resist allowing 
cultural defence in criminal courts.  
In the final part, Cultural defence and culturally motivated 
actions, I develop my main argument for more individuated usage 
of culture in criminal courts. I distinguish between several ways in 
which people’s actions can be motivated by culture and argue that 
not all of these cases fall within the scope of “having a good-faith 
belief in the propriety of one’s actions” (as required by cultural 
defence). In several instances, it is shown, identical actions can be 
performed from a multiplicity of cultural motivations. By looking at 
the ways in which culture is currently used in criminal courts, I 
propose a further challenge to those in favor of formal cultural 
defence, by showing how the suggested guidelines for establishing 
people’s cultural motivations prop up the status quo, and fail to 
treat all members of minority groups fairly and equally. As an 
alternative, a more individuated approach is suggested, paying more 
attention to the subjective elements of cultural motivations rather 
than to the apparently objective elements of membership or the 
existence of particular cultural practices. 
 
1. What is cultural defence? 
For the purposes of this chapter, the following working definition of 
cultural defence is adopted: 
 
A cultural defence maintains that a person who has a reasonable good-
faith belief in the propriety of his/her action, based on his/her cultural 
heritage or tradition, should not be held fully accountable for such 
action, should it be in violation of the official law.458 
                                                 
458 In the literature, there are several slightly different formulations of 
cultural defence, varying in the broadness as well as the formality of the 
definition given. As a default, the standard formulations do, however, 
emphasize the role of cultural defence as aiming to mitigate or negate 
criminal responsibility based on the defendant’s good-faith belief in the 
propriety of their action, on the basis of their cultural heritage or tradition. 
e.g. Lyman 1986, 88; Magnarella 1991, 67; Van Broeck 2001, 28-29; 
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In other words, cultural defence maintains that in certain cases 
one’s criminal culpability may be diminished by one’s cultural 
background, and that this can also have an effect on the establishing 
of one’s guilt and/or the deciding of an appropriate sentence.459 
The ways in which one’s cultural background can be shown to 
diminish one’s culpability do, of course, vary, and cultural defence 
can also be understood to refer to the variety of ways in which a 
person’s cultural background is used as a potentially mitigating 
factor in criminal courts.460 These ways of using culture in criminal 
courts include the bringing forth of cultural evidence in conjunction 
with other types of defences, although, in recent years, there has 
also been some support for the establishment of cultural defence as 
a formal, freestanding defence.461 In this section, I give a brief 
outline of different types of cultural defences, and the underlying 
notions of culture within these defences, with the help of illustrative 
examples from actual court cases. 
                                                                                                     
Golding 2002, 149. This emphasis on the “good-faith belief in the 
propriety of one’s actions, based on one’s cultural heritage or tradition” 
will also play an important role in my analysis of culturally motivated 
actions and the ways in which these motivations should be taken into 
account in criminal courts in the final part of this chapter. 
459 Apart from the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of the trial, cultural 
defence can also affect pre-trial processes as well as the processes of 
appeal. Culture can also play an important part in civil cases, although my 
discussion is, in most part, restricted to criminal cases. For an excellent 
overview of the variety of cases involving some form of cultural defence 
or usage of culture in legal proceedings, see: Renteln 2004. For 
illuminating examples from different litigations, see articles in Foblets and 
Renteln 2010. 
460 This understanding of cultural defence is somewhat different from the 
working definition given above in so far as it refers to those concrete, 
formal defences through which the defendant’s diminished culpability is 
being established. The working definition, on the contrary, provides the 
rationale behind these defences and also establishes what, exactly, the 
defence needs to show in order to mitigate or negate the defendant’s 
criminal responsibility. 
461 See e.g. Note 1986; Ma 1995; Renteln 2004; 2010. 
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1.1. Example case: Jacob Zuma’s rape trial 2005-2006462 
In 2005-2006, the then future president of South Africa, Jacob 
Zuma, was on trial for allegedly raping a family friend. The trial 
was widely followed and reported on, and was a very complicated 
affair. It was complicated not least because the person on trial was a 
very prominent and powerful figure in South Africa, but also 
because it involved issues of HIV/AIDS, questions of the privacy of 
public figures, issues of gender equality, problems of the treatment 
of alleged rape victims in courts and in the media, as well as 
questions of culture at the background of very exceptional 
circumstances of post-apartheid South Africa.463 
One of the well reported aspects of the trial was the way in 
which the Zulu culture of the accused was used during the trial.464 
During the trial, Jacob Zuma highlighted his background as a Zulu 
male by dressing up in traditional Zulu outfit and by giving his 
testimony in the Zulu language. He also commented on several 
Zulu traditions, for example by indicating that, in his culture, it 
would have been offensive had he not slept with the alleged victim, 
as the woman had already indicated her willingness to sleep with 
him. These indications included things such as being dressed in 
certain way, sitting without her legs being crossed as well as having 
a conversation about her not having a boyfriend. Undoubtedly, 
there was more to Zuma’s defence, but the cultural factors were, 
nevertheless, used to try to establish that Zuma did not, as a Zulu 
                                                 
462 State vs. Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, SA (2006) 
463 It should be emphasized that my purposes for using this case are purely 
illustrative, and that my discussion is restricted only to those aspects of the 
trial that are viewed to incorporate elements of cultural defence. For more 
thorough analyses of the case, see e.g. Skeen 2007; Robins 2008; Hassim 
2009; Waetjen and Mare 2009. 
464 It is debatable whether the media emphasis of the cultural aspects of the 
trial was fair (the cultural factors were, after all, only one aspect of the 
trial), but the usage of culture during the trial does, nevertheless, provide 
us a good example of some of the ways in which culture can be used in 
criminal courts.  
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male, do anything wrong, but was simply acting in a way anyone 
from his culture would, even should, act in the given 
circumstances.465 
Admittedly, Jacob Zuma’s rape trial is a very complex case, and 
the verdict of the case, that of acquittal, did not, in the end, depend 
on the cultural factors that were brought forth during the trial.466 
The Zuma rape trial is, nevertheless, a good example of a case 
where the defendant’s cultural background was used in an attempt 
to establish that the defendant did not, in accordance with his 
culture, do anything wrong, and that this should also be taken into 
account in the assessment of the case at hand. Following the 
working definition given above, it could be argued that if Zuma did 
genuinely believe that the victim was consenting and if this belief 
was based on the behaviour of the victim being the kind of 
behaviour that, in Zulu culture, would be interpreted as consent, 
then, even if the victim was not consenting and the acts performed 
constituted rape, the defendant should not be held fully accountable, 
as – due to his cultural background – he could be seen as having 
had a reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of his action (that 
it was not rape but consensual sex).  
In most legal systems, there are several avenues that the defence 
may attempt to take in order to establish the defendant’s good-faith 
belief in the propriety of his action (based on his cultural heritage or 
tradition). In what is to follow, I distinguish several different types 
of cultural defence, and also return to the Zuma -case at regular 
intervals in order to demonstrate, how the rationales for different 
types of cultural defences would work, and how one’s 
understanding of the defendant’s culture, in each case, acquires 
slightly different meanings. 
                                                 
465 As Stephen Robins notes, the defence’s interpretation of Zulu culture 
and Zulu masculinity went largely unquestioned, although alternative 
interpretations would also have been available. Robins 2008, 421-428. 
466 The verdict of acquittal was based, mainly, on the judging of the 
alleged rape victim as unreliable, based on several (in part, incorrect) 
accusations of rape and attempted rape that she had made previously. 
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1.2. Cultural evidence in conjunction with other types of 
defence 
As opposed to cultural defence as a formal, freestanding defence (to 
be discussed in 1.3.), cultural evidence may be brought forth in 
connection with other, more traditional types of defences. Most 
commonly, cultural evidence has been brought forth in connection 
with mistake of fact -defences, as well as with different types of 
state of mind -defences, such as insanity or diminished capacity. 
 
Mistake of fact -defences 
The bringing forth of cultural evidence in support of the mistake of 
fact -defence is to establish that, due to the defendant’s cultural 
background, the defendant did not know that he was committing a 
crime, and that this should also be taken into account in the 
assessment of the defendant’s culpability. The usage of cultural 
evidence in conjunction with the mistake of fact -defence can 
operate in two ways. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that, due to his cultural 
background, the defendant was mistaken about the situation that he 
was in, due to having misinterpreted his situation from within his 
own culture. A well discussed case of this kind of mistake of fact 
from within one’s own culture is the case of People v. Moua,467 
where a member of a Hmong tribe (Moua) was accused of rape 
after having allegedly performed a Hmong ritual of marriage-by-
capture. According to a Hmong tradition, marriage-by-capture is a 
ritual in which a man captures a woman and has sexual intercourse 
with her, thus marrying her. As part of the ritual, the woman is 
supposed to show resistance in order to show her virtuousness. In 
the case of People v. Moua, the existence of this cultural ritual was 
considered as evidence showing that, although Moua encountered 
resistance from the woman he had sexual intercourse with, he did 
                                                 
467 People of the State of California v. Kong Pheng Moua, Fresno County 
Superior Court (1985)  
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not know that the woman was not consenting, but thought that the 
resistance was part of the ritual.468  
The using of culture in the Zuma rape trial could also be 
interpreted as utilizing this kind of mistake of fact from within one’s 
own culture. In the Zuma trial, the signs given by the alleged rape 
victim were argued to have been the kinds of signs that, in Zulu 
culture, would be interpreted as sexual advancements, thus creating 
an expectation on the part of any Zulu male, including Jacob Zuma, 
to sleep with the woman in question. In the presence of these signs 
(the woman’s dress, behaviour and topics of conversation), and in 
the absence of explicit resistance (the alleged victim was said to 
have frozen during intercourse), it could have been argued that, 
even if the woman did not consent to having sex with the defendant, 
the defendant did not know, nor could he have known, that the 
victim was not consenting, and that this mistake of fact on behalf of 
the defendant should also bear upon the assessment of his 
culpability and the final verdict of the case. 
On the other hand, cultural evidence could also be brought forth 
to show that the defendant may not have been aware of breaking the 
law, due to now knowing what the law was (mistake of fact with 
respect to the law). For example, it could be argued that, due to the 
fact that a specific action was considered morally appropriate in the 
defendant’s own culture, the defendant did not know that his action 
was criminalized. Although ignorance of the law would not 
normally be considered as a legitimate excuse for breaking the law, 
it could be argued that, in some cases involving members of very 
different cultural background, the ignorance of the law should 
operate as a relevant factor in the assessment of the defendant’s 
culpability. For example, it has been argued that some of the newly 
arrived immigrants, sometimes coming from very different legal 
                                                 
468 In this case, the charges were eventually reduced from kidnapping and 
rape to a lesser charge of false imprisonment to which the defendant 
pleaded guilty. For further discussion on People v. Moua, see e.g.: Ma 
1995; Coleman 1996; Renteln 2004, 126-128; Kim 2006; Song 2007, 89-
93. 
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systems, may not have had the opportunity to familiarize 
themselves with the law of their new residence, and could not thus 
have been aware that the particular action they performed was 
criminal.469 
With respect to these two ways of using cultural evidence in 
conjunction with the mistake of fact -defence, two important points 
need to be made. Firstly, it should be emphasized that neither the 
mistake of fact from within one’s own culture nor the mistake of fact 
with respect to law -defences work on a presumption that, due to 
the defendant’s cultural background, the defendant should also be 
allowed to act in accordance with his culture (when in conflict with 
the official law). Rather, what the mistake of fact -defences attempt 
to show is that, because of the defendant’s cultural background, it is 
reasonable to presume that the defendant did not have all the 
relevant information about the situation that he was in, and that, due 
to not having all relevant information, the full implications of the 
law should not be applied. Had the defendant known about the 
criminality of his actions, or had he known that (in the case of 
People vs. Moua) the woman’s resistance was genuine, the 
defendant should have, no doubt, been subject to the full 
implications of the law, regardless of whether his actions were, in 
his culture, considered as morally appropriate. 
Secondly, it should be noted that, in order to use cultural 
evidence in conjunction with the mistake of fact -defence, one does 
not need to be committed to any particularly strong view of how 
culture can be conceived as ‘causing’ or ‘motivating’ people to act 
in certain ways. In order to use the mistake of fact -defence, all one 
needs to acknowledge is that, often, people do act in accordance 
                                                 
469 See e.g. Note 1986; Ma 1995. Veronica Ma argues for a five year 
transitory period for the newly arrived immigrants, during which they are 
expected to accustom themselves to their new society (including its legal 
system). During this period, the newly arrived immigrants could raise a 
cultural defence, after which this right would automatically expire. (Ma 
1995) However, as for example Van Broeck has noted, the length of one’s 
stay does not automatically transfer into better knowledge of the social or 
legal rules of the country. (Van Broeck 2001) 
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with their culture, and that, lacking information to the contrary, they 
may well also continue to act in such ways. The mistake of fact -
defence needs not, however, rest on a view according to which 
people could not also act against the dictates of their culture, should 
their cultural norms, values or practices conflict with the official 
law. 
 
Insanity and diminished capacity 
Apart from the mistake of fact -defences, cultural evidence could 
also be used in an attempt to establish that, due to the defendant’s 
cultural background, the defendant had no other option than to act 
the way he did, and that, because of this incapacity, the full 
implications of the law should not be applied. In these cases, the 
purpose of cultural evidence is to show that, despite of being in full 
knowledge of the facts (both of his situation and of the law), the 
defendant was incapable of appreciating the criminality of his 
action, due to his action being morally appropriate – even morally 
required – in his own culture. In these cases, it could be argued that 
the defendant’s frame of mind – his incapacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his action – should be considered on par with insanity 
or diminished capacity, and that the verdict of the case should take 
this into account.470 
Contrary to the mistake of fact -defences, the using of cultural 
evidence in conjunction with insanity or diminished capacity -
defences requires far more robust view on how culture can cause or 
motivate people to act in certain ways. In order to view culturally 
motivated actions on a par with insanity, one needs to view culture 
as the defendant’s primary (even the only) system of norms and 
values that, at least in some cases, determines what the defendant is 
capable of doing.471 Culture, thus understood, stands as something 
                                                 
470 E.g. Note 1986. These so-called state of mind -defences also include 
defences of provocation and duress that have both been successfully used 
in cultural cases. See e.g. Woodman 2010; Amirthalingam 2010. 
471 To follow the terminology used in the Background section (esp. 2.2.), 
culture is seen as determining the defendant’s behaviour (DC) and is often, 
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against which the defendant could not go, even in cases where the 
norms of the culture collided with the prevailing norms of the law. 
For example, in so called crimes of honour (including honour 
killings), the defence may attempt to claim that, for the defendant, 
in his culture, there was no other option than to commit the crime in 
question, and that this sense of obligation or necessity should be 
viewed on a par with insanity, thus diminishing the defendant’s 
culpability.472 Whereas in the Zuma rape trial, no attempts to 
establish Zuma’s incapacity to act against the requirements of his 
culture were put forth, certain elements of this more robust view of 
culture were, nevertheless, present. As Zuma claimed, in the Zulu 
culture it would have been highly offensive had he not slept with 
the woman in such circumstances and, although Zuma clearly also 
had the choice of not sleeping with the woman in question, there 
was a strong presumption that Zuma did what his culture in fact 
required him to do, making the alternative courses of action, if not 
impossible, very unlikely. 
 
1.3. Cultural defence as a formal defence 
Whereas the allowing of cultural evidence in conjunction with other 
types of defences has enabled the defendant’s cultural background 
to be taken into account in criminal courts, in recent years, there 
have also been calls to establish cultural defence as a formal, 
freestanding defence. 473 As a formal defence, one’s cultural 
                                                                                                     
although by no means necessarily, connected to the ideas of culture also 
being broad (BC) as well as singular (SC) regulator of the defendant’s life. 
472 The paralleling of culturally motivated actions with insanity is, of 
course, very controversial, and I will come back to the difficulties of using 
such defence in section 2. I will also discuss the different ways of 
understanding what it may mean for one’s actions to be”determined” or 
“compelled” by one’s culture in section 3. 
473 As it stands, neither the American, English nor South African legal 
systems recognize cultural defence as a formal, freestanding criminal 
defence, although cultural evidence is often used in conjunction with other 
types of defences.  For country analyses, see e.g. Phillips 2003; Woodman 
2010 (UK); Renteln 2004; Song 2007 (USA); Carstens 2010 (SA); for 
other legal systems, see articles in Foblets and Renteln 2010. 
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background could be taken – on its own – as a potentially 
mitigating or exonerating factor in the assessment of one’s 
culpability, without being conjoined with any other, more 
traditional type of defence. Rather than being seen insane or lacking 
knowledge of the law, a member of a cultural group could use the 
evidence of his cultural norms, values or practices in order to show 
that, although against the law, his actions were, in his culture, 
appropriate, and that, due to having acted in a good-faith belief in 
the propriety of his action, the (full) implications of breaking the 
law should not be applied. 
Contrary to the mistake of fact, insanity, or diminished capacity 
-defences, the formal cultural defence rests on the view that the 
incompatibility of the cultural norms and values of a minority and 
the norms and values reflected in the official law is, on its own, 
enough of a reason to sometimes treat members of minority cultures 
differently. According to this view, the defendant may well have 
had knowledge of breaking the law, he may have been aware of all 
relevant facts of his situation, and he may even have had the 
opportunity and capacity to refrain from acting the way he did, but, 
due to the conflict between the norms and values of his culture and 
the official law, he nevertheless acted in a way that he though was 
right, and should not thus be subject to the full implications of the 
law. 
With respect to cultural defence as formal defence, a few 
important clarifications should be made. As already indicated, 
cultural defence as a formal defence rests on an assumption that the 
conflict between the official law and the practices, norms or values 
of a minority is something that should be taken into account in 
criminal courts. This assumption can be seen as a continuation of 
the general liberal multiculturalist position according to which the 
liberal society is organized in accordance with the general rules and 
norms of the majority and that, at times, this may put minority 
members in a disadvantaged position in comparison to the majority. 
Importantly, however, taking into account the defendant’s cultural 
background, and the acknowledgement of the possible conflict 
between the official law and a minority culture do not, as yet, say 
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anything about how these conflicts should be resolved. Cultural 
defence (whether formal or in conjunction with other types of 
defence) could operate either as a full justificatory defence or as a 
partial excuse and, in most cases, the proponents of cultural defence 
have rejected the idea that one’s cultural background should operate 
as a full justificatory defence, exonerating the defendant entirely.474 
Nor is it the case that formal cultural defence would provide an 
automatic excuse for any action performed in accordance with 
one’s culture, but the applicability of cultural defence can be 
variously restricted.475 Whereas a formal cultural defence 
establishes one’s cultural background as a potentially mitigating 
factor in the assessment of one’s culpability, not all actions need to 
be excused, nor should one’s cultural background operate as an 
automatic excuse, even for those actions that are deemed as 
generally acceptable within one’s own culture. 
This latter clarification – that of the denial of automatic excuses 
– may be best explained in the light of the working definition of 
cultural defence given above. According to cultural defence, the 
diminishing of the defendant’s culpability is based on his 
reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of his action, based on 
his cultural heritage or tradition, rather than on the general 
acceptability of his actions in his own culture. According to formal 
cultural defence, it is thus not enough that a particular action is 
considered as generally acceptable in the defendant’s own culture, 
but the defendant must also have performed such action for the 
right reasons – that is, he must have also genuinely believed that the 
action he performed was right, and that this belief in the rightness 
of his actions was based on his cultural heritage or tradition.476  
                                                 
474 For strong arguments for cultural defence as a partial defence, see: 
Golding 2002; Renteln 2004, ch. 10. 
475 For example, by disallowing cultural defence in cases that involve 
irreparable physical harm or the undermining of basic human rights. e.g. 
Renteln 2004, 214-218; 2010, 78. 
476 I will come back to the problems of what “a good-faith belief in the 
propriety of one’s action” might mean and how this “good-faith belief” 
may be established in more detail later on in this chapter. 
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For example, in the Zuma rape trial one could argue that if Zuma 
did genuinely believe that the victim was consenting and if this 
belief was based on Zuma’s cultural background as a Zulu, and the 
cultural interpretations of the victim’s behaviour as consent in Zulu 
culture, then, even if the victim was not consenting and the 
defendant’s actions constituted rape, Zuma should not be held fully 
accountable, as – due to his cultural background – he could be 
interpreted as having a reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety 
of his action (not being rape but consensual sex). Importantly, 
however, it does not follow that any case, involving a defendant of 
the same cultural background and an alleged victim behaving in a 
similar manner, should be viewed as a case in which the full 
implications of the law should not be applied. The defendant’s 
cultural background (in this case, him being a Zulu male) could, 
according to formal cultural defence, operate as a mitigating factor, 
but only if this background also entailed that the defendant had “a 
reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of his action” – that is, 
if he genuinely believed the action to be the right action to do. As 
often noted, cultures are heterogeneous, and two persons with the 
same cultural background may well have very different views on 
what is considered as appropriate in their culture, and the criminal 
courts must also take this into account. The difficulties of 
establishing whether the defendant did, in fact, act in good-faith 
belief are, of course, various, and I will return to these difficulties in 
the final section of this chapter. 
 
2. Normative issues 
In many legal systems, there is already some scope for taking 
cultural considerations into account in criminal courts, primarily 
through using cultural evidence in support of other types of 
defences, or by assessing, on a case to case basis, whether the 
cultural background of the defendant is deemed relevant for the 
assessment of the case at hand. In some cases, the usage of cultural 
evidence has been successful, affecting either the establishment of 
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guilt or the actual sentencing, or both.477 Not everyone, however, 
would allow culture to operate as a mitigating, let alone 
exonerating, factor in criminal courts. To a large extent, the 
arguments both for as well as against cultural defence follow the 
traditional arguments for and against differentiated rights, starting 
from the more general arguments for why culture should (or should 
not) play a part in criminal courts, proceeding to more specific 
arguments that take into account the specificities of the criminal 
justice system and its effects on the accused, victim, as well as the 
rest of society. In this section, I outline some of the main arguments 
both for as well as against cultural defence and, by doing so, also 
pave the way for my own argument as developed in section 3. 
Many of the discussed arguments are concerned specifically with 
the question of whether cultural defence should be established as a 
formal, freestanding defence, although most of the arguments can 
also be extended to the context of whether to allow cultural 
evidence in conjunction with other types of defences. 
 
2.1. Arguments for and against cultural defence 
Cultural diversity and respect for different cultures 
On one of the most general levels, the proponents of formal cultural 
defence may attempt to build their case by resorting to arguments 
from the value of cultural diversity or the need to give due respect 
to different cultures and/or their members. Whereas these 
arguments are not identical,478 they operate on the assumption that 
the official legal system, if too strictly applied, may undermine the 
minorities’ ways of life and reduce the acceptable, legitimate ways 
of living to those approved by the majority (and the legal system 
build upon the norms and values of the majority). The arguments 
                                                 
477 It should be noted that the usage of cultural evidence in criminal courts 
does not always lead into leniency, but can also operate as a basis for 
harsher punishment. See e.g. Siesling and Ten Voorde 2010. Most debates 
on the usage of culture in criminal courts have, however, concentrated on 
the usage of culture as a basis for mitigation, and, in this respect, my 
discussion will follow suit. 
478 See also: Background, section 2. 
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from respect seem especially worthy of attention, as it is not only 
the ways in which the legal system responds to particular cultural 
practices, but also how it responds to the performers of these 
practices that the proponents (as well as the opponents) of cultural 
defence should be concerned about. 
According to some classical arguments, respecting people’s 
cultural differences is also seen as entailing respect of those cultural 
practices and ways of life that the minority members are engaged 
in.479 Within the liberal framework, these requirements of respect480 
are, however, necessarily limited, excluding at least those practices 
that are in clear violation of basic human rights.481 In debates on 
cultural defence, these limitations are well in view, as the 
proponents of cultural defence tend not to advocate cultural defence 
as a full justificatory defence, but rather as a partial excuse. 
Whereas cultural factors may be used both to explain as well as, at 
times, partially excuse the criminal conduct of the defendant, this 
conduct, nevertheless, remains criminal, and punishable by the rule 
of law. 
Like in other contexts, in the context of cultural defence it is 
important to make a distinction between respect for particular 
cultural practices and respect for the practitioners of these practices. 
                                                 
479 Perhaps one of the most prominent views to this effect can be found in 
Taylor 1994. See also Ch. 4, 1.3. 
480 Objection could be made that the notion of respect (and, especially, the 
idea of requiring respect for different cultural practices) does not fit well 
with the liberal framework that is more properly concerned with whether 
certain practices should be tolerated or interfered with. However, as the 
notion of respect is not entirely alien to the liberal framework (most 
liberals would, for example, subscribe to at least some minimal notion of 
respect in term of equal respect of persons), I find it useful to assess, what 
kinds of limitations the liberal framework would provide for those who do 
argue for formal cultural defence in terms of the requirement of respect to 
different cultures and/or their members. 
481 Liberals may, and they also do, disagree on the criteria for determining 
those practices that cannot be tolerated (let alone respected), although they 
do also agree that some, exceptionally cruel or inhumane practices fit these 
criteria. 
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Whereas not all practices deserve or should be respected (perhaps 
not even tolerated), all human beings, by virtue of being human, 
should be treated with equal respect and concern. However, if we 
look at the ways in which culture has been used in criminal courts, 
it is far from clear whether this requirement is being fulfilled. 
Having to show that the defendant was either ignorant or insane is 
hardly respectful of the defendant in question, ignoring many of the 
ways in which people can be motivated by their culture. Treating 
culturally motivated crimes on a par with insanity or diminished 
capacity props up the view of minority members as somehow 
captured in their culture, having no free choice, being not able to do 
anything except what their culture dictates.482 The association of 
culture with insanity, ignorance or diminished capacity feeds into 
the view of minority cultures as deficiencies, thus creating a strong 
case for more nuanced ways of using culture in criminal courts – 
including the establishing of cultural defence as a formal, 
freestanding defence. 
 
Fair and equal treatment 
One of the main requirements for the law, and the criminal justice 
system, is that it treats individuals fairly and equally. Bracketing 
culture from criminal courts, it is argued, puts this requirement 
under strain, as it is essential, both for the understanding of the 
committed crime as well as for the assessment of the defendant’s 
culpability, that relevant cultural factors are known.483 The 
argument from the requirement for fair and equal treatment can be 
discussed in two parts, the first concerning the general cultural bias 
of the law, the second the supposed predictability of the law. 
                                                 
482 For excellent analyses on how the using of culture in criminal courts 
may reduce the defendants (as well as the victims) into objects devoid of 
free will and agency, see: Volpp 1994; 2000. For a more general, critical 
analysis on culture and agency, see: Phillips 2007, Ch. 4. 
483 The commitment to individualized justice and cultural pluralism is 
especially strongly argued in Note, 1986; see also: Ma 1995; Renteln 
2004, esp. Ch. 10; Song 2007 
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To rehearse the common arguments of liberal multiculturalism, 
it is argued that any legal system (including the criminal law 
system) is always a product of a particular (majority) culture – 
reflecting the norms, values and practices of the majority – and that 
this puts the members of minority cultures in a disadvantaged 
position to that of the majority. Whereas the majority can continue 
to live their lives legitimately, in accordance with their own cultural 
norms and practices, some minority practices may, either 
unintentionally or intentionally,484 be in conflict with the official 
law. The interpretations of what it is reasonable for a person to 
know or how it is reasonable for him to act in certain 
circumstances, may also differ, depending on the cultural 
background of the person in question.485 The taking into account of 
the defendant’s cultural background aims at balancing out the 
cultural biases of the law by providing a culturally sensitive 
understanding of the situation at hand.  
The cultural bias of the law, and the consequent need to take 
cultural considerations into account in criminal courts, does not, 
however, say anything yet about how the cultural factors should be 
interpreted or whether cultural defence should also be established as 
a formal, freestanding defence. The allowing of cultural evidence 
provides minority members access to several other defences 
(including mistake of fact, insanity and diminished capacity), which 
                                                 
484 This is a difference between practices that, due to the cultural bias of 
the law, happen to be in conflict with the law, and practices that are 
deliberately banned by law. Whereas in the first cases, the requirement of 
fair and equal treatment may well point towards the need to modify the 
law (or its implementation), in the latter cases, the situation is 
substantively different, as the purpose or the intention of the law is 
precisely the criminalization of the minority practices in question. See 
also: Background 2.3.; for the need to balance rationales for and against 
particular rights, Ch. 3, 3.3. 
485 The question of “a reasonable person” has been discussed extensively 
especially in the contexts of provocation –defence,  raising the question of 
whether the behaviour of a reasonable person to certain stimuli would be 
different depending on his/her cultural background, See e.g. 
Amirthalingam 2010, Renteln 2004, 31-36. 
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may well ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial, including 
the possibility of diminished culpability and/or mitigation of the 
sentencing in proportion to the committed crime and the established 
culpability.486  
However, whereas the usage of other types of defences may well 
be able to ensure the desired (fair and equal) outcome, there may 
also be certain deficiencies in this approach. Firstly, even if the 
outcome of the trial could be seen as consistent with the principles 
of individuated justice (including the taking into account the 
defendant’s cultural background and the proportionality of the 
punishment), it is debatable whether the process of the trial or the 
reasons for reaching such outcome would be fully satisfactory. As 
already indicated, the treating of culturally motivated actions on a 
par with insanity, ignorance or diminished capacity may not accord 
the defendant due respect and may also only serve to obscure the 
real reasons for why the defendant committed the crime in 
question.487 Secondly, the allowing of cultural evidence only in 
conjunction with the more traditional types of defence may allow 
for too much variation, making the supposedly predictable law 
unpredictable. As has been noted, the lack of formal guidelines on 
the ways in which culture can be used in criminal courts has lead to 
a situation in which it is often left to the discretion of the judges as 
to whether to allow cultural evidence in courts, and whether to 
                                                 
486 One of the main benefits of cultural defence (as argued by its 
proponents) lies precisely in its ability to cater for the requirement of 
proportionality of the punishment to the crime committed. See esp. 
Renteln 2004; 2010; Kim 2006. It should, however, be noted, that the 
argument from proportionality does not, on its own, work as an argument 
for formal cultural defence, as the proportionality could also be achieved 
by the allowing of cultural evidence in conjunction with other types of 
defences. 
487 As Nancy Kim has convincingly shown, one of the ways in which 
culture is used in criminal courts is by way of mystifying and exoticizing 
the culture in question, making it even more difficult for the courts to 
assess the cases at hand. (Kim 2006) This problem, I believe, is especially 
severe in cases where cultural defence needs to be fitted into a framework 
that has not been designed to take cultural considerations into account. 
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deem this evidence as relevant to the case at hand.488 In the worst 
case scenario, both the process of the trial as well as the final 
verdict may hang on the personal prejudices or stereotypes of the 
judge or the jury, thus putting minority members, not only on an 
unequal footing with the majority, but also with one another. 
 
Victim’s perspective and legitimation of oppressive practices 
So far, the requirement for the criminal law to treat all people fairly 
and equally would seem to create a strong case for allowing cultural 
evidence in criminal courts, and for taking cultural considerations 
into account when assessing the defendant’s culpability and the 
appropriate sentencing. The same requirements of fair and equal 
treatment can, however, also pull in different direction, 
emphasizing that it is not only the defendant that the law should 
treat fairly, but also those against whom the crimes have been 
committed. Should one allow a system in which, for example, 
certain kinds of sexual assaults are considered as part of a particular 
culture (and, given people’s propensity to act in accordance with 
their culture, not as harshly punishable for the perpetrators from 
that culture), then, depending on the cultural background of the 
defendant, or the victim, or both, the justice done to the victim is 
different. 489 Whereas formal cultural defence does not, in principle, 
maintain that, due to the general moral acceptability of the 
defendant’s action in his own culture, the defendant should 
automatically be subject to differentiated treatment in courts,490 
                                                 
488 Renteln 2004; 2010. 
489 It is debatable whether the cultural background of the victim should 
affect the assessment of the defendant’s culpability (see e.g .Renteln 2004; 
Song 2007, 110-111), although, undoubtedly, the background of the victim 
has, in many cases, been deemed relevant for the assessment of the case at 
hand. It is, for example, very difficult to imagine that the charges of 
People v. Moua would have been reduced, had the victim of the case been 
any average American and not a member of the Hmong themselves. (see 
also section 1.2. above) 
490 As indicated in the previous section, formal cultural defence is still 
based on the view that the defendant must also have performed his actions 
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there is, no doubt, concern that the establishment of cultural 
defence as a formal defence may create a system in which the 
justice done to the victim will differ, depending on the defendant’s 
(and, possibly, the victim’s) cultural background.491 
The taking into account the victim’s perspective is especially 
important in cases where cultural evidence is brought forth to 
account for those practices that are conceived as oppressive towards 
a certain sub-section of the group, but that are, nevertheless, 
considered morally acceptable in the defendant’s own culture. As 
many have argued, the establishment of a formal cultural defence 
may lead into a (partial) legitimation of certain oppressive 
practices, leaving those most vulnerable within a particular cultural 
group without protection.492 Many criminal cases where cultural 
evidence is brought forth are, indeed, cases that involve women and 
children (forced marriage, crimes of honour, circumcision), and the 
patriarchal norms of the culture in question. Allowing formal 
cultural defence, in these cases, may only reinforce patriarchal 
norms, and also give certain legitimation to oppressive practices by 
recognizing them as “proper” practices of that culture.493 The 
recognition of certain oppressive practices as inherent elements of a 
particular culture is not only problematic from the perspective of 
the victim, whose protection under the law is thus diminished, but 
also from the perspective of those who strive to change their culture 
                                                                                                     
for right reasons, not only that he performed actions that were, broadly 
speaking, conceived as morally appropriate in his own culture. 
491 This concern is not only a concern relating to cultural defence as a 
formal, freestanding defence, but is also applicable in cases where the 
defendant’s culpability is diminished by other factors (e.g. insanity or 
diminished capacity) based on their cultural background. However, as I 
will discuss in more detail in the final part of this chapter, the methods of 
establishing the defendant’s culpability often take a very simplified view 
of how one’s culture may affect one’s behaviour, directing the courts to 
too group-based assessments of the cases at hand, at the expeses of both 
individual defendants as well as victims. 
492 See: Goldstein 1994; Volpp 1994; Coleman 1996; Shachar 1998; 
Phillips 2003; 2007; Song 2007. 
493 See also Ch. 1, 2,2; Ch.4; Ch. 5. 
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from within.494 The formal recognition of certain practices as the 
proper practices of that culture often contributes to the upholding of 
the status quo, and makes it even harder for those who are 
oppressed to gain equal status within their cultures. 
 
Social cohesion 
Apart from the difficulties of according proper justice to the victims 
of the culturally motivated crimes, it has been argued that formal 
cultural defences, rather than contributing to the equal and fair 
treatment of all citizens before the law, would create permanent 
minorities, members of whom would be treated differently, solely 
on the basis of their cultural background.495 This may diminish 
social cohesion by reinforcing the gap between “us” – the liberal 
reasonable people, and “them” – those somehow captured in their 
culture.496 
The labeling of certain actions as “cultural” and the 
reinforcement of the ideas of specifically cultural minorities and 
somewhat non-cultural majority is, of course, not only a concern 
relating to a cultural defence as a formal defence. As already noted, 
the using of cultural evidence in conjunction with other types of 
defences (such as insanity and diminished capacity) may also prop 
                                                 
494 It should be noted that the concern of the reinforcement of oppressive 
practices is not only a concern relating to minority cultures, but also to the 
culture of the majority. As has been noted especially by the feminist 
critique, cultural defences have been most successful in cases where the 
minority culture’s norms are somewhat reflective or congruent with the 
norms of the majority (for example, in cases where women’s “no” is 
portrayed as “yes” or “maybe”). This congruence between the norms of 
the minority and the majority may be a problem, regardless of whether 
cultural defence is allowed or denied as, in either case, the oppressive 
nature of the majority’s norms may go unquestioned. For discussion, see 
e.g. Phillips 2003; 2007; Song 2007. 
495 Doriane Coleman goes as far as to warn against the “dangerous 
balkanisation of criminal law” where different groups are subject to 
different rules of law. Coleman 1996, 1098. For a qualified defence of 
parallel legal systems, see: Shachar 2001. 
496 See also: Volpp 2000. 
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up the view of minority members as somehow captured in their 
culture, devoid of free will and moral agency. The concern, with 
respect to social cohesion, can thus be seen as a product of any 
systematic usage of culture in criminal courts, where people’s 
cultural background is deemed as relevant for differentiated 
treatment. Viewing one’s cultural background as a potentially 
mitigating or exonerating factor will, perhaps inevitably, build into 
a system in which the members of minority cultures are, as a 
default, conceived as different from the majority – this difference 
being also reflected in the criminal law and the proceedings of the 
criminal courts.497  
 
2.2. Cultural defence and cultural offences 
As should be clear by now, there are strong arguments both for as 
well as against cultural defence and the allowing of cultural 
evidence in criminal courts. Whereas the taking into account the 
defendant’s cultural background (in some form or another) seem 
necessary for the equal and fair treatment of minority members, the 
challenges for allowing cultural defence cannot be ignored. Most 
importantly, it must be ensured that both the defendant and the 
victim are treated fairly, and that cultural defence does not reduce 
the justice done to the victim or help reinforce the oppressive 
practices within the cultural groups in question. On the other hand, 
it should also be acknowledged that there is enormous variation, not 
only in the kinds of defences within which cultural evidence can be 
brought forth, but also in the kinds of offences to which cultural 
defence may be applied. Not all arguments (for or against cultural 
defence) may apply to all cultural offences or culturally motivated 
                                                 
497 As argued by Leti Volpp and Anne Phillips, cultural defence seems to 
also reinforce certain stereotypes, even to an extent in which the defence 
becomes available only to those who fit neatly into these stereotypes, and 
not others. Volpp 1994; Phillips 2007. 
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crimes,498 making some cases of cultural defence less controversial 
than others. 
Whereas most criminal cases, discussed in the literature on 
cultural defence, are cases that have involved particularly severe 
violence against the victim (often, a woman or a child of the same 
cultural origin),499 it is by no means the case that all cultural 
defence cases would fall within the same category. Indeed, many of 
the cases in which cultural evidence has been brought forth have 
been cases in which there is no clear victim of the crime, or which 
do not, strictly speaking, fall within the scope of criminal law. 
Cultural evidence has been brought forth, for example, in cases 
involving the usage and possession of illicit drugs,500 in cases of 
polygamous marriage,501 as well as in cases involving cultural or 
religious dress codes.502 In these instances, there is not necessarily a 
clearly identifiable victim of the crime, thus making the arguments 
from the victim’s perspective relatively void. The allowing of 
cultural defence, in cases of victimless crimes,503 would thus seem 
to be at least less controversial than in the crimes commonly 
highlighted in the literature.  
                                                 
498 The terms “cultural offences” and “culturally motivated crimes” are 
used interchangeably. 
499 Some of the most commonly discussed cases involve those of People v. 
Moua (marriage by capture), People v. Chen (wife murder) and People v. 
Kimura (child drowning). 
500 For an overview of cases involving drugs, see Renteln 2004, ch. 5. 
501 The cases involving Mormons in the United States may be most known 
(see e.g. Renteln 2004, 128-130; Song 2007, ch. 6), although it is clear that 
the allowing of polygamy in Islam is bound to bring these discussions 
back to the forefront. For some current controversies in Canada and UK, 
see e.g. Bala 2011; IslamToday 2011; Sona 2005. 
502 Most of the cases involving cultural or religious dress codes do not fall 
under criminal law, but are often cases that challenge the existing 
legislation on, for example, employment or equality of opportunity. See 
Renteln 2004, ch. 8; Woodman 2010; see also Ch. 3 above. 
503 Strictly speaking, there may not be such crimes as victimless crimes, 
although the identification of the victim(s) and the harm done to the 
victim(s) can vary tremendously depending on the crime in question. 
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Whereas my intention is not to claim that the usage of cultural 
defence in victimless crimes would be fully without controversy,504 
I do believe that the debates on cultural defence would benefit 
greatly from making better use of the differences between different 
kinds of cultural offences or culturally motivated crimes. As Jeroen 
van Broek has noted, much of the literature on culture and crime 
has concentrated either on cultural offences or on cultural defence, 
and the relation between the two has not always been clear.505 
However, there would seem to be a big difference between the 
allowing the use of the defendant’s cultural background as a partial 
excuse in cases of victimless crimes (such as drug usage or 
voluntary polygamy) and in cases that involve severe human rights 
violations (such as forced marriage or crimes of honour). Whereas 
in the first case, cultural defence may well be seen as simply 
balancing out the cultural bias of the law (without incorporating the 
controversies of diminishing the justice done to the victim),506 in the 
latter cases, the arguments against cultural defence are much 
stronger. Like in any case of cultural accommodation, the 
arguments for and against cultural defence need to be assessed and 
balanced on a case to case basis, and this balance may, depending 
on all the relevant factors of the case, be tipped to either side.507 
                                                 
504  The arguments from the victim’s perspective are, after all, only one 
aspect of the debate, leaving for example the arguments from social 
cohesion or (more controversially) legitimation of oppressive practices 
intact. 
505 Van Broeck 2001 
506 The mitigation (or even exoneration) of the defendant’s culpability, for 
example in cases of the religious usage of illicit drugs, may not, of course, 
be the approach approved by those who argue that the law should be 
universal in terms of it treating everyone the same, although I believe that 
even the most committed proponents of legal universalism have to 
acknowledge that the arguments against mitigation on cultural grounds in 
these cases are much weaker than for example in cases that involve severe 
human rights violations. 
507 It should be emphasized that my intention is not to give any definitive 
guidelines on whether the defendant’s culpability should be diminished in 
particular cases or not, but simply to indicate that, depending on the case 
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Moreover, it is not only the severity of the crime or the role of 
the victim that the assessment of the cases should take into account, 
but also other elements of cultural offences, including the actual 
motivation of the defendant to commit the crime in question. To 
recall, cultural defence holds that the defendant must have 
committed the crime “in good-faith belief in the propriety of his 
actions”, and this requires that the action was also performed for the 
right reasons.508 However, whereas the literature on cultural defence 
does, quite explicitly, recognize the importance of establishing the 
motivation, and the good-faith belief of the defendant, surprisingly 
little has been written on the different ways in which people’s 
actions can be motivated by culture, and how these motivations 
may affect the assessment of the cases at hand. In the final part of 
this chapter, I attempt to fill in some of this void by discussing 
some of the ways in which people’s actions can be motivated by 
culture and, by way of doing so, also point out to some of the 
challenges that the variety of cultural motivations and the 
difficulties of identifying these motivations bring to the ways in 
which culture is used in criminal courts. 
 
3. Cultural defence and culturally motivated actions 
Having outlined some of the ways in which culture is used in 
criminal courts, as well the main arguments for and against cultural 
                                                                                                     
at hand, the balance may tip to either direction. For example, it may well 
be conceded that, at times, the general acceptability of the defendant’s 
actions in his own culture may result into the defendant committing a 
crime he simply did not know was criminalized (e.g. newly arrived 
immigrants), and that this concession should also be taken into account in 
criminal courts. However, the knowledge of the acceptability of the 
defendant’s actions in his own culture, and his lack of knowledge of the 
criminality of these actions in his new surroundings do not, as such, give 
enough information to judge the case at hand, but should be balanced 
against the arguments against the mitigation or the diminishing of the 
defendant’s culpability. These arguments, however, can only be assessed 
in the light of the nature of the crime in question, and may, depending on 
the relevant features at hand, result in quite different conclusions.  
508 I will come back to this shortly, in section 3. 
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defence, I now turn to develop my own argument for a more 
individuated usage of culture in criminal courts. The starting point 
of my argument lies in the working definition of cultural defence 
given in the beginning of this chapter, and its emphasis on the 
defendant’s “reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of his/her 
action, based on his/her cultural heritage or tradition” as the main 
basis for the lessening of the defendant’s accountability for the 
crimes in question. For my purposes, it is not important whether the 
potential diminishing of the defendant’s culpability is established 
directly (formal cultural defence) or indirectly (with the use of 
other, more traditional types of defences), although it is important 
that the ultimate grounds for such action lie in the potential conflict 
between the official law and the cultural norms and values of the 
defendant. Some actions, although against the official law, may 
well be considered as perfectly appropriate in the defendant’s own 
culture, and, in committing the crime in question, the defendant 
may have acted perfectly in accordance with the norms and values 
of his culture, having genuinely believed that what he did was not 
wrong and/or (in some mistake of fact -cases) against the law. 
In order to build my argument, I look at some of the often 
ignored difficulties that the requirement of ‘having a reasonable 
good faith belief in the propriety of one’s action, based on one’s 
cultural heritage or tradition’ brings to the usage of culture in 
criminal courts. Most notably, I concentrate on the difficulties of 
establishing and identifying the defendant’s cultural motivations by 
analysing both, the ways in which people’s actions can be 
“required” by culture, as well as the reasons that people may have 
for acting in accordance with these requirements. In the latter part 
of this section (3.2.), I utilize my analyses of cultural motivations in 
the light of some of the normative guidelines for the establishing of 
the defendant’s good-faith belief in criminal courts. 
 
3.1. How can an action be motivated by culture? 
In order to have “a reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of 
one’s action, based on one’s cultural heritage or tradition”, culture 
must be viewed as a regulatory framework through which certain 
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actions or ways of life are deemed as acceptable (or unacceptable). 
The often discussed conceptions of culture as a broad system of 
norms and values or as a context of choice509 fit well with this view, 
providing certain culturally defined limits to what people may, or 
may not, within their own cultural framework, do.510 In debates on 
cultural defence, however, culture is often viewed as having a much 
stronger role, providing also certain normative guidance into what 
people of that culture should or should not do. Culture is seen as 
directing people’s behaviour, “causing” them to act in certain ways, 
even to an extent of “compelling” people to act in ways they do.511 
The ways in which culture can “direct” or “cause” people to act in 
certain ways are, of course, varied, both in the extent to which 
culture is seen as compelling people to act in certain ways, as well 
as in the reasons that people may have for behaving in accordance 
with the dictates of their culture.  
 
Levels of compulsion 
One of the ways in which culture can be seen as motivating people 
to act in certain ways is by creating normative expectations on how 
people, of that particular culture, should act or behave. These 
expectations may be very different, both in terms of their strength 
as well as their origin. A practice or an action, conceived as 
appropriate in one’s culture, can be so at least in the senses of it 
being permissible, encouraged, or required. For example, in many 
cultures, polygamy is permitted, giving the men of that culture an 
option to marry more than one wife.512 The permissibility of 
                                                 
509 See also: Background, 2.2.; Ch. 1, 1.1. 
510 This does not entail that these limits would be generally agreed upon, 
but is perfectly compatible with the views of culture as heterogeneous, 
contested and constantly changing . 
511 As demonstrated especially by the usage of insanity -defence. 
512 In most cultures that permit the practice of marrying more than one 
partner, this practice is, indeed, gendered, allowing men to marry more 
than one wife, but not vice versa. As this is the case, I have chosen to use 
the practice of polygamy (as opposed to polyandry or other, more gender-
neutral forms) as my illustrative example. My usage of this example does 
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polygamy does not, however, create any obligation for people to 
engage in polygamy, although it does give people an option to do 
so, if they so wish. The same practice of polygamy can, however, 
also be a practice that is encouraged – to an extent, even expected – 
in one’s culture. The men (as well as the women) of such cultures 
may face certain amounts of pressure to engage in polygamy, 
although the failure to do so leads to no substantive sanctions.513 
Even if polygamy was encouraged, even expected in one’s culture, 
it is still permissible for people not to engage in such practice, 
without going against the dictates of their culture. On the strongest 
level, however, certain actions or practices may also be seen as 
being required in one’s culture, and the failure to engage in such 
practices constitutes a failure to follow the rules and norms of one’s 
culture. Although I do not know of any cultures where marrying 
more than one wife would be obligatory, the same example is used 
for illustration. Should polygamy be considered as required in one’s 
culture, the failure to engage in such practice would constitute a 
failure to follow the norms and values of one’s culture. It would be 
an act that goes against the dictates of one’s culture: it would be 
wrong, in the light of the normative requirements posed by one’s 
culture or cultural group. 
The differentiation between those practices or actions that are 
viewed as permissible, encouraged or required becomes especially 
interesting when one looks at the ways in which the strength of 
one’s cultural, normative expectations is seen to affect one’s 
criminal culpability. In many cases, the courts may assess the level 
to which the defendant could be seen as being “compelled” by his 
culture, taking a more accommodative view of those practices that 
                                                                                                     
not, of course, reflect any normative standpoint with respect to the practice 
itself (or its gendered nature), but is used simply for illustration. 
513 It is clear that those practices that are encouraged (although not as yet 
required) by one’s culture may also hold some negative consequences to 
those who fail to engage in such practices, although it is not the case that a 
person would be going against the norms and values of their culture, 
should they fail to perform those practices that are conceived as 
“encouraged”. 
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are seen as required (as opposed to encouraged or merely 
permitted) in the defendant’s culture.514 The idea being that the 
defendant’s criminal culpability should also depend on the 
existence of alternative options, and that there is a correlation 
between the strength of one’s cultural, normative expectations and 
the possibility of the defendant acting otherwise. 
Whereas I do not wish to deny the relevance of the existence of 
alternative options for the assessment of the defendant’s culpability, 
I do, nevertheless, wish to point to some problems that an overt 
emphasis on the strength of one’s cultural expectations, and on the 
levels upon which the defendant is seen as compelled by his 
culture, may bring. To recall, cultural defence maintains that the 
diminishing of the defendant’s culpability is based on the 
defendant’s reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of his 
action, not on whether the defendant was, in the given 
circumstances, capable of acting otherwise. This good-faith belief, 
it should be emphasized, may have nothing to do with whether the 
practice or action in question was required, encouraged or simply 
permitted in one’s culture, although the consequences of such a 
belief may be identical. Whereas one’s good-faith belief in the 
permissibility of one’s action entails that the defendant could have, 
in accordance with the rules and norms of his culture, also acted 
otherwise, it may well be that the actor, nevertheless, was incapable 
of appreciating the criminality of his action, due to his belief in the 
propriety of his action in his own culture. On the other hand, the 
defendant may well have had a good-faith belief in the obligatory 
nature of his actions in his culture, but this does not, necessarily, 
mean that the defendant could not also have acted otherwise. On the 
contrary, if we wish to hold on to the view of the members of 
minority cultures as free agents, capable of also questioning and 
                                                 
514 It has, for example, been argued that in the case of People v. Moua, the 
courts should have taken into account the contestability of the ritual of 
marriage-by-capture within the Hmong tradition, as well as the fact that 
marriage-by-capture was far from being the only possible ritual of 
marriage among Hmong. Song 2007, 107-108. 
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changing their culture, we should not think of them as being 
incapable of going against the dictates of their culture, even in cases 
where the action in question is seen as being required by one’s 
culture.  
It should be clarified that I do not wish to deny that, at times, it 
may well be more difficult for the defendant to act against those 
practices that are required in his culture than against those that are 
simply permitted. The pressures to act in accordance with one’s 
cultural requirements may well be stronger, but this does not 
automatically mean that the culpability of the defendant should thus 
also be weakened. On the contrary, the pressures to act in 
accordance with one’s cultural requirements may come from a 
variety of sources, and the motivation of the defendant to act the 
way he did may have little, if anything, to do with what he thinks is 
right. That is, the motivation of the defendant to perform an action 
conceived of as encouraged or required in his culture may not 
always come from his “good-faith belief in the propriety of his 
action”, but may include (or even be solely based on) other reasons, 
not fitting well with the basic tenets of cultural defence. 
 
Substantive and instrumental motivations 
As Jeroen van Broeck has argued, one’s motivation for engaging in 
certain cultural practices, or for performing certain culturally 
motivated actions, may be either substantive or instrumental, and 
the line between the two is not always easy to draw.515 On the one 
hand, one may wish to engage in a particular cultural practice (say, 
polygamy), because one considers this practice to be a valuable, 
perhaps even inalienable, aspect of one’s culture. Due to one’s 
cultural background, one may view polygamy as “the right thing to 
do”, although, depending on the strength of one’s cultural 
expectations, one may not necessarily think that it would be wrong 
not to engage in such practice. This kind of motivation, to 
participate in a cultural practice due to one’s belief in the 
appropriateness of such action, may be called substantive 
                                                 
515 Van Broeck 2001. 
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motivation, as it relates directly to the norms and values of one’s 
culture, and to one’s will to act in accordance with these norms and 
values. 
On the other hand, one’s motivation to engage in a cultural 
practice (say, polygamy) may also be instrumental, in several 
senses. In these cases, one does not engage in polygamy because 
one thinks it to be the right thing to do, but, for example, because 
one wishes to conform to the cultural practices of one’s group, or be 
recognized and accepted as a member of that group. At times, one’s 
motivation to engage in particular cultural practices flows, not from 
the fact that one believes that these practices are the right thing to 
do, but rather, from the fact that other group members expect one’s 
participation, and one wishes to affirm one’s solidarity or belonging 
to the group in question. Moreover, it is perfectly possible that 
one’s motivation to engage in certain cultural practices is both 
substantive as well as instrumental. One may, for example, consider 
the practice of polygamy as a perfectly appropriate (in the sense of 
it being permissible) practice in one’s culture, although one’s 
primary motivation for engaging in such practice is in one’s will to 
show to others that one takes the norms and values of one’s culture 
seriously. 
These ways of being motivated to participate in particular 
cultural practices (either by one’s belief to be doing the right thing, 
one’s wish to conform or to be recognized, or any combination of 
these) are, however, only the first level at which people’s actions 
can be motivated by their culture. Apart from wanting to engage in 
certain cultural practices, people may also be culturally motivated 
in the senses of wanting to preserve or protect (or, alternatively, 
change or destroy) their culture. In the most extreme cases, one’s 
desire to protect one’s culture (either from internal dissent or 
external influence) may lead to acts of pressurizing, ostracizing or 
even physically harming those that are conceived as threats to one’s 
culture. Although the physical harming of someone may be 
conceived as morally wrong also within one’s own culture, these 
acts can also be seen as culturally motivated, although in a different 
sense to the cultural motivations discussed above. 
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Adherence, conformity, preservation, protection and change 
A more systematic account of different kinds of cultural 
motivations and their relation to cultural defence is in order. To 
recall, cultural defence maintains that the diminishing of the 
defendant’s culpability should be based on the defendant’s 
reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of his/her action, based 
on his/her cultural heritage or tradition. In the light of the 
motivations discussed so far, the substantive motivations of wanting 
to adhere to the norms and values of one’s culture would seem to fit 
best to this description. Should one’s motivation to marry more than 
one wife, for example, lie in one’s belief that this is, according to 
the norms and values of one’s culture, the right thing for one to do, 
I see no reason for why the criminal courts should not take this into 
account as a potentially mitigating factor in the assessment of the 
case at hand.516 Whereas the requirement of having a reasonable 
good faith belief in the propriety of one’s action does provide 
certain qualifications to the kinds of actions cultural defence can be 
applied to,517 as a default, one’s wish to adhere to the norms and 
values of one’s culture should be seen as the kind of motivation 
fitting well with the basic tenets of cultural defence. 
More difficult cases are brought forth by the variety of 
instrumental motivations. As already indicated, one’s motivation to, 
say, marry more than one wife may not be based on one’s belief 
that this is the right thing for one to do (one may, on the contrary, 
even think of polygamy as morally wrong), but one may, 
nevertheless, marry more than one wife due to one’s will to 
conform to the views of others and be recognized by one’s peers as 
a full member of the group. The question is, should this kind of 
                                                 
516 As already discussed, this does not mean that all actions, conceived as 
the right thing to do by the defendant, should automatically diminish the 
defendant’s culpability, as the final assessment of the case needs to take all 
relevant details into account, including the balancing of the interests of all 
parties involved. 
517 To be discussed in more detail in 3.2. 
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motivation qualify as a good-faith belief in the propriety of one’s 
action, if it is solely based on one’s wish to conform to the 
expectations of others, rather than on one’s belief in the rightness of 
one’s actions. Although I do not wish to deny the importance of 
external recognition,518 or the very genuine pressures that people 
may encounter in order to conform to the expectations of others, I 
do, nevertheless, believe that there is something substantively 
different between the motivations of adherence and conformity, and 
that this difference should also be acknowledged by the criminal 
courts. Whereas one’s motivation to adhere to the norms and values 
of one’s culture fits directly to the basic tenets of cultural defence, 
the motivation of conformity may perhaps better be understood in 
terms of external pressure, and be also better assessed under 
defences such as duress (or provocation). 
With respect to the motivation of preservation, slightly different 
difficulties arise. In these cases, one’s motivation to engage in a 
particular cultural practice comes not from one’s wish to adhere to 
the norms and values of one’s culture, nor from one’s wish to 
belong, but rather from one’s wish to preserve the availability of 
certain practices in one’s culture. One may, for example, marry 
more than one wife, not because one thinks this to be the right thing 
for oneself to do (one may even feel slightly disturbed by the 
prospect of oneself in a polygamous marriage), but because one 
views the permissibility of polygamy as one of the distinctive 
features of one’s culture, and wishes to preserve the availability of 
this option also for future generations. Whereas one’s motivation to 
engage in polygamy is not based on the view that this would be, for 
the practitioner himself, the right thing to do, it may, nevertheless, 
be based on the view that, in order to preserve the permissibility of 
this practice for others, one feels obliged to participate in such 
practice oneself. 
The motivation of protection is closely related to the motivation 
of preservation, although, for my purposes, it is important to discuss 
these separately. In the case of protection, one does not only wish to 
                                                 
518 See also Ch. 4 & 5. 
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preserve the viability of a particular practice in one’s culture, but 
also sees that it is necessary to act in a particular manner in order to 
protect one’s culture from unwanted influences. Whereas in the 
case of one engaging in a polygamous marriage, the line between 
preservation and protection may be difficult to draw519, it is clear 
that the motivation of protection may also take much stronger forms 
than the mere participation in those practices that one wishes to 
preserve. For example, the so-called honour crimes may be done 
precisely from the motivation of protecting one’s culture from 
unwanted influences by shedding a cautionary example of what 
happens to those who go against the rules and norms one wishes to 
protect. The performer of such actions does not, necessarily, need to 
believe that these actions are, within the norms and values of his 
culture, morally right, although he may believe that such actions 
are, nevertheless, necessary in order to protect his culture against 
unwanted influences.520 The complexity of these cases is 
highlighted by the fact that the motivations of protection (like those 
of conformity and preservation) may also be conjoined with certain 
elements of adherence. The performer of, for example, certain 
crime of honour may genuinely believe that his actions were in 
accordance with the norms and values of his culture and that, in the 
given circumstances, he did what was, in the lights of his own 
culture, the right thing to do. 
What should be apparent from the above discussions is that 
precisely the same action can be performed from a variety of 
cultural motivations, but that not all of these motivations fall neatly 
                                                 
519 The difference being in one’s views on why one fears that the viability 
of polygamy is being cast under doubt in one’s culture. Whereas one may 
wish to engage in polygamy in order to preserve the viability of this 
practice (regardless of the reasons for why this practice is seen as ceasing), 
one’s wish to protect also incorporates a view of an external threat against 
which one’s behaviour is directed. 
520 One’s belief in the necessity of one’s actions despite of one’s belief that 
these actions are, in one’s own culture, wrong, may, of course, come from 
a variety of sources, including the sources of external pressure or one’s 
wish to conform to the expectations of others. 
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within the realm of “a reasonable good-faith-belief in the propriety 
of one’s action, based on one’s cultural heritage or tradition”. As 
will be discussed in the upcoming section (3.2.), the current 
practices of identifying those cases in which cultural defence may 
be applied, do not, however, take the variety of these motivations 
sufficiently into account. In order to see why this may be a 
problem, let me bring in yet another type of cultural motivation, 
that of change. 
Apart from the instrumental motivations of conformity, 
preservation and protection, one’s actions may also be 
instrumentally motivated by one’s wish to change one’s culture or 
some aspects of it. For example, one may participate in a particular 
practice, because one thinks that this practice should be acceptable 
in one’s culture, even if, according to the dominant interpretations, 
it is not permitted. One may, for example, marry more than one 
wife because one thinks that polygamy should be an acceptable 
practice in one’s culture, even if the prevailing interpretations of 
one’s cultural norms and values prohibit such practice. Or, one may 
resort to actions that are targeted to change the minds of others, 
even if one does not believe that these actions themselves are in 
accordance with the norms and values of one’s culture. For 
example, in order to change the patriarchal structures of one’s 
group to more egalitarian ones,521 one may resort to actions that one 
does not believe to be morally right in one’s culture, but that one 
believes are, nevertheless, required for such change to happen. One 
may, for example, disobey one’s elders even if, as a default, one 
does not believe that one’s culture allows this kind of disobedience. 
Or, in the most extreme cases, one may resort to violence against 
those upholding the kinds of structures one wishes to change, even 
                                                 
521 It should be noted that the “new” egalitarian structures may well be the 
kinds of structures that one genuinely believes to be in accordance with 
one’s cultural norms and values and that, from the actor’s point of view, it 
is not so much a question of changing one’s culture, but rather of bringing 
the dominant practices in line with what one views as the correct 
interpretations of one’s culture. 
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if one does not, as a default, believe violence to be condoned in 
one’s culture. 
Whereas the instrumental motivation of change may not, along 
with the other instrumental motivations of conformity, preservation 
and protection, fit well with the idea of having a reasonable good-
faith belief in the appropriateness of one’s action, it is important to 
note that these actions, too, may incorporate certain elements of 
adherence. One may, for example, marry more than one wife, 
because one genuinely believes polygamy to be the correct 
interpretation of one’s culture, or one may disobey one’s elders, 
because one genuinely believes that independent decision making 
and freedom of action are central values of one’s culture. The 
crucial difference, in these cases, is that, whereas actions based on 
conformity, preservation or protection tend to coincide with the 
general, dominant interpretations of one’s culture, the actions based 
on change are often connected to the non-dominant, even marginal 
interpretations of one’s culture. From the perspective of cultural 
defence and the requirement of the defendant’s reasonable good-
faith belief in the propriety of his/her action, it should not, however, 
make a difference whether one’s belief is based on the dominant or 
non-dominant interpretations of one’s culture, but rather, whether 
the defendant genuinely believes that, within the norms and values 
of his/her culture, what he did was a right thing to do.522 
 
3.2. Establishing motivations in criminal courts 
As noted by Alison Renteln, the lack of clear guidelines into when 
and how culture can be used in criminal courts has led to a situation 
where the allowing of cultural evidence has often been left to the 
                                                 
522 One could object by saying that reasonable good-faith beliefs only 
include those beliefs that coincide with the prevailing, dominant 
interpretations of the norms and values of one’s culture. In the light of the 
view of cultures as heterogeneous and changing, this objection does, 
however, lose its force. Whereas it may well be that not all interpretations 
of one’s culture can be conceived as reasonable, there is, nevertheless, 
substantive scope for variation. 
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discretion of the judges.523 In cases where cultural factors have been 
allowed to play part, the usages of culture have been extremely 
varied, and abuses of cultural defence have not been avoided.524 As 
the usage of culture has become more common (and accepted) in 
criminal courts, it has also become important to establish guidelines 
into the ways in which culture can operate in criminal courts. 
Unfortunately, as I try to show in this section, neither the existing 
practices nor the suggested guidelines have been able to provide 
frameworks that would treat all minority members fairly and 
equally. The existence of different kinds of cultural motivations has 
largely been ignored, and the basic idea of cultural defence as 
diminishing the defendant’s culpability on the grounds of his/her 
“good-faith belief in the propriety of their action” has been 
marginalized. This, I try to argue, has largely to do with an overt 
concentration on the apparently objective elements of the 
defendant’s culture at the expense of the defendant’s motives, and 
an insufficient treatment of the alternative interpretations of the 
existing cultural norms and practices. Instead of concentrating on 
the (apparently) objective elements of minority cultures, I suggest 
that the criminal courts should pay more attention to the 
motivations of those individuals who have committed the crimes in 
question by utilizing a more sophisticated reading of both the 
minority cultures in question, as well as the variety of ways in 
which people can be motivated by their culture. 
 
                                                 
523 Renteln 2004; 2010. 
524 Renteln discusses cases such as People v. Rhines (1982), a rape case in 
which the defence attempted to establish a link between ‘the customary 
loud voice of African-Americans’ and the presumption of consensual sex, 
as well State v. Bauer (1996), where the defendants’ Rastafarianism was 
attempted as an excuse for a multi-million dollar marihuana farm. (Renteln 
2010, 68-71) Whereas these two cases come across as obvious attempts to 
misuse cultural defence, it is clear that there is always a possibility that the 
claims, utilizing cultural factors, are flawed, and the task of the courts is to 
identify which of these claims are genuine. 
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Expert testimony 
In cases where the defendant’s cultural background is suspected to 
have influenced the defendant’s behaviour, the question to be asked 
remains whether the behaviour of the defendant falls within the 
kinds of behaviour that should also affect the defendant’s 
culpability in criminal courts. That is, whether the defendant can be 
seen as having acted in a reasonable good-faith belief in the 
propriety of his/her action, based on his/her cultural heritage or 
tradition, and whether this good-faith belief should also affect the 
final judgement of the case. Not all actions that are claimed to have 
been performed in a good-faith belief are, after all, genuine and the 
task of the criminal courts is to establish whether this is so in 
particular cases. 
In order to establish the authenticity525 of the cases at hand, the 
criminal courts often resort to expert testimonies to explain the 
traditions and practices of the defendant’s culture. As Renteln 
notes: 
 
It is unclear who is entitled to say whether or not a practice is 
“genuine”. The practice may never have been part of the culture, or it 
may have fallen into desuetude. Expert witnesses play a crucial role in 
cultural defence cases by verifying the existence of traditions and by 
helping to show whether the tradition actually influenced the 
individual in particular situations. Without the benefit of their 
expertise, courts are often incapable of making sense of the cultural 
arguments advanced in specific cases.526 
 
For Renteln, the expert witnesses are ideally external experts 
(anthropologists, social scientists, regional experts, etc.), who are 
not themselves members of the group in question, although she 
does also acknowledge the possibility of consulting the leading 
                                                 
525 By “authenticity” in this context I refer simply to the question of 
whether the defendant’s claims to have acted in good-faith belief (based 
on his cultural heritage or tradition) are genuine. 
526 Renteln 2004, 11. 
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members of the community to explain the details and the 
significance of any particular practice or tradition to the courts.527 
This usage of the members of cultural groups is, however, 
questioned for two reasons. Firstly, Renteln notes that there may 
not be consensus on the interpretations or significance of particular 
cultural practices within the cultural group, and the usage of expert 
witnesses from within the group is likely to lead to bias, only giving 
validity to those interpretations that the witness in question happens 
to support. Secondly, Renteln worries that the internal witnesses 
may succumb to the pressures of misrepresenting their culture in 
order to save a friend or relative, thus working against rather than 
for the purposes of the court.528  
Whereas my intention is not to question the importance of using 
reliable expert witnesses in cultural defence cases, I do, 
nevertheless, wish to point to two difficulties that the use and the 
role of expert testimonies may bring. Firstly, contrary to Renteln 
who emphasizes the role of external expert witnesses, it is quite 
clear that the real experts of cultural interpretations are found from 
within that culture – from those who adhere to the norms and values 
of that culture.529 The problem of acquiring biased information by 
listening only to the leader(s) of the group is, of course, very real 
and calls for a more inclusive approach to choosing the expert 
witnesses. The current leaders of the group cannot be given sole 
authority to define what is genuine in any particular culture, but the 
                                                 
527 Renteln 2004, 11; 206. 
528 Renteln 2004, 206; 2010, 81. Renteln also discusses two other reasons 
for not using insiders as expert witnesses, one relating to the possibility 
that the insiders may be prohibited from disclosing all (e.g. sacred) 
information to the courts, the other relating to the likely level upon which 
different types of witnesses are able to persuade the court. (ibid.) I will not 
comment on these considerations here. 
529 As Marie Deveney (1992) has noted, the views of the actual members 
of the group are seldom heard in criminal courts, but the defining of 
cultural practices is left to the anthropologists and social scientists. 
Deveney 1992. 
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non-dominant interpretations must also be heard.530 The purpose of 
using external expert witnesses may, of course, be precisely this, 
although one should not ignore the danger that the testimonies of 
the external experts may well follow the more prominent 
interpretations of culture, giving some space for disagreement, but 
not being able to balance out all the biases resulting from the 
internal power hierarchies of the group.531 In order to guarantee fair 
and equal treatment of all minority members (including those 
whose cultural interpretations deviate from the dominant norm), the 
courts should aim at a wide basis for understanding how and why 
the defendant may have been culturally motivated to commit the 
crime in question. This may require listening to not only the 
external experts or the leaders of the group but also those whose 
voices are not normally viewed as authoritative in cultural matters, 
including younger women, and the more progressive as well as 
radical elements of the group.532  
The acquiring of a broader basis of expert witnesses may also be 
used to respond to Renteln’s second worry, that of the possibility of 
the internal witnesses succumbing to the pressures of 
misrepresenting their culture in order to save a friend or a relative. 
                                                 
530 The calls for listening to the non-dominant fractions of cultural groups, 
including younger women, are not, of course, new, nor are they restricted 
to the court rooms. See e.g. Okin 1999; 2005; Benhabib 2002. 
531 The problems relating to the usage of external expert witnesses vary 
from outright flawed testimonies (see e.g. Volpp 1994 on the case of 
People v. Chen), to the prejudices inherent in the legal system itself. As 
Madhavi Sunder points out, the courts tend to reinforce static and 
homogeneous views of culture, making no accommodation for cultural 
dissenters. (Sunder 2001) See also Phillips 2007 on the tendency of the 
courts to favour accounts offered by older rather than younger generations. 
This tendency, Phillips continues, is not only inherent in the operations of 
the courts, but may also be prevalent among e.g. social workers, who may 
well be called in as external expert witnesses in cultural cases. (Phillips 
2007, 74-77) 
532 I will return to the ways in which the broader bases of witnesses may 
contribute to the establishing of the defendant’s motivations in more detail 
in my discussions of the so-called “cultural defence test”. 
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Obviously, the courts should ensure, as far as possible, that the 
credibility of the witnesses is not diminished by their too close a 
relation to the defendant. Of course, the possibility of bias, in the 
case of internal expert witnesses, cannot be fully abolished, but it 
can certainly be minimised, at least partially by the same methods 
as for the possible biases of the external witnesses. As Renteln 
herself notes, there should be clear guidelines and codes of ethics to 
expert witnesses, and I see no reason why these guidelines should 
apply only to external experts.533 Furthermore, whereas it is surely 
possible for the internal witnesses to distort cultural evidence for 
the benefit of either the defendant or the victim, this problem is, by 
no means, restricted to the usage of internal witnesses, but may be 
equally valid in cases of external experts working as “hired guns” 
for either the defence or prosecution.534 Although I thus agree with 
Renteln that the avoiding of bias and the ensuring of the credibility 
of the expert witnesses requires, among other things, clearer 
guidelines and codes of ethics, I disagree that the best way to ensure 
fair presentation of minority cultures would be by concentrating on 
external expert witnesses. On the contrary, in order to ensure fair 
presentation of the more marginal or suppressed elements of the 
group, there needs to be a broader basis of expert witnesses, ideally 
combining both internal as well as external expert witnesses. 
Secondly, whereas the expert witnesses (external and internal) 
may well be used to confirm the existence of a particular practice as 
                                                 
533 It may be objected that external witnesses are professionals 
(researchers, social workers, regional experts) who give their testimony as 
professionals (and are thus also bound by their professional codes of 
conduct) whereas internal witnesses may be private individuals (not bound 
by the same professional codes of conduct). However, whereas this is at 
times true, it is, by no means, always the case. To the contrary, the internal 
expert witnesses may include group leaders, clerics, representatives of 
women’s groups (or other smaller associations), who are thus not giving 
their testimonies purely as private individuals. Further, there is no reason 
to think why someone, simply by virtue of being a private individual from 
a particular group, should be deemed unreliable, as the general codes of 
conduct surely apply also to the private individuals of minority groups. 
534 Cf. Renteln 2004, 206. 
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well as help explain its role and significance within the cultural 
group (or some of its fraction), the role of the expert witnesses 
should not be exaggerated. The focus of the expert witnesses is, 
after all, on cultural interpretations and on the role of particular 
cultural norms, values or practices in the abstract, not on whether 
the defendant in particular may have been thus influenced. As 
discussed in the previous section, identical actions can be 
performed from a variety of cultural motivations and, even if the 
action itself could be interpreted as being in line with the norms and 
values of the defendant’s culture, this does not necessarily mean 
that the actor would have also performed the action for the right 
reasons – that is, because, due to their cultural background, they 
genuinely believed their action to be the right thing to do.  
 
Cultural defence test 
Whereas the usage of expert witnesses in cultural defence cases is 
relatively common,535 it is clear that the expert testimonies do not, 
on their own, suffice to establish the authenticity of the cases at 
hand. The expert testimonies concentrate primarily on the 
establishing of the existence of some cultural practice or tradition, 
and on explaining its meaning and potential significance within a 
cultural group. They do not, however, say anything, as yet, about 
how the defendant in question may have been influenced by their 
culture, or whether the defendant is, thus, eligible to use the cultural 
evidence for his/her benefit. Acknowledging the potential abuses of 
cultural defence, Renteln proposes that the courts utilize so-called 
cultural defence test to help avoid abuse.  
The cultural defence test incorporates three basic questions that 
the courts would need to ask in cases where the defendant’s cultural 
background seems relevant for the assessment of the case at hand: 
                                                 
535 Of course, not all cultural defence cases incorporate or give strong role 
to expert witnesses as demonstrated by our initial example case of Jacob 
Zuma’s rape trial, where the acknowledged interpretations of Zulu culture 
were largely based on the defendant’s own behaviour and testimonies. See 
e.g. Robins 2008. 
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1) Is the litigant member of the ethnic group? 
2) Does the group have such a tradition? 
3) Was the litigant influenced by the tradition when he or she acted?536 
 
Should one or more of the answers be negative, Renteln argues, the 
usage of cultural defence should be deemed inappropriate.537 
Interestingly, the three basic questions of the test each focus on 
slightly different aspects of culture and of the defendant, and may 
also require slightly different methods to be answered to.  
The second question of the cultural defence test correlates most 
directly with the common task of the expert witnesses who are 
brought to the courts to explain the existence, prominence as well 
as the potential significance of particular cultural practices to the 
courts. Importantly, as discussed earlier, these expert witnesses 
should be chosen to give as unbiased picture of the cultural 
practices as possible, in order to cater also for those interpretations 
that are not necessarily dominant within the group in question. In 
order to guarantee fair and equal treatment of all members of 
minority cultures, the courts should ensure that it is not only the 
voices of the leaders or the elders of the group that are being 
represented, but also of those who are not normally given the 
authority to decide which interpretations of cultural contents are 
“genuine”. 
The importance of listening also to the non-dominant cultural 
interpretations in criminal courts comes from two sources. On the 
one hand, it is important that the defendant, being influenced by 
their cultural background, and having acted in ways they thought 
was right, is not disadvantaged or privileged by the fact that the 
practices or traditions they were adhering to were only marginal or, 
on the other hand, prevalent practices of their culture. Should the 
defendant be seen to have acted in a reasonable good-faith belief in 
the propriety of their action, it should not make a difference 
                                                 
536 Renteln 2004, 207; 2010, 62 
537 Renteln 2010, 71. 
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whether their actions were in line with the most prominent, main 
stream interpretations of their culture, or with some slightly more 
marginal understandings. On the other hand, the bringing forth of 
the alternative interpretations may also help to identify the actual 
motivations of the defendant by providing important background 
information to answering the third question of the cultural defence 
test, that of whether the litigant was influenced by the tradition 
when he or she acted.538  
To see why this is the case, let us recall that identical actions 
may be performed from a multiplicity of cultural motivations, 
including those of adherence, conformity, preservation, protection, 
and change. It does, and it also should, however, make a difference 
whether one’s actions are motivated by one’s good-faith belief that 
one is doing the right thing (adherence), or whether one is simply 
acting in order to please others, or in order to shed an example to 
those whose cultural interpretations one happens to disagree with. 
Whereas it is not always easy to make a distinction between the 
substantive and the instrumental motivations of the defendant, the 
bringing forth of alternative interpretations helps to highlight the 
possibility that the defendant may have also acted for other reasons 
than for having believed that they were, in accordance with their 
cultural norms and values, doing the right thing. Whereas the 
establishing of a particular cultural practice or tradition as an 
element of the defendant’s culture is often used to indicate that the 
defendant was, indeed, acting in good-faith belief in the propriety 
of their actions, the bringing forth of alternative interpretations 
should inform the courts of the complexity of the matter, including 
the possibility of the defendant to have acted from other, perhaps 
less acceptable, motivations. 
                                                 
538 As will become clear in due course, I do not entirely agree with 
Renteln’s formulation of the third question. Given the working definition 
of cultural defence, it is not enough that the defendant is influenced (in 
whichever way) by some cultural practice or tradition, but that this 
influence has also lead the defendant to genuinely believe that his actions, 
according to the norms and values of his culture, were the right thing to do 
(or, at least, not wrong). 
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The answering of the third question – that of whether the litigant 
was influenced by the tradition when they acted – requires much 
more than the establishing of the existence of such tradition in the 
defendant’s culture. The establishing of the existence of cultural 
traditions and the understanding of their potential influence may 
help the courts to understand why, in the lights of the defendant’s 
culture, it may well have been reasonable for the defendant to act 
the way they did, but it is not enough to establish whether the 
defendant did, indeed, act due to these influences. As Anne Phillips 
has forcefully argued, it would be absurd to think that culture (its 
norms, values, practices) would influence all of its members 
identically, giving straight forward explanations of people’s actions 
or behaviour.539 People can be influenced as well as motivated by 
their cultures in a variety of ways, and it would also be absurd to 
think that any culturally induced action should also be conceived as 
potentially mitigating the defendant’s culpability in criminal courts. 
On the contrary, as indicated by the working definition of cultural 
defence, the defendant’s actions must have also been made for the 
right reasons, and the identification of these reasons can only be 
done at the level of the individual. Instead of asking, whether the 
defendant’s actions were influenced by the defendant’s cultural 
traditions, the courts should rather ask, whether the defendant 
genuinely believed in the rightness of their actions, based on their 
cultural background, and were thus culturally motivated. Instead of 
concentrating on the (apparently) objective elements of the 
defendant’s culture (such as the existence and importance of certain 
traditions or practices), the courts should rather focus on the 
subjective elements of the defendant (such as their motivations and 
intentions), even if the assessment of these motivations needs to be 
done in the context of the defendant’s cultural framework.540 
                                                 
539 Phillips 2006; 2007. 
540 A strong case for a more individuated, although culturally sensitive, 
assessment of the cases at hand have also been developed by Leti Volpp, 
who cautions against the dangers of linking people’s behaviour to their 
group identity. Volpp also shows how the subjective cultural experts (that 
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In my view, the use of sufficiently unbiased information about 
the norms, traditions or practices of the minority culture, and the 
assessing – on a case to case basis – of the defendant’s actual 
motivations for acting the way they did should already suffice to 
establish the authenticity of the case at hand. But Renteln’s cultural 
defence test incorporates one more question that is supposed to help 
prevent the misuse of cultural defence in criminal courts. According 
to Renteln, the courts should also try to establish whether the 
litigant was a member of the particular group and base the litigant’s 
eligibility to use cultural defence on this membership. According to 
Renteln “if a person is not a member of the group, then even if the 
group has the custom in question, he or she cannot claim to have 
been influenced by the cultural imperative.”541 
Given the relatively general consensus about cultural 
membership as one of the criteria for allocating differentiated 
rights,542 it should not come as a surprise that this criterion is also 
suggested to cases of cultural defence. The using of the criterion of 
membership is directed to prevent cases, such as Abankwah v. INS 
(1999), in which the courts were clearly incompetent in establishing 
the facts of the case, granting political asylum to a person who was 
not, in the end, a member of the group they claimed to be, nor in 
danger of being subject to the group practices in case of being 
returned to their home country.543 The criterion of membership is 
                                                                                                     
is, internal expert witnesses) can be used to provide fuller, more nuanced 
analyses of the cases at hand, taking also into account the individual 
variations in culturally motivated actions. (Volpp 1994; see also: Volpp 
2000) 
541 Renteln 2010, 71. 
542 See also discussions in Ch. 1, 4 & 5. 
543 The case of Abankwah v. INS involved a Ghanaian woman who, after 
having entered in the USA sought political asylum on the grounds that, 
should she have been returned to her tribe (Nkumssa) in central Ghana, 
she may have been subject to female genital mutilation (FGM). After 
having been granted political asylum, it became apparent that Abankwah’s 
claim was false in several respects, including that she was not necessarily 
a member of the Nkumssa tribe, nor would she have been subject FGM, as 
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supposed to guard against opportunistic usage of cultural defence 
as, in order to establish the authenticity of their claims, the defence 
must also show that the defendant is, indeed, a member of the group 
whose rules and traditions they claim to be following, instead of a 
mere opportunist trying to portray themselves as acting in 
accordance with their cultural commitments.544 
In the light of my earlier analyses on the constitution of 
politically relevant membership (esp. Ch 4), the use of the criterion 
of membership for the eligibility of the defendant to cultural 
defence, becomes suspect. The same considerations also show why, 
in cases such as Abankwah vs. INS, the establishing of the 
claimant’s membership may have produced right outcomes, but 
why, as a default, the criterion of membership should be rejected. 
In my analysis, one’s group membership is primarily based on 
different forms and types of recognition, including the person’s 
own self-identification, the (other) group members’ recognition, as 
well as the recognition of others (including the state) as a member 
of any particular cultural group. The recognition-based account of 
group membership was adopted due to it being better able to 
incorporate heterogeneities in cultural contents, as well as due to it 
reflecting the political significance of group membership by way of 
recognizing how one’s own behaviour as well as the behaviour of 
others could depend on whether one was recognized as a member. 
At the same time, there is always a possibility of there being 
discrepancies in different actors’ recognition, as not all involved 
may have identical views on who, and on what grounds, counts as a 
member of any particular group. 
In the light of the recognition-based account of membership, it 
should be clear that one’s membership of a cultural group should 
                                                                                                     
FGM was not practiced in central Ghana where she came from. For further 
details and discussion, see Renteln 2010, 71-74. 
544 For example, in the case of State v. Bauer (1996), there was suspicion 
that the defendants may not have been Rastafarians, but simply using 
Rastafarianism as a protective cloak for their endeavours. See: Renteln 
2010, 68-71. 
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not operate as a necessary requirement for the defendant to be able 
to claim to have acted in accordance with their cultural 
commitments. Firstly, it is far from clear who should be allowed to 
decide whether the defendant is, indeed, a member of the group in 
question. In the previous discussions, I emphasized the need to 
listen to the individuals themselves on matters of membership, 
although, in most cases, the commonly used criteria do not follow 
the criterion of self-identification. Secondly, even if such decision 
could be made,545 it is far from clear why one’s membership should 
bear upon the authenticity of one’s claims. As noted time and again 
during the course of this work, it is perfectly possible for one to be 
considered to be a member of a cultural group without them 
accepting the common (or not so common) norms, values, traditions 
or practices of the group, just like it is possible for one to be 
considered a non-member, or ex-member, and still view some of 
the norms, values, traditions or practices as central to one’s identity, 
and as appropriate guidelines to one’s behaviour. It is thus 
important that the membership in a cultural group does not operate 
as a necessary requirement for the establishing of the authenticity of 
the defendant’s claims, as it is highly contested, how one’s 
membership is decided, as well as how this membership resonates 
with one’s beliefs on what it is right for one to do. 
To reiterate, I do not claim that the establishing of the 
defendant’s membership could not, at times, direct the courts to 
make right decisions about the authenticity of the defendant’s 
claims, although I do think that one’s membership is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient requirement for the establishing of such 
authenticity. As demonstrated by the Abankwah vs. INS –case, the 
establishing of the claimant’s group membership (or non-
membership), could have helped the courts to establish whether the 
claimant did require political asylum, although it should be 
                                                 
545 As already indicated, the politically relevant decisions on membership 
often follow either the (apparent) consensus of the group itself, or some 
content-based criteria, such as ancestry, the following of the group rituals 
etc. 
Part II Liberal Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in Practice 
356 
 
remembered that this case was, not only very specific, but also far 
less straight forward than would at first seem. Firstly, the case of 
Abankwah vs. INS does not fit well with the more common cases of 
cultural defence as it was not about the establishing of Abankwah’s 
motivations to act in ways that would be appropriate in her own 
culture but criminalized by the state law. In Abankwah’s claims for 
asylum, her group membership (or non-membership) could be seen 
as relevant, as her claims were based on the ways she would be 
treated by other group members, should she be returned to her 
home country. Should the courts have found out that Abankwah 
was not considered to be a member of the Nkumssa (the tribe that, 
allegedly, would have subjected her to FGM), the courts could have 
seen the fault in her claims. However, even in this case, 
Abankwah’s membership is relevant only if, firstly, the established 
membership coincides with the views of membership of the 
Nkumssa tribe and, secondly, if the threat of FGM is also tied with 
the tribe’s views of one’s membership.546 On its own, the 
establishing of the claimant’s membership (or non-membership) 
tells the courts nothing, as it must first be established how this 
membership (and whose view of membership) relates to those 
threats or motives that the court is in the process of assessing. 
On a more positive note, I believe that the establishing of the 
authenticity of the defendant’s claims can also be done without 
such focus on the defendant’s membership (or non-membership) 
and the relations in which one’s membership stands to one’s 
cultural motivations. As highlighted by the working definition of 
cultural defence, what the courts should be primarily interested in is 
whether the defendant had a reasonable good-faith belief in the 
propriety of his/her action, based on his/her cultural heritage or 
tradition. The establishment of the existence of this good-faith 
belief does not, however, require the establishment of one’s 
                                                 
546 It should be noted that, in the case of Abankwah v. INS, this latter 
aspect should also have been deemed as incorrect, not because the practice 
of FGM was not dependent on the tribe membership, but because the 
Nkumssa tribe of central Ghana did not normally practice FGM. 
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membership, but rather, the establishment of the appropriate 
influence of one’s cultural heritage or tradition to one’s beliefs on 
the right modes of action. Recall that, one does not need to be a 
formal member of a group to be influenced by its norms, values or 
traditions, although, no doubt, some connection to these values and 
traditions must be in place. And, in order to establish this, the two 
other questions of the cultural defence test seem to suffice. Firstly, 
whether there exist such traditions that the defendant could have 
been influenced by, and secondly, whether this influence resulted in 
the defendant believing that, within the norms and values of their 
culture, they did the right thing. Establishing these two things may, 
as already discussed, require far more complex and sophisticated 
understandings of both the existing cultural norms, values and 
traditions, as well as of the defendant’s cultural motivations, but 
these understandings need not depend on the establishing of the 
defendant’s membership. Rather, in cases of cultural defence, it is 
the subjective, individuated elements of the defendant’s motivations 
that should be assessed, on the background of those norms and 
traditions that the defendant may have been influenced by. 
 
4. Conclusion on liberal individualism and cultural defence 
In this chapter, I have concentrated on one particular debate within 
multiculturalism, that of the usage of cultural defence in criminal 
courts. Being closely connected to legal proceedings and to actual 
court cases, this debate has helped to highlight some of the more 
concrete problems associated with the accommodation of people’s 
cultural differences in the light of the more individuated approach 
developed earlier on in this work (Ch. 4 & 5). With respect to the 
usage of culture in criminal courts, the on-going discussion has 
highlighted the difficulties of responding to group’s internal 
heterogeneities and power structures by showing how the current 
practices as well as the suggested guidelines for using culture in 
criminal courts may work for the benefit of upholding of the status 
quo and fail to treat all members of minority cultures fairly and 
equally. 
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It should be emphasized that my intention in this chapter has not 
been to develop normative guidelines on how and when exactly the 
defendant’s cultural background should operate as a mitigating 
factor in criminal courts. As discussed in section 2 of this chapter, 
there are good reasons both for as well as against such mitigation, 
and the balancing of these reasons need to be done on a case to case 
basis. In general, this assessment should take into account, not only 
the severity of the crime and the role of the (possible) victim, but 
also the actual motivation of the defendant to commit the crime in 
question.  
The main focus, and contribution, of this chapter has been on 
this latter aspect of discussion, that of the analysis of different kinds 
of cultural motivations, and the possible difficulties of identifying 
these motivations in criminal courts. I distinguished between five 
types of cultural motivation – those of adherence, conformity, 
preservation, protection, and change – and argued that not all of 
these motivations could be seen as falling within the basic tenets of 
cultural defence, and the requirement of the defendant to have had 
“a reasonable good-faith belief in the propriety of his/her actions, 
based on his/her cultural heritage or tradition”. Having outlined 
some of the difficulties of differentiating between these 
motivations, I turned to see how in criminal courts the claims of the 
defendant’s good-faith belief were assessed. I discussed two 
methods of trying to account for the authenticity of the defendant’s 
claims, that of the using of expert testimonies, and that of the so-
called cultural defence test. I suggested that, in order for the courts 
to treat all members of minority cultures equally, two developments 
to these methods should be made. Firstly, in establishing the 
existence and the potential significance of a particular cultural 
practice or tradition, the courts should utilize a broader basis of 
expert witnesses, including those who are not normally given the 
power to decide about the prevalent interpretations of their culture. 
Secondly, in order to establish the defendant’s good-faith belief, 
more attention should be placed on the subjective elements of the 
defendant’s motivations rather than on the apparently objective 
elements of group membership or the existence of particular 
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cultural practices or traditions. Only by focusing on the 
individuated motivations of the defendants (assessed within the 
context of their own cultural framework) could the courts be seen as 
treating members of minority cultures equally, without prioritizing 
or suppressing some members on the basis of status quo. 
 
--- 
 
As a whole, this Part II (Ch. 4, 5 & 6) has focused on the questions 
of allocating differentiated rights or, more generally, on the 
questions of who, and on what grounds, the liberal state should treat 
differentially. Contrary to Part I (Ch. 1, 2 & 3) that concentrated 
mainly on the questions of how to justify culturally differentiated 
treatment, this part has started from a presumption that there are 
strong liberal egalitarian grounds for differentiated treatment, and 
that, in order for such treatment to do the job it is supposed to do 
(that is, to alleviate cultural disadvantages), questions of allocation 
must be attended to. The second presupposition, and the main target 
of this part, has been the commonly accepted view of culturally 
differentiated treatment as specifically group-differentiated 
treatment, including group-based and membership-based allocation. 
In order to argue for an individual-centred, albeit culturally 
sensitive, approach for responding to issues of cultural diversity, I 
have looked at both, the ways in which people may be affected by 
their culture, as well as the ways in which differentiated treatment 
(variously construed) may rectify people’s cultural disadvantages. 
By careful analyses of the constitution of group memberships, 
cultural identities, as well as culturally motivated actions, I have 
shown some of the flaws of thinking about culturally differentiated 
treatment primarily in terms of group-differentiated treatment, and 
the allocation of such treatment primarily in terms of membership-
based allocation. Although I have not attempted to give any 
concrete policy advice, or even criteria through which to assess the 
necessity of culturally differentiated treatment in particular cases, 
these chapters have, nevertheless, shown something important 
about the focus of those policies that the liberal state may adopt in 
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circumstances of cultural diversity. Due to the heterogeneities of 
cultural contents, memberships as well as their influences on 
individual human beings (including cultural motivations), I have 
argued that it is essential that the individual (albeit culturally 
embedded individual) is brought back to the forefront of the 
discussions. Rather than asking what should be done in order to 
guarantee fair and equal treatment of members of minority cultural 
groups, it may be more fruitful to ask what should be done in order 
to guarantee fair and equal treatment of all individuals, whose 
needs, wants and well-being may well have been influenced by a 
variety of sources, including those cultures they are or have been 
connected to. 
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Conclusion 
 
Liberal multiculturalism and its limits 
 
As the debates on the accommodation of people’s cultural 
differences within western liberal societies have become more 
common, they have also become more detailed and fragmented. 
The theoretical, empirical as well as political discussions on 
different kinds of groups (national and linguistic minorities, 
indigenous peoples, immigrants, religious minorities, etc.) as well 
as on different kinds of minority rights (self-governance, 
representation, assistance, exemption, symbolic recognition, etc.) 
have, to a large extent, been differentiated, taking into account the 
complexity of normative considerations inherent in each. Many of 
the discussions have also operated within the political and legal 
contexts of particular societies, directing the debates away from the 
more abstract questions on the justifiability of differentiated rights 
within liberalism, to the more pragmatic questions on the kinds of 
consequences that different cultural policies may have, not only for 
the minorities or minority members, but also for society at large. 
The critical assessments of different political models of 
multiculturalism have also led to scepticism, both with respect to 
liberal multicultural theories as well as the applicability of these 
theories in practice.547 
Whereas acknowledging of the complexity of multicultural 
issues, and the variety of ways in which these issues are 
approached, bear many positive aspects to it, the fragmentation of 
the field has not been an altogether positive development. The 
                                                 
547 Some go as far as to claim that there has been ‘multiculturalism 
backlash’ that rejects the basic tenets of multiculturalism and cultural 
accommodation for more uniform, nationalistic approaches. Whether, and 
to what extent, such backlash has happened is debatable, as many 
(although by no means all) multicultural policies have been established as 
standard policies of accommodation in many countries. For debate, see 
Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Kymlicka 2007. 
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contemporary debates owe a lot to the older, more general debates 
on multiculturalism and minority rights and should also be assessed 
in the light of these historical roots. Many of the contemporary 
discussions still utilize the theoretical frameworks developed at the 
height of the theoretical debates on multiculturalism (late 90’s, 
early millennium), taking these debates as the general frameworks 
within which to assess the more specific issues at hand. 
Consequently, many of the flaws and presuppositions of the so-
called grand theories548 have been transferred into the contemporary 
debates, leaving some of the crucial presuppositions of liberal 
multiculturalism unquestioned.549 
In the light of these developments, the aims of this work have been 
twofold. On the one hand, I have tried to return to the roots of 
liberal multiculturalism in order to see why, in contemporary 
contexts, the liberal multicultural project is seen both as a failure, as 
well as a framework within which the more specific debates on 
cultural accommodation should, nevertheless, be conducted. This 
question has drawn me to look at the very basic questions of liberal 
multiculturalism, including the questions relating to the initial 
framing of the debates, and the difficulties this framing has led to 
with respect to the applicability of liberal multicultural theories in 
practice. 
                                                 
548 In this work, I have used the term “grand theories” to refer to those 
approaches that attempt to construct a relatively comprehensive account of 
a variety of multicultural issues (including different types of differentiated 
rights) based on a particular liberal value such as individual autonomy, 
equality or freedom of association. See also: Background and introduction 
to Part I. 
549 This is not to say that all aspects of the so-called grand theories would 
have gone unquestioned, nor that there would have been no theoretical 
developments within liberal multiculturalism since. Quite the contrary, the 
more contextualized approaches have affected, not only actual 
multicultural policies, but also the theoretical frameworks themselves (for 
debate, see.: Bader and Saharso 2004; Carens 2004; Kukathas 2004) and 
many of the most pressing critiques (including issues of cultural 
heterogeneity and contestability, plurality of group commitments, etc.) are 
already acknowledged in most contemporary debates on multiculturalism. 
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On the other hand, I have also tried to point out some of the 
presuppositions inherent in the more contemporary debates on 
multiculturalism, including the group-differentiated nature of 
cultural policies, and the difficulties this group-differentiation 
brings to the specifically liberal approaches to cultural diversity. 
My focus on the issues of group-differentiation has led me to look 
for ways in which the liberal state, engaging in a variety of 
accommodative measures, could develop these measures by taking 
better into account both the basic tenets of liberalism as well as 
multiculturalism. As a result, suggestions for more individuated, yet 
culturally sensitive approaches to cultural diversity were put 
forward, bringing the basic liberal commitment to the primacy of 
the individual back to the centre of debate. 
 
1. The grand theories and their constraints: theoretical 
frameworks vs. policy guidance 
In Part I of this work, I concentrated on the so-called grand theories 
of multiculturalism, assessing them both for internal coherence as 
well as for scope of application. The applicability of the autonomy, 
equality and toleration-based approaches to cultural diversity were 
discussed, not only in the light of their own theoretical frameworks, 
but also in the context of the more general framework of 
multiculturalism and liberal multiculturalism in particular.  
Drawing from the initial framing of debates, the discussions on 
liberal multiculturalism can be seen as incorporating three levels of 
discussion, addressing slightly different issues and being in slightly 
different relations to one another.550 On the most general level are 
the questions within liberalism itself, with respect to those basic 
liberal values and principles that any liberal multicultural theory 
should be committed to. As shown in this work, many of the 
differences between the grand theories of multiculturalism can be 
traced back to the differences at this level of discussion, although it 
is clear that the autonomy, equality and toleration –based arguments 
                                                 
550 See also: Figure 2, in Background 3.1. 
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are also often used conjointly as well as selectively depending on 
the issues at hand. 
The second level of discussion, perhaps at the very centre of 
debates on liberal multiculturalism, incorporates questions relating 
to the application of the liberal principles to the circumstances of 
cultural diversity. The basic questions about the reasons for the 
liberal state to take cultural considerations into account, and about 
the justifiability of different cultural policies (including minority 
rights) within the liberal framework, lie precisely at this level of 
discussion. For the most part, it was shown that the grand theories 
of multiculturalism were operating at this level, trying to show why 
the liberal state should (or should not) take cultural claims 
seriously, and why differentiated rights were (or were not) 
compatible with liberalism. 
The third level, and the level towards which many of the 
contemporary debates on multiculturalism have been turning, 
incorporates questions about the actual cultural policies and the 
responses that the liberal state should take in particular cases. 
Should the wearing of burqas and niqabs be banned in public 
places? Should traditional or religious laws be recognized in 
domestic matters? Should minority quotas be used in public 
offices? These are just some of the more concrete questions that 
liberal multiculturalists, as well as political decision makers, have 
been confronted with, each incorporating a slightly different set of 
normative considerations as well as empirical issues to be dealt 
with. 
The relation of these more concrete questions of policy to the 
other two levels of discussion (liberalism and liberal 
multiculturalism) is, as I have tried to show, very complex and not 
as straight forward as one might think. Utilizing the grand theories 
of liberal multiculturalism may help one to conceptualize some of 
the normative issues involved, but may not give any straight 
forward answers to what the liberal state’s responses should be in 
any given circumstances. As my discussions on autonomy, equality 
and toleration-based approaches showed, the grand theories of 
multiculturalism were (sometimes contrary to their proponents) 
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successful in showing two things. Firstly, why cultural claims and, 
especially, culturally induced disadvantages are a proper concern of 
the liberal state and, secondly, that differentiated treatment or 
differentiated rights (variously construed) are not necessarily 
incompatible with liberalism. The establishing of these two things 
does not, however, say anything yet about how cultural matters, or 
cultural disadvantages, should be responded to, nor does it thus say 
anything yet about whether differentiated treatment or the granting 
of differentiated rights should be the appropriate responses to adopt. 
Rather than giving concrete policy advice, the grand theories of 
liberal multiculturalism should be viewed as providing frameworks 
within which the more concrete questions of cultural 
accommodation can be discussed, leaving considerable scope of 
legitimate variation to those policies that the liberal state may 
eventually adopt. 
 
2. Minority rights in practice: group-differentiated rights vs. 
individuated allocation 
Given the success of the liberal multicultural theories in 
establishing both, strong reasons for the liberal state to take cultural 
considerations into account, as well as the justifiability of different 
types of minority rights within the liberal framework, it becomes 
important to see how, in practice, people’s cultural differences are 
accommodated and how the adopted policies fit within the liberal 
multicultural framework. The assessment of such questions can take 
several routes, none of which may, perhaps, be fully satisfactory. 
As the discussions on multiculturalism developed, the debates 
within the field became separated and somewhat fragmented. The 
debates concerning the general justifiability of minority rights (as a 
bulk) turned into discussions on different types of rights separately, 
and further, into debates about particular issues in particular 
circumstances. One example of this kind of narrowing the focus –
approach can be found in discussions on Muslim head scarves that 
focus on particular (set of) practices within particular (set of) 
communities, and the approaches of the liberal state(s) to these 
practices. The debates on Muslim head scarves can further be 
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narrowed, for example, by contextualizing the debates into 
particular social and political circumstances, or by focusing on one 
specific controversy (for example, the banning of burqas and niqabs 
in public places) and the relevant normative (as well as empirical) 
questions surrounding this particular issue.551 
The benefits of focusing on one particular issue (head scarves, or 
the usage of particular kinds of head scarves in particular 
circumstances), affecting one particular group (Muslims, or a 
particular subgroup of Muslims), in one particular social 
surroundings (in France, Belgium etc.) should be obvious. The 
more focused the discussion, the better can this discussion take a 
variety of considerations into account, including factual matters 
relating to the role and status of the practice both within the group 
as well as in the wider liberal society. On the down side, it is clear 
that an assessment of a particular policy (affecting a particular 
group in particular circumstances) is not going to produce results 
that would be generally applicable, even to cases that pay close 
resemblance to the case at hand.552  
It should be made clear that I fully acknowledge and respect the 
need for more contextualized and specified analyses and 
discussions on particular cases and policies, as the normative 
                                                 
551 Perhaps the most well-known group of debates concerning Muslim 
head scarves has been conducted within the French context of laïcité, and 
the banning of ostensive religious symbols in public institutions. For 
overview, see Laborde 2005; 2008; Bowen 2007; McGoldrick 2006; 
O’Brien 2005. For some attempts to conceptualize the recent bans on 
burqas, see: Van der Schyff and Overbeeke 2011; Parvez 2011. 
552 For example, the debates on the banning of burqas and niqabs 
(incorporating, among others, questions relating to public recognizability) 
may not be easily transferred into debates on other types of head scarves 
for example in employment or in education (involving, among others, 
questions of equality of opportunity) , and neither of these debates may be 
easily transferred into debates concerning other cultural or religious 
garments, such as the Jewish yarmulkes or Sikh turbans (that involve, 
among others, very different kinds of power relations within the groups in 
question). 
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considerations inherent in each are bound to differ.553 The more 
general theoretical frameworks of liberal multiculturalism can 
provide good starting points for these analyses, by providing certain 
constraints as well as focal points of discussion.554 Whereas the 
more specified approaches need not be uncritical of the theoretical 
frameworks upon which they are built, focusing on the many details 
of the cases at hand may, nevertheless, render some of the 
theoretical presuppositions unquestioned. One of these 
presuppositions,that of the conceiving of differentiated rights as 
specifically group-differentiated rights, has been the starting point 
of the Part II of this work, requiring also a slightly different 
approach to the assessment of different cultural policies and their 
relation to the theoretical frameworks of liberal multiculturalism. 
Instead of taking the common approach of assessing the 
justifiability of different types of minority rights or the effects of 
particular policies in particular circumstances, in Part II, I have 
concentrated on a different question of liberal multiculturalism – 
that of the allocation of differentiated treatment or differentiated 
rights in accordance with the basic tenets of liberal 
multiculturalism. My enquiry started from a fairly general 
observation according to which culturally differentiated rights were 
often viewed as group-differentiated rights, also in the senses in 
which these rights were granted, either to particular groups as 
collectives (group rights proper) or to members of these groups by 
virtue of one’s membership in the group in question (membership 
rights). The acknowledgement of the group-differentiated nature of 
minority rights led me to look at various questions relating to the 
constitution of one’s membership, the role of one’s cultural identity 
as well as the ways in which culture (variously construed) could be 
                                                 
553 See also discussions on the irreducibility of normative considerations 
relevant for each type of minority right in Background 2.3. 
554 By constraints and focal points, I refer to those values and principles 
(including liberal individualism, value of liberty, autonomy and equality) 
that any, specifically liberal approach to cultural diversity cannot ignore. 
See also: Background 1.2. 
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seen as affecting people’s behaviour, either as a member or non-
member of any particular cultural group.  
Like the more specified, narrowing the focus –approaches 
mentioned above, my approach, too, has certain shortcomings. 
Firstly, as the issues of multiculturalism, and the adopted culturally 
differentiated policies, are varied, it has been impossible to build a 
systematic account of all those cases in which the group-based or 
membership-based allocation would deserve further scrutiny. In this 
work, I have thus utilized only a few, albeit well-known and widely 
discussed examples in order to illustrate my points, not only for the 
more individuated approach to allocation, but also for the 
importance of bringing the questions of allocation to the centre of 
debates on liberal multiculturalism. No doubt, more work on the 
questions of allocation remains, although if I have convinced the 
reader about the need and relevance of such work for liberal 
multiculturalism, I claim some success. 
Secondly, it is clear that focusing on the questions of allocation 
– that is, on the questions of who, and according to which 
principles, should come under culturally differentiated treatment – 
leaves some of the questions regarding the need for such 
differentiated treatment unanswered. Instead of asking, who should, 
for example, be exempt from certain rules or regulations, the 
objection goes, we should rather ask whether such exemptions are 
needed in the first place. However, whereas I acknowledge (and 
have, during the course of my work, acknowledged) the need to ask 
these latter questions too,555 this does not take away the importance 
of thinking about those principles according to which differentiated 
rights are allocated. After all, most western liberal societies have 
adopted some systems of minority rights and, although the 
culturally differentiated treatment may not always be the best of 
policies, it may, nevertheless, be an acceptable policy within the 
liberal multicultural framework. Any policies, whether good or bad, 
can, of course, always be made better, and my analyses of the 
                                                 
555 See esp. Ch. 3. 
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questions of allocation should be seen as attempts to serve this 
purpose. 
 
3. Towards more individuated approach to cultural diversity 
The main claim of this work, that of the need for a more 
individuated, yet culturally sensitive approach to cultural diversity, 
has been built by looking at some of the benefits as well as 
constraints of the traditional, liberal approaches to cultural 
diversity. As argued in Part I, there are strong reasons for the liberal 
state to take cultural considerations into account, and to be 
concerned about people’s cultural disadvantages. The cultural bias 
of liberal institutions, connected with cultural diversity, bring 
cultural matters into the realm of liberal politics. The potentially 
tremendous importance of cultural norms and practices to the 
identities and self-respect of their followers, also provide reasons 
for the liberal state to at least aim to rectify those disadvantages that 
result from the incompatibility of these norms or practices with the 
general rules and norms of the wider society. It may not, of course, 
be possible, or even justifiable, to accommodate all cultural norms 
and practices, although, as I argued in Part I, the liberal state 
should, as a default, view people’s interests in adhering to these 
norms and practices as legitimate, and the disadvantages induced by 
such adherence as deserving of being rectified. 
Importantly, the rationale for the liberal state to be concerned 
about people’s cultural disadvantages and, as a default, to attempt 
to rectify these disadvantages, say nothing as yet about the kinds of 
policies through which this could be done, or about the scope 
within which the effects of such policies should be extended. As the 
liberal theories of multiculturalism show, differentiated rights are 
not necessarily incompatible with liberalism, but the justifiability of 
such rights in any particular circumstances should be done in 
context. Whereas no comprehensive method for assessing the 
justifiability of any particular right in any particular circumstances 
were developed, in this work, I have, nevertheless, emphasized the 
need to balance the reasons both for as well as against these rights 
on a case to case basis. In some cases (for example, where cultural 
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practices incorporate gross human rights violations), the balance of 
reason may work against the accommodation of such practices, 
whereas in other cases, the balance of reasons may well tip to the 
other side, legitimating also the possibility, albeit not the 
requirement, for a liberal state to accommodate people’s cultural 
differences with the help of differentiated rights. Provided that in 
many cases, differentiated treatment or differentiated rights are, 
indeed, justifiable (although not required) liberal responses to 
cultural diversity, the question follows: to whom should these rights 
be extended. 
Starting from the relative consensus among liberal 
multiculturalists about differentiated rights as specifically group-
differentiated rights, in Part II, I have provided strong reasons for 
the liberal multiculturalists to reassess this view and to turn rather 
to more individuated approaches to accommodating people’s 
cultural differences. As shown by the recognition-based account of 
group-membership,556 it is not only cultural contents that should be 
viewed as heterogeneous and contested, but also people’s group 
memberships, the acknowledgement of which can be done from 
several different perspectives. The difficulties brought forth by the 
contestability of people’s group memberships can be seen 
especially clearly in the context of group-differentiated rights that, 
despite efforts to the contrary, always support certain cultural 
contents at the expense of others.557 Whereas I did not reject the 
possibility of group membership (that is, the general conception or, 
what often comes to same thing, the state’s recognition of group 
membership) as an appropriate criterion for allocating differentiated 
rights in specific cases,558 I did, nevertheless, point out that in 
many, perhaps even most, cases, more attention should be paid to 
the person’s own views of their culture as well as of their 
                                                 
556 See esp. Ch. 4 and Ch. 5. 
557 For full argument to this effect, see esp. Ch. 1 and Ch. 4. 
558 For example, in cases where the purpose of differentiated treatment is 
to rectify those disadvantages that result from structural discrimination or 
general prejudices against particular group of people. 
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membership. This, it was argued, was necessary in order for the 
differentiated rights to do the work they were supposed to do 
without disadvantaging certain individuals or fractions of groups 
along the way. 
The two final chapters – those concerning the debates on the 
right of exit and on cultural defence – not only clarified some of the 
details of my approach, but also operated as examples of the ways 
in which a more individuated, yet culturally sensitive approach to 
cultural diversity could work in practice.  As argued with respect to 
the discussions on exit, there are several ways in which people’s 
memberships as well as their identities as members of cultural or 
religious groups can be conceived of. Consequently, one’s exit from 
a cultural group may not be thought of simply in terms of leaving 
the contours of one’s group, but may also incorporate an identity-
aspect to it – that of renouncing one’s belonging as a member of 
that group. These ways of understanding exit from one’s cultural 
group do not, however, need to go hand in hand, but a person, 
despite having left the contours of their group, may still identify as 
a member and view this identification as an inherent element of 
who they conceive themselves to be. From the perspective of the 
liberal state, it was argued, the following of people’s self-
identifications was to be the preferred approach to the recognizing 
of people’s memberships, for two reasons. Firstly, this recognition, 
by the liberal state, would provide certain external affirmation to 
people’s identities as group members and, by way of doing so, also 
contribute to the making of formal rights of exit (as commonly 
understood) more realistic. Secondly, and more importantly, it is 
only by tracking the ways in which people themselves identify as 
group-members (or non-members) that the liberal state manages to 
steer clear from defining any substantive requirements for group 
membership, and leaves it to the group members themselves to 
decide, what these requirements may be. 
The final chapter, and my discussions on cultural defence, 
further elaborated the importance of focusing on individuals (rather 
than groups or group members) by emphasizing, not only the 
importance of recognizing the heterogeneity and contestability of 
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group memberships and cultural contents, but also of those reasons 
that people may have for acting “in accordance with their culture”. 
The debates on cultural defence (that is, on the using of culture as a 
potentially mitigating factor in criminal courts) incorporate 
important ideas about the ways in which people’s actions can be 
culturally motivated, and how these motivations (or, as I argued, 
certain types of motivations) may affect the culpability of the actor 
in criminal courts. In the course of my discussions I did, however, 
show that not all culturally motivated actions should be conceived 
of as diminishing the defendant’s culpability, and that the suggested 
methods for identifying these motivations were often far from 
sufficient. Rather than attempting to establish the existence of a 
particular practice or tradition in a particular culture, or the 
defendant’s membership in the group with which this practice or 
tradition is commonly associated, I argued that the courts should 
pay more attention to those motivations that any particular 
individual (that is, the defendant) may have for acting the ways they 
did, not only as a cultural being, but as a person with complex 
cultural and social backgrounds as well as a variety of personality 
traits.  
Being in line with the general argument of this work, I suggested 
that, in order for the liberal state (including the criminal courts) to 
treat all individuals fairly and equally, the influence of different 
cultures or cultural practices on individuals could not be ignored. 
The taking into account of cultural factors should not, however, be 
too strictly connected to any particular cultural groups or people’s 
memberships in these groups, but take better into account 
individual variations. As it is clear that cultures can be variously 
interpreted, it should also be clear that the influence of different 
cultures, however interpreted, are different for different people, at 
times also independent of their status or relation to the culture or 
the cultural group in question. 
 
 373 
 
Bibliography 
 
Ackerman, B. (1980) Social Justice and the Liberal State. New Haven: 
 Yale University Press. 
Addis, A. (1992) “Individualism, Communitarianism and the Rights of 
 Ethnic Minorities”, Notre Dame Law Review 67(3), 615-676. 
Amirthalingam, K. (2010) “Culture, Crime, and Culpability: Perspectives 
 on the Defence of Provocation”, in: Foblets, M. and Renteln, A.D. 
 (eds.) Multicultural Jurispudence: Comparative Perspectives on the 
 Cultural Defence. Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing. 
Anderson, E. (1999) “What is the point of Equality?”, Ethics 109, 287-
 337. 
Appiah, K.A. (1994) “Identity, Authenticity, Survival”, in: Gutmann (ed.): 
 Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, 
 New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
— (1996) “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections”, in 
 Appiah, K.A. and Gutmann, A. (eds.) Colour Conscious – The 
 Political Morality of Race. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
 University Press. 
— (2001) “Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity”, Critical Inquiry 27, 
 305-332.  
— (2005) The Ethics of Identity. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
 University Press. 
Archard, D. (2007) “The Wrong of Rape”, The Philosophical Quarterly 
 57(228), 374-393. 
Arneson, R. (1989) "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," 
 Philosophical Studies 56, 77-93. 
— (1990) “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity 
 for Welfare”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 19(2), 158-194. 
— (2002) “Equality of Opportunity”, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
 Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equal-opportunity/ (seen 
 24.10. 2012) 
— (2008) “Justice is not equality”, Ratio (new series) XXI, 371-391. 
Bader, V. and Saharso, S. (2004): “Introduction: Contextualized Morality 
 and Ethno-Religious Diversity”, Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 
 7(2), 107-115. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
374 
 
Bala, N. (2011) “Polygamy in Canada: Justifiably Not Tolerated”, JURIST 
 - Forum, Dec. 3, 2011, http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/nicholas-bala-
 canada-polygamy.php (seen 22.10.2012) 
Barclay, L. (2005) “Liberalism and Diversity”, in: Jackson, F. and Smith, 
 M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, 155-
 180. 
Barry, B. (2001) Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of 
 Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
— (2002) “Second Thoughts – and Some First Thoughts Revived”, in: 
 Kelly, P. (ed.) Multiculturalism Reconsidered.  Cambridge and 
 Malden: Polity Press. 
Beitz, C. (1979) Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press. 
Beitz, C. (2005) “Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice”, Journal of Ethics 
 9, 11-27. 
Benhabib, S. (ed.) (1996) Democracy and Difference. Princeton, New 
 Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
— (2002) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global 
 Era. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
— (2004) The Rights of Others. Cambridge University Press.  
Benson, P. (1994) “Free Agency and Self-Worth”, The Journal of 
 Philosophy 91(12), 650-668. 
Berlin, I. (1969) “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in: Berlin, I.: Four Essays on 
 Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berman, B., Eyoh, D. and Kymlicka , W. (eds.) (2004) Ethnicity and 
 Democracy in Africa. Ohio University Press. 
Borchers, D. (2012) “Calculating on Identity?  The Costs and Benefits of 
 the Costs-of-Exit Debate”, in: Borchers, D. and Vitikainen, A. (eds.): 
 On Exit: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the right of exit in liberal 
 multicultural societies. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. 
Borchers, D. and Vitikainen, A. (eds.) (2012) On Exit: Interdisciplinary 
 perspectives on the right of exit in liberal multicultural societies. 
 Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. 
Bowen, J.R. (2007) Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the 
 State, and Public Space. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Boxill, B. and Boxill, J. (2003) “Affirmative Action”, in: Frey, R.G. and 
 Wellman, C.H. (eds.) A Companion to Applied Ethics.  Blackwell 
 Publishing. 
Bibliography 
375 
 
Brubaker, R. (2004) Ethnicity Without Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: 
 Harvard University Press. 
Buchanan, A.E. (1989) “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of 
 Liberalism”, Ethics 99(4), 852-882. 
Burgess-Jackson, K. (ed.) (1999) A Most Detestable Crime. New York and 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Caney, S. (2002) “Equal Treatment, Exceptions and Cultural Diversity”, 
 in: Kelly, P. (ed.) Multiculturalism Reconsidered.  Cambridge and 
 Malden: Polity Press. 
— (2005) Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press. 
Carens, J.H. (1997) “Liberalism and Culture”, Constellations 4(1), 35-47.  
— (2000) Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration 
 of justice as Evenhandedness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2004) “A Contextual Approach to Political Theory”, Ethical Theory & 
 Moral Practice 7(2), 117-132. 
Carstens, P.A. (2010) “The Cultural Defence in Criminal Law: South 
 African Perspectives”, in: Foblets, M. & Renteln, A.D. (eds.) 
 Multicultural Jurispudence: Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural 
 Defence. Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing. 
Christman, J. (1987) “Autonomy: A Defence of the Split-level Self”, 
 Southern Journal of Philosophy 25, 281-293. 
— (1991) “Autonomy and Personal History”, Canadian Journal of 
 Philosophy 21, 1-24. 
— (2001) “Liberalism, Autonomy & Self-Transformation”,  Social Theory 
 & Practice 27(2), 185-206. 
— (2005) “Procedural Autonomy and Liberal Legitimacy”, in: Taylor, J.S. 
 (ed.): Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its 
 Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.  
Cohen, G.A. (1989) "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99, 
 906-944. 
— (2008) Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
 University Press. 
Colburn, B. (2010) Autonomy and Liberalism. New York and London: 
 Routledge. 
Coleman, D.L. (1996) “Individualizing Justice through Multiculturalism: 
 The Liberal’s Dilemma”, Columbia Law Review 96(5), 1093-1167. 
Connolly, W.E. (1991) Identity\Difference. Ithaca: Cornell University 
 Press. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
376 
 
Crowder, G.E. (2007) “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism”, Political 
 Theory 35(2), 121-146. 
— (2009) “Thunder versus Enlightenment: A response to Thunder”, 
Political Theory 37(1), 161-166. 
Den Uyl, D.J. and Rasmussen, D. (2006) “The Myth of Atomism”, The 
 Review of Metaphysics 59, 841-868. 
Deveaux, M. (2000) Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. Ithaca: 
 Cornell University Press. 
Deveney, M.R. (1992) “Courts and Cultural Distinctiveness”, University 
 of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25(3&4), 867-877. 
Dworkin, G. (1988) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge 
 University Press. 
— (2005) “Moral Paternalism”, Law and Philosophy 24, 305-319. 
Dworkin, R. (1978) “Liberalism,” in: Hampshire, Stuart (ed.) Public and 
 Private Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
— (1981a) “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Philosophy 
 and Public Affairs 10(3): 185-246. 
— (1981b) “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources”, Philosophy 
 and Public Affairs 10(4): 283-345. 
— (1989) “Foundations on Liberal Equality”, in: Tanner Lectures on 
 Human Values, Vol. 2. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 
— (2002) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Harvard 
 University Press. 
Festenstein, M. (2005) Negotiating Diversity: Culture, Deliberation, 
 Trust. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Fischer, Meik (2012) “Minors and the Exit Option under German Law”, 
 in: Borchers, D. and Vitikainen, A. (eds.): On Exit: Interdisciplinary 
 perspectives on the right of exit in liberal multicultural societies. 
 Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. 
Foblets, M. and Renteln, A.D. (eds.) (2010) Multicultural Jurispudence: 
 Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defence. Oxford and 
 Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing. 
Forst, R. (1997) “Foundations of a Theory of Multicultural Justice”, 
 Constellations 4(1), 63-71. 
Frankfurt, H. (1971) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, 
 Journal of Philosophy 68, 5-20. 
Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. (2003) Redistribution or Recognition: A 
 Political-Philosophical Exchange. London, New York: Verso. 
Bibliography 
377 
 
Freeman, S. (2002) “Liberalism and the Accommodation of Group 
 Claims”, in: Kelly, P. (ed.) Multiculturalism Reconsidered.  Cambridge 
 and Malden: Polity Press. 
Friedman, M. (1986) “Autonomy and the Split-level Self”, Southern 
 Journal of Philosophy 24, 19-35. 
— (2003) Autonomy, Gender and Politics. Oxford University Press. 
Galeotti, A.E. (2002) Toleration as Recognition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
Galston, W. (1995) “Two Concepts of Liberalism”, Ethics 105, 516-534.  
— (2002) Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for 
 Political Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press. 
— (2005) The Practice of Liberal Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
Gaus, G. (2003) “Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical 
 Principle”, in: Wall, S. and Klosko, G. (eds.) Perfectionism and 
 Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory. New York and Oxford: Rowman 
 and Littlefield. 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Glazer, N. (1997) We Are All Multiculturalists Now. Cambridge, Mass. 
 Harvard University Press. 
Goldstein, T.F. (1994) “Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American 
 Criminal Justice System Formally Recognize A “Cultural Defence”?”, 
 Dickinson Law Review 99, 141-168. 
Golding, M. P. (2002) “The Cultural Defence”, Ratio Juris 15(2), 146-
 158. 
Goodin, R.E. (2006) “Liberal Multiculturalism: Protective and Polyglot”, 
 Political Theory 34(3), 289-303. 
Gould, C. (2001) “Group Rights and Social Ontology”, in: Sistare, C., 
 May, L. and Francis, L. (eds.): Groups and Group Rights. University 
 Press of Kansas. 
Gracia, J. (2006) “Individuality, Life Plans, and Identity: Foundational 
 Concepts in Appiah’s The Ethics of Identity”, Journal of Social 
 Philosophy 37(2), 283-291. 
Gray, J. (1986) Liberalism. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
— (2000) Two Faces of Liberalism. New York: The New Press. 
Griffin, J. (1986) Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral 
 Importance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
378 
 
Gutmann, A. (1986) “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism”, Philosophy 
 & Public Affairs 14(3), 308-322. 
— (2003): Identity in Democracy. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
 University Press. 
Hacking, I. (1992a) “Making Up People”, in Stein, E. (ed), Forms of 
 Desire: Sexual Orientation and the Social Constructionist 
 Controversy. New York and London: Routledge. 
— (1992b) “World-Making by Kind-Making: Child Abuse for Example”, 
 in: Douglas, M. and Hull, D. (eds.) How Classification Works: Nelson 
 Goodman among the Social Sciences. Edinburgh University Press. 
Hansson, S.O. (2004) “What are opportunities and why should they be 
 equal?”, Social Choice and Welfare 22: 305-316. 
Hartney, M. (1991) “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights”, 
 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 4(2), 293-314. 
Hassim, S. (2009) “Democracy’s Shadows: Sexual Rights and Gender 
 Politics in the Rape Trial of Jacob Zuma”, African Studies 68(1), 57-
 77. 
Hirschmann, N.J. (2003) The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist 
 Theory of Freedom. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Holtug, N. and Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2007) Egalitarianism: New Essays 
 on the Nature and Value of Equality. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
 University Press. 
Holtzleithner, E. (2012) “Interrogating Exit in Multiculturalist Theorizing: 
 Conditions and Limitations”, in: Borchers, D. and Vitikainen, A. (eds.) 
 On Exit: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the right of exit in liberal 
 multicultural societies. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. 
Honneth, A. (1997) “Recognition and Moral Obligation”, Social Research 
 64(1), 16-35. 
— (2001) “Recognition or Redistribution? Changing perspectives on the 
 Moral Order of Society”, Theory, Culture & Society 18(2-3), 43-55. 
IslamToday (2011) “BC Supreme Court’s Polygamy Ruling Sets Limits 
 on Canada’s Religious Freedom” (4th Dec. 2011) 
 http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-230-4268.htm (seen 22.10.2012) 
Johnson, J. (2000) “Why Respect Culture?”, American Journal of Political 
 Science 44(3), 405-418. 
Johnston, D. (1989) “Native Rights as Collective Rights”, Canadian 
 Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2(1), 19-34. 
Jones, P. (1999) “Human Rights, Group Rights, and People’s Rights”, 
 Human Rights Quarterly 21(1), 80-107. 
Bibliography 
379 
 
— (2006) “Toleration, Recognition and Identity”, The Journal of Political 
 Philosophy 14(2), 123-143. 
Kelly, P. (2002) “Introduction: Between Culture and Equality”, in: Kelly, 
 P. (ed.) Multiculturalism Reconsidered.  Cambridge and Malden: 
 Polity Press. 
Kenny, M. (2004) The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and 
 the Dilemmas of Difference. Cambridge and Malden: Polity. 
Killmister, S. (2011) “Group-Differentiated Rights and the Problem of 
 Membership”, Social Theory and Practice 37(2), 227-255 
Kim, N.S. (2006) “Blameworthiness, intent, and Cultural Dissonance: The 
 Unequal Treatment of Cultural Defence Defendants”, University of 
 Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 17/2, 199-229. 
Kraybill, D. (ed.) (2003): The Amish and the State (2nd edition). Baltimore, 
 Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Kukathas, C. (1992a) “Are There Any Cultural Rights?”, Political Theory 
 20(1), 105-139. 
— (1992b) “Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka”, Political 
 Theory 20(4), 674-680. 
— (1997a) “Multiculturalism as Fairness: Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural 
 Citizenship”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 5(4), 406-427. 
— (1997b) “Cultural Toleration”, in: Shapiro and Kymlicka (eds.): 
 Ethnicity and Group Rights, NOMOS XXXIX. New York and 
 London: New York University Press. 
— (1998) “Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference”, 
 Political Theory 26(5), 686-699. 
— (2001) “Can a Liberal Society Tolerate Illiberal Elements”, Policy 
 17(2), 39-45. 
— (2003) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. 
 Oxford Political Theory. 
— (2004) “Contextualism Reconsidered: Some Skeptical Reflections”, 
 Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 7(2), 215-225. 
— (2012) “Exit, Freedom, and Gender”, in: Borchers, D. and Vitikainen, 
 A. (eds.) On Exit: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the right of exit in 
 liberal multicultural societies. Berlin and Boston: De  Gruyter. 
Kymlicka, W. (1989) Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: 
 Clarendon Press. 
— (1992) “The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to  Kukathas”, 
 Political Theory 20(1), 140-146. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
380 
 
— (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
 Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— (1997) “Do we need a liberal theory of minority rights?  Reply to 
 Carens, Young, Parekh and Forst”, Constellations 4(1), 72- 87. 
— (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and
 Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edition. Oxford 
 University Press. 
— (2007a) Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International 
 Politics of Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2007b) “The new debate on minority rights (and  postscript)”, in: 
 Laden, S. and Owen, D. (eds.): Multiculturalism and Political Theory. 
 Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University  Press. 
Kymlicka, W. and Banting, K. (eds.) (2006) Multiculturalism and the 
 Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary 
 Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kymlicka, W. and Opalski, M. (eds.) (2001) Can Liberal Pluralism Be 
 Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern 
 Europe. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Laborde, C. (2005) : “Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in 
 Schools”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 13(3), 305–329. 
— (2008) Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political 
 Philosophy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Levy, J.T. (1997) “Classifying Cultural Rights”, in: Shapiro, I. and 
 Kymlicka, W. (eds.) Ethnicity and Group Rights. New York: New 
 York University Press. 
— (2004) “Liberal Jacobinism”, Ethics 114, 318–336. 
— (2009) “Multicultural Manners”, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1403687 or  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1403687 
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2006) “The Badness of Discrimination”, Ethical 
 Theory and Moral Practice 9, 167-185. 
— (2007) “Nothing Personal: On Statistical Discrimination”, The Journal 
 of Political Philosophy 15(4), 385-403. 
Loobuyck, P. (2005) “Liberal multiculturalism: A Defence of liberal 
 multicultural measures without minority rights”, Ethnicities 5(1), 108-
 135. 
Lukes, S. (2003) Liberals & Cannibals. London and New York: Verso. 
Lyman, J.C. (1986) “Cultural Defence: Viable Doctrine or Wishful 
 Thinking”, Criminal Law Journal 9, 87-117. 
Bibliography 
381 
 
Lyon, D. & Spini, D. (2004) “Unveiling the Headscarf Debate”, Feminist 
 Legal Studies 12, 333-345. 
Ma, V. (1995) “Cultural Defence: Limited Admissibility for New 
 Immigrants”, San Diego Justice Journal 3, 461-484. 
MacIntyre, A. (1981) After Virtue. London: Duckworth. 
Mackenzie, C. & Stoljar, N. (eds.) (2000) Relational Autonomy: Feminist 
 Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self. Oxford 
 University Press. 
Magnarella, P.J. (1991) “Justice in a Culturally Pluralistic Society: The 
 Cultural Defence on Trial”, Journal of Ethnic Studies 19, 65-84. 
Margalit, A. and Halbertal, M. (1994) “Liberalism and the Right to 
 Culture”, Social Research 61(3), 491-510. 
Martin, R. and Reidy, D.A. (eds.) (2006) Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A 
 Realistic Utopia? Blackwell Publishing. 
Mason, A. (2000) Community, Solidarity and Belonging. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press. 
— (2006) Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equal Opportunity and 
 its Place in Egalitarian Though . Oxford: Oxford  University Press. 
— (2007) “Multiculturalism and the critique of essentialism”, in:  Laden, 
 S. and Owen, D. (eds.): Multiculturalism and Political Theory. 
 Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
May, L. Sistare, C. and Schonshecke, J. (eds.) (1997) Liberty, Equality 
 and Plurality. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
May, S., Modood, T. and Squires, J. (2004) “Ethnicity, nationalism, and 
 minority rights: charting the disciplinary debates”, in: May, S., 
 Modood, T. and Squires, J. (eds.): Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority 
 Rights. Cambridge University Press. 
McDonald, M. (1991) “Should Communities Have Rights?”, Canadian 
 Journal of Law and Jurispudence 4(2), 217-237. 
McGoldrick, D. (2006) Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Head 
 Scarf Debate in Europe. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
 Publishing. 
Mendus, S. (1989) Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism. Basingstoke: 
 Macmillan. 
— (2002) “Choice, Chance and Multiculturalism”, in: Kelly, P. (ed.) 
 Multiculturalism Reconsidered.  Cambridge and Malden: Polity 
 Press. 
Meyers, D.T. (1989) Self, Society, and Personal Choice. New York: 
 Columbia University Press. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
382 
 
Mill, J.S. (1986) [1859] On Liberty. New York: Prometheus Books.  
Miller, D. (1995) On Nationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— (2000) Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity  Press. 
— (2002a) “Group Rights, Human Rights and Citizenship”,  European 
 Journal of Philosophy 10(2), 178-195. 
— (2002b) “Liberalism, Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments” 
 in: Kelly, P. (ed.) Multiculturalism Reconsidered.   Cambridge and 
 Malden: Polity Press. 
— (2005) “Against Global Egalitarianism”, The Journal of Ethics 9, 55–
 79 
Moellendorf, D. (2002) Cosmopolitan Justice. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Moore, A. and Crisp, R. (1996) “Welfarism in Moral Theory”, 
 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4), 598-613. 
Moody-Adams, M. (2006) “Reflections on Appiah’s The Ethics of 
 Identity”, Journal of Social Philosophy 37(2), 292-300. 
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. (1992) Liberals & Communitarians, 2nd edition. 
 Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. 
Narveson, J. (1991) “Collective Rights?”, Canadian Journal of Law and 
 Jurisprudence 4(2), 329-245. 
Narveson, J. and Sterba, J.P. (2010) Are Liberty and Equality Compatible? 
 Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Note (1986) “The Cultural Defence in the Criminal Law”, Harward Law 
 Review 99, 1293-1311. 
Nussbaum, M. (1988) “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on 
 political distribution”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6, 
 Supplementary Volume, 145-84. 
O’Brien, R. (2005) The Stasi Report:The Report of the Committee of 
 Reflection on the Application of the Principle of Secularity in the 
 Republic. Buffalo, New York: William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 
Okin, S. M. (1999) “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women”, in: Cohen, J., 
 Nussbaum, M., Howard, M. (eds.) Is Multiculturalism Bad for 
 Women?, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
— (2002) “’Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender and 
 Realistic Rights of Exit”, Ethics 112, 205-30. 
— (2005) “Multiculturalism and feminism: no simple question,  no  
 simple answers”, in: Eisenberg, A. and Spinner-Halev, J. (eds.): 
 Minorities within Minorities. Equality, Rights and Diversity. 
 Cambridge University Press 
Bibliography 
383 
 
Parekh, B. (1997) “Equality in a Multiracial Society”, in: Franklin, J. (ed.) 
 Equality, London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
— (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and  Political 
 Theory. Basingstone, Hampshire: Palgrave. 
— (2008) A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an 
 Interdependent World. Basingstone, Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Parvez, Z. (2011): “Debating the Burqa in France: the Antipolitics of 
 Islamic Revival”, Qualitative Sociology 34(2), 287-312. 
Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2001) A Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Phillips, A. (1995) The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— (2003), “When Culture Means Gender: Issues of Cultural  Defence in 
 the English Courts”, The Modern Law Review 66(4), 510- 531. 
— (2006) “’Really’ Equal: Opportunities and Autonomy”, The  Journal of 
Political Philosophy 14(1), 18-32. 
— (2007) Multiculturalism without Culture. Princeton and Oxford: 
 Princeton University Press. 
— (2010) Gender & Culture. Cambridge and Malden: Polity.  
Pierik, R. (2004) “Conceptualizing Cultural Groups and Cultural 
 Difference: The social mechanism approach”, Ethnicities 4(4), 523-
 544. 
Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
— (1994) “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples”, Philosophy and Public 
 Affairs 23(3), 195-224. 
— (2002) World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
 Responsibilities and Reforms. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press. 
Quong, J. (2006) “Cultural Exemptions, Expensive Tastes, and Equal 
 Opportunities”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 23(1), 53-71.   
Radcliffe Richards, J. (1997) “Equality of Opportunity”, Ratio (new 
 series) X, 253-279. 
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard 
 University Press. 
— (1986) “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy 
 and Public Affairs 14 (3), 223-251. 
— (1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
— (1999) Law of the Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
 Press. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
384 
 
— (2001) Justice as Fairness. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
 Press. 
Raz, J. (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— (1994) “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective”, in Raz, J. Ethics in 
 the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics. 
 Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
— (1998) “Multiculturalism”, Ratio Juris 11, 193-205. 
— (2001) Value, Respect, and Attachment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press. 
Raz J. and Margalit, A. (1994) [1990] “National Self-Determination”, in 
 Raz, Joseph (1994) Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the 
 Morality of Law and Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Reaume, D. (2000) “Official Language Rights: Intrinsic Value and the 
 Protection of Difference”, in: Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (eds) 
 Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Reitman, O. (2005): “On Exit”, in: Eisenberg, A. and Spinner-Halev, J. 
 (eds.): Minorities within Minorities. Equality, Rights and Diversity. 
 Cambridge University Press. 
Renteln, A. D. (2004) The Cultural Defence, New York: Oxford 
 University Press. 
— (2010) “The Use and Abuse of the Cultural Defence”, in: Foblets, M. 
 and Renteln, A.D. (eds.) Multicultural Jurispudence: Comparative 
 Perspectives on the Cultural Defence. Oxford and Portland Oregon: 
 Hart Publishing. 
Resnik, J. (1989) “Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the 
 Federal Courts”, University of Chicago Law Review 56, 671-759. 
Robins, S. (2008) “Sexual Politics and the Zuma Rape Trial”, Journal of 
 Southern African Studies 34(2), 411-427. 
Roemer, J.E. (1998) Equality of Opportunity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
 University Press. 
Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press. 
Saunders, Ben (2010) “Fairness Between Competing Claims”, Res Publica 
 16, 41-55. 
Scott, D. (2003) “Culture in Political Theory”, Political Theory 31(1), 92-
 115. 
Scott, J.W. (2007) The Politics of the Veil. Princeton: Princeton University 
 Press. 
Bibliography 
385 
 
Scheffler , S. (2003) “What is Egalitarianism?”, Philosophy & Public 
 Affairs 31(1), 5-39. 
— (2007) “Immigration and the Significance of Culture”, Philosophy & 
 Public Affairs 35(2), 93-125. 
Sen, A. (1980) “Equality of What”, in: McMurrin, S.M. (ed.) The Tanner 
 Lectures on Human Values Vol I. Salt Lake City: University of Utah 
 Press. 
— (1997) On Economic Inequality (expanded edition with a substantial 
 annexe by James Foster and Amartya Sen).  Oxford and New York: 
 OxfordUniversity Press. 
Shachar, A. (1998) “Group Identity and Women’s Rights in Family Law: 
 The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation”, Journal of Political 
 Philosophy 6(3), 285-305. 
— (2000) “On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability”, Political 
 Theory 28(1), 64-89. 
— (2001) Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s 
 Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Siesling, M.and Ten Voorde, J. (2010) “The Paradox of Cultural 
 Differences in Dutch Criminal Law”, in: Foblets, M. & Renteln, A.D. 
 (eds.) Multicultural Jurispudence: Comparative Perspectives on the 
 Cultural Defence. Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing. 
Sistare, C., May, L. and Francis, L. (eds.) (2001) Groups and Group 
 Rights. University Press of Kansas. 
Skeen, E. (2007) The Rape of a Trial: Jacob Zuma, AIDS, Conspiracy, 
 and Tribalism in Neo-liberal Post-Apartheid South Africa. BA Thesis, 
 Department of Anthropology, Princeton University. 
Skinner, Q. (2002) “A Third Concept of Liberty”, Proceedings of the 
 British Academy 117, 237–68. 
Smith, N.H. (2002) Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity. 
 Malden: Polity. 
Sona, F. (2005) “Polygamy in Britain”, Osservatorio Delle Liberta Ed 
 Instituzioni Religiose, 
 http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/104/documents/Sona_Polygamy_in 
 _Britain.pdf  (seen 22.10.2012) 
Song, S. (2007) Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Spinner-Halev, J. (1994) The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity 
 and Nationality in the Liberal State. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
 University Press. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
386 
 
— (2000) Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
— (2005) “Autonomy, association and pluralism”, in: Eisenberg, A. and 
 Spinner-Halev, J. (eds.) Minorities within Minorities. Equality, Rights 
 and Diversity. Cambridge University  Press. 
Stone, P. (2007) “Why Lotteries Are Just”, The Journal of Political 
 Philosophy 15(3), 276-295. 
Sunder, M. (2001) “Cultural Dissent”, Stanford Law Review 54, 495-567. 
Tamir, Y. (1994) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University 
 Press. 
Tan, K. (2004) Justice without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism 
 and Patriotism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1985) Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
 Papers, vol. 2 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
— (1989) Sources of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
— (1994) “The Politics of Recognition”, in: Gutmann, A (ed.)
 Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press. 
— (1995) “Irreducibly Social Goods”, in: Taylor, C. Philosophical 
 Arguments. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Temkin, L. (1993) Inequality. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
 Press. 
Thunder, D. (2009) “Why Value Pluralism Does Not Support the State’s 
 Enforcement of Liberal Autonomy: A Response to Crowder”, Political 
 Theory 37(1), 154-160. 
Tomasi, J. (1995) “Kymlicka, Liberalism, and Respect for Cultural 
 Minorities”, Ethics 105, 580-603. 
Tully, J. (1995) Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of 
 diversity. Cambridge University Press. 
Tylor, Sir. E. B. (1973) [1871] Primitive Culture: Researches into the 
 Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and 
 Custom, New York: Gordon Press. 
Valadez, J.M. (2007) “The continuing significance of ethnocultural 
 diversity”, in: Benhabib, S., Shapiro, I., Petranovic, D. (eds.) Identities, 
 Affiliations and Allegiances. Cambridge University Press. 
Van Broeck, J. (2001) “Cultural Defence and Culturally motivated Crimes 
 (Cultural Offences)”, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
 Criminal Justice 9(1), 1-31. 
Bibliography 
387 
 
Van der Schyff, G. and Overbeeke, A. (2011): “Exercising Religious 
 Freedom in the Public Space: A Comparative and European 
 Convention Analysis of General Burqa Bans”, European 
 Constitutional Law Review 7(3), 424-452. 
Van Dyke, V. (1975) ”Justice as Fairness: For Groups?”, American 
 Political Science Review 69, 607-614. 
  (1977) ”The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political 
 Theory”, World Politics 29(3), 343-369. 
Vertovec, S. & Wessendorf, S. (eds.) (2010) The Multiculturalism 
 Backlash. London and new York: Routledge. 
Vitikainen, A. (2009) “Liberal Multiculturalism, Group Membership, and 
 Distribution of Cultural Policies”, Ethnicities 9(1), 53-74. 
— (2012) “Exit, Identity, and Membership”, in: Borchers, D. and 
 Vitikainen, A. (eds.) On Exit: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the 
 right of exit in liberal multicultural societies. Berlin and Boston: De 
 Gruyter. 
Volpp, L. (1994) “(Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the 
 “Cultural Defence””, Harvard Women’s Law Journal 17, 57-101. 
— (2000) “Blaming Culture For Bad Behavior”, Yale Journal of Law & 
 the Humanities 12, 89-116. 
Waetjen, T. and Maré, G. (2009) “Tradition’s Desire: The Politics of 
 Culture in the Rape Trial of Jacob Zuma”, Theoria, March 2009, 63-81 
Waldron, J. (1992) “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 
 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 25, 751-793. 
Wall, S. and Klosko, G. (eds.) (2003) Perfectionism and Neutrality: 
 Essays in Liberal Theory. New York and Oxford: Rowman and 
 Littlefield. 
Wallerstein, I. (1990) “Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the 
 Modern World-System”, Theory, Culture & Society 7, 31-55. 
Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books. 
Weinstock, D. (2005) “Beyond Exit Rights”, in: Eisenberg, A. and 
 Spinner-Halev, J.: Minorities within Minorities. Equality, Rights and 
 Diversity. Cambridge University Press. 
Williams, B. (1973) “The Idea of Equality”, in: Williams, B.: Problems of 
 the Self Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Williams, M.S. (1996) “Memory, History and Membership: The Moral 
 Claims of Marginalized Groups in Political Representation”, in: 
 Räikkä, J. (ed.) Do We Need Minority Rights? Kluwer Law 
 International. 
Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism 
388 
 
Williams, M.S. and Waldron, J. (eds.) (2008) Toleration and its limits, 
 NOMOS XLVIII, New York and London: New York University Press. 
Wolff, J. (1998)”Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos”, Philosophy 
 & Public Affairs 27, 97-122. 
Woodman, G.R. (2010) “The Culture Defence in English Common Law: 
 the Potential for Development”, in: Foblets, M. & Renteln, A.D. (eds.) 
 Multicultural Jurispudence: Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural 
 Defence. Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing. 
Young, I.M. (1990) Justice and the politics of Difference. Princeton 
 University Press. 
— (1997) ”A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka’s 
 Ethic-Nation Dichotomy”, Constellations 4(1), 48-53. 
— (2000) Inclusion and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
